Moral EpistEMology How do we know right from wrong? Do we even have moral knowledge? Moral Epistemology studies these and related questions concerning our understanding of virtue and vice. It is one of philosophy’s perennial problems, reaching back to Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Hume, and Kant, and has recently been the subject of intense debate as a result of findings in developmental and social psychology. In this outstanding introduction to the subject, Aaron Zimmerman covers the following key topics: • what is moral epistemology? What are its methods? Includes a discussion of Socrates, Gettier, and contemporary theories of knowledge • skepticism about moral knowledge based on the anthropological record of deep and persistent moral disagreement, including contextualism • moral nihilism, including debates concerning God and morality and the rela- tion between moral knowledge and our motives and reasons to act morally • epistemic moral skepticism, intuitionism, and the possibility of inferring “ought” from “is,” discussing the views of Locke, Hume, Kant, Ross, Audi, Thomson, Harman, Sturgeon, and many others • how children acquire moral concepts and become more reliable judges • criticisms of those who would reduce moral knowledge to value-neutral knowledge or attempt to replace moral belief with emotion. Throughout the book Zimmerman argues that our belief in moral knowledge can survive skeptical challenges. He also draws on a rich range of examples from Plato’s Meno and Dickens’ David Copperfield to Bernard Madoff and Saddam Hussein. Including chapter summaries and annotated further reading at the end of each chapter, Moral Epistemology is essential reading for all students of ethics, epistemology, and moral psychology. Aaron Zimmerman is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His research is focused on the intersection of thought, language, and reason, and he also writes and teaches on David Hume’s philosophical work. New problems of philosophy series Editor: José Luis Bermúdez The New Problems of Philosophy series provides accessible and engaging surveys of the most important problems in contemporary philosophy. Each book examines either a topic or a theme that has emerged on the philosophical landscape in recent years, or a longstanding problem refreshed in light of recent work in philosophy and related disciplines. Clearly explaining the nature of the problem at hand and assessing attempts to answer it, books in the series are excellent starting-points for undergraduate and graduate students wishing to study a single topic in depth. They will also be essential reading for professional philosophers. Additional features include chapter summaries, further reading, and a glossary of technical terms. Also available: Fiction and Fictionalism Noncognitivism in Ethics R. M. Sainsbury Mark Schroeder analyticity Embodied Cognition Cory Juhl and Eric Loomis Lawrence Shapiro physicalism Daniel Stoljar Forthcoming: self Knowledge Folk psychology Brie Gertler Ian Ravenscroft perceptual Consciousness semantic Externalism Adam Pautz Jesper Kallestrup Consequentialism philosophy of images Julia Driver John Kulvicki Moral EpistEMology Aaron Zimmerman This edition published 2010 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010. To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk. © 2010 Aaron Zimmerman All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Zimmerman, Aaron (Aaron Zachary) Moral epistemology / by Aaron Zimmerman. p. cm. — (New problems of philosophy) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Ethics. 2. Knowledge, Theory of. I. Title. BD176.Z56 2010 170'.42—dc22 2009048670 ISBN 0-203-85086-6 Master e-book ISBN ISBN 10: 0-415-48553-1 (hbk) ISBN 10: 0-415-48554-1 (pbk) ISBN 10: 0-203-85086-6 (ebk) ISBN 13: 978-0-415-48553-1 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-415-48554-8 (pbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-203-85086-2 (ebk) For Max CoNtENts Acknowledgments ix Chapter 1 Moral epistemology: content and method 1 1.1 What is moral epistemology? 1 1.2 Socrates, Gettier, and the definition of “knowledge” 3 1.3 The standard method: levels of inquiry 9 1.4 Theories of moral knowledge: an overview 14 1.5 Chapter summary 22 1.6 Further reading 23 Chapter 2 Moral disagreement 25 2.1 Disagreement and skepticism 25 2.2 Moral contextualism 33 2.3 Chapter summary 40 2.4 Further reading 41 Chapter 3 Moral nihilism 42 3.1 Moral skepticism characterized 42 3.2 The death of god 43 3.3 Mackie’s queerness 47 3.4 Motives internalism 54 3.5 Reasons internalism 61 3.6 Chapter summary 69 3.7 Further reading 71 viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Chapter 4 the skeptic and the intuitionist 73 4.1 The Pyrrhonian problematic 73 4.2 Non-inferential moral knowledge 76 4.3 Chapter summary 103 4.4 Further reading 105 Chapter 5 Deductive moral knowledge 107 5.1 On deducing “ought” from “is” 107 5.2 In search of an epistemologically valuable moral deduction 113 5.3 Assessing the epistemological value of our deduction 124 5.4 Chapter summary 138 5.5 Further reading 139 Chapter 6 abductive moral knowledge 141 6.1 Moral inference to the best explanation 141 6.2 Chapter summary 149 6.3 Further reading 150 Chapter 7 the reliability of our moral judgments 151 7.1 Acquiring moral concepts and exercising objectivity 151 7.2 Chapter summary 168 7.3 Further reading 169 Chapter 8 Epilogue: challenges to moral epistemology 171 8.1 Frege, Moore, and the definition of “immorality” 171 8.2 Common-sense objections to non-cognitivism 180 8.3 The Frege–Geach problems: semantics v. pragmatics 182 8.4 Non-cognitivist forms of validity 186 8.5 Chapter summary 193 8.6 Further reading 193 Glossary of philosophical terms 195 Notes 204 Works cited 219 Index 241 aCKNowlEDgMENts I would like to thank Tony Bruce for asking me to write this book, and Joshua May, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Pekka Väyrynen, Jonathan Way, and an anonymous Routledge referee for written comments. Discussions with Tony Anderson have also proved helpful. Puzzlement over the source and nature of moral knowledge is what brought me to philosophy more than fifteen years ago. And I have tried to write a book for the person I was at that time – a philosophically-minded sophomore just trying to figure things out. I hope this book finds its way into that student’s hands, and that it is sufficiently clear and cogent to inform his or her intellectual struggle. If it does this, and does not bore his or her teacher to tears, the book will have achieved its intended end. I have always wanted to share my passion for philosophy with my mish- pocha – the audience of people for whom I care most: my wife, Kira Goldberg, my parents, Hope and Daniel Zimmerman, and the rest of the Zimmermans, the Nathans, the Mansells, the Cherlins, the Goldbergs, the Mandelbaums, the Thatchers, the Finkels, the Moores, the Magnuses, the Fiorentinos, the Kays, the Kyriokous, the Tzahs, the Kay-Grosses, the Lebows, the Palogers, the McElroys, the Weisses, the Stanleys, the Fitelsons, the Wolfs, the Browns, the Stormers, the Friedmans, the Lendermans, the Schers, the Kriegers, the Filuses, and the many other families who have shown me so much love. Perhaps this book is not yet the book for this crew. If not, I will keep trying. If you find certain passages in what follows overly dense or hard to follow, please feel free to question me via electronic mail. I will do my best
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