Money and Politics on the International Stage : The Political Economy of the United Nations Security Council : money and influence

292 Pages·2014·2.479 MB·English

by  James Raymond Vreeland, Axel Dreher

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ThePoliticalEconomyoftheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil
MoneyandInfluence
Trades of money for political influence persist at every level of gov-
ernment. Not surprisingly, governments themselves trade money for
political support on the international stage. Strange, however, is the
tale of this book: In this study, legitimacy stands as the central politi-
cal commodity at stake. The book investigates the ways governments
trademoneyforfavorsattheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncil,thebody
endowedwiththeinternationallegalauthoritytolegitimizetheuseof
armedforcetomaintainorrestorepeace.Withawealthofquantitative
data,thebookshowsthatpowerfulcountries,suchastheUnitedStates,
Japan, and Germany, extend financial favors to the elected members
of the Security Council through direct foreign aid and through inter-
national organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund and
theWorldBank.Inreturn,developingcountriesservingontheSecurity
Councilmustdelivertheirpoliticalsupport–orfacetheconsequences.
JamesRaymondVreelandisAssociateProfessorofInternationalRela-
tions at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and holds
ajointappointmentintheDepartmentofGovernment.
Axel Dreher is Professor of International and Development Politics at
HeidelbergUniversity.
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The Political Economy of the
United Nations Security Council
Money and Influence
JAMES RAYMOND VREELAND
GeorgetownUniversity
AXEL DREHER
HeidelbergUniversity
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For our godsons
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Contents
Figures pagexi
Tables xiii
Acknowledgments xv
1. MoneyandPoliticsontheInternationalStage 1
1.1 TradingFavors 1
1.2 DoUNSCVotesMatter? 6
1.3 DoUNAmbassadorsHavePoliticalLeverageover
BilateralandMultilateralChannelsofInfluence? 17
1.4 WhatAretheConsequencesofPoliticallyMotivated
Aid? 26
1.5 PlanoftheBook 27
2. ATheoryofTradingSecurityCouncilVotesforAid 35
2.1 IntroducingaLogicofTradingFavorsonthe
InternationalStage 35
2.2 TheVote-AidTradeGame 38
2.3 TheExtendedFormGameandPayoffs 40
2.3.1 NoRequestorNoOffer 41
2.3.2 TheVote-AidTradeSubgame 41
2.3.3 TheVote-AidTradePayoffs 42
2.4 ASolutiontotheGame 42
2.4.1 ToCutortoDisburse 43
2.4.2 ToComplyortoDefect 43
2.4.3 ToOfferorNot 44
2.4.4 ToRequestorNot 46
2.5 SummarizingEquilibriumStrategies 47
2.6 Archetypes:TooClose,TooFar,andJustRight 48
2.6.1 TooClose 48
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2.6.2 OrTooFar 49
2.6.3 JustRight 49
2.7 ChangingtheValueoftheVoteandtheReputation
Cost 50
2.8 LegitimizingForcefulForeignPolicy 51
2.8.1 OpenlyPayingOffUNSCMembers 52
2.8.2 Obfuscation:LaunderingDirtyPolitics 54
2.8.3 ReputationalParadox 56
2.9 TestableHypotheses 57
Appendix2.1:AMoreElegantSolution 59
3. ExamplesofPunishments,Threats,andRewards 62
3.1 TypesofExamples 62
3.2 Zimbabwe1992 63
3.3 Yemen1990 67
3.4 Zaire1990–1991 69
3.5 SoClose:OverdeterminedCases 71
3.6 AndSoFar:TheExceptionthat“ProvestheRule” 73
3.7 GreatPowersandEmergingMarkets 76
3.8 Resolution1441andtheThreeTypes:TooClose,
TooFar,andJustRight 80
3.9 CircumstantialEvidence 85
3.10 AddressingSkepticism 91
4. WhoWinsElectiontoRepresenttheWorld? 94
4.1 MythsversusReality 94
4.2 TheUNSCElectionRules 98
4.3 Conjectures 105
4.3.1 TheUNCharter:InternationalPeaceand
Security 107
4.3.2 ForeignAssistance 110
4.3.3 Power:ARealistView 113
4.3.4 Historical,Political,andReligiousConnections 115
4.3.5 TakingTurns 116
4.3.6 Summary 116
4.4 TheStatisticalModel 119
4.5 Year,Country,andColdWarEffects 121
4.6 ModelEstimation 123
4.7 DiscussionoftheResults 126
4.7.1 CommitmenttoPeace 127
4.7.2 ForeignAidandMultilateralLending 128
4.7.3 InternationalPowerandPoliticalConnections 129
4.7.4 ColonialHeritage,PoliticalIdeology,Religion,
andCorruption 132
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Contents ix
4.7.5 Turn-TakingandRotation 133
4.8 TheWayForward 133
Appendix4.1:ElectionProbabilities 135
5. StatisticalEvidenceofTradingFinanceforFavors 137
5.1 Introduction 137
5.2 BackgroundonBilateralAid:TheUnitedStates,Japan,
Germany,theUnitedKingdom,andFrance 137
5.3 BackgroundonMultilateralOrganizations:TheIMF,
theWorldBank,theUN,andRegionalDevelopment
Banks 139
5.4 MeasuringtheEffectofUNSCMembership 141
5.5 AddressingPotentialProblemsofUNSCSelectionBias 143
5.6 TheAfricaSolution 147
5.7 Data,Methods,andAnalysis 148
5.7.1 BilateralAid 149
5.7.2 IMFandWorldBankPrograms 157
5.7.3 TheUN 165
5.7.4 RegionalDevelopmentBanks 169
5.7.5 TargetingSwingVoters 175
5.7.6 VotingBehaviorontheUNSC 181
5.8 Conclusion:SummarizingtheMainFindings 184
Appendix5.1:DescribingtheDataUsedinthisChapter 186
6. ConsequencesofPoliticallyMotivatedAid 188
6.1 DoesForeignAidHelporHurt? 188
6.2 TheForeignAidDebate 192
6.3 PerniciousEffects 194
6.4 AConservativeAnalysis 198
6.5 Results 201
6.6 DemocracyversusDictatorship 209
6.7 Conclusion 218
Appendix6.1:DescribingtheDataUsedinthisChapter 219
7. ReformingtheUNSC 220
7.1 AndtheWorldWillLiveasOne? 220
7.2 CooperationandSacrifice 222
7.3 ReformingRepresentation 229
7.3.1 AddingElectedMembers 229
7.3.2 AddingPermanentMemberswithoutVetoPower 231
7.3.3 AddingPermanentMemberswithVetoPower 232
7.4 Representation,Accountability,andTermLimits 233
References 243
Index 000
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