Ministerial advisors : role, influence and management.

123 Pages·2011·1.15 MB·English

by  OECD

Ministerial Advisors
Role, Influence And MAnAgeMent
Contents
Executive summary Ministerial Advisors
Chapter 1. The phenomenon of ministerial advisors
Chapter 2. The employment framework for ministerial advisors Role, Influence And MAnAgeMent
Chapter 3. Functions and influence of ministerial advisors
Chapter 4. Are the frameworks governing ministerial advisors sufficient?
Chapter 5. Case studies: Austria, United Kingdom and Canada
Annex A. Code of conduct for special advisors, United Kingdom
Annex B. Guidelines for special advisors in Denmark
Annex C. Methodology of the survey
further reading
M
Matheson, A. et al. (2007), “Study on the Political Involvement in Senior Staffing in
is
and on the Delineation of Responsibilities Between Ministers and Senior Civil Servants”, t
e
OECD Working Papers on Public Governance, OECD Publishing. ria
OECD (2007), “Political Advisors and Civil Servants in European Countries”, l A
d
Sigma Papers, No. 38, OECD Publishing. v
is
o
r
s
R
o
l
e
, In
f
l
u
e
n
c
e
A
n
d
M
A
Please cite this publication as: n
A
OECD (2011), Ministerial Advisors: Role, Influence and Management, OECD Publishing. g
e
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264124936-en M
e
n
This work is published on the OECD iLibrary, which gathers all OECD books, periodicals and t
statistical databases. Visit www.oecd-ilibrary.org, and do not hesitate to contact us for more
information.
Isbn 978-92-64-12492-9 -:HSTCQE=VWY^W^:
42 2011 21 1 P

Ministerial Advisors
ROLE, INFLUENCE AND MANAGEMENT
This work is published on the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD.
The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect
the official views of the Organisation or of the governments of its member countries.
This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of
or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and
boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area.
Please cite this publication as:
OECD (2011), Ministerial Advisors: Role, Influence and Management, OECD Publishing.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264124936-en
ISBN 978-92-64-12492-9 (print)
ISBN 978-92-64-12493-6 (PDF)
Photo credits: Cover © Shutterstock/Brian A Jackson.
Corrigenda to OECD publications may be found on line at: www.oecd.org/publishing/corrigenda.
© OECD 2011
You can copy, download or print OECD content for your own use, and you can include excerpts from OECD
publications, databases and multimedia products in your own documents, presentations, blogs, websites and
teaching materials, provided that suitable acknowledgment of OECD as source and copyright owner is given.
All requests for public or commercial use and translation rights should be submitted to [email protected]
Requests for permission to photocopy portions of this material for public or commercial use shall be addressed
directly to the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) at [email protected] or the Centre français d’exploitation du
droit de copie (CFC) at [email protected].
3
FOREWORD –
Foreword
Political leaders, ministers and heads of government rely on advice from
senior civil servants and, increasingly, from so-called ministerial advisors.
This is a growing group of people who are essential to help these officials
make informed strategic decisions, keep up with different stakeholders and
accelerate government responses. Unlike senior civil servants, ministerial
advisors are exempt from the requirement of political neutrality.
The number and influence of ministerial advisors have become a source
of public concern in the last decade in many countries. Media and
government enquiries have pointed out their growing numbers, the opacity
of their status and the lack of clear accountability structures in which they
operate. As of 2011, these concerns have not been fully addressed in most
OECD countries. The OECD Survey on Ministerial Advisors, carried out
across 27 respondent countries, shows that the majority of these countries
have not developed a governance framework promoting transparency,
integrity and accountability for ministerial advisors.
Clean government requires integrity frameworks that regulate the
interactions between the public sector and stakeholders, notably to prevent
risks at the politico-administrative interface. Because of the inherent risks
linked to the responsibilities of top decision-makers and their advisors, the
Public Governance Committee has taken a pioneer approach to identify and
mitigate these risks.
This report builds on the results of two surveys carried out with senior
public servants and ministerial advisors, respectively. It encourages a
forward-looking policy debate about ministerial advisors on the basis of
evidence on how to optimise their contribution in different politico-
administration settings. In particular it provides insight into the steps taken
by countries to establish a clear governance framework by:
• Defining advisors’ tasks, delineating their functions as distinct from
those of senior public servants and setting the boundaries they may
not overstep, such as giving orders to public servants;
MINISTERIAL ADVISORS: ROLE, INFLUENCE AND MANAGEMENT © OECD 2011
4
– FOREWORD

• Setting integrity standards for ministerial advisors, for instance
through codes of conduct and pro-active disclosure of private
interests to prevent conflict of interest;
• Increasing transparency not only in respect to the number of
advisors but of their overall cost, profiles, tasks and competencies;
• Clarifying the accountability structure in which advisors operate, in
particular by specifying that ministers are accountable for the
conduct of their staff.
The report was prepared by Elodie Beth, Administrator in the Reform of
the Public Sector Division in the Public Governance and Territorial
Development Directorate. Janos Bertok, Acting Head of Division, provided
strategic guidance to the project. Special thanks go to those experts who
provided case studies on national experiences with ministerial advisors,
namely: Stefan Ritter, Special Advisor in the Chancellery in Austria; Joe
Wild, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet in the Privy Council in Canada; as
well as Sue Grey, Propriety and Ethics Team, in the Cabinet Office in the
United Kingdom. Thanks are also due to Ken Kincaid, Kate Lancaster, and
Karena Garnier for editing and preparing the report for publication.

