Modernization of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Arsenal

91 Pages·2012·2.7 MB·English

MASARYK UNIVERSITY
FACULTY OF SOCIAL STUDIES

Department of International Relations and European Studies

Modernization of Russia's
StrategicNuclearArsenal

DIPLOMA THESIS

By

Mgr. Jana Honková

Thesis Supervizor: PhDr. Petr Suchý, Phd.
UČO: 206587
Field of Study: International Relations
Year of matriculation: 2010

Brno, 2012
I do hereby solemnly declare that the diploma thesis “Modernization of Russia's Strategic
Nuclear Arsenal“ is a result of my independent work. All sources of information and
bibliographical references used in this thesis have been cited accordingly in the footnotes and
in the references.
14th December 2012

_________________
Mgr. Jana Honková

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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my thesis supervisor PhDr. Petr Suchý, Phd., for his long-standing
support of my academic efforts, professional guidance of my thesis as well as his
extraordinarily kind and helpful approach.
I would also like to acknowledge my deepest appreciation for a good friend and colleague
at the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, in Fairfax,
VA, Scott Matthew Swift who provided invaluable consultation and constructive critique in
all stages of the writing process.
I have also benefited from discussions with my friends Christopher Joseph Zerega, Michal
Mádl and William Prescott Salley for which I am grateful.
Finally, I would like to thank my family for their support and patience during the entire
course of my studies.

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Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................................................................... 3
1. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 5
2. MODERNIZATION OF RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC ARSENAL (1991-2012) ......................................... 7
2.1. MODERNIZATION OF GROUND-LAUNCHED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES ......................... 7
2.1.1. Topol-M ........................................................................................................................................... 7
2.1.1.1. Development History............................................................................................................................. 7
2.1.1.2. Specifications and Advantages .............................................................................................................. 9
2.1.2. Yars ............................................................................................................................................... 10
2.1.2.1. Development History........................................................................................................................... 10
2.1.2.2. Specifications and Advantages ............................................................................................................ 11
2.1.3. New Heavy ICBMs ........................................................................................................................ 12
2.1.3.1. Liquid-Propellant ICBM Project ......................................................................................................... 13
2.1.3.2. Solid-Propellant ICBM Project............................................................................................................ 14
2.1.4. Summary: Modernization of Russia’s ICBM Force ...................................................................... 17
2.2. MODERNIZATION OF STRATEGIC NAVAL FORCES ............................................................................... 18
2.2.1. Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles ........................................................................................ 18
2.2.1.1. Sineva .................................................................................................................................................. 18
2.2.1.1.1. Development History ..................................................................................................................... 18
2.2.1.1.2. Specifications and Advantages ....................................................................................................... 20
2.2.1.2. Bulava ................................................................................................................................................. 21
2.2.1.2.1. Development History ..................................................................................................................... 21
2.2.1.2.2. Specifications and Advantages ....................................................................................................... 23
2.2.1.3. Layner ................................................................................................................................................. 24
2.2.1.3.1. Development History ..................................................................................................................... 24
2.2.1.3.2. Specifications and Advantages ....................................................................................................... 25
2.2.2. Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarines .......................................................................................... 26
2.2.2.1. Project 955 Borey Class Submarines: Development History and Specifications................................. 26
2.2.2.2. Project 955A Borey A Class Submarines: Development History and Specifications .......................... 29
2.2.3. Summary: Modernization of Russia’s Strategic Navy ................................................................... 31
2.3. MODERNIZATION OF STRATEGIC AVIATION ........................................................................................ 32
2.3.1. Strategic Bombers ......................................................................................................................... 32
2.3.1.1. Specifications and Current Modernization of Tu-95MS and Tu-160 .................................................. 35
2.3.1.2. New Strategic Bomber ........................................................................................................................ 36
2.3.2. Air-Launched Cruise Missiles ....................................................................................................... 37
2.3.2.1. Kh-555 ................................................................................................................................................. 38
2.3.2.2. Kh-101/102.......................................................................................................................................... 39
2.3.3. Summary: Modernization of Russia’s Strategic Aviation .............................................................. 39
2.4. MODERNIZATION OF RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC ARSENAL (1991-2012): SUMMARY OF TRENDS ............... 42
3. DRIVERS OF RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION ............................................................. 45
3.1. SETTING THE ARGUMENT STRAIGHT .................................................................................................. 50
4. CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................... 53
5. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................... 72
6. SOURCES .................................................................................................................................................. 73
6.1. PRIMARY SOURCES ............................................................................................................................. 73
6.2. SECONDARY SOURCES ........................................................................................................................ 74

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From what I have seen of our Russian friends and allies during the war, I am
convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is
nothing for which they have less respect than for weakness; especially military
weakness.

Churchill, Winston. Speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946.

[W]e should not tempt anyone by allowing ourselves to be weak. We will, under no
circumstances, surrender our strategic deterrent capability. Indeed, we will
strengthen it.

Putin, Vladimir. “Being Strong. Why Russia Needs to Rebuild Its Military.” Foreign
Policy (February 21, 2012).

