Modality and Meaning

350 Pages·1994·8.506 MB·English

by  William G. Lycan (auth.)

MODALITY AND MEANING
Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy
Volume 53
Managing Editors
GENNARO CHIERCHIA, University of Milan
PAULINE JACOBSON, Brown University
FRANCIS 1. PELLETIER, University ofA lberta
Editorial Board
JOHAN V AN BENTHEM, University ofA msterdam
GREGORY N. CARLSON, University of Rochester
DAVID DOWTY, Ohio State University, Columbus
GERALD GAZDAR, University of Sussex, Brighton
IRENE HElM, MIT., Cambridge
EWAN KLEIN, University of Edinburgh
BILL LADUSAW, University of California at Santa Cruz
TERRENCE PARSONS, University of California, Irvine
The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.
MODALITY
ANDMEANING
by
WILLIAM G. LYCAN
University of North Carolina at Chapel HiU
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-0-7923-3007-3 ISBN 978-94-011-0936-9 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-0936-9
Printed an acid-free paper
AII Rights Reserved
© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1994
Softcover re print ofthe hardcover Ist edition 1994
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
In memoriam
Janet Grace Lycan, 1905-1991
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface xiii
Acknowledgements xiii
Sources and Abstracts xv
PART I MODALITY
Chapter 1. The Trouble with Possible Worlds. 3
1. Meinong vs. the Forces of Decency 4
2. The Theoretical Status of Nonexistents 6
3. The Real Problem 10
4. Continuing Hostilities 11
5. Approaches to Possibility 14
6. The Meinongian Quantifier as Nonobjectual 16
Chapter 2. Three Conceptions of Possible Worlds. 25
1. A Thumbnail History 25
2. Lewis' Reversal 27
3. The Independence of the Indexicality Thesis 30
4. Lashed to the Masts 34
5. Lewis' Argument Against Impossibilia 39
Chapter 3. Ersatzing for Fun and Profit. 45
1. Potential World-Surrogates 45
2. Combinatorialism 47
3. Problems for Combinatorialism 48
vii
viii
4. Tractarian Combinatorialism 55
5. Prognosis 58
Chapter 4. Against Concretism. 73
1. Understanding, or Not Understanding, Relentless 73
Meinongianism
2. Some Disadvantages of Relentless Meinongianism 75
3. Mature Lewis' Modal Realism 80
4. Three Further Objections to Mature Lewis 83
5. Lewis Against Us Ersatzers 87
6. Summing Up 90
Chapter 5. Essences. 95
1. The Case for Haecceitism 95
2. A Visit with Quine 99
Chapter 6. Fiction and Essence. 109
1. The Conservative Line 109
2. Opening Defense of the Conservative Position 110
3. McMichael's Issue 113
4. The Modal Properties of Fictional Individuals 115
5. McMichael's Argument 117
6. More on Behalf of the Conservative Position 118
7. ~s, Haecceities for Nonactuals 120
8. Two Further Options 123
9. Geach's Puzzle about Intentional Identity 124
10. Edelberg's Asymmetrical Cases 127
TABLE OF CONTENTS ix
Chapter 7. The Paradox of Naming Resolved by a Kinder,
Gentler Theory of Direct Reference. 135
1. The Paradox and the Possibilities 136
2. Plantinga's Compromise 139
3. The Plantinga Problem Generalized 140
4. A Paratactic Approach to Attitude Contexts 142
5. A Two-Scheme Theory 145
6. Abbreviation and the Spot-Check Test 149
7. Direct Reference 150
8. Frege's Puzzle 152
9. Empty names 156
Chapter 8. Relative Modality 171
1. Modalities in Natural Language 172
2. Immediate Philosophical Returns 178
3. Moral Psychology 185
PART II MEANING
Chapter 9. Semantic Competence, Funny Functors, and
Truth-Conditions. 203
1. Logical Space 204
2. Frege's Horizontal 207
3. Substitutional Quantification 211
4. What Is Semantical Muteness? 217
5. A New Counterexample 218
6. Grades of Understanding 221
7. Indexicals 223
x
Chapter 10. Logical Constants and the Glory of Truth-
Conditional Semantics. 233
1. Davidson's VlmdeTjuI Project 233
2. "Meaning Postulates" 235
3. "Logical Constants" 237
4. The Underlying Magnitude 241
5. Meaning Postulates Reinstated 243
6. The Damage 244
7. Denouement 245
Chapter 11. Propositions and Analyticity. 249
1. Quine Against Analyticity 250
2. The First Unpromising Account 251
3. The Second Unpromising Account 254
4. Truth by Convention 256
Chapter 12. Stipulative Definition and Logical Truth. 263
1. Stipulative Definition 263
2. The Objections 264
3. The Ann Arbor Defense 273
4. And so what? 279
Chapter 13. Analogy and Lexical Semantics. 283
1. Polysemy 285
2. Ross' Apparatus 288
3. Metaphor 291
4. Two Criticisms 294
5. Repercussions and Alleged Repercussions 298
TABLE OF CONTENTS xi
BIBLIOGRAPHY 305
NAME INDEX 327
SUBJECT INDEX 333