Mind, Brain, and Free Will

251 Pages·2013·1.101 MB·English

by  Richard Swinburne

Mind, Brain, and Free Will
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Mind, Brain, and
Free Will
Richard Swinburne
1
3
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Contents
Preface vii
Introduction 1
1. Ontology 4
2. Epistemology 40
3. PropertyandEventDualism 67
4. InteractiveDualism 100
5. AgentCausation 125
6. SubstanceDualism 141
7. FreeWill 174
8. MoralResponsibility 210
AdditionalNotes 230
Index 239
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Preface
Idiscussedmanyoftheissuesofthepresentbookinapreviousbook,TheEvolutionof
theSoul(1986,revisededition1997).Withafewrelativelysmallexceptions(thenature
of the soul, discussed at the end of Chapter6 of this book, being the main one), my
conclusions on those issues remain the same. But many of the arguments by which
Isupportthoseconclusionsaredifferent,and—Ibelieve—deeperandstronger,based
onafulldiscussionofunderlyingphilosophicalissues(e.g.thecriteriafortheidentityof
events and substances, and the grounds for asserting that a certain state of affairs is
metaphysicallypossible)whichunderliedifferencesamongphilosophersaboutissuesof
mind and body. Also, this book includes a far fuller, and to my mind far more
satisfactory, discussion than did The Evolution of the Soul, of what kind of free will
humanspossess;andintheprocessIhavebeenabletotakeaccountinthepresentbook
of the important results of recent neuroscience about the brain mechanisms which
underlieourintentionalactions.
I have used some material from the earlier book, as well as material from several
articles of mine published in the last few years: ‘From Mental/physical Identity to
Substance Dualism’ in (ed.) P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman Persons, Human and
Divine,OxfordUniversityPress,2007,pp.142–65;‘Checosamirendeme?Unadifesa
del dualismo delle sostanze’ in (ed.) A.Lavazza, L’Uomo a Due Dimensioni, Bruno
Mondadori, 2008; ‘Could anyone justifiably believe epiphenomenalism?’, Journal of
ConsciousnessStudies,18no3–4(2011),196–216;‘DualismandtheDeterminationof
Action’ in (ed.) Richard Swinburne, Free Will and Modern Science, British Academy,
2011; and ‘How to determine which theory of personal identity is true’ in (ed.)
G.GasserandM.Stefan,PersonalIdentity—SimpleorComplex?,CambridgeUniversity
Press,2012.Thankstotheeditorsand/orpublishersofthesearticlesforpermissionto
reusetheirmaterial.Iammostgratefultothetwoanonymousrefereeswhoproduced
valuablecommentsonapenultimatedraftofthisbook,asalsotothosemanyphiloso-
pherswithwhomIhavearguedabouttheissuesovernumerousyears.Andmythanks
finallytoSarahBarkerfortypingandretypingearlierversionsofthebook,andtoPeter
Momtchiloff for welcoming yet another book of mine and guiding it through the
publicationprocess.
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Introduction
The focus of this book is the nature of human beings—whether we are merely
complicated machines, or souls interacting with bodies; and what follows from this
for whether we have free will in a sense which makes us morally responsible for our
actions. But I think that we cannot make much progress in these two well explored
fields without discussing certain very general preliminary issues of metaphysics and
epistemology.
So Chapter1 is devoted to the general issue of what sorts of things there are, and
what are the criteria for one such thing being the same as another such thing.
I distinguish three kinds of thing: substances (the constituents of the world such as
electrons, planets, and houses), their properties (such as weighing 1000 kg, or being
spherical), and events (occurrences at particular times, which consist in substances
having or changing their properties). I then consider what are the criteria for two
substances, properties,or eventsbeingthe samesubstance, property, or event.Imust
askthosereaderswhoarenotprofessionalphilosopherstobepatientwithwhatmight
seem the rather abstract hair-splitting arguments of this chapter. For only with clear
criteria for the identity of substances, events, and such like can we answer questions
about whether mental events are merely brain events (i.e. the same events as brain
events), or whether I am the same thing (same substance) as my body. In Chapter2
Iconsiderwhatmakesabeliefthatacertaineventoccurredorthatacertainscientific
theoryistrue,orthatsomepropositionispossiblytrue,ajustified(orrational)belief.
And again I have to ask those readers who are not professional philosophers to be
patient, as the full relevance of my conclusions on these issues will only be apparent
laterinthebook.Foritisonlywhenwehaveasatisfactoryaccountofwhatmakessuch
beliefs justified, that we will be in a position to assess the justification of a scientific
theory that our intentions do or do not cause brain events; or the justification of the
claimthat(inacertainsenseof‘possible’)itispossiblethatIcouldloseallofmypresent
bodyandacquireaverydifferentone.
Equippedwithimportantmetaphysicalandepistemologicalresults,Ithencomein
Chapters 3–7 to examine the relation of our life of thought and feeling to what
happens in our brains and so in our bodies. I argue in Chapter3 that there are two
kinds of event in the world—physical events (including brain events) and mental