Monopolists without Borders

87 Pages·2013·5.28 MB·English

by  D. Daniel Sokol

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D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida Levin College of Law, [email protected]
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D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists without Borders: The Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a
Global Gilded Age, 4 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 37 (2007), available at http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/
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Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional
Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global
Gilded Age
D. Daniel Sokolt
ABSTRACT: Antitrust has entered a gilded age of increasedi nternational
cooperation and enforcement at levels never before seen. Yet, increased
globalization creates challenges to combat international anticompetitive
conduct. PartI introduces the Article. Part 11 provides a briefo verview of the
history of international antitrust. This overview departs from previous
historical analyses as it focuses on participation within each of the
internationala ntitrust institutions to explain these historical limitations. Part
111 identifies and explores three case studies which are generally representative
of international antitrust. These case studies have been chosen because the
issues they address have been at the top of the agenda of internationala ntitrust
in the past decade: mergers, cartels, and market access.
Part IV introduces the theoretical tools to address the problems of
internationala ntitrust. This Partm akes the analytical case for the application
of comparative institutionala nalysis, an analysis of the choice of the decision-
making process, to international antitrust. It addresses how a comparative
institutional analysis framework allows for a more complete examination of
both internationala nd domestic institutions. It also explains the participation
model as the organizing principle for the analysis of institutions, as
participation affects each institution's ability to create policy remedies. The
second theoreticalt ool that PartI V introduces is internationalr elations theory.
Comparative institutionala nalysis works with internationalr elations theory to
provide an effective way to understand the interplay of institutions at the
domestic and international levels, as well at the level of international
institutionsv is-6-vis each other.
Part V offers an analysis of the efficacy of various types of antitrust
institutions to determine which of these institutions are best suited to address
the problems of internationala ntitrust. This Parte valuates the capacity of each
institution to address problems that the case studies implicate. These
institutions include the World Trade Organization (WTO), regional and
bilateral trade agreements, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), the International Competition Network (1CN),
t William H. Hastie Fellow, University of Wisconsin Law School.
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domestic legislatures,c ourts, and agencies, and the market as an institution.
Part VI concludes that existing institutions each have limitations in their
ability to address any of the issues in internationala ntitrust exclusively. This
Article argues that the ICN is the institution best suited to address these issues.
This approach may assist to identify other regulatory areas in which an ICN
modeled "soft law" transnationali nstitutionalc hoice may prove to be the most
effective way to address internationali ssues.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ..............................................4. 1................................................
A .O verview .........................................4.1...........................................
B. Article Roadmap ....................................4.2.....................................
II. International Antitrust History ................................44.................................
A. Early Attempts at International Antitrust Institutions ...........4.4.......
B. Modem International Antitrust Institutions ..................4.6...............
C. The Contemporary Debate ..............................49..............................
III. International Problems That Confront Antitrust ...................5.2.................
A .C artels .............................................5.3............................................
1. Ha rm s ...........................................5.3..........................................
2. Cartels and Their Implications for Law and Development .....55....
3. Domestic Institution Capacity Constraints Against Cartels ....5.6...
4. Cooperation Costs ................................5.8................................
B .M ergers ...........................................59.............................................
1. Costs to the Current System ..........................59.........................
2. The Weakness of Existing Domestic Merger Review ........... 61
C. Market Access ......................................63........................................
1. Problem Defined .................................6.3.................................
2. Lack of Agreement Between Antitrust and International
T rade ..........................................6.4........................................
3. Vertical Restraints and Market Access ..................6.5...............
4. The Limits of Antitrust .............................67.............................
IV. Theoretical Tools ........................................6.9..........................................
A. Using Comparative Institutional Analysis ...................69.................
B. Institutions, Costs, and Benefits ..........................7.0........................
1. Costs and Complexity ..............................70..............................
2. Participation ....................................7.2.....................................
C. International Organizations and Antitrust ...................7.4.................
D. The Role of International Institutions and its Application to
International Antitrust ...............................7.5...............................
