Modernity and the Final Aim of History: The Debate over Judaism from Kant to the Young Hegelians

261 Pages·2003·1.59 MB·English

by  Francesco Tomasoni (auth.)

MODERNITYANDTHE FINALAlM OF HISTORY
ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D'HISTOIREDES IDEES
INTERNATIONALARCHIVES OFTHE HISTORY OF IDEAS
187
MODERNITY AND THE FINAL AlM OF HISTORY
The Debate over Judaism from Kant to the Young Hegelians
by
Francesco Tomasoni
FoundingDirectors:
P.Dibonj (Paris) and R.H.Popkin (Washington University,St.Louis & UCLA)
Director:
Sarah Hutton(Middlesex University,United Kingdom)
Associate-Directors:J.E.Force (Lexington);J.C.Laursen (Riverside)
Editorial Board:M.J.H.Allen (LosAngeles);J.R.Armogathe(Paris);A. Gabbey (NewYork);
T.Gregory (Rome);J.Henry (Edinburgh);J.D.North (Oxford); J.Popkin(Lexington);
G.AJ.Rogers (Keele);Th.Verbeek (Utrecht)
MODERNITY AND THE FINAL AlM
OFHISTORY
THE DEBATE OVER JUDAISM
FROM KANT TO THE YOUNG HEGELIANS
by
FRANCESCO TOMASONI
UniversitäDei PiemonteOrientale,
Facoltä diLettere eFilosofia, Vercelli
Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V.
AC.I.P.Catalogue record forthisbook isavailablefromthe Library ofCongress.
ISBN978-90-481-6411-0 ISBN978-94-017-0113-6(eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-0113-6
Newrevisededition andtranslation of
Tomasoni,Francesco,La modemitäeilfinedellastoria.IIdibattitosull'ebraismodaKantai
giovanihegeliani © 1999Morcelliana.
Published withkindpermission0/ Morcelliana,1talia.
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OriginallypublishedbyKluwerAcademicPublishersin2003.
Softcoverreprintofthehardcover 1stedition2003
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FORARRIGOPACCHI
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments IX
INTRODUCTION
1. Prejudicesandthephilosophy 0/history 1
2. Thequestion 0/assimilation and thestartingpoint0/thestudy 8
3. Gur investigation 13
CHAPTERONE
REASON,HUMANITY AND RELIGIONS 17
1. "True" religion and positive religions: Mendelssohn and
Lavater 18
2. Emancipation, toleration andfaith: Mendelssohn, Hamann and
Jacobi 32
3. The redimensioning 0/ Enlightenment: dialogue between
Wizenmann andKant 61
CHAPTERTWO
CHRISTIANITY, PEOPLEAND NATIONS 89
1. Liberty, morality and thestate:Fichte 90
2. Baptism andnationality:Schleiermacherand DavidFriedländer 99
3. Popular religion and reason: the first writings 0/ Hegel at
Tübingen andBern 107
4. Thefate 0/Judaism: thewritings 0/HegelatFrankfurt andJena 128
5. TheSublimeand theelection0/apeople:theBerlin Lessons 149
6. The impossible conciliation:Fries 158
VII
VlII CONTENTS
CHAPTERTHREE
ATHEISM, PROGRESS AND REVOLUTION 167
1. Judaism and myths:Schelling and Strauss 168
2. Self-consciousness and social emancipation: Bruno Bauer and
Karl Marx 175
3. Alienation, monotheism and humanism: Feuerbach, Daumer
and Ghillany 186
4. Jewish Humanism and Messianism: Gotthold Salomon and
Moses Hess 197
CONCLUSION 219
Bibliography 223
Index ofsubjects 239
Index ofnames 245
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Among all the friends and researchers who have encouraged me and offered
their invaluable advice, a special thanks is due to Gianni Paganini for his
penetrating criticism and indispensable support also in the realization ofthis
new revised edition. Furthermore I remember with gratitude Stefano
Minelli, who a few months before his death was pleased to agree to
this edition in the name of Morcelliana. Finally, I am grateful to
Andrew Harwood forhaving worked sodiligently onthetranslation, inclose
collaboration with myself.
IX
INTRODUCTION
1.Prejudices andthephilosophy ofhistory
Freeing oneselffrom one's prejudices is a task which the vast majority of
modern philosophy sets as a condition for proper rational enquiry and for
communicationbetween men on an equal footing and without bias.Iltis not
easy, however, to recognise one's prejudices. Infact, it isvery often he who
feels immune that is most subject to its influence.' This is true of the
thinkers considered here, ever ready to accuse others of prejudice, whilst
being convinced of the irreproachability of their own point of view. The
danger lies in forgetting that even our own point ofview is both relative and
conditioned. Within a tradition that transmits not only behavioural patterns,
