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Military Intelligence January-March 2003: Vol 29 Iss 1 PDF

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Preview Military Intelligence January-March 2003: Vol 29 Iss 1

D)|D LD : ”e le Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin tantaarh ita ta e! 2003 PB 34-03-1 'y Fundamentals of Intelligence From the Editor The initial theme of this issue of MIPB addressed a single aspect of the U.S. Army's ongoing Transforma- tion, “Intelligence Synchronization.” However, in light of the number and diversity of changes affecting the Military Intelligence community, it was determined that we needed to broaden the issue’s scope. The change to “The Fundamentals of Intelligence” was,designed to review the unchanging foundation of what we do in light of the ongoing Transformation. These unchanging foundations can be distilled to three basic functions: collection, analysis, and pro- duction. While these functions capture the foundati6n ofArmy MI support to operations, we must expand upon their most basic form in order to reflect the greatér specialization to support the full spectrum of Army operations from the six Intelligence tasks, Thése intelligence tasks reflect the unchanging founda- tions of what we do as MI professionals. HoweVer, they Were neither codified nor aligned with the Intelli- gence Battlefield Operating System (BOS) tasks presented in the Army'Universal Task List (AUTL). The MI Doctrine Division seized upon the opportunity to not only ensurerthe Jntelligence BOS AUTL tasks were synonymous with the Intelligence Tasks, but also to updated the Intelligence Tasks to reflect their support to the force, and MF role in supporting. the Army Trarsformation. As you will see, the Intelligence Tasks are now subsumed under the four new — TaSks—which are also the Intelli- gence BOS tasks listed in tive AUTla(FM 7-45). aa The Army’s Transformation process has addressed Ben BOS and.e very branch which will lead many . revisions to our doctrine. FM 2-Ointelligence (Drait),.will’ serve as theMilitary Intelligence Corps’ Tier 1 (Keystone) field manual. This field manual identifies the fundamental Intelligence tasks: hspi e 4) Support toSituational Understanding Q) Perform Intelligenee Preparation oft heB aitlofield tuck 4) Perform Situational Development rh» (J Support to Force Protection ae=tcea haaa ng es 4) Support to Strategic Responsiveness U Perform Indications and Warnings (1&W) Intelligence Readiness 4) Intelligence, Surveillanésyand'Reconnaissance (ISR) Q Perform Intelligence Synchromization “J Perform ISR Integration ic*erc e m speraelertisetone 4} Conduct Reconnaissance ) Conduct Surveillance 4) Support to Effects “J Support to Targeting 4) Support to Information Operations J Perform Battle Damage Assessment This issue of MIPB provides many articles addressing one or more aspects of the fundamentals of intelligence. We cannot, however, point to these fundamentals alone as the reasons behind our success. We must not forget the most important element, the soldiers and civilians who execute the Intelligence mission day in and day out. The fundamentals offer a road map on what they are to accomplish and how they will accomplish it. It is for the MI soldiers and civilians, however, to achieve success through their training, innovation, adaptive thinking, and increasingly capable enabling tools. This issue of M/IPB pro- vides many insights on how that may be accomplished. Mechael| eenroeseae te d e Michael P. Ley LITARY NTELLIGENCE Professional Bulletin PB 34-03-1 FEATURES Volume 29 Number | 5 Synchronized Chaos: Visualization, Integration, and Dynamic Thinking January-March 2003 by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen K. Iwicki 9 Benchmark for Intelligence Transformation STOCKWELL - MUL STAFF: by Michael C. Taylor Commander 15 Supporting Close Combat: Intelligence Synchronization FER oe Brigadier General John M. Custer by Dennis Lewis = Deputy Commandant 19 Modified Intelligence Synchronization Matrix—A Technique Nie for Futures for Brigade Combat Team Operations LIBRAKIcS Jerry V. Proctor by Captain Tod A. Langley Director of Combat Developments 22 Coalition Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance: The Charles A. Hayward CAESAR Project Managing Editor by Colonel Stephen J. Bond 26 HORIZON, The Unifying Tool of French n IntelligdhbBA@NECOLLEGE Michael P. Ley Editor by Lieutenant Colonel Martin J. Renard, French Army 1 |B RARY Elizabeth A. McGovern 31 MASINT: New Eyes in the Battlespace Associate Editor by William K. Moore (U.S. Army, Retired) FEB JoNellM . Elkins 35 Language Tools Operations Supervisor by Kenneth Dunn US. | JENT First Lieutenant James C. Bean 36 Tactical Source Profiling and Indicator Analysis PDERPUS, OFY Design Director by Chief Warrant Officer Three Gregory M. Garcia Specialist Ernesto A. Bolafios 42 Visualization of Threats and Attacks in Urban Environments Associate Design Director by Frederick J. Diedrich, Kathleen M. Carley, Jean MacMillan, Keith Baker, Staff Sergeant Sharon K. Nieto Lieutenant Colonel Jerry L. Schlabach, and Lieutenant Colonel J. Victor Fink Contributing Designer and 46 Combined Go Team Transformation in the Republic