1. The Use of Hard Law Institutions .....................7.6....................
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Monopolists Without Borders
2. The Design of Soft Law Institutions ...................................... 77
3. Dynamics of Soft Law Institutions ........................................ 79
V. Institutions and Their Application to the Problems of International
A ntitrust ........................................................................................... . . 8 1
A .Hard Law Institutions .................................................................. 81
1. The World Trade Organization .............................................. 81
a. Introduction ..................................................................... 81
b. Nondiscrimination in the World Trade Organization ........... 82
c. Participation in the World Trade Organization ................ 83
d. Ability of the World Trade Organization to Solve
Antitrust Problem s ....................................................... 86
i. M arket A ccess ............................................................ 86
ii. Central Merger Authority ........................................ 89
iii. Norm-creator for Mergers and Cartels ..................... 92
2. Preferential Trade Agreements ............................................. 93
a. The Role of Preferential Trade Agreements ..................... 93
b. Can Trade Agreements Make a Difference at the
Regional or Bilateral Level? .................... ................. . . . 93
c. Participation in Antitrust Regional Trade Agreements ......... 96
B. Soft Law Antitrust Institutions ..................................................... 97
1. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
De velopm ent ........................................................................ 97
a. Functions of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development ........................................... 97
b. Dynamics of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development's Institutional Structure ......... 99
c. Participation in the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Developm ent ............................................. 100
d. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development's Ability to Solve Problems ....................... 101
2. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development ... 102
a. The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Developm ent Explained ................................................... 102
b. Participation in the United Nations Conference on
Trade and D evelopm ent ................................................... 103
c. Dynamics of the United Nations Conference on Trade
and D evelopm ent ............................................................. 104
d. Institutional Dilemma of the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Developm ent .............................................. 105
3. The International Competition Network ................................... 105
a. Overview of the International Competition Network .......... 105
b. The International Competition Network as a
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Transnational Institution .................................................. 106
c. Participation in the International Competition Network ..... 106
d. Dynamics of the International Competition Network ......... 108
i. Virtual Operation .......................................................... 108
ii. Action-oriented Agenda ............................................... 108
e. Harmonization at the International Competition
N etw ork ............................................................................ 109
f. Operational Functions of the International Competition
N etw ork ............................................................................ 111
i. M ergers ......................................................................... 112
ii. C artels .......................................................................... 115
iii. M arket Access ............................................................ 115
C. The M arket as an Institution ............................................................ 116
VI . C onclusion ................................................................................................. 118
A. The Effectiveness of Institutions ..................................................... 118
B. Final Thoughts on Institutional Responses to the Problems of
International Antitrust ................................................................... 120
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Monopolists Without Borders
Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional
Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global
Gilded Age
D. Daniel Sokol
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview
Antitrust has entered a gilded age of increased international cooperation
and enforcement at levels never before seen. A considerable literature exists on
domestic and international institutions that make up the international antitrust
system.1 However, the conceptualization of this system needs revisiting due to
limitations in the scholarship on how best to utilize these institutions. There are
two reasons for this reconceptualization. First, in the fifteen or so years during
this most recent era of increased antitrust internationalization, institutions have
shifted in their capabilities and experiences. Second, much of the existing
scholarly literature advocates solutions across only one or two possible
institutional alternatives. What this area of law requires is comparison of all
1. See, e.g., Oliver Budzinski & Mariana Bode, Competing Ways Towards an International
Competition Policy Regime: An Economic Perspective on ICN vs. WTO, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
ANTITRUST (Frank Columbus ed., forthcoming 2006); Sadao Nagaoka & Akira Goto, Vertical
Restraints and Market Access, 24 EMPIRICA 21 (1997); COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST
JURISDICTION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Michael S. Greve & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2004); Jim
Chen, The Vertical Dimension of Cooperative Competition Policy, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 1005 (2003);
KEVIN C. KENNEDY, COMPETITION LAW AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: THE LIMITS OF
MULTILATERALISM (2001); Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of
International Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 173 (2005); PHILIP MARSDEN, A COMPETITION
POLICY FOR THE WTO (2003); Eleanor M. Fox, InternationalA ntitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J.
INT'L L. 911 (2003); Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism-Races Up, Down, and
Sideways, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1781 (2000); Andrew T. Guzman, Is InternationalA ntitrust Possible?, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501 (1998); Christian A. Conrad, Strategies to Reform the Regulations on
International Competition, 26 WORLD COMP. 101 (2003); Spencer Weber Waller, The
Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343 (1997); Michael J. Trebilcock,
Competition Policy and Trade Policy--Mediatingt he Interface, 30 J. WORLD TRADE 71 (1996); Andre
Fiebig, A Role for the WTO in International Merger Control, 20 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 233 (2000);
Ariel Ezrachi, The Role of Voluntary Frameworks in MultinationalC ooperation Over Merger Control,
36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 433 (2004); Josef Drexl, InternationalC ompetition Policy After Cancn:
Placing a Singapore Issue on the WTO Development Agenda, 27 WORLD CoMP. 419 (2004); Damien J.
Neven & Lars-Hendrik Riller, The Allocation of Jurisdictioni n InternationalA ntitrust, 44 EUR. ECON.
