Moral sentiments and material interests: the foundations of cooperation in economic life

417 Pages·2006·2.612 MB·English

by  Gintis, Herbert

Moral Sentiments and
Material Interests
EconomicLearningandSocialEvolution
GeneralEditor
KenBinmore,DirectoroftheEconomicLearningandSocial
EvolutionCentre,UniversityCollegeLondon
1. EvolutionaryGamesandEquilibriumSelection,LarrySamuelson,1997
2. The Theory of Learning in Games, Drew Fudenberg and David K.
Levine,1998
3. Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 2: Just Playing, Ken
Binmore,1998
4. Social Dynamics, Steven N. Durlauf and H. Peyton Young, editors,
2001
5. Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games, Ross Cressman,
2003
6. MoralSentimentsandMaterialInterests:TheFoundationsofCooperation
in Economic Life, Herbert Gintis, Samuel Bowles, Robert Boyd, and
ErnstFehr,editors,2005
Moral Sentiments and
Material Interests
The Foundations of
Cooperation in Economic
Life
editedby
HerbertGintis,Samuel
Bowles,RobertBoyd,and
ErnstFehr
TheMITPress
Cambridge,Massachusetts
London,England
(2005MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology
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Moralsentimentsandmaterialinterests:thefoundationsofcooperationineconomiclife
/editedbyHerbertGintis...[etal.].
p. cm.—(Economiclearningandsocialevolution;6)
Includesbibliographicalreferencesandindex.
ISBN0-262-07252-1(alk.paper)
1.Cooperation. 2.Gametheory. 3.Economics—Sociologicalaspects. I.Gintis,Herbert.
II.MITPressseriesoneconomiclearningandsocialevolution;v.6.
HD2961.M657 2004
3300.0105193—dc22 2004055175
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
ToAdeleSimmonswho,asPresidentoftheJohnD.andCatherine
T.MacArthurFoundation,hadthevisionandcouragetosupport
unconventionaltransdisciplinaryresearchinthebehavioralsciences.

Contents
SeriesForeword ix
Preface xi
I Introduction 1
1 MoralSentimentsandMaterialInterests:Origins,Evidence,and
Consequences 3
HerbertGintis,SamuelBowles,RobertBoyd,andErnstFehr
II TheBehavioralEcologyofCooperation 41
2 TheEvolutionofCooperationinPrimateGroups 43
JoanB.Silk
3 TheNaturalHistoryofHumanFoodSharingandCooperation:
AReviewandaNewMulti-IndividualApproachtothe
NegotiationofNorms 75
HillardKaplanandMichaelGurven
4 CostlySignalingandCooperativeBehavior 115
EricA.SmithandRebeccaBliegeBird
III ModelingandTestingStrongReciprocity 149
5 TheEconomicsofStrongReciprocity 151
ErnstFehrandUrsFischbacher
viii Contents
6 ModelingStrongReciprocity 193
ArminFalkandUrsFischbacher
7 TheEvolutionofAltruisticPunishment 215
RobertBoyd,HerbertGintis,SamuelBowles,andPeterJ.Richerson
8 NormComplianceandStrongReciprocity 229
RajivSethiandE.Somanathan
IV ReciprocityandSocialPolicy 251
9 PoliciesThatCrowdoutReciprocityandCollectiveAction 253
ElinorOstrom
10 ReciprocityandtheWelfareState 277
ChristinaM.Fong,SamuelBowles,andHerbertGintis
11 Fairness,Reciprocity,andWageRigidity 303
TrumanBewley
12 TheLogicofReciprocity:Trust,CollectiveAction,andLaw 339
DanM.Kahan
13 SocialCapital,MoralSentiments,andCommunityGovernance
379
SamuelBowlesandHerbertGintis
Contributors 399
Index 401
Series Foreword
The MIT Press series on Economic Learning and Social Evolution
reflects the continuing interest in the dynamics of human interaction.
This issue has provided a broad community of economists, psycholo-
gists, biologists, anthropologists, mathematicians, philosophers, and
otherswithsuchastrongsenseofcommonpurposethattraditionalin-
terdisciplinary boundaries have melted away. We reject the outmoded
notion that what happens away from equilibrium can safely be
ignored, but think it no longer adequate to speak in vague terms of
bounded rationality and spontaneous order. We believe the time has
cometoputsomebeefonthetable.
Thebooksintheseriessofarare:
0 Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, by Larry Samuelson
(1997). Traditional economic models have only one equilibrium and
therefore fail to come to grips with social norms whose function is to
select an equilibrium when there are multiple alternatives. This book
studieshowsuchnormsmayevolve.
0 The Theory of Learning in Games, by Drew Fudenberg and David
Levine (1998). John Von Neumann introduced ‘‘fictitious play’’ as a
way of finding equilibria in zero-sum games. In this book, the idea is
reinterpretedasalearningprocedureanddevelopedforuseingeneral
games.
0 Just Playing, by Ken Binmore (1998). This book applies evolutionary
gametheorytomoralphilosophy.Howandwhy dowemakefairness
judgments?
0 Social Dynamics, edited by Steve Durlauf and Peyton Young (2001).
The essays in this collection provide an overview of the field of social
dynamics, in which some of the creators of the field discuss a variety