of Korea Administration atah Ebh ete Specialist Misty L. Simpkin by Captain Alan G. Rogers William J.G leason 49 Civilians on the CTC Battlefield—Threat, Opportunity, or Distraction Cover Design: by Captain Matthew J. Morgan Specialist Ernesto A. Bolanos 52 Evaluation of the Enemy Situation: The Role of the G2 in the Cover photographs courtesy of German Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) U.S. Army by Major Rob Trabucchi Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelli- 55 Unit Intelligence Staff for Small Armies (or for Small Deployments gence Center and Fort Huachuca from Big Armies) Vs1m ipeaeie:rm p eenc steerss (USAIC&FH) publishes the Military by Major Phil L. Hughes, New Zealand Intelligence Corps intelligence Professional Bul- 58 The Bathtub That Doesn’t Hold Water letin quarterly under provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB disseminates ma- by Collin A. Agee terial designed to enhance individu- 60 SIREEL—Simulated InfraRed Earth Environment Lab als’ knowledge of past, current, and by Stacie Taylor emerging concepts, doctrine, ma- 61 TUAV “Video” Data Can Support Numerous Missions terial, training, and professional de- by John Dugan, Ph.D. and Donald Wurzel velopments in the MI Corps DEPARTMENTS Subscription form is on page 4 2 Always Out Front 80 Professional Reader Disclaimer: This publication pre- 3 CSM Forum 82 MI Heritage sents professional information, but the views expressed herein are 65 Enduring Freedom 84 Contact Information and those of the authors, not the De- 69 AIMP Corner Submissions partment of Defense or its elements. 71 Doctrine Corner The content does not necessarily 74 Proponent Notes Unit Profile—323d Mi Battalion reflect the official U.S. Army posi- 77 TSM-ASAS Corner tion and does not change or super- sede any information in other U.S. By order of the Secretary ofn the y 5SoiS4ahse t al) Army publications. We reserve the Official: Jol BML right to edit any submitted material. Contact Information is on last page JOEL B. HUDSON ERIC K. SHINSEKI Administrative Assistant to the General, United States Army Secretary of the Army Chiefo f Staff 0233801 Always Out Front by Brigadier General John M. Custer Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca Much has been written recently throughout the Unit of Action (UA) about the Transformation of and Unit of Employment (UE). With our Army. We are on a path thousands of sensors sending mil- from an “Iron Army” (whose lions of reports, it quickly becomes strength has been based on clear that the synchronization and layers of rolled homogeneous fusion of such vast amounts of in- steel) to an “Information Army” formation will be the critical path in (whose power revolves around the “See First” paradigm. Synchro- the commander's situational nization of sensors and systems understanding). This transfor- from “mud to space” has long been mation portends great changes viewed as a primary mission of within Military Intelligence. . .our Military Intelligence. Branch. We should, however, Collection: The unique collec- understand up front that al- tion capabilities of our branch will though the “how” of our busi- continue to be a vital resource for ness may drastically change, the Objective Force, and no other the “what” will remain constant branch will contribute as much to throughout the Army's trans- the commander's situational aware- formation. The “what” are the ness. The information provided by Military Intelligence core com- Aerial Common Sensor (ACS), petencies that will provide the Prophet, and the fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) critical path in gaining greater importance and value will be crucial to the “Understand First” construct. Our as our Army transforms to a more flexible, more human intelligence and counterintelligence profession- deployable, more lethal force. als provide another facet to the unique collection equa- The basic framework of the future force “See First, tion, and automation or any other capability simply can- Understand First, Act First, and Finish Decisively” is not replicate their contributions. firmly rooted in our core competencies. The systems Analysis: Even as we build the future Army the need we develop and the soldiers we train will prove to be both the enabling and the deciding factors in the Ob- for human analysis at every echelon remains constant, jective Force's ultimate success. The five Military In- as the “soldier in the loop” can never be replaced by com- telligence core competencies comprise the fundamen- puters. The Distributed Common Ground System-Army tal processes that make our branch so important to (DCGS-A) architecture wiil provide new analytical tools the Army today and so critical to the force we hope to and the dissemination path for vast amounts of required build in the future. | use the acronym “ICAP2” to information. Target recognition technologies hold great quickly enumerate our Military Intelligence core com- promise, but targeting success will require a human brain petencies. These equate to— to decide whether a truck moving through enemy terri- tory is in fact carrying artillery shells or school children. ISR Synchronization The advent of network-centric collaborative tools, flattened Collection information environments, and reach to the joint level to Analysis facilitate targeting capabilities will prove the continuing Presentation requirement for human analysis at every echelon. OoOPorUotveuctUi on ISR Synchronization: The Objective Force's Fu- Presentation: The method a commander's staff uses to ture Combat System (FCS) will depend on the sys- process data into information and ultimately knowledge tems and sensor integration performed by intelligence soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers (Continued on page 4) Military Intelligence CSM Forum by Command Sergeant Major Lawrence J. Haubrich U.