REV. 845 (2000); Ignacio Garcia Bercero & Stefan D. Amarasinha, Moving the Trade and Competition
Debate Forward, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 481 (2001); Frank R. Schoneveld, Cartel Sanctions and
InternationalC ompetition Policy: Cross-BorderC ooperation and Appropriate Forumsf or Cooperation,
26 WORLD COMP. LAW & ECON. REV. 433 (2003); Edward T. Swaine, Against PrincipledA ntitrust, 43
VA. J. INT'L L. 959 (2003); Daniel K. Tarullo, Norms and Institutions in Global Competition Policy, 94
AM. J. INT'L L. 478 (2000); Diane P. Wood, Antitrust at the Global Level, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 309
(2005).
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possible solutions-a comparative institutional analysis.
The application of comparative institutional analysis to international
antitrust serves a critical purpose. However, previous scholarship has not
applied comparative institutional analysis to study the effects of particular
proposals that address international antitrust. 2 Any analysis or policy
prescription that fails to examine each of the potentially relevant institutions,
both international and domestic, is incomplete. Such lack of comparative
institutional analysis has significant repercussions as to the choice of an
effective antitrust institution. In particular, assigning policy prescriptions to a
less adequate institution increases costs globally and frustrates attempts to
enhance societal welfare and lift people out of poverty.
This Article provides an in-depth study of how one area of regulatory law
responds to globalization. This response requires increased internationalization
where traditional domestic capacities seem inadequate to address
globalization's challenges. Moreover, the dynamics of internationalization in
this area suggest lessons for other areas of international regulation. Therefore,
the Article examines how various domestic and international institutions work
with each other to reduce anticompetitive conduct that has international effects.
Following such an approach provides guidance more generally on how
international organizations can improve the capacity of domestic institutions to
address difficult cross-border regulatory issues.
B. Article Roadmap
Part II provides an historical overview of international antitrust. This
overview departs from previous accounts as it focuses on participation in each
of the international antitrust institutions. Participation helps to explain the
effectiveness-or lack thereof--of a particular institutional choice.
Participation plays a critical role in framing comparative institutional analysis.
The purpose of the historical discussion is to put various international
institutions and approaches in context. This discussion also illustrates how
institutions change over time and respond to each other. The structure of these
institutions and the capacity of potential parties to participate within them
provide a framework that applies specifically to international antitrust
institutions. Part III introduces the problems of international antitrust. It
identifies and explores three case studies involving the key issues of
international antitrust: mergers, cartels, and market access.
Part IV introduces the theoretical tools to address the problems of
international antitrust. This Part makes the analytical case for the application of
2. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY
AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS (2001).
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Monopolists Without Borders
comparative institutional analysis to international antitrust. It addresses how a
comparative institutional analysis framework allows for a more complete
examination of both international and domestic institutions. It also explains the
participation model as the organizing principle for the analysis of institutions,
for participation affects each institution's ability to create policy remedies.
Participation in a comparative institutional analysis model depends on costs and
benefits to participation. Participation in a given institution is a function of the
costs and the benefits of participation.3 Policy alternatives come with certain
costs, such as transaction costs. The benefits of participation include the
distribution of benefits across the affected population both on a per capita basis
and in terms of variance across the population.4
Participation frames the way to view costs and benefits of a particular
institutional choice as results of the decision making process to address societal
problems. The costs affect any given institution and the ability of actors to
participate in it. The lower the cost of participation, the more effective the
institution may be. This relationship also works in reverse. As more parties
participate, information costs decrease. This increases the benefits to parties
participating in the institution.
The second theoretical tool that Part IV introduces is international relations
theory. International relations explain the different models of organization of
international institutions. Hard law institutions favor a binding international
adjudicatory institutional choice. The soft law approach, whether
transgovernmental5 or transnational,6 favors an administrative agency to agency
nonbinding institutional model. Comparative institutional analysis works with
international relations theory to provide an effective way to understand the
interplay of institutions at the domestic and international levels as well at the
level of international institutions vis-A-vis each other.
Part V explores how both comparative institutional analysis and
international relations theories of international governance apply to
international antitrust institutions and affect the capacity of these international
organizations to address critical issues in international antitrust. Part V offers
an analysis of the efficacy of various types of antitrust institutions to determine
which of these institutions are best suited to address the problems of
international antitrust. This Part evaluates the capacity of each institution to
address problems that the case studies implicate and the ability of parties to
participate in each of the institutions. These institutions include the World
3. This can be understood in the equation P=flc-b), where P is institutional participation; c is the
cost of participation and b the benefit of participation.
4. KOMESAR, LAW'S LIMITS, supra note 2, at 30.
5. Agency to agency interaction is described in greater detail in Part IV.
6. Sub-state level interaction, which also includes non-state actors, is described in greater detail in
Part IV.
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Trade Organization (WTO), regional and bilateral trade agreements, the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the International
Competition Network (ICN), domestic courts and agencies, and the market as
institution. Earlier work has underemphasized the importance of the
participatory aspect in international antitrust institutions. From this analysis, the
importance of the ICN emerges as a soft law institution that can create antitrust
compliance more effectively than other institutional alternatives.
Part VI concludes that existing institutions each have limitations in their
ability to address any of the issues in international antitrust exclusively. This
Article argues that the ICN is the institution best suited to address these issues.
This approach may assist to identify other regulatory areas in which an ICN
modeled solution may prove to be the most effective way to address
international issues.
II. INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST HISTORY
A. Early Attempts at InternationalA ntitrust Institutions
Increased globalization has opened markets to anticompetitive conduct by
foreign actors or exported anticompetitive practices to other countries.7 The
internationalization of antitrust enforcement is a response to this globalization
of anticompetitive conduct. Integrated international attempts to control
anticompetitive practices are for the most part a post-World War II endeavor.8
For much of its history, coordinated international antitrust has been a history of
ineffective efforts. Institutional constraints and the lack of analytical
convergence on enforcement approaches have hampered coordinated
international antitrust efforts. The ineffectiveness of these efforts has been a
function of the type of participation in international antitrust institutions and the
costs and benefits of such participation. This Part introduces the institutional
alternatives, whereas Part V examines the costs and benefits that underlie the
potential effectiveness of each institutional alternative as the most effective
decision maker to address international antitrust issues.
The first significant multilateral attempt to remove international
anticompetitive barriers occurred at the Bretton Woods Conference of July
1944. Participants there suggested the creation of three pillars for a postwar
economic order: the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (later the World Bank), and the International
7. This hearkens back to earlier periods of globalization. For example, international cartels played
an important role in the pre-WWII world. WYATT WELLS, ANTITRUST AND THE FORMATION OF THE
POSTWAR WORLD (2002); RUDOLF K. MICHELS, CARTELS, COMBINES, AND TRUSTS IN POST-WAR
GERMANY (1928).
8. However, the League of Nations made an initial foray into this area. Wailer, supran ote 1, at 349.
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Monopolists Without Borders
Trade Organization (ITO). In particular, the ITO charter provided for increased
trade liberalization. It included a section on restrictive business practices. The
ITO would have allowed for dispute resolution for violations of anticompetitive
conduct. Specifically, members were to take measures against "business
practices affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access
to markets, or foster monopolistic control whenever such practices have
harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade."9 The ITO would have
been empowered to investigate such conduct and recommend remedial action
to member governments. 10 The ITO also previewed many of the issues
discussed in the current international antitrust circles-public and private
restraints, cartels, monopolization, and market access.
However, the ITO faced resistance from a number of countries, including
the United States. The U.S. Congress feared a loss of sovereignty and the
limitations that the charter might impose upon U.S. businesses. Developing
countries also felt that the costs of participation outweighed the benefits,
because of these countries' increased focus on an import substitution industrial
policy. " The differences in conceptualization of economic policy and
government control in the economy precluded consensus on the ITO. Without
U.S. support, the organization did not materialize.12
During the early postwar period, the U.S. Department of Justice undertook
successful aggressive criminal prosecution of many of the international cartels
that had been active in the interwar period.' 3 This was a push specific to the
international cartel as a business model.14 As a result of the ineffectiveness of
international efforts to create the ITO, the United States took a unilateral
approach to international cartels through the application of its antitrust laws
extraterritorially. 15S tarting in 1945 with the United States v. Aluminum
9. 62 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 3206, HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ORGANIZATION: INCLUDING A GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF THE CHARTER, Art. 46 (1948).
10. MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 592
(3d ed. 2005).
11. WELLS,s upra note 7, at43-137.
12. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969). GATT members later
adopted a limited Decision on Arrangements for Consultations on Restrictive Business Practices in
1960, BISD 9S/ 28-29, that had little effect.
13. WELLS, supra note 9, at 43-137.
14. Helen Mercer, The Rhetoric and Reality of Anti-cartel Policies: Britain, Germany and Japan
and the Effects of US Pressure in the 1940s, in CARTELS AND MARKET MANAGEMENT IN THE POST-
WAR WORLD (LSE Business History Occasional Paper, No. 1,L ondon School of Economics, Carlo
Morelli ed., 1997).
15. Because of the economic and political weakness of postwar Europe, the United States did not
press European countries on their toleration and sometimes active support of cartels. The EU did not
take an active role in cartel enforcement until the 1990s. This had to do with greater tolerance of cartels
in some countries as a way to better organize their export activity or a different sense of what was
critical in promoting "competition" within the nascent European community. Generally, the EU avoided
areas of disagreement in enforcement of competition law where there was the possibility of political
resistance from Member States. DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 358 (1998).
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