Modeling of Nature: Philosophy of Science and Philosophy of Nature in Synthesis

464 Pages·1996·28.914 MB·English

by  William A. Wallace

I
The Modeling of Nature
L
Philosophy of Science and
Philosophy of Nature
in Synthesis
William A. Wallace
The Catholic University of America Press
Washington, D.C.
Copyright © 1996
The Catholic University of America Press
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum
requirements of American National Standards for Information
Science-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library materials.
ANSI Z39.~8-1984.
@
Library or Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Wallace. William A.
The modeling of nature: philosophy of science and philoso
phy of nature in synthesis I by William A. Wallace.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
I. Aristotle-Views on Science. 2. Science-Philosophy.
3. Science-Methodology. 4· Philosophy of nature. I. Title.
QI51.A8wJ5 1996
~01-dc20
96-5378
ISBN 0-8132-0859-9 (cloth: alk. paper)
ISBN 0-8132-0860-2 (pbk. : alk. paper)
Contents
List of Figures IX
Preface XI
Illustration Credits XIX
Part I. Philosophy of Nature 1
1. Nature: The Inner Dimension 3
1.1 The Causal Model 5
1.2 Matter as Nature 7
I.) Form as Nature 9
1.4 Nature as Agent 12
1.5 Nature as End 15
1.6 Necessity in Nature 19
1.7 The Inner Dimension 22
1.8 The Individual Natural Body 27
1.9 Models ofYarious Natures 31
2. Modeling the Inorganic 35
2.1 Elements and Compounds 38
2.2 Elemental Constituents 40
2·3 The Inorganic Form 45
2·4 Activity and Reactivity 49
2·5 The Ultimate Substrate 53
2.6 Natural Generation 58
2·7 Outer Space 63
2.8 States of Matter 67
2·9 Models of Inanimate Substance 70
2. IO Planet Earth 73
3. Plant and Animal Natures 76
3.1 Species of Organisms 77
v
vi Contents
3.2 Metabolism and Homeostasis 81
3·3 Development and Reproduction 87
3·4 Modeling a Plant Nature 92
3·5 Sentience and Mobility 97
3.6 Modeling an Animal Nature 100
3·7 Psychosomatic Components 106
4. The Modeling of Mind 114
4.1 Cognitive Science and Cognition 115
4.2 Sensation [20
4·3 Perception [22
4-4 The Simulation of Sense Knowledge 127
4·5 Intellection I3[
4·6 Basic Types of Concepts [35
4·7 Intentionality [39
4·8 Intelligibles and Sensibles [46
4·9 Truth: Active and Passive [50
4.10 Computer Intelligence [53
5. Human Nature 157
5·[ Life Powers and the Human Soul 158
5.2 Entitative Pelfection [63
5·3 Human Cognition [68
5·4 Appetition and Emotion [74
5·5 Volition 176
5.6 Human Nature in Action [80
5·7 Operative Perfection 185
5.8 Intimations of Metaphysics 189
Part II. Philosophy of Science 195
6. Defining the Philosophy of Science 197
6. I The Break with Aristotle [98
6.2 Beginnings of the Discipline 202
6.3 Critiques of Science 205
6-4 The Logical Construction of Science 210
6.5 The Historical Development of Science 2 16
6.6 Science and Natural Philosophy 22 I
6.7 Science and Nature 227
6.8 The Philosophy of Science 232
7. Science as Probable Reasoning 238
7. I Measurement and Metrical Concepts 239
7.2 Theories and Theoretical Concepts 244
Contents vii
7·3 Hypothetico-Deductive Reasoning 246
7·4 Theoretical Entities and Their Modeling 249
7·5 A Fuller Typology of Concepts 254
7.6 Causation, Event Ontology, and Probability 258
7·7 Knowledge, Opinion. and Belief 262
7.8 Topics and Probable Reasoning 266
7·9 The Social Construction of Science 275
8. The Epistemic Dimension of Science 280
8.1 Causal Connections 281
8.2 Definitions 285
8·3 Demonstrations 292
8·4 Foreknowledge and Suppositions 297
8·5 The Demonstrative Regress 300
8.6 Models and Ontology 308
8·7 A Logical Empiricist Ontology 312
8.8 The Two Ontologies Compared 319
9. Conceptual Studies of Scientific Growth 323
9.1 Geometrical Optics: The Rainbow 324
9.2 Planetary Astronomy: The Moon and the
Planets 334
9·3 Statics and Kinematics: Falling Bodies 341
9·4 Biology: The Motion of the Heart and
Blood 350
9·5 Optics: Light and Color 355
9·6 Dynamics: Universal Gravitation 359
9·7 Chemistry: Atoms and Molecules 364
9·8 Biochemistry: The DNA Molecule 369
10. Controversy and Resolution 377
10.1 The Demonstration Long Lost 380
10.2 The Face of the Moon 384
10·3 The Earth's Motion 390
10·4 What Moves the Blood? 396
10·5 Experimenting with the Prism 400
10.6 The Cause of Gravity 406
10·7 Quantifying Qualities 409
10.8 The Modeling of Nature Revisited 4[5
10·9 Philosophy of Science: A Reprise 420
Bibliography 427
Index 437
Figures
1.1 The Causal Model 24
1.2 The Inner Dimension 26
1.3 The Individual Natural Body 27
1.4 A Powers Model of Various Natures 31
2.1 Electron Orbits of Elements in the
Periodic Table 41
2.2 Electron Orbits in the Hydrogen and
Helium Atoms 43
2·3 Electron Orbits in the Sodium Atom 46
2·4 Crystal Lattice of Salt 48
2·5 Accidental and Substantial Change 60
2.6 A Powers Model of an Inorganic Nature 71
3.1 Elements of Homeostasis 82
3·2 Conventional Models of a Water Molecule 85
3·3 Conventional Models of a
Glucose Molecule 86
3A A Space-Filling Model of the
DNA Molecule 90
3·5 A Powers Model of a Plant Nature 95
3.6 The Stimulus-Response Model 100
3·7 Macllina speculatrix 101
3.8 A Schematic Robot Model 103
3·9 Animal Powers 104
3.10 A Powers Model of an Animal Nature 105
4·1 Periplaneta computarrix 129
4·2 Concept Formation 133
4·3 Human Cognitive and Appetitive Powers 134
4-4 Basic Types of Concepts 140
4·5 Intentions of Intellect and Will 143
4·6 First and Second Intentions 145
ix
x Figures
5·1 A Powers Model of Human Nature 159