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps In my last article | outlined in a chance on Specialist 5 great detail the Quality Assurance Lawrence J. Haubrich. Some- Operating System (QAOS) and one coached, taught, devel- the Leader's Survey Program. The oped, and mentored him! That bottom line up front is: The sur- someone, who took a chance veys provide our Military Intelli- fam on Specialist 5 Haubrich, gence Corps the means to en- > LZ mentored him to become your sure that we train our soldiers to ia 4 Mi Corps CSM. | ask you, the MI meet the needs in your forma- leadership, to take that same tions and that Military Intelligence chance. Groom those great MI (Ml) soldiers are trained to stan- fm Warriors to become that NCO—the dard. | want to thank you, the MI NCO that will take a chance on leadership, for taking this Green 4 the future soldiers of the MI Corps. Tab issue and making our Ml During the last six months | was Corps stronger and preparing our very fortunate to visit the 5th of Mi Warriors for success in the the 104th Reserve MI Total Army Objective Force. School System (TASS) Battalion Again, | ask our great MI lead- § from Fort Huachuca, AZ, at Camp ership for assistance in building Parks Reserve Training area, a stronger MI Corps in the Ob- Dublin, CA. There | observed our jective Force. Another Green Tab MI soldiers conducting a mobile issue is that we need the leader- training team (MTT) and training ship to look into the “STAR MOSs” in our great to standard those reclassified soldiers in MOSs 97B Corps. In the past, | have sent out several emails and 97E. While at Camp Parks | also visited the concerning MI STAR MOSs to the Command Ser- Western Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center geants Major and Sergeants Major in the Mi Corps (WARISC), the 250th MI BN (TE), located in San asking them to board our soldiers for promotion to Rafael, CA, and the 223d MI BN (Linguist) located Sergeant and Staff Sergeant. My comments regard- in San Francisco, CA. | want to thank their leaders ing MI STAR MOSs are direct and to the point; we for showing me around their units, briefing me on are not taking care of soldiers. We need to work on their mission and upcoming deployments, and, most our STAR MOSs and leadership development for importantly, for providing me with the opportunity to our Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Corps to be successful in the Army and the Objective Force. | talk with those great MI warriors assigned to their ask each of you to coach, teach, develop, and mentor units. | also attended the XIV Annual Army Techni- our MI soldiers to be your NCO replacement. This cal Control and Analysis Element (ATCAE) Confer- process starts as soon as the soldier signs into ence 2002 at the National Security Agency (NSA). your formation from initial entry training (IET). Pro- There | had the opportunity to talk with soldiers as- mote those great MI warriors when they enter the signed to the ATCAE and meet with several soldiers zone and deserve to be recommended for the next assigned to the 704th MI Brigade who work in vari- grade. We are responsible for growing our NCO Corps. ous sections in NSA. NSA provides yet another | ask you, the MI leadership, to look in the mirror. example of our MI soldiers doing great things in the Remember the NCO or Officer who took you under joint environment, “Worldwide Support to the his or her wing, took a chance on you, and recom- Warfighter.” mended that you go before the promotion board. Thank you all for what you do for our MI Corps and Remember too that after you went to the promotion our Army. As always, let us take care of each other board, this process of coaching, teaching, devel- and our families. You train hard, you die hard; you oping, and mentoring continued. Someone took train easy, you die easy. Peace needs protection! ALWAYS OUT FRONT! January-March 2003 (Continued from page 2) deployment, these core competencies will continue makes the presentation of information another critical to shape the battlefield and provide the cornerstone factor for a force that will perform battle command on for victory. The allure of technology is narcotic but we the move. How the S2, or “Knowledge Officer,” of the must constantly remind ourselves that both today’s future packages and presents information will directly Army and the Army of tomorrow need trained intelli- influence the commander's decision. This concept of gence professionals v.10 understand how to support “presentation” will