Работа магистра наук - Исследование последствий приобретения Российской Федерацией французских амфибийных кораблей типа Mistral. Baker P.T. A study of the russian acquisition of the french Mistral amphibious assault warships

152 Pages·2.363 MB·English

NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

A STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITION OF THE
FRENCH MISTRAL AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS

by

Patrick Thomas Baker

June 2011

Thesis Advisor: Mikhail Tsypkin
Second Reader: Douglas Porch
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June 2011 Master‘s Thesis
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A Study of the Russian Acquisition of the French Mistral Amphibious
Assault Warships
6. AUTHOR(S) Patrick Thomas Baker
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Monterey, CA 93943-5000
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
In 2009, Moscow opened negotiations with Paris to purchase the Mistral class amphibious assault ship. In December
2010, Russia indicated that it was prepared to move forward with an agreement to buy two Mistral class warships,
with the option of building two more jointly at a Russian shipyard. Neither Russia, nor the Soviet Union ever
possessed a vessel with the capabilities of the Mistral class. An amphibious assault ship would be a new addition to
the Soviet/Russian naval arsenal. The fact that Russia must turn to foreign suppliers to modernize its fleet capabilities
indicates that Russia‘s domestic arms industry lacks the capability to produce a range of modern warships. The
Mistral is the first significant arms sale of a major NATO power (France) to a country that some still see as a threat.
For this reason, the sale has raised fears among the smaller NATO members, who charge that Paris has brushed aside
their security concerns for national and economic reasons. This thesis argues that the Mistral sale is driven by
Russia‘s need to acquire modern command and control and shipbuilding technologies, rather than increase its
amphibious assault capabilities per se.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF
Mistral, Russian Navy, Russian Naval Modernization, Amphibious Assault Warships, Helicopter PAGES
Carriers, NATO Arms sales, NATO solidarity, NATO Baltic relations 152
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

A STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITION OF THE FRENCH MISTRAL
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS

Patrick Thomas Baker
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 2000

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(EUROPE AND EURASIA)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2011

Author: Patrick T. Baker

Approved by: Mikhail Tsypkin, PhD
Thesis Advisor

Douglas Porch, PhD
Second Reader

Harold Trinkunas, PhD
Chair, Department of National Security Affairs
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ABSTRACT
In 2009, Moscow opened negotiations with Paris to purchase the Mistral class
amphibious assault ship. In December 2010, Russia indicated that it was prepared to
move forward with an agreement to buy two Mistral class warships, with the option of
building two more jointly at a Russian shipyard. Neither Russia, nor the Soviet Union
ever possessed a vessel with the capabilities of the Mistral class. An amphibious assault
ship would be a new addition to the Soviet/Russian naval arsenal. The fact that Russia
must turn to foreign suppliers to modernize its fleet capabilities indicates that Russia‘s
domestic arms industry lacks the capability to produce a range of modern warships. The
Mistral is the first significant arms sale of a major NATO power (France) to a country
that some still see as a threat. For this reason, the sale has raised fears among the smaller
NATO members, who charge that Paris has brushed aside their security concerns for
national and economic reasons. This thesis argues that the Mistral sale is driven by
Russia‘s need to acquire modern command and control and shipbuilding technologies,
rather than increase its amphibious assault capabilities per se.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION................................................................1
B. IMPORTANCE ................................................................................................1
C. PROBLEM AND HYPOTHESIS ...................................................................2
D. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................4
II. RUSSIAN PLANNING AND REASONS BEHIND THE SELECTION OF
THE MISTRAL .........................................................................................................15
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................15
B. RUSSIAN PLANNING DOCUMENTS .......................................................15
C. RUSSIAN STATE ARMAMENTS PROGRAM (GVP) ............................17
D. WHAT STARTED THE TREND TOWARD MISTRAL? .......................19
1. Russian Defense Industry ..................................................................20
2. Outdated Shipbuilding Facilities ......................................................24
3. Further Arguments Against Domestic Design and Production
Only .....................................................................................................30
4. Tirpitz Plan Redux .............................................................................31
5. Lessons Learned From Georgia Conflict .........................................33
E. CURRENT RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIPS ..................................37
F. NEW RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS WARSHIPS BESIDES THE
MISTRAL ........................................................................................................40
G. CURRENT RUSSIAN AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY ..............................41
H. OTHER COMPARABLE AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS
TO THE MISTRAL ........................................................................................44
I. MISTRAL CAPABILITIES .........................................................................49
J. RUSSIAN NAVAL CAPABILITY GAPS ...................................................54
1. Command and Control ......................................................................55
2. Hospital Ship or Disaster Relief Warship ........................................57
3. Long Range Cruises to Show the Flag .............................................58
4. Amphibious Assault ...........................................................................59
K. GENERAL PLACEMENT OF RUSSIAN MISTRALS .............................61
1. Pacific Fleet.........................................................................................62
2. Baltic Fleet ..........................................................................................68
3. Northern Fleet ....................................................................................69
4. Black Sea Fleet ...................................................................................70
L. RUSSIAN NAVAL INFRASTRUCTURE ..................................................72
M. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................78
III. EFFECTS OF MISTRAL SALE ON NATO ALLIANCE ....................................81
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................81
B. BALTIC AND POLISH CONCERNS .........................................................81
C. EU COUNCIL/PARLIAMENT REACTIONS ...........................................87
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D. NATO RESPONSE BEFORE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF
SALE ...............................................................................................................89
E. LISBON SUMMIT RESULTS .....................................................................96
F. NATO REACTIONS POST FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT ...................98
G. BALTIC REACTIONS POST-OFFICAL ANNOUNCEMENT...............99
H. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................104
IV. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................107
A. LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE POTENTIAL SALE ......................107
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................111
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................131

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