Morality Matters PDF
Preview Morality Matters
morality matters morality matters roger trigg #2005byRogerTrigg BLACKWELLPUBLISHING 350MainStreet,Malden,MA02148-5020,USA 108CowleyRoad,OxfordOX41JF,UK 550SwanstonStreet,Carlton,Victoria3053,Australia TherightofRogerTriggtobeidentifiedastheAuthorofthisWorkhas beenassertedinaccordancewiththeUKCopyright,Designs,andPatentsAct1988. Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedina retrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,electronic,mechanical, photocopying,recordingorotherwise,exceptaspermittedbytheUKCopyright, Designs,andPatentsAct1988,withouttheprior permissionofthepublisher. Firstpublished2005byBlackwellPublishingLtd LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationData Trigg,Roger. Moralitymatters/RogerTrigg. p.cm. Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex. ISBN0-631-23594-9(hardcover:alk.paper)–ISBN0-631-23595-7(pbk.:alk.paper) 1. Ethics.2. Politicalethics.I.Title. BJ1012.T742004 170–dc22 2003028153 AcataloguerecordforthistitleisavailablefromtheBritishLibrary. 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Forfurtherinformationon BlackwellPublishing,visitourwebsite: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com Contents Preface viii Introduction 1 ‘That’s Your Opinion’ 1 A Just Society? 4 Should Law Enforce Morality? 7 1 What Is Natural? 11 Is Morality Natural? 11 What Does ‘Being Natural’ Mean? 12 How Free Are We? 16 The Roots of Morality 18 Moralityand Natural Law 21 2 Human Nature and Natural Law 26 What Is Natural Law? 26 Reason and Natural Law 29 Going against the ‘Grain of Nature’ 32 What Is Morality About? 34 vi 3 Human Rights 38 s The Political Context 38 t n The Status of Rights 41 e What Counts as a Right? 43 t n Who Gives Us Our Rights? 45 o c Are ‘Rights’ Merelya Western Idea? 48 4 Natural Rights and Law 53 Can Laws Be Unjust? 53 The Moral Background 55 The Lawas Teacher 58 Liberalism and the Law 61 Should the Law Allow Torture? 63 5 The Rule of Law 68 What Is the Difference between Moral Rules and Laws? 68 Judicial Activism 71 The Role of Judges 73 Dissent and Democracy 76 Conscientious Objectors 78 6 The Public and the Private 82 Is a Political Pluralism Ethically Neutral? 82 The ‘Veil of Ignorance’ 85 The Moral Basis of Agreement 88 Trust 90 ‘Fair Play’ 92 7 Groups and Individuals 96 Which Differences Matter Morally? 96 Discrimination and Multiculturalism 99 Politics and Race 102 ACase History: American Law 104 Sexual Orientation and Discrimination 108 8 Patriotism and Nationalism 111 vii The Dangers of Patriotism 111 c o The Limits of Moral Concern 113 n Particular and Universal Loyalties 116 t e Liberalism and Country 120 n t The Patriot and the Cosmopolitan 122 s 9 One World: a Global Ethic? 125 ACosmopolitan Law? 125 Global Responsibilities 129 Global Politics 132 Morality in International Relations 135 10 Character and Principle 140 The Importance of Character 140 ‘Good Character’ 142 Liberalism and Character 145 ‘Dirty Hands’ 148 Moral Conflict 150 11 Morality and Human Nature 154 Human Dignity 154 ‘Playing God’ 157 Value Pluralism and Objectivity 159 Rationalityand Freedom 162 Conclusion 165 Glossary 168 Bibliography 173 Index 175 Preface This volume continues a long series of books I have written, taking a stand against various forms of relativism. My last book (Philosophy Matters, Blackwell 2002) argued that relativism ultimately undermines philosophy itself as an academic discipline. I now wish to look at alternatives to relativism in the controversial field of morality. I am also continuing my previous stress on the philosophical importance of the idea of a common humannature,formingthebasisofsocietieswhichmayatfirstsightappear verydifferent. The book took shape while I was visiting the Center of Theological Inquiry, a research institute in Princeton, New Jersey, for the latter part of 2002.TheCenter providedanidealbaseforhardworkandnewinspiration. Iammost grateful for thekindlyhospitalityI received there.Ilearnt much from colleagues visiting the Center from various parts of the world. I also received much stimulus from discussions in Princeton University, particu- larlyatitsCenterforHumanValues,andattheJamesMadisonProgramin American Ideals and Institutions. I was very grateful for a research grant covering the same period, from theJohnTempletonFoundation.TheFoundationfurtherswork inthearea of science and religion, and, although the grant helped me primarily with other projects, it also indirectlyaided this one. As always I have enormously benefited from the help, support and encouragement of my family. My wife Julia, my daughter Dr Alison Teplyand my son-in-law Robert Teply have all given invaluable advice and criticism. Roger Trigg, Universityof Warwick Introduction ‘That’s Your Opinion’ A moral argument is often stopped in its tracks when someone refuses to consider a position by saying that ‘that is just your opinion’. The implication is that anybody’s judgement is as good as anyone else’s, and thatnoone has aright to tell otherswhat to do. The factthat Ido not like bananas may be a fact about me, but it has no bearing on what you may enjoy.Similarly,itisimplied,ifIdisapproveofsomething,thatmaytellyou aboutme,but ithasnorelevancetowhatyou shoulddo. Theconfusionin allthisisdisplayedbytheideathatwehaveno‘right’totellotherswhatto do. We seem at the same moment to be denying that moral claims can tie everyone down, and asserting that there is at least one moral claim that we should all respect, namely that we ought not to impose our views on others. How have we come to this point? We respect individual freedom, and consider that we are right to do so. Then, in the name of that freedom, manydenythatmoralitycaneverbeother thanapersonal,evensubjective, affair.Whatseemsrighttomeisrightforme,butnotnecessarilyforothers. This seems very tolerant, and we all value toleration. Yet the ideas of freedom and toleration are not morally neutral, but are only possible given a certain kind of society, which inculcates a definite moral position. Asocietyinwhichtoleration,andindividualfreedom,areonlyupheldinso farastheyseemrighttoindividualsishardlyonemostof uswouldfeelsafe living in. Too much would depend on the passing whims, and tastes, of particular people. Wewould allwant the reassurance of a more substantial moral framework, perhaps underpinned by the lawof the land. 2 The confusionendemic inall thisiswell illustratedbythosewhowant a rightof individual‘privacy’tobepubliclyrecognized.Theythenextendthe n idea of such privacy to cover wide-ranging personal judgements about our o i own preferred lifestyle. Privacy becomes ‘autonomy’, and ‘autonomy’ be- t c comestherighttomakemyownchoiceswithoutinterferencefromothers. u d Yet a right to such autonomy, whether claimed morallyor enforced legally, o involves a demand that others respect my own choices. Since very few r t choices fail to have public effects, this becomes a demand that I do what I n i like, regardless of its effect on others,and on the public good. In anysocial setting,suchapositioncannotbesustained.Byclaimingrightstoprivacy,we makeother people’sclaimstosimilarrightsunobtainable.Wecannotallget what wewant without colliding with others. Morality cannot just be a matter of individual taste. Yet it is not just constituted by the customs and traditions of a particular society. We may wanttocriticizewholesocieties,includingourown.Infactthesamepeople whowantedtodecrytheideaofanyuniversalmorality,onthegroundthat it was merely an imposition of Western values, were the first to condemn apartheidinSouthAfrica.Ifwhatisrightisreducedtowhatisjudgedright in a particular society, white South Africa could claim to be a society. A commoncomplaintwasthat‘youdonotunderstandourcircumstances,and would think differently if you lived here’. Yet if anything was objectively wrong,theapartheidregime,withitssystematicracialdiscrimination,surely was. Otherwise, no one could properlycondemn it. Yet condemnation had to appeal to basic moral principles that go deeper than the particular judgements of a particular society. We have to be pulled back from a position that tolerates any and every view, including those that preach intolerance and hatred. No one can consistently use moral language, except in the most cynical way, without recognizingthatitintrinsicallymakesjudgements,callsonreasonswhichare applicabletoeveryone,andrulesoutsomepossibilities.Somephilosophers, even so, have maintained that this truth-expressing function of moral lan- guage is wholly illusory. Saying that something is good, they would hold, only says something about ourselves, such as that we commend it. It is not making anyclaim about theworld. We see in these claims the long shadow cast by science. Its success in moderntimeshasbeensuchthatitappearsthattruthhastoberestrictedto what can be decided according to its meticulous experimental method. It seemsthattruthcannotbeatstake,ifwehavenoagreedmeansofsettlinga dispute.Thiswasthepositionofthe‘logicalpositivists’,whodefinedclaims to truth in terms of our ability toverifyor falsify them by scientific means. 3 Thus claims, which cannot be checked, have no meaning. This view was i propagated between the two world wars by the ‘Vienna Circle’, and it n t echoed through universities long after the Second World War. One of its r o main exponents in the English-speaking world was A. J. Ayer, whose book d Language, Truth and Logic tried to show that moral statements were merely u c expressing emotion, evincing one’s own feelings and perhaps calculated to t i stir those of others. Moral statements were ‘emotive’, not saying anything. o n Ayer claimed that ‘it is impossible to find a criterion for determining the validityofethicaljudgements, becausetheyhavenone’.1Sentencesexpress- ingmoraljudgementsarenotabletoexpresstruthsorfalsehoods.Theydo not sayanything at all. This view resonated through society long after logical positivism was discreditedasaphilosophicaltheory.Theidearemainsstrongthat‘facts’are the province of science, while moral judgements are to be contrasted as ‘values’.Factsareobjective,and‘values’personal.Tosaythatsomethingisa ‘valuejudgement’thenbecomesaneffectivedeviceforstoppingaconversa- tion. The idea is that no reason can be given for what appears an arbitrary subjective choice. This is reinforced by the dominant idea that, as it is fallacious to deduce a value judgement from any particular set of facts, there is no rational way of passing from a particular circumstance to a judgement of what ought to be done. It seems that our personal choices must not be constrained by whatever happens in theworld. The issue is whether moral judgements can be made rationally, and should be influenced by anything outside our own arbitrary will. Can they beopentodiscussionandargument?Otherwisemoralbeliefsbecomemere facts about individuals or groups. Some have some preferences, or desires, while others have different ones. The temptation in a democratic society will be to count heads, or to conduct sociological surveys, to gauge what people think. Morality becomes a matter of opinion polls. What becomes importantissimplymeetingasmanypeople’swishes,orfailingtooffendas many, as possible. The opinions are basic data, so that the question is no longer who is right, but how many believe something. It is irrelevant why they believe it. Morality then becomes politics. Moral issues become the stuff of political negotiation. We are onlyconcerned with what can obtain maximumagreement.Moralargumentissqueezedoutofthepublicsphere, tobereplacedbypoliticalcompromises.Anyideaofprincipledreasoning is abandonedinfavourof negotiations and accommodationsbetween interest groups.
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