emerge as an even more signifi- tactical commanders by manipulating emerging tech- cant consideration for intelligence training as our au- nologies. These professionals will continue to be the tomated processes constantly increase both report- centerpiece of our Branch and the Army. ing speed and the amount of information available to Protection: Force Protection will continue to be of commanders. The S2, or “Knowledge Officer,” will have great importance to commanders, a requirement that to be confident and expert in selecting the crucial must continue to be answered by military intelligence “nuggets” of information the commander requires. units and soldiers deployed across the battlefield. Ev- There simply will not be time for the commander to ery soldier bears a responsibility to protect the analyze everything, and any attempt will quickly de- force but few have the total battlefield perspective bilitate unit operations of our branch. As we report enemy locations, ac- The Military Intelligence core competencies will con- tivities, and intentions, military intelligence person- tinue to provide the foundation for our Army’s suc- nel are specifically contributing to the overall force cess in the Objective Force. Beginning long before protection effort. MIPB Subscription Subscription Order Form Els) be Slat » Jraer rrocessing ode 6489 Please send me subscription(s) for years | no more than 2) for Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB). $21.00 (Domestic, APO, and FPO); $29.40 (Foreign) per year. You can E-mail us at [email protected] or michael [email protected] The total cost of my order is $ All prices include regular domestic postage and handling and are subject to change. | understand this charge is not refundable Address Piease choose method of payment: (Lompany or Personal Name) 0 -heck payable to the Superintendent of Documents 0 GPO Deposit Account No (TITTTITH] {otreet Address) a MasterCard [visa [oiscover (Additional Address/Attention Line) CEETT TTT TTT TTT (Udy, state, ZIP Code) “lu-Mmatecuress and Teepnone umber Expiration Date Please include your E-mail address to confirm Receipt of payment. Authorization Signature Mail to: Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-FDR-CB, Fort Huachuca,A Z 856 13-6000 Military Intelligence Synchronized Chaos: Visualization, Integration, and Dynamic Thinking by LTC Stephen K. Iwicki Critical if we are going to minimize future success is to synchronize the the number of force-on-force fights. flow of intelligence to keep it alive, “See First, Understand First, Act We must enable our units to maneu- channeled to the right places, and First, Finish Decisively” ver out of contact while maintaining constantly adjusting focus to meet their situational understanding. It will the changing needs of our command- —Objective Force Concept be the Unit of Action (UA) (brigade ers. There are three steps necessary Across the spectrum of operations, of today) Commander’s responsibil- to achieve this basic goal: visualiza- intelligence is a dynamic and excit- ity to synchronize all of these mov- tion, integration, and dynamic think- ing endeavor. It involves interactions ing pieces, including information ing. with many different organizations, management, on a scale we have Visualization: Developing systems, data networks, and most never seen before. importantly people. The intriguing and Monitoring with Our intelligence mission will be dynamic nature of the profession Interpretive Tools driven by the need for accurate da- feeds life to the intelligence process tabases. Graphics and text are the Visualization is a term we loosely and its people. As we enter transfor- outputs of our analysis, but data- throw around in casual conversation mation with a heavier reliance on bases represent a large portion of the without much thought. Most people automated systems, we must con- path to those products and as a re- equate visualization with sitting in centrate on developing free-thinking sult drive all of our visualization sys- front of a bank of monitors watching analysts rather than machine opera- tems. Databases are essential to several visual feeds. Visualization is tors. We must recognize that it is in-depth analysis, predictive assess- far more complex and begins with the interaction of the human brain with ments, time-sensitive targeting, and defining the scope of the problem and the many different automated tools situational development for 0-96 the commander's intent. This is our as well as with other analysts that hours. As intelligence professionals, starting point for developing a com- allows us to make accurate assess- our mission is to go beyond “CNN- mon understanding of the situation ments that support the decision- type situation reporting” and identify and the direction we want to proceed. makers. trends and predict future enemy op- We fuse our intelligence prepara- Our Army, our military, and our na- erations. While this type of product tion of the battlefield (IPB) factors tion are undergoing a massive opera- is often presented graphically, its (enemy, friendly, and environment) to tional transformation as a result of analysis is based on historical track- form the basis of the COP. Next