Rolf Alter
Director
Public Governance
and Territorial Development Directorate
MINISTERIAL ADVISORS: ROLE, INFLUENCE AND MANAGEMENT © OECD 2011
5
TABLE OF CONTENTS –
Table of contents
Executive summary .......................................................................................................... 9
Chapter 1The phenomenon of ministerial advisors .................................................... 15
1.1. Why are ministerial advisors appointed? .............................................................. 16
1.2. Senior public servants’ perspectives on ministerial advisors ................................ 18
1.3. How ministerial advisors contribute to policy making .......................................... 21
1.4. The status of ministerial advisors .......................................................................... 22
1.5. How ministerial advisors and public servants work together ................................ 23
1.6. Ministerial advisors’ job descriptions ................................................................... 29
1.7. Working boundaries .............................................................................................. 29
1.8. Conclusion............................................................................................................. 31
Notes ............................................................................................................................ 32
Chapter 2 The employment framework for ministerial advisors ............................... 33
2.1. General employment rules for the public service often apply ............................... 34
2.2. The minister determines an advisor’s appointment and term of employment ....... 35
2.3. Pay based primarily on the salary scale in the public service ............................... 39
2.4. Conclusion............................................................................................................. 42
Notes ............................................................................................................................ 43
Chapter 3Functions and influence of ministerial advisors ......................................... 45
3.1. What ministerial advisors regard as their main functions: strategic advice
and co-ordination .................................................................................................. 46
3.2. Ministerial advisors: a source of public concern ................................................... 49
3.3. Conclusion............................................................................................................. 53
Notes ............................................................................................................................ 54
Chapter 4 Are the frameworks governing ministerial advisors sufficient? ............... 55
4.1. Same standards of conduct apply to public servants and ministerial advisors ...... 56
4.2. Advisors seldom required to disclose private interests publicly ........................... 59
4.3. Only information on numbers of advisors readily available ................................. 61
4.4. Advisors accountable solely to their ministers ...................................................... 63
4.5. Misconduct seldom sanctioned ............................................................................. 65
MINISTERIAL ADVISORS: ROLE, INFLUENCE AND MANAGEMENT © OECD 2011
6
– TABLE OF CONTENTS
4.6. Reforms to improve transparency, integrity and accountability ............................ 67
4.7. Role for centres of government in managing ministerial advisors? ...................... 71
4.8. Conclusion............................................................................................................. 71
Notes ............................................................................................................................ 73
Chapter 5 Case studies: Austria, Canada and the United Kingdom .......................... 75
5.1. Ministerial advisors in Austria .............................................................................. 76
5.2. Exempt staff in Canada ......................................................................................... 85
5.3. Special advisors in the United Kingdom ............................................................... 90
Notes ............................................................................................................................ 97
Annex A Code of Conduct for Special Advisors, United Kingdom............................ 99
Annex B Guidelines for Special Advisors in Denmark ............................................. 109
Annex C Methodology of the survey ........................................................................... 113
References ..................................................................................................................... 117
Tables
Table 1.1. How countries define ministerial advisors ......................................... 24
Table 5.1. Reasons for appointing ministerial advisors in Austria ...................... 80
Table 5.2. Main changes in the Model Contract for Special Advisors
in the United Kingdom ....................................................................... 94
Table 5.3. Main changes in the Code of Conduct for Special Advisors in the
United Kingdom ................................................................................. 96
Figures
Figure 1.1. Why ministerial advisors are appointed: advisors’ and public servants’
standpoints .......................................................................................... 17
Figure 1.2. Benefits of employing ministerial advisors: views of senior public
servants ............................................................................................... 21
Figure 1.3. Formal arrangements for clarifying the roles of ministerial
advisors ............................................................................................... 28
Figure 1.4. Ministerial advisors’ view of their working relations with public
servants ............................................................................................... 30
Figure 2.1. What employment rules apply to ministerial advisors? ..................... 35
Figure 2.2. The minister’s discretionary powers in managing advisors ............... 36
Figure 2.3. Determining ministerial advisors’ basic pay ...................................... 39
MINISTERIAL ADVISORS: ROLE, INFLUENCE AND MANAGEMENT © OECD 2011
7
TABLE OF CONTENTS –
Figure 2.4. Are advisors allowed to have outside, concurrent sources of
remuneration? ..................................................................................... 41
Figure 3.1. Insights from ministerial advisors into their actual functions ............ 47
Figure 3.2. Main sources of public concern.......................................................... 52
Figure 4.1. Practices banned or restricted by standards of conduct ...................... 59
Figure 4.2. Objectives of disclosure of private interests ....................................... 60
Figure 4.3. How publicly available are disclosures of private interests? .............. 61
Figure 4.4. What private information are ministerial advisors requested
to disclose? .......................................................................................... 62
Figure 4.5. What information on ministerial advisors is available? ..................... 63
Figure 4.6. To whom are ministerial advisors accountable? ................................ 64
Figure 4.7. Types of sanctions in the event of ministerial advisors’
misconduct .......................................................................................... 66
Figure 4.8. To what extent have countries addressed public concerns over
ministerial advisors? ........................................................................... 70
Boxes
Box 1.1. Why ministers appoint ministerial advisors: evidence from
New Zealand ...................................................................................................... 19
Box 2.1. Ministerial advisors’ remuneration: the Austrian experience ..................... 40
Box 3.1. The political cabinet in the Ministry of Environment, Poland .................... 50
Box 4.1. Integrity standards for ministerial advisors in New Zealand ...................... 57
Box 4.2. Sanctions applicable in the event of misconduct by special advisors
in Finland ........................................................................................................... 66
Box 4.3. Reforms in the United Kingdom to enhance transparency
and accountability .............................................................................................. 69
Box B.1. Main provisions of Denmark’s Standard Job Contract for Special
Advisors ........................................................................................................... 111
MINISTERIAL ADVISORS: ROLE, INFLUENCE AND MANAGEMENT © OECD 2011