5.2 Powers of a Healthy Animal 165
5·3 Powers of a Healthy Human Organism 167
5·4 Human Powers in Operation 183
5·5 Human Perfectibility 187
7.1 Additional Types of Concepts 255
8.1 Quine's Ontology 315
9·1 Modes of Radiation in the Rainbow 328
9·2 Path Widths in the Production of Colors 329
9·3 The Production of the Primary Rainbow 330
9-4 Projection from a Fixed Incline 345
9·5 Projection from Variable Inclines 346
9.6 Experimenting with Horizontal Projection 347
9·7 Descartes' Diagram for the Primary and
Secondary Rainbow 356
9.8 Newton's One-Prism Experiment 357
9·9 Newton's Experimellfum crucis 358
IO.I An Overlay Model of Human Nature 419
Preface
T
he basic insight behind this volume must be credited to Aristotle,
the "Father of Western Science," in whose PhYsics we first find for
mulated the ideal of a scientific study of nature. The Insight is that
the human mind, contrary to the teaching of the skeptics of Aristotle's
day, is capable of transcending the limitations of sense and of grasping
the natures of things. To succeed in this quest it is endowed with a spe
cial capability, namely. that of reasoning from the more known to the less
known. from the clearly perceived appearances of things to their hidden
but intelligible underlying causes. In some cases, as when trying to pen
etrate into the material substrate of the universe-what Aristotle was to
call "protomatter" (Julie prote)-the mind must reason by analogy (kat'
allalogian) and settle for a type of proportionate understanding.! To use
the modern idiom, in foundational quests one must employ modeling
techniques to penetrate into nature's secrets. This portion of our insight,
only recently recognized by many philosophers, is signaled in our title.
"The Modeling of Nature."
The modeling here suggested is not of a kind with a model one might
construct to predict the weather, to make an economic forecast, or oth
erwise to achieve a practical result, granted that it has elements in com
mon with them. Rather the intent is more speCUlative, theoretical, at
ground epistemological-what might be termed "epistemic." The mean
ing is that conveyed by the Greek episteme, Aristotle's term for knowl
edge that is genuine knowing and thus to be differentiated from opinion
(doxa). When individuals have an opinion on a matter they think they
know, and yet they really do not know, for they allow that the contrary to
what they hold might be true. But when they know scientifically-and,
I. Physics, Book I, chap. 7, 191a8: "As for this underlying nature [protomatter],
it is knowable by analogy."
xi
xii Preface
for Aristotle, "epistemic" knowing is the same as "scientific know
ing"-they are certain of the object of their knowledge, and this pre
cisely because they know it through the causes that make it be as it is.
The difference between opinion and science, or epistemic knowing,
assumes importance in contemporary philosophy because of a serious
situation that has developed regarding the natural and human sciences.
Part of the problem derives from the Scottish empiricist David Hume,
who embraced a type of skepticism that denied to the human mind the
ability ever to grasp a causal connection. Part of it derives from the Ger
man idealist Immanuel Kant, who extended Hume's line of reasoning to
propose a more extreme agnosticism: the human mind is radically inca
pable of knowing things as they are in themselves. Both positions are
difficult to reconcile with the advances made in the study of nature dur
ing the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and yet whole generations of
philosophers have found themselves blocked by Humean and Kantian
aporiai. As a consequence, in the present day there are few proponents
of a realist epistemology that is capable of vindicating science's knowl
edge claims. The logical empiricist phase of the mid-twentieth century
registered the most serious failure in this regard. Perhaps it is not sur
prising that relativism and pragmatism have now become the dominant
movements. with science seen as "justified belief" at one extreme or as
myth and rhetoric at the other, but with all agreed that it can no longer
be differentiated from opinion. Science too is fallible and revisable, ever
incapable of arriving at truth and certitude.
Such a view of science, and its consequent appraisals of their results,
would have scandalized Galileo Galilei and Sir Isaac Newton, the "Fa
thers of Modem Science." Obviously it calls into question not only their
contributions but even the reality of the Scientific Revolution, for in this
view that great historical event produced only a plausible way of look
ing at things, ultimately devoid of epistemic value. Galileo surely would
have rejected this appraisal of his discovery of mountains on the moon,
satellites of Jupiter, phases of Venus, and the laws wherewith he
launched his "new science" of motion. For he, as we now know, made
skillful use of demonstrative techniques to achieve his results, operating
within the context of Aristotle's Posterior Allalytics to overthrow the
"old science" of the Schools.2 Newton too was Aristotelian in his
2. See our Ga/ileo s Logic of Discol'ery alld Proof The Background. COlllelll. and
Use of His Appropriated Treatises on Aristotles Posterior Analytics. Dordrecht
Boston-London: K1uwer Academic Publishers. 1992; also Sec. 9.2 below. This is not
to say that Galileo was an Aristotelian pure and simple, for he rejected many of Aris-