Modality in Leibniz's Philosophy by Chloe D. Armstrong A dissertation submitted in partial ...

235 Pages·2015·2.74 MB·English

Modality in Leibniz’s Philosophy
by
Chloe D. Armstrong

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Philosophy)
in the University of Michigan
2015

Doctoral Committee:

Professor Tad M. Schmaltz, Chair
Professor Gordon Belot
Professor George P. Hoffmann
Professor Louis Loeb

© Chloe D. Armstrong
Acknowledgements

Leibniz develops a metaphysical system according to which a person’s nature
includes traces of everything that happens in the universe. When I think about the
important influences that shaped my dissertation it suffers the same feature, its
origin including traces of all details of my life and the people in it. Accordingly
recognizing all those influences worthy of acknowledgement feels like it requires an
infinite analysis.
However, I cannot omit recognizing Tad Schmaltz, Louis Loeb, Gordon
Belot, and George Hoffmann, for being so generous with their time, intellects, and
comments on this project. Particularly Tad, who worked as tirelessly as I did at
times, and who offered advice and guidance on every aspect of this process. I am
indebted to the University of Michigan philosophy department, and the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for their research support.
Additionally, I am grateful to those participants of the 2015 Metaphysics and
Methodology symposium at the Canadian Philosophical Association Congress, the
2014 South Central Seminar in the History of Early Modern Philosophy, and the
2013 Franco-American Workshop on the History of Modern Philosophy, ENS Lyon,
for engaging with earlier drafts of these chapters. Time and time again I have
benefited from the enthusiasm, unwaveringly sharp minds, patience, and kindness of
the graduate students, faculty, and staff at the University of Michigan. Their efforts
motivated me to do better work, and helped me make so many of those
improvements. In the busiest times my friends and family offered emergency snack
deliveries, ice-cold diet cokes, and bicycle rides. Thank you all so much.

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Table of Contents
(cid:1)
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................... ii
(cid:1)
List of Abbreviations .............................................................................................................. vi
(cid:1)
Abstract ................................................................................................................................ viii
(cid:1)
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1
(cid:1) (cid:1)
1 Necessitarianism .................................................................................................... 3
(cid:1) (cid:1)
2 Modal Variantism and Leibniz’s Quasi-Modal Notions .......................................... 9
(cid:1) (cid:1)
3 Summary of Chapter 1 ........................................................................................ 11
(cid:1) (cid:1)
4 Summary of Chapter 2 ........................................................................................ 14
(cid:1) (cid:1)
5 Summary of Chapter 3 ........................................................................................ 15
(cid:1)
Chapter 1: Necessitarianism & Modality 1670-80 .............................................................. 18
(cid:1) (cid:1)
1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 18
(cid:1) (cid:1)
2 Leibniz’s Letter to Wedderkopf ............................................................................ 20
(cid:1) (cid:1)
2.1 Leibniz’s Commitment to Necessitarianism .................................................. 20
(cid:1) (cid:1)
2.2 Divine Creation and Necessity ...................................................................... 21
(cid:1) (cid:1)
2.3 Necessity and God’s Freedom ....................................................................... 25
(cid:1) (cid:1)
3 On the Omnipotence and Omniscience of God and Human Freedom ................. 27
(cid:1) (cid:1)
3.1 Strategy One: Possibility and Imaginability .................................................. 29
(cid:1) (cid:1)
3.2 Strategy Two: Necessity of the Consequence ................................................ 37
(cid:1) (cid:1)
4 The Confession of a Philosopher .......................................................................... 41
(cid:1) (cid:1)
4.1 First Version (1672) ...................................................................................... 42
(cid:1) (cid:1)
4.2 Second Version (1677?) ................................................................................. 53
4.3(cid:1) Per se Necessity and the Dreaded Doctrine of Necessitarianism .................. 60(cid:1)
4.3.1(cid:1) Per se Modality and Essences ................................................................ 60(cid:1)
4.3.2(cid:1) Per se Modality and the Necessitarian Argument .............................. 67(cid:1)
NC

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(cid:1) (cid:1)
4.3.3 Returning to the “Confession” ................................................................ 73
(cid:1) (cid:1)
5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 75
(cid:1)
Chapter 2: Necessitarianism & Modality 1681-99 .............................................................. 80
(cid:1) (cid:1)
1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 80
2(cid:1) Transitioning Away from Per se Modality ........................................................... 86(cid:1)
(cid:1) (cid:1)
3 The Complete Concept Account, 1672-1686 ........................................................ 94
(cid:1)
3.1 Logical Foundations ......................................................................................... 94
(cid:1) (cid:1)
3.2 Metaphysical foundations ............................................................................. 101
(cid:1) (cid:1)
4 The Complete Concept Account, 1686 ................................................................ 107
5(cid:1) Leibniz’s Problematic Account of De re Modality .............................................. 115(cid:1)
(cid:1) (cid:1)
5.1 Arnauld’s Worry ..........................................................................................1 15
(cid:1) (cid:1)
5.2 Three Rejected Proposals ............................................................................. 118
(cid:1) (cid:1)
5.2.1 Reduction to Truth in a World ............................................................. 118
(cid:1) (cid:1)
5.2.2 Counterparts ......................................................................................... 120
(cid:1) (cid:1)
5.2.3 Hypothetical Necessity ..........................................................................1 21
(cid:1) (cid:1)
5.3 Criteria for an Account of De re Contingency .............................................1 22
(cid:1) (cid:1)
6 Two New Modal Accounts .................................................................................. 124
(cid:1) (cid:1)
6.1 Infinite Analysis ...........................................................................................1 24
(cid:1) (cid:1)
6.2 Possible Free Decrees ................................................................................... 141
(cid:1) (cid:1)
6 Necessitarianism .................................................................................................1 56
(cid:1) (cid:1)
7 Conclusion ..........................................................................................................1 59
Chapter 3: Necessitarianism & Modality 1700-1716 ......................................................... 161(cid:1)
(cid:1) (cid:1)
1 Introduction ........................................................................................................1 61
2(cid:1) Background: The Theodicy and Being a Cautious Metaphysician ...................... 164(cid:1)
(cid:1) (cid:1)
3 Varieties of Necessity: Absolute, Hypothetical, and Moral .................................1 70
(cid:1) (cid:1)
4 The Necessitarian Argument from Omniscience. ................................................ 178
5(cid:1) Possible Free Decrees in the Theodicy ................................................................. 181(cid:1)