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1. Introduction and Methodology
After the Soviet Union collapsed, nearly a quarter of its ground-based strategic nuclear
triad leg and almost half of its bomber fleet fell outside Russian control.i In spite of that, the
Russian Federation, as the Soviet Union’s successor, inherited a large nuclear arsenal. From
its formation up until today, the Russian Federation has been continuously modernizing its
strategic nuclear forces. The chapters below track Russia’s strategic nuclear modernization
from December 1991 to mid-December 2012 and include references to previous (Soviet)
modernization efforts where necessary or appropriate. Their aim is to provide empirical
foundation for answers to the following research questions:
1) What was the character of Russia’s strategic nuclear modernization in the period from
1991 to 2012?
2) What were the drivers of Russia’s strategic nuclear modernization in the period from
1991 to 2012?
As indicated above, the exact research period for this thesis occasionally transcends the
period specified in the research questions. Russia’s plans for future strategic modernization
are included as well, when publicly available.
Although the thesis occasionally refers to “strategic modernization” or “strategic arsenal”,
it does not cover modernization of all weapon systems Russia could consider strategic. As the
title suggests, it deals only with the modernization of strategic nuclear weapon systems,
namely those that are part of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF, also referred to as
RVSN, Strategic Rocket Forces). More concretely, the text below outlines the modernization
of: ground-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs), strategic ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), strategic bombers and
long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). The term “modernization” is understood as
research, development and deployment of new or significantly upgraded weapon systems.
The content of this thesis can be divided into two parts. The first part (Chapter 2) focuses
on the first research question and it introduces the history of each weapon system’s
development (I) as well as its advantages and exact specifications (II). Brief summaries of
each strategic triad leg’s modernization follow in respective (sub)chapters and provide a
detailed answer to the first research question. Those findings are summarized and further

iSteven J. Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945-
2000 (Washington, D.C., and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002), 215.
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developed in Chapter 2.4: Modernization of Russia’s Strategic Arsenal (1991-2012):
Summary of Trends, and in Chapter 4: Conclusion.
Chapter 3: Drivers of Russia’s Strategic Modernization represents the second part of this
thesis and provides theoretical foundation for the answer to the second research question. It
draws upon the work of various international scholars and the author’s own understanding of
Russia’s affairs. Chapter 4: Conclusion summarizes and completes the argument of Chapter 3
thus answering the second research question.
The findings and conclusions introduced in this thesis result from the author’s own open-
source research, analytical approach and inductive as well as deductive reasoning. The
prevalent amount of information comes from indigenous Russian sources such as Russian
newspaper reports, public statements made by Russian representatives or defense industry
officials, and Russian blog posts. After providing a detailed overview of Russia’s
modernization steps during the research period, the author uses induction to find features that
are common to modernization of each leg of Russia’s strategic triad. To ease the reader’s
orientation, the first part concludes with defining three approximate periods of Russia’s
strategic nuclear modernization. The second thesis’ part combines the findings of the first part
and deductively applies the results of other scholarly work dealing with Russia’s identity and
strategic culture on the issue of strategic nuclear modernization in Russia.

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2. Modernization of Russia’s Strategic Arsenal (1991-2012)
2.1. Modernization of Ground-Launched Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
The following subchapters deal with the research, development and deployment history as
well as the specifications and advantages of the RS-12M1/2 Topol-M and the RS-24 Yars. In
the end, Russia’s current work on new ICBMs is introduced.

2.1.1. Topol-M
2.1.1.1. Development History
The so-called Topol-M missile complex was code named by Russia RT-2UTTH (internal
designation), or RS-12M1/2 (treaty designation), and designated by NATO as SS-27.1 The
RS-12M1/2 Topol-M was the first intercontinental ballistic missile the Russian Federation
developed after the end of the Cold War, and it was also the first strategic weapon constructed
solely by Russia without any participation of the CIS countries or Ukraine (as was common
previously).2 Research work began in the late 1980s and, in contrast to some other systems
under development such as the RSS-40 Kuryer,3 proceeded even after the fall of the iron
curtain and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union.
The RS-12M1/2 Topol-M development was initially assigned to two companies: the
Ukrainian Yuzhnoye Design Bureau, and the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology
(MITT). Following the breakup of the USSR, the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau withdrew from
the project. In February 1993 President Boris Yeltsin signed decree No. 275 that made the
Moscow-based MITT a sole prime-contractor and developer of the new intercontinental
ballistic missile.4
Although the new missile was initially supposed to carry multiple re-entry vehicles, due to
the expected arms control limitations (START II5) the RS-12M1/2 Topol-M was finally
designed as a single-warhead missile.6 However, it is possible that the initial plans for a
MIRVed ground-based ICBM were eventually used anyway: the RS-24 Yars missile which is
said to be a modified, MIRVed Topol-M variant entered operation in 2010. (See Chapter
2.1.2.)
The RS-12M1/2 Topol-M was from the very beginning developed as a missile with two
basing modes. The work on the silo-based variant, however, began earlier than on the road-
mobile one. It is possible that Russia preferred the development of a silo-based ICBM to the
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road-mobile one because of the expected future arms control limitations on ICBM
development and deployment. In the early 1990s, the START II Treaty, signed in 1993, was
seen as a more or less certain future. The START II Treaty, which, among other things, was
supposed to eliminate all heavy ICBMs, would have left Russia nearly zero silo-based ICBMs
by the end of the millennium. The only remaining silo-based ICBMs would have been the RS-
18s (NATO designation: SS-19s) downgraded to one warhead per missile. Since such a
disproportion in the force structure might not have been considered reasonable by Russian
military officials, the awaiting arms control limitations might have influenced Russian
procurement planners in favor of the RS-12M2 Topol-M ICBM (and simultaneously towards
postponement of the development of the road-mobile version, designated RS-12M1).7
The first test launch of the silo-based version of the Topol-M missile, designated RS-
12M2, was conducted in December 1994. The deployment of the silo-based version of the
Topol-M ICBM occurred three years later in December 1997ii after the last test-launch ended
successfully in July 1997.8 The pace of missile development and deployment was high
although the Topol-M’s precursor, the RS-12M Topol intercontinental ballistic missile
(NATO designation: SS-25), had been flight tested in a relatively short timeframe as well
(from 1983 to 1985). The notable feature here was not the short testing period itself, but rather
the number of test flights conducted before the RS-12 Topol-M was deployed. While in the
Soviet Union fifteen to twenty test launches typically took place before a missile was declared
operational, the RS-12M2 Topol-M entered the so-called evaluative deployment stage in July
1997 (i.e., deployment without warheads being mated) after just four test firings.9 Three
reasons were mentioned for such a short period of testing: firstly, the missile’s derivative
relation to the already operational and reliable RS-12M Topol ICBM; secondly, more
carefully prepared tests than was the case in the Soviet Union; and lastly, insufficient
funding.10
The RS-12M1 Topol-M, the mobile version of its silo-based counterpart designated RS-
12M2 Topol-M, was first flight tested in September 2000. Four additional test launches were
conducted before the missile’s deployment with the last taking place in December 2004. The
RS-12M1 Topol-M was deployed and became fully operational in December 2006.11

ii In 1997 only two Topol-M missiles were deployed in modified SS-19 silos. The deployment of the first silo-
based Topol-M regiment followed in 1998. Given that the system was not fully accepted for service until April
2000, the 1997 deployment could be classified as just “for show”. (Quoted from: Zaloga, The Kremlin's Nuclear
Sword: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1945-2000, 223. “SS-27,” MissileThreat,
http://www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/id.145/missile_detail.asp. Accessed on November 30, 2012.)
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2.1.1.2. Specifications and Advantages
The RS-12M1/2 Topol-M is a three-stage solid-propellant ICBM with a range reported to
be 10.000-11.000 km.12 In its range, length, launch- and throw-weight, it does not differ much
from its predecessor, the Soviet mobile ICBM designated the RT-2PM Topol (NATO
designation: S-25 Sickle).13 Precisely, the RS-12M1/2 Topol-M’s total length is supposed to
be 22,7 m, launch-weight 42.700 kg, and throw-weight 1.000-1.200 kg.14 It is equipped with
only one warhead the yield of which had been previously reported to be 550 kt.15 However,
recent sources state that the missile carries an 800kt-warhead.16
Since the very time of its introduction, the RS-12M1/2 Topol-M had been referred to as
the missile defense penetrator. The claimed large number of penetrations aids, especially the
hypersonic maneuverable warhead,17 contributes to the missile’s high penetration capability.
It can maneuver during the boost phase as well as during the last phase of its flight so that it
evades terminal phase interceptors.18 The missile’s more powerful engine in the first stage
shortens the duration of the boost phase to five minutes19 and thus complicates any satellite’s
detection of the missile launch. It is also reported to use a special protective coating that
should protect the missile from possible laser-gun attacks.20 It is supposed to be able to resist
a nuclear explosion at a distance of 500 m, be protected against electromagnetic pulse and
against physical disturbance as well.21
In addition to the emphasis put on the missile’s penetration capability (defined as the
missile’s capability to reach its target regardless what defensive measures the opponent uses),
a lot of effort was invested in the missile’s survivability (defined as the capability to survive
the opponent’s first strike). The high survivability of the mobile missile system compensates
in part for the very low survivability22 of the silo-based RS-12M2 Topol-M. Mobile ICBMs
are harder to detect in general (the RS-12M1 Topol-M is the first Russian mobile ICBM; the
first Soviet mobile ICBM was the RS-12M1 Topol-M’s predecessor, the RT2-PM Topol,
deployed in the 1980s)23. Furthermore, the mobile RS-12M1 Topol-M that uses the
Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) as a launch platform24 was equipped with a new
concealment technology.25
The missile uses an upgraded autonomous inertial navigational system that receives
information from GLONASS (Globalnaya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema, or Global
Navigation Satellite System).26 Initially, Russia claimed the RS-12M1/2 Topol-M’s accuracy
was 350 m. The conjectures about different (better) actual accuracy were later confirmed.
Today, Russia admits that the missile’s circular error probable (CEP) is 200 m.27

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