Moral Responsibility Reconsidered

86 Pages·2022·2.044 MB·English

by  Gregg D. Caruso, Derk Pereboom

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This Element examines the concept of moral responsibility as it r
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and the kinds of responsibility associated with attributability,
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answerability, and accountability – it distinguishes between
basic and non-basic desert conceptions of moral responsibility
and considers a number of skeptical arguments against each. It
then outlines an alternative forward-looking account of moral
responsibility grounded in non-desert-invoking desiderata such m moral responsibility
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as protection, reconciliation, and moral formation. It concludes by ra
addressing concerns about the practical implications of skepticism l r
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This Elements series provides an extensive Ben Eggleston d
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concepts in the field of ethics. Each entry Kansas Gregg D. Caruso and
in the series acquaints students with the
main aspects of its topic while articulating Dale E. Miller
the author’s distinctive viewpoint in a Old Dominion sserP Derk Pereboom
manner that will interest researchers. University, Virginia ytisre
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ElementsinEthics
editedby
BenEggleston
UniversityofKansas
DaleE.Miller
OldDominionUniversity,Virginia
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
RECONSIDERED
Gregg D. Caruso
SUNY Corning
Derk Pereboom
sse Cornell University
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DOI:10.1017/9781009219730
©GreggD.CarusoandDerkPereboom2022
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Moral Responsibility Reconsidered
ElementsinEthics
DOI:10.1017/9781009219730
Firstpublishedonline:November2022
GreggD.Caruso
SUNYCorning
DerkPereboom
CornellUniversity
Authorforcorrespondence:GreggD.Caruso,[email protected]
Abstract:ThisElementexaminestheconceptofmoralresponsibilityas
itisusedincontemporaryphilosophicaldebatesandexploresthe
justifiabilityofthemoralpracticesassociatedwithit,includingmoral
praise/blame,retributivepunishment,andthereactiveattitudesof
resentmentandindignation.Afteridentifyinganddiscussingseveral
differentvarietiesofresponsibility–includingcausalresponsibility,
take-chargeresponsibility,roleresponsibility,liabilityresponsibility,and
thekindsofresponsibilityassociatedwithattributability,answerability,
andaccountability–itdistinguishesbetweenbasicandnon-basic
desertconceptionsofmoralresponsibilityandconsidersanumberof
skepticalargumentsagainsteach.Itthenoutlinesanalternative
forward-lookingaccountofmoralresponsibilitygroundedin
non-desert-invokingdesideratasuchasprotection,reconciliation,and
moralformation.Itconcludesbyaddressingconcernsaboutthe
practicalimplicationsofskepticismaboutdesert-basedmoral
responsibilityandexplainshowoptimisticskepticscanpreservemostof
sserP whatwecareaboutwhenitcomestoourinterpersonalrelationships,
ytisre morality,andmeaninginlife.
v
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U e Keywords:moralresponsibility,freewill,freewillskepticism,basicdesert,
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d forward-lookingmoralresponsibility
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C y ©GreggD.CarusoandDerkPereboom2022
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niln ISBNs:9781009219754(PB),9781009219730(OC)
o d ISSNs:2516-4031(online),2516-4023(print)
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Contents
1 MoralResponsibility 1
2 SkepticismaboutBasicDesert 20
3 Forward-LookingMoralResponsibility 36
4 ImplicationsofSkepticismaboutBasicDesert 43
5 FinalWords 60
References 62
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MoralResponsibilityReconsidered 1
1MoralResponsibility
Afundamentalandfamiliarpartofourpersonalrelationshipsandoureveryday
moralpracticesismakingjudgmentsaboutwhetherapersonismorallyrespon-
sible for their behavior, and, when we judge that they are, holding them
responsible for their actions and omissions. We typically think, for instance,
thatnon-humananimals,veryyoungchildren,andthosesufferingfromsevere
developmentaldisabilitiesordementiadonotsatisfytheconditionsformoral
responsibility.Ontheotherhand,whenanormaladulthumanbeingknowingly
doeswrong,itisnaturaltothinkthattheyare(absentanyexcusingconditions)
morallyresponsibleforwhattheydidandthereforedeservingofcertainnega-
tiveattitudes,judgments,andtreatment.Similarly,whensomeonedoessome-
thingmorallyrightorexemplary,andwejudgetheyarecompetent,uncoerced,
andawareofwhattheyaredoing,wefeelthattheyaredeservingofpraiseand
reward.Philosophers,however,havelongdebatedwhetherindividualsareever
morallyresponsibleinthissenseandwhetherourcommonpracticeofholding
individualsresponsibleandlegitimatetargetsofvariousdesert-basedattitudes,
judgments,andtreatmentiseverjustified.