we significant international and domes- ing and link and nodal analysis, as add our operational plan to broadly tic events over the last five years. The well as the fusion and retention define the future situation and iden- developments associated with our power of our individual analysts. If a tify what we must accomplish to military's transformation efforts are unit does not take the time to build meet our objectives. Finally, we must forcing us to make major cultural data libraries, there will be no his- communicate and display this “pic- changes in the way we perform in- torical research capability, and this ture” so that the staff and subordi- telligence operations. These factors will lead to flawed analysis. nate commanders understand a challenge us to change the ways we The Army is making great strides shared vision. This is the critical visualize and present information, as we transform to the Objective starting point for all visualization ef- synchronize operations, and train the Force. More and more of our sys- forts. It is difficult to achieve when people who perform these critical tems are continuing to achieve bet- the commander and staff are collo- missions. ter connectivity towards creating the cated. We are about to further com- plicate this endeavor by adding the Objective Force mission accom- Common Operational Picture (COP). plishment and survivability depend As a result, we are collecting more new dimension of networked collabo- heavily on accurate intelligence and pieces of information that come to rative analysis ventures under the reliable communications networks to us Over a growing variety of auto- Objective Force operating concepts. enable rapid standoff engagements mated systems, communications Now that we have started the pro- to destroy the enemy. Our Objective networks, and data formats. If left cess by creating in effect a static Force goals of near-perfect intelli- unmanaged, we surrender increased COP, we must move forward and put gence, high situation understanding, situation awareness Capabilities to our visualization process in motion. and timely, accurate targeting are chaos. The key to our current and We must collect the information January-March 2003 available to us and determine which Observe alization needs across the com- data sources we can have pushed This aspect is something we do all mand. to us, which we must pull, and which the time but do not always incorpo- This entire system has come a ones we may oniy be capable of rate it into the formal doctrinal process. long way since the days of Desert observing. The dimensions of There are many aspects of intelli- Storm when we had paper maps, no “Push, Pull, Observew’i ll change gence that come to our attention via web pages, no email, and a lot of dramatically as we move from the near- real time (NRT) displays. These courier missions. We have a long Legacy Force to the Interim Force include unmanned aerial vehicles way to go if we are going to make and finally reach the Objective (UAVs), air defense artillery (ADA), the next technological leap forward Force. counterfire data, some theater imag- (not a small percentage improve- Push ery intelligence (IMINT), and real-time ment) that is required for the “near human intelligence (HUMINT) report- perfect intel” expected with the Ob- Today, we need to have record ing via radio, to name a few. Most of jective Force. What it really means message traffic pushed to us to these are critical pieces of our deci- are better trained, proactive collec- populate database systems. We sion cycle that must make it into a tion managers and analysts that also need to push non-record mes- database because they are mentally understand dissemination is a two- sage traffic products, such as integrated into our analysis process. way street and are prepared to lead briefings and assessments, via As this currently occurs, by the time data-mining efforts to monitor our email from the relevant commands an analyst takes the time (if they do situation development and targeting; with whom we participate. As we it at all) to generate a record mes- locate the answers in a timely man- reach Objective Force capabilities, sage traffic report to send to and ner; and present that intelligence in data will be pushed across distrib- correlate into all-source analysis a manner consistent with our uted networks to automatically system (ASAS) or the COP, the value commander's visualization needs. populate common databases of the information has likely expired. accessable to the entire force Integration: Information We will leverage advances in meta- Smart filters and defined user pro- Channeling data tagging technology and auto- files will help ensure that users get matic target recognition (ATR) to and Management what they want without having to solve this problem. The benefits of While visualization helps show us specifically ask for it. technical meta data use include what we know, the integration pro- Pull source system identification, data cess is how we maintain the COP, We need to be able to pull prod- quality measurement, and improved enable situational understanding ucts that organizations post to their database administration. ATR will