Modal Matters: Essays in Metaphysics PDF
Preview Modal Matters: Essays in Metaphysics
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/3/2020,SPi Modal Matters OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/3/2020,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/3/2020,SPi Modal Matters Essays in Metaphysics Phillip Bricker 1 OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/3/2020,SPi 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries ©PhillipBricker Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin Impression: Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY,UnitedStatesofAmerica BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressControlNumber: ISBN–––– PrintedandboundinGreatBritainby ClaysLtd,ElcografS.p.A. LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/3/2020,SPi To Margi, Nora, and Adam, for all their love and support. OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/3/2020,SPi OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/3/2020,SPi Contents Preface ix Acknowledgments xiii Part . Reality . Introduction:ASketchofReality() . RealismwithoutParochialism() Postscript() Part . Possible Worlds Realism and Actuality . ConcretePossibleWorlds() . IslandUniversesandtheAnalysisofModality() . AbsoluteActualityandthePluralityofWorlds() . IsolationandUnification:TheRealistAnalysisofPossible Worlds() . ReducingPossibleWorldstoLanguage() . QuantifiedModalLogicandthePluralDeRe() Part . Modal Plenitude . PrinciplesofPlenitude() Postscript() . PlenitudeofPossibleStructures() Postscript() . AllWorldsinOne:ReassessingtheForrest-Armstrong Argument(/) . OnLivingForever() Part . Humean Perspectives on Truthmaking, Mereology, Spacetime, and Quantities . Truthmaking:WithandwithoutCounterpartTheory() . TheRelationbetweenGeneralandParticular:Entailmentvs. Supervenience() . CompositionasaKindofIdentity() OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/3/2020,SPi viii . CompositionasIdentity,Leibniz’sLaw,andSlice-Sensitive EmergentProperties() . TheFabricofSpace:Intrinsicvs.ExtrinsicDistanceRelations() . IsThereaHumeanAccountofQuantities?() Bibliography Index OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,7/3/2020,SPi Preface This volume consists of thirteen papers that have been previously published (one onlyinpart)andfivepapersthathavenotbeenpublishedbefore.Ihavemadeonly minorchangestopreviouslypublishedpapersandtheunpublishedpapersthathad been available on my website. Footnotes that were added for this volume are in squarebrackets.ForthreeofthesepapersIhaveaddedsubstantialpostscripts,either to account for relevant literature written after my paper, or to note how my views havedeveloped. DavidLewiswrote, inthe introductiontohis first volume of papers: “Iwouldhave likedtobeapiecemeal,unsystematicphilosopher,offeringindependentproposalson a variety of topics” (Lewis a: ix). It’s different with me: all of my work in metaphysics, from my days as a graduate student at Princeton, has been loosely governed by a certain underlying picture of reality, and certain fundamental prin- ciplesthatItaketoholdsway.Butowingtosomecombinationoftimidity,distrac- tion,andjustplainlaziness,Ineverattemptedtolayoutindetail“mysystemofthe world.”Mostofthepapersinthisvolume(Chapterexcepted)arebutfragmentsof that system. In the introductory Chapter, “A Sketch of Reality,” I provide the backdropthattiesthefragmentstogether. No doubt, among philosophers, my views in the metaphysics of modality are closely associated with Lewisian modal realism. And, indeed, I do believe in a pluralityofconcretepossibleworlds,ononenaturalwayofunderstanding‘concrete’. (SeeChapter.)Buttwocaveatsareinorder.First,mybeliefinmathematicalentities andstructureshasalwaysbeenmuchfirmerthanmybeliefinpossibleworlds.When I was a graduate student, there was talk of Kreisel’s dictum, as paraphrased by Dummett: “The problem is not the existence of mathematical objects but the objectivityofmathematicalstatements”(Dummett:xxxviii). Thatstuckinmy craw.Howcantherebeobjectivestatementswithnothingforthosestatementstobe about,truthsungroundedinreality?(SeeChaptersand.)IsuspectIhavebeena mathematicalPlatonistsince,asayoungchild,Itookthenumberstobemyspecial friends, with distinct personalities, and with whom I competed in all manner of sports (though they needed my assistance to swing the bat, or throw the ball). MyPlatonismhasevolvedsincethen,butIamnolessconvincedthatmythoughts about mathematical entities reach their target. The objectivity of mathematics demands that there be a subject matter for mathematics, and there is no reason to think that the physical world can play that role. What makes my belief in possible worldslesssecureisjustthatitislessclearthatmodalstatementsareobjectivelytrue, orthatonlyconcretepossibleworldscansupplytherequiredsubjectmatter. The first caveat,then, is thatmyrealismabout possible worldsis partof amuch wider realism. The second caveat is that my realism about possible worlds is not LewisianmodalrealismbecauseIdonotfinditcoherenttoholdthattheactualand themerelypossiblehavethesameontologicalstatus.Asagraduatestudent,Iworried
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