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(cid:1) (cid:1)
6 The Necessitarian Argument from God’s Perfection ........................................... 184
(cid:1) (cid:1)
6.1 Premise 3: This World is Necessarily the Best. ....................................... 185
ATC
(cid:1) (cid:1)
6.2 God Necessarily Chooses the Best World ....................................................1 88
(cid:1) (cid:1)
7 Freedom: Spontaneous, Intelligent, and Contingent Action ................................1 97
(cid:1) (cid:1)
7.1 Divine Freedom ............................................................................................ 198
(cid:1) (cid:1)
7.2 Human Freedom ........................................................................................... 202
(cid:1) (cid:1)
8 Inclining ‘without Necessitating’ ......................................................................... 206
(cid:1) (cid:1)
9 Leibniz’s discussion of other Necessitarians ........................................................2 10
(cid:1) (cid:1)
10 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 213
(cid:1)
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 215
(cid:1)
Appendix: List of Key Works ...............................................................................................2 17
(cid:1)
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................... 219

v
List of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used for primary texts frequently referred to in the text,
keyed to the works in the Bibliography.

A = Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe (Leibniz 1923)

AG = Leibniz: Philosophical Essays (Leibniz 1989)

CP = Confessio philosophi: papers concerning the problem of evil, 1671-1678 (Leibniz 2005)

C = Opuscules et fragments inédits de Leibniz. Extraits des manuscrits (Leibniz 1961)

DSR = De summa rerum: metaphysical papers, 1675-1676 (Leibniz 1992)

G = Die philosophischen Schriften (Leibniz 1875–90)

Grua = Textes inédits d'après les manuscrits de la Bibliothèque provinciale de Hanovre
(Leibniz 1948)

H = Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom on Man and the Origin of Evil
(Leibniz 1985)

J = Oeuvres de Leibniz, Série II: Essais de Théodicée-Monadologie Lettres entre Leibniz et
Clarke (Leibniz 2006)

L = Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters (Leibniz 1969)

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LA = The Leibniz-Arnauld correspondence (Leibniz 1967)

LOC = Leibniz: The labyrinth of the continuum: writings on the continuum problem, 1672-
1686 (Leibniz 2001)

NE = New Essays on Human Understanding (Leibniz 1996)

P = Leibniz: Logical papers: a selection (Leibniz 1966)

PW = Philosophical writings of Leibniz (Leibniz 1973)

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Abstract

Leibniz analyzes contingency in terms of a range of different notions: hypothetical
necessity, per se contingency, infinite analysis, possible free decrees of God, and moral
necessity. These have been interpreted as attempts to retreat from the neccesitarian view he
adopts in his early work, but I defend the view that Leibniz’s commitment to
necessitarianism—the claim that all truths are necessary—is an important and unwavering
feature of his system.
The core of Leibniz’s modal theory is the thesis that the denial of a necessary truth is
contradictory. Leibniz thinks that if we take all necessary truths into account, including the
nature of God, God’s understanding of essences, and his will to do what is best, then all
things considered all truths are necessarily true. All truths are necessarily true because the
denial of any truth contradicts some necessary feature of God. Instead of understanding
Leibniz’s subsequent theories of contingency as abandoning necessitarianism, I treat them as
attempts to account for distinctions his interlocutors draw. Rather than eschew all talk of
contingency, Leibniz offers and liberally invokes proxies for this notion.
I trace the development of Leibniz’s various accounts of contingency from his early to
mature work in order to illustrate that they are best understood in a necessitarian
framework. I develop versions of his various accounts of contingency, including per se
contingency and hypothetical necessity (Chapter 1), infinite analysis and possible free decrees
of God (Chapter 2), and moral necessity (Chapter 3). The outcome of my project is a
systematic treatment of Leibniz’s surrogate or proxy theories of contingency within his
necessitarian framework. It also establishes the character of Leibnizian possible worlds, which
are key for the grounding of contingent truths in the goodness of God’s will. Instead of
representing all logical space, possible worlds represent alternative plans for God’s world
creation, and are thus constrained by metaphysical principles informed by God’s nature.

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