and, more importantly, define our secure home pages. This is impor- eliminate the current gap of informa- information gaps. | recently had the tant because usually the higher or- tion collected but never entered in chance to hear four senior intelli- ganizations never receive the the database. Databasing informa- gence officials from the Depart- complete distribution list for record tion from visual products will remain ment of Defense (DOD), Congress, message traffic. Often times, it is a significant challenge until this tech- and the National Intelligence Com- quicker for a tactical end-user to nology matures. munity speak in separate forums pull the message or product from Doctrinal Note: ATR is also listed about what they felt were the major a secure home page instead of as target recognition aides. changes needed in the US. Intelli- waiting hours for the record mes- Combining “Push, Pull, Observe” gence Community. They all had sev- sage traffic to hopefully arrive over is the most difficult visualization chal- eral common themes that point to a small communications pipe. Ad- lenge that we face. We must figure integration. First, all were in agree- ditionally, over the last few years, a out a way to bring all three of these ment that people are our most valu- new problem has arisen where sev- information dimensions together in able asset and we need to better eral other service organizations only an integrated, time sensitive, ergo- train and manage them. Second, post their reports and no longer nomically smart automation environ- they all mentioned that decision- bother to send out record message ment that updates the COP and our makers generally follow three rules traffic. That means find it, pull it, or common databases in NRT. Some when receiving information: Tell me never see it. As we reach the Objec- of these feeds do not belong to the what you know; Tell me what you tive Force, the pull function will merge Intelligence Battlefield Operating DON'T know, and Tell me what it with our virtual collaboration efforts System (BOS), but are critical for our means. Most of these individuals with lower, lateral, and higher head- success. We must also ensure we ranked telling what we don't know quarters via the Global Information have a common understanding of as the most important of the three Grid (GiG). both visualization systems and visu- factors since it represented the area Military Intelligence of greatest risk when making a deci- and relevant knowledge is required erally to push, pull, and observe sion. to enable full spectrum operations. information. In order for us to be ef- Integration is the means by which Knowledge enables the commander's fective, we must bring all of these we manage the complex process of understanding and guides his deci- factors together to understand and simultaneous intelligence operations. sions on where to fight, when to fight, communicate what it means. The It is simultaneous because we are and how to fight. Senior Army lead- technology revolution has trans- performing many different analytical ers have seriously asked if the UA formed our primary method of dis- functions at the same time. We are S2 needs to be a lieutenant colonel seminating information to classified working the current fight, shaping the (LTC). That is not as far-fetched as web posting, electronic sharing of decisive fight, and sustaining intelli- some may think. The job probably files over networks, and email. Dur- gence operations while simulta- will be as hard or harder than the job ing Operation ALLIED FORCE in neously contributing to the future of a Division G2 today. 1999, we could rapidly pull imagery fight and working toward the desired We all have to remember that in- and reports from a secure homepage endstate conditions. We have to formation fusion and analysis are within several hours, while the record manage multiple information cycles processes that require a combina- message report distribution usually and integrate a wide variety of data tion of smart automated processing did not arrive until several days later. formats to make this process work. systems and interaction with the That is a major difference in the time- Data integration technology is human brain. Any automation sys- liness of reporting. As a result, a criti- changing rapidly. We are shifting to tem is simply a tool we use in our cal issue for Army Intelligence is that a knowledge-based force. The Army trade. If we are good at it, we can the Intelligence Community is evolv- is trading off 50 tons of rolled steel exploit it to answer our commander's ing beyond our dependence on protection (tanks) for the ability to needs. These systems come in stovepiped record message traffic. rapidly deploy, see first, understand many forms that allow us to access We must now address all the plan- first, act first, and finish decisively. That raw and finished products, view live ning factors and data formats shown means our Army is more dependent imagery, maintain situational aware- in Figure 1. on accurate intelligence than ever ness, and engage the enemy through This change is due to increasing before. A conservative estimate is the targeting process. Our systems demands for quