Morality and self-interest

334 Pages·2008·1.809 MB·English

by  Bloomfield, Paul

Morality and Self-Interest
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Morality and Self-Interest
Edited by
Paul Bloomfi eld
1
2008
3
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Copyright © 2008 by Paul Bloomfi eld
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Morality and self-interest / edited by Paul Bloomfi eld.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN978-0-19-530584-5;978-0-19-530585-2 (pbk.)
1. Ethics. 2. Self-interest. I. Bloomfi eld, Paul, 1962–
BJ1581.2.M652007
170'.42—dc22 2007016218
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America
on acid-free paper
Acknowledgments
My professional interest in the relationship between morality and self-interest is due to an
ongoing exchange I’m having with Richard Joyce, from which I have greatly profi ted and for
which I am much obliged. The reader will soon see that Joyce has commented rather exten-
sively on my own contribution to this volume. He read and commented on an early draft of
“Why It’s Bad to Be Bad,” which I emended in light thereof. After, seeing his contributuion,
I did not use my position as editor to reply. I begin to address his point of view in my review,
inMind (Bloomfi eld, 2007), of his latest book The Evolution of Morality (2006).
I thank Stephen Finlay and Michael P. Lynch for their early and continuous encour-
agement of my editing what has eventually become this book. Especial thanks go to
Sonia Michel for fi nding the cover art, on top of all her help and support. I also had help-
ful early conversations on the topic in a graduate seminar with Erin Andrews, Robert
Crum, Bo Ram Lee, and Daniel Massey. Christopher Morris has given excellent advice
all along the way, all greatly appreciated.
Approaching the question of how to comprehend the issues involved in thinking
about morality and self-interest was diffi cult. Insofar as the issues concern the meaning or
semantics of “morality”, or a conceptual analysis of morality, it is metaethics par excel-
lence; insofar as it concerns the question “how should I live?”, it is squarely an issue in
normative ethics. Bringing together the justifi cation and/or rationality of morality, with
the sort of motivational or psychological issues involved in the question “Why be moral?”
means the situation can become conceptually daunting. The distinction between self and
other was a natural place for someone with my interests to begin, since it bears on both
metaphysical and moral discourse. A bit of research showed that W. D. Falk had already
invented the wheel on which I had begun working. His paper “Morality, Self, and Others”
vi Acknowledgments
is a masterpiece, and is included here in full. I’d like to thank George Nakhnikian for his
permission to reprint it.
There is one other contribution within not expressly written for this volume. Thomas
Nagel’s paper, “The Value of Inviolability” appeared fi rst in French and appears here in
English for the fi rst time. I am grateful to the editors of Revue de Métaphysique et de
Morale for their permission to publish a translation of “La valeur de l’inviolabilité”.
The prospect of editing a volume is made most unattractive by the grim stories one
hears about the process. Frequently, editing is said to be “a labor of love” and being an
editor “a thankless position”. In retrospect, I am very lucky to have had an experience that
is an exception to the rule. I am most thankful and grateful to my contributors, each and
every one, as well as to my editor, Peter Ohlin, and the production editor, Gwen Colvin.
Contents
Contributors ix
Introduction 3
PART I: MORALITY WITHOUT SELF-INTEREST
A. Morality on the Defensive
1 The Trouble with Justice 15
Christopher W. Morris
2 Nietzsche on Selfi shness, Justice, and the Duties of the Higher Men 31
Mathias Risse
3 Morality, Schmorality 51
Richard Joyce
B. Morality on the Offensive
4 Because It’s Right 79
David Schmidtz
5 The Value of Inviolability 102
Thomas Nagel
viii Contents
C. Potential Congruence and Irreconcilability
6 Potential Congruence 117
Samuel Scheffl er
7 Too Much Morality 136
Stephen Finlay
PART II: MORALITY WITHIN SELF-INTEREST
A. Morality as Necessary to Self-Interest
8 Scotus and the Possibility of Moral Motivation 159
T. H. Irwin
9 Butler on Virtue, Self-Interest, and Human Nature 177
Ralph Wedgwood
10 Virtue Ethics and the Charge of Egoism 205
Julia Annas
B. Morality as Indistinguishable from Self-Interest
11 Morality, Self, and Others 225
W. D. Falk
12 Why It’s Bad to Be Bad 251
Paul Bloomfi eld
13 Classical and Sour Forms of Virtue 272
Joel J. Kupperman
14 Shame and Guilt 287
Michael Stocker
Bibliography 305
Index 317
Contributors
Julia Annas is Regents Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. She has
published several books and articles across a wide range of topics in ancient philosophy,
and in recent years has concentrated on ancient ethical theories and also contemporary
virtue ethics.
Paul Bloomfield is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Connecticut. He has published on topics in metaphysics and moral philosophy, and he
is the author of Moral Reality (2001).
W. D. Falk taught philosophy for more than forty years in Europe, Australia, and
the United States, fi nishing his career at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill,
in1975. His collected papers are entitled Ought, Reasons, and Morality (1986).
Stephen Finlay is an Assistant Professor in the School of Philosophy at the
University of Southern California. His research focuses on the explanation of normativ-
ity and the metaphysical and semantic foundations of ethics.
T. H. Irwin is Professor of Ancient Philosophy in the University of Oxford and a
Fellow of Keble College. From 1975 to 2006, he taught at Cornell University. He has
written on ancient philosophy and the history of ethics.
Richard Joyce is a Research Fellow at the University of Sydney. His primary
research areas are metaethics and moral psychology, and he is the author of The Myth of
Morality (2001) and The Evolution of Morality (2006).
Joel J. Kupperman is Board of Trustees Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Connecticut. His most recent books are Ethics and Qualities of Life (2007) and Classic
Asian Philosophy: A Guide to the Essential Texts,2nd ed. (2007).
ix