Motivation and Agency

280 Pages·2003·1.54 MB·English

by  Alfred R. Mele

Motivation and Agency
Alfred R. Mele
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
MOTIVATION AND AGENCY
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MOTIVATION
and
AGENCY
Alfred R. Mele
1
2003
3
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Mele, Alfred R., 1951–
Motivation and agency / Alfred R. Mele.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references
ISBN 0-19-515617-X
1. Agent (Philosophy) 2. Motivation (Psychology) I. Title.
BD450 .M383 2002
128'.4—dc21 2002025751
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
For my children (in alphabetical order): Al, Angela, and Nick
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Preface
Although philosophers of mind and action share a serious interest with moral
philosophers in some deep and exciting philosophical topics, the level of cross fertil-
ization is not nearly as high as I think it should be. One such topic is motivation; an-
other is human agency. They are the topics of this book. What I seek are answers to a
web of questions about motivation and human agency that take into account impor-
tant work in the philosophy of mind and action and moral philosophy, as well as some
relevant empirical work in such fields as the psychology of motivation, social psy-
chology, physiological psychology, and neurobiology. The questions include the fol-
lowing: Will an acceptable moral theory make warranted conceptual or metaphysical
demands (of a kind to be identified) on a theory of human motivation? Where does
the motivational power of practical reasoning lie? How are reasons for action related
to motivation? What do motivational explanations of different kinds have in com-
mon? What is it to decide to do something? What is it for an attitude essentially to
encompass motivation to act? What is it for one such attitude to have more motiva-
tional force or strength than another? What room will an acceptable view of the
connection between motivational strength and intentional action leave for self-
controlled agency? Is it likely that a proper account of motivated, goal-directed ac-
tion will be a causal account? Can a causal perspective on the nature and explanation
of action accommodate human agency par excellence? What emerges from my an-
swers is a view of human agency.
Work on this book was supported by a 1999–2000 NEH Fellowship for College
Teachers while I was still a member of the faculty of Davidson College, a place whose
charms are unforgettable. Some of the work was done while I was a visiting fellow in
the Philosophy Program (June through August 1999) in the Research School of Social
viii Preface
Sciences at the Australian National University (ANU). I am grateful to the NEH, the
ANU, and Davidson College for their past support and to Florida State University for
the support it provides now.
Portions of this book derive from some of my published articles. Parts of the intro-
duction and chapters 1 and 6 first appeared in “Motivation: Essentially Motivation-
Constituting Attitudes,” Philosophical Review104 (©1995 Cornell University; mate-
rial reprinted by permission of the publisher), and part of section 4 of chapter 1
borrows from “Noninstrumental Rationalizing,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly79
(©1998 University of Southern California and Blackwell Publishers). Chapter 2 is an
augmented, refined, and empirically updated version of “Goal-Directed Action: Tele-
ological Explanations, Causal Theories, and Deviance,” Philosophical Perspectives
14 (2000). Much of section 2 of chapter 3 derives from “Acting for Reasons and Act-
ing Intentionally,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly73 (©1992 University of South-
ern California and Blackwell Publishers). Chapter 4 is a distant descendent of “Moti-
vational Internalism: The Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning,” Philosophia19
(1989; material reprinted by permission of Asa Kasher, ed.); some elements of the
original article survive in it. Chapter 5 is a beefed-up, refined version of “Internalist
Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness,” Ethics106 (©1996 by the University of Chi-
cago Press; all rights reserved). Chapter 7, a thorough revision of “Motivational
Strength,” Noûs 32 (1998), develops important extensions and refinements of the
view advanced in the original article. Chapters 8 and 9 are revisions, respectively, of
“Strength of Motivation and Being in Control: Learning from Libet,” American
Philosophical Quarterly34 (1997), and “Deciding to Act,” Philosophical Studies100
(©2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers).
Despite my having borrowed from my published work, my views on certain ques-
tions about motivation and agency have evolved much more than I expected. The
main cause was my grappling with how to work scattered parts of the picture into a
unified whole.
I am indebted to a great many people for comments on parts of this book. Undoubt-
edly, this list is incomplete: George Ainslie, Jay Atlas, Robert Audi, Bruce Aune, Kurt
Baier, Joe Beatty, Helen Beebee, John Bishop, Karin Boxer, David Braddon-Mitchell,
Myles Brand, Michael Bratman, Randy Clarke, Jonathan Dancy, Steve Darwall,
Doug Ehring, Jim Friedrich, Andre Gallois, Steve Gardiner, Eve Garrard, Josh Gert,
Grant Gillett, Irwin Goldstein, Dorothy Grover, John Heil, Mark Heller, Richard
Holton, Brad Hooker, Jen Hornsby, Frank Jackson, Karen Jones, Corey Juhl, Jeanette
Kennett, Vera Koffman, Rae Langton, Michael Levine, Kirk Ludwig, Jack Lyons,
Cindy Macdonald, Graham Macdonald, Mike Martin, Hugh McCann, Matt McGrath,
Michael McKenna, David McNaughton, Maria Morales, Paul Moser, Dana Nelkin,
Natika Newton, David Owens, Charles Pigden, Piers Rawling, Rainer Reisenzein,
Mike Ridge, Dave Robb, Abe Roth, Scott Sehon, Mike Smith, Michael Smith, Peter
Smith, Lance Stell, Bob Stern, Rowland Stout, Steve Sverdlik, Bill Talbott, Raimo
Tuomela, Art Walker, Bob Ware, George Wilson, Nicole Wyatt, Gideon Yaffe, and
Nick Zangwill. Peter Hanowell provided efficient, cheerful assistance with numerous
tasks, and Diana Palmieri helped with some research on neurobiology.
Drafts of sections or chapters were presented at the Australian National University,
Bielefeld University, Birkbeck College, Ghent University, Monash University, South-