ThisElementintroducesandexaminestheconceptofmoralresponsibilityasit
isusedincontemporaryphilosophicaldebates,andexploresthejustifiabilityof
themoralpracticesassociatedwithit,includingmoralpraiseandblame,retribu-
tivepunishment,andthereactiveattitudesofresentment,indignation,and,more
broadly, moral anger. It begins by identifying and discussing several different
varietiesofresponsibility,includingcausalresponsibility,take-chargeresponsi-
bility, role responsibility, liability responsibility, and the kinds of responsibility
sserP associated with attributability, answerability, and accountability. It then argues
y
tisre thatthekindofmoralresponsibilitythatisofcentralphilosophicalandpractical
vin importanceinthefreewillandmoralresponsibilitydebatesisbestunderstoodin
U
eg terms ofbasic desert, the idea thatthe harm of blame and punishment and the
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irbm benefit of praise and reward are deserved and fundamentally so, and that such
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C y backward-lookingdesertisthusabasicelementofmorality.We(yourauthors)
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en denythathumanbeingsareevermorallyresponsibleinthisbasicdesertsense,
iln
o d and we accordingly advocate skepticism about basic desert. However, we also
e
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silb contendthatforward-lookingaspectsofourpracticeofholdingmorallyrespon-
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P 0 sible, those that feature aims such as reconciliation in relationships and moral
3
79 formationofwrongdoers,arejustified.Thus,uponreconsideringmoralresponsi-
1
2
9
0 bility, we argue that certain backward-looking aspects should be rejected, and
0
1
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7 certainforward-lookingaspectsretained.
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10 InthisElementwewillexaminetheargumentsforbasicdesertskepticism.
1
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1 Someskepticsdenythatwehavebasicdesertmoralresponsibilitybecausethey
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2 Ethics
believe it can be shown to be incoherent or impossible. Others maintain that
although this sort of responsibility is coherent and possible, nevertheless, our
bestphilosophicalandscientifictheoriesprovidecompellingreasonsfordeny-
ingthatwehaveit.Oftenbasicdesertskepticscontendthatwelackthecontrol
in action, that is, the free will, basic desert moral responsibility requires.
Accordingly,theyarealsotypicallyskepticsaboutanimportantandcontrover-
sialsortoffreewill.1Whatallbasicdesertskepticsagreeon,however,isthat
adequate justification for grounding basic desert moral responsibility and the
practices associated with it – basic desert-invoking praise and blame, punish-
mentandreward–hasnotbeenproduced(Pereboom2001,2014a,2021b;Levy
2011;Waller2011,2014;Caruso2012,2018b,2021b).