but also more or less explicit ready-made judgements, the question is
whether to subject these judgements to rational observation and, through
comparing and contrasting them, arrive at an argued and personally
satisfying opinion, or close oneself within those acquired certainties,
refusing "to submit oneselfto the law ofthe best argument".' In this case,
I For the importance of this requirement see Jürgen Habennas, Erläuterungen zur
Diskursethik.Frankfurta.M.:Suhrkamp,19922, 104,218.
2 For Gadamer's insistence on this point see his interview in Hans-Georg Gadamer im
Gespräch,ed.CarstenDutt.Heidelberg:Universitätsverlag,1993,20.
3 PaulRicoeur, Temps etrecit,111, Letempsraconte.Paris:Du Seuil, 1985,325-326, which
recalls thewell-known polemicbetween Gadamerand Habennas intheircontributions to
Hermeneutik undIdeologiekritik, ed. Karl-Otto Apel. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971. After
pointing outthatthetenn"prejudice" hasvariousmeanings,Ricoeur locatesit"withinthe
orbitofjudgernent"andcompares ittothepartytothecaseinatrial. Ifthis partysought
tosetitselfupinitsowncourt,itwouldbelikeaclaimantchallenginghisownmagistrate.
This is what prejudice does when it refutes the higher appeal of reason. For the
importance ofthe critical moment in Ricoeur, see Gianni Paganini,Lafilosofia francese
nella seconda meta dei novecento, in Storia della Filosofia, previously edited by Mario
Dal Pra, vol. XI, tom I, edited by Gianni Paganini. Padova: Vallardi-Piccin, 1998,261
265,279-282.
2 INTRODUCTION
the force ofprejudice is shown in its most negative sense. Challenging of
person, who claims to be free of bias, is a necessary precondition for
dialogue, but it is not the only one.' Should this person refuse the search for
truth implied also in the questioning of his convictions, then the dialogue
loses its significance and fails even to be a pleasant conversation with
others.'
All the philosophicaI positions considered here clearly reveal the
influence of both environment and tradition, but there will also emerge
differing reactions, even opposing, ranging from simple acceptance of the
prejudices to criticism ofthem and from defence ofone's own certainties to
the search for more valid solutions. Obviously, we ourselves cannot expect
to stand as unbiassed observers, as judges free from the influence of our
time. That would be an even worse prejudice. The same historical distance
that separates us from the period of time under study, with all the
accumulation of experiences in-between, suggests pre-comprehension. In
fact, we are confronting the debate over Judaism after the outbreak ofanti
Semitism in the second half of the nineteenth century and in the twentieth
century, in particular after the shoah. While, on the one hand, it is essential
to bracket these experiences and avoid reading the texts in such a way that
will necessarily lead us to the subsequent consequences, on the other hand, it
must be recognised that our interest is nurtured by the very experiences and
problems arising thereafterand which still have relevance to us today.
If an indispensable part in the assimilation, defence or criticism of the
prejudices is played by reason, our attention is drawn by that movement
which, by antonomasia, upheld the need for rational control over one's own
beliefs and presuppositions, namely Enlightenment. "Radical
Enlightenment" has often been accused of having nurtured the impossible
dream of an absolutely free and autonomous reason, forgetting that
"imprinting", that "horizon" which defines us." Nevertheless, distinction is
4 Forthe henneneuties ofthedialogue inGadamer, but also fortheeritieism raised by Karl
Otto Apel on the inadequaey ofhis methodology, see Paolo Spinieei, Fenomenologia ed
ermeneutiea and Oltre l'ermeneutiea in Storia della Filosofia, XI, tom I, ed. Paganini,
609-616,639-649.
5 On the need for eritieism within dialogue and understanding, see Giuseppe Cambiano,
Ermeneutiea efilologia,"Rivista di filosofia", 1997,3, 448-460, who eomplains that in
Gadamer's interpretation of platonie dialogue there isa lossofthe eritieal dimension "of
doubt, of comparison" (448, 460), of eonfutation (456-457) and sustains Socrates'
asymmetrie position towards interloeuters and traditional language, eonfinning his
objeetiveoffreedomfromprejudiee(458-459).
6SeeGadamer,op.cit.,19.