Criticstendtofocusbothontheargumentsforskepticismaboutbasicdesert
and on its practical implications. Some reject the claim that basic desert moral
responsibility is incompatible with determinism, and are also concerned that
accepting the skeptical position would mistakenly result in people not getting
what they deserve. Some argue that rejecting basic desert moral responsibility
would have damaging consequences for morality, the law, society, personal
relationships,andoursenseofmeaninginlife.Theycontend,forinstance,that
it would undermine morality, leave us unable to adequately deal with criminal
behavior,increaseanti-socialconduct,andjeopardizeoursenseofachievement
and purpose. Optimistic skeptics respond by arguing that rejecting basic desert
moral responsibility would not be destructive in these ways. They argue that
threatstomoralitycanbeaverted,andthatprospectsforsustaininggoodpersonal
relationships and our sense of meaning in life can be vindicated. Although
sse retributivism as a justification for criminal punishment would be ruled out,
rP y adequateresourcesfordealingwithcriminalbehaviorremaininplace.
tisre
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inU 1.1VarietiesofResponsibility
e
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irb When philosophers discuss moral responsibility, what they generally have in
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aC mindisthekindofresponsibilitythatmakesagentsjustifiedtargetsofcertain
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b e approvingordisapprovingattitudes,judgment,andtreatment.Aswe’venoted,
n
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deh 1 Historical advocates of skepticism about this sort of free will include Śāntideva (700/1995),
silb Spinoza (1677/1985), Paul d’Holbach (1770), Joseph Priestley (1778/1965), Arthur
u
P Schopenhauer(1818/1961),FriedrichNietzsche(1888/1954).Morerecentproponentsinclude
0
37 GalenStrawson(1986,1994),TedHonderich(1988),BruceWaller(1990,2011,2015),Michael
9
12 Slote (1990), Derk Pereboom (1995, 2001, 2014a, 2021b), Saul Smilansky (2000), Daniel
9
00 Wegner(2002),GideonRosen(2004),JoshuaGreeneandJonathanCohen(2004),Benjamin
1
87 Vilhauer(2004,2012),ShaunNichols(2007,2015),TamlerSommers(2007,2012),BrianLeiter
9
/7 (2007),ThomasNadelhoffer(2011),NeilLevy(2011),SamHarris(2012),GreggCaruso(2012,
1
01 2021b),‘TrickSlattery(2014),Per-ErikMilam(2016),RobertSapolsky(2017),StephenMorris
.01 (2018), Elizabeth Shaw (2019), and Farah Focquaert (2019b); for an overview, see Caruso
/g
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MoralResponsibilityReconsidered 3
ourpracticeofholdingagentsmorallyresponsiblehasbackward-andforward-
lookingaspects.Thecorebackward-lookingaspectisdesert–inparticular,the
deserved harm of blame and punishment for wrongdoing, and the deserved
benefitofpraiseandrewardformorallyexemplaryaction.Abasicconception
of desert is backward-looking to its core. That is, basic desert claims are
fundamental, and thus not grounded on forward-looking considerations such
asreconciliationinrelationshipsandmoralformationofwrongdoers.
Oneconcernraisedforskepticismaboutbasicdesertisthatitistoorevision-
aryofourmoralresponsibilitypractices.Amoreconciliatoryandconservative
position,defendedbyDanielDennettandManuelVargas,aimstogroundour
moral responsibility practice, inclusive of its desert-based justifications, in
forward-looking considerations at a higher level. On such accounts, practice-
level justificationsfor blame andpunishment invoke considerationsofdesert,
whilethatdesertisnotbasicbecauseatahigherlevelthepracticeisjustifiedby
good anticipated consequences, such as deterrence of wrongdoing and moral
formationofwrongdoers.Defendersofthisapproachmaintainthatourpractice
ofholdingagentsmorallyresponsibleinthisnon-basicdesertsenseshouldbe
retainedforthereasonthatdoingsowouldhavethebestoverallconsequences
relativetoalternativepractices.Whilesuchaviewavoidscertainobjectionsto
basic desert, it faces a number of other concerns (see Section 1.3). As an
alternative, we will set out in Section 3 our more resolutely forward-looking
conception of moral responsibility, grounded in objectives such as moral for-
mation of wrongdoers and reconciliation in relationships impaired by wrong-
doing(Pereboom1995,2001,2014a,2021b;Caruso2021b;CarusoinDennett
sse andCaruso2021).
rP y To begin, it is important that we first differentiate moral responsibility,
tisre whetherbackward-orforward-looking,fromseveralothernotionsofresponsi-
v
inU bility.Infact,theterm“responsibility”isperhapssurprisinglyambiguousand
e
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dirb used in a number of different senses. Sometimes, for instance, we use it to
ma simply indicate the cause of something – as when we say that “Hurricane
C
yb e Katrina was responsible for the destruction of New Orleans” or “The fallen
n
iln treebranchwasresponsibleforthedamagetotheroof.”Thissense,knownas
o
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eh causal responsibility, is assigned when we say that someone or something is
silbu responsible for an event or outcome because he, she, or it caused it to occur
P
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3 (Talbert2016:8).Inanimateobjects(suchasthetreebranch)andevents(like
7
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2 HurricaneKatrina)canbecausallyresponsibleinthissense.Sotoocanagents
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1 when they play a direct or indirect causal role in bringing about a particular
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9/7 actionoroutcome.Note,though,thatcausalresponsibilityisfarfromsufficient
1
01.0 formoralresponsibility–someoneorsomethingcancauseaneventoroutcome
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/gro without deserving moral praise or blame, punishment or reward, for having
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4 Ethics
doneso.Thisiseasiesttoseeinthecaseofinanimateobjectsandevents,butit’s
also true for agents. An infant, for instance, may be causally responsible for
ruining your favorite shirt by getting sick on it, and a Parkinson’s patient for
knockingyourcellphonetothegroundbecauseoftheirtremors,eventhough
neitherismorallyresponsibleforwhattheydid.
Moralresponsibilityisalsodistinctfromtake-chargeresponsibility(Waller
1990,2004,2011,2014).SkepticBruceWallerarguesthat:
Justdesertsandmoralresponsibilityrequireagodlikepower–theexisten-
tial power of choosing ourselves, the godlike power of making ourselves
fromscratch,thedivinecapacitytobeanuncausedcause–thatwedonot
have.(2011:40)
Yet,Wallermaintains,
you[nevertheless]havetake-chargeresponsibilityforyourownlife,whichis
aresponsibilityyoudeeplyvalueandenjoyexercising.(2011:108)
Takingresponsibilityisdistinguishedfrombeingmorallyresponsibleinthat,if
onetakesresponsibilityforaparticularoutcomeitdoesnotfollowthatoneis
morally responsible for that outcome. One can take responsibility for many
things, from the mundane to the vitally important. For example, one can take
responsibility for teaching a course, organizing a conference, or throwing
a birthdayparty. The responsibility taken, however, is verydifferent fromthe
moral responsibility that would justify blame and punishment, praise and
reward (Pereboom 2001: xxi; Waller 2011: 105; for an objection, see
Smilansky2012;forareply,seeCaruso2018b:sect.1).
sse AcloselyrelatednotioniswhatH.L.A.Hartdesignatesasroleresponsibility.
rP
ytisre Inintroducingtheidea,Hartpointsoutthat:
v
inU Wheneverapersonoccupiesadistinctiveplaceorofficeinasocialorganiza-
e
gd tion,towhichspecificdutiesareattachedtoprovideforthewelfareofothers
irbm ortoadvanceinsomespecificwaytheaimsorpurposesoftheorganization,
a
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y heisproperlysaidtoberesponsiblefortheperformanceoftheseduties,orfor
b
en doing what is necessary to fulfill them. Such duties are a person’s [role]
iln
o responsibility.(1968:212)
d
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silb Wecansay,then,thatroleresponsibilityreferstothevarioustasksandduties
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0 associated with a particular role or job description, such as being a parent,
3
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91 teacher, or firefighter. Such responsibility, however, does not entail moral
2
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00 responsibility.AutonomousmachinesandAI,forinstance,canberesponsible
1
8
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9 in the role sense since they are typically responsible for carrying out various
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01 tasksanddutiesinvirtueoftherolesforwhichtheyaredesigned.Justaswesay
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1/g thatthesurgeon,firefighter,orbridgeinspectorhascertain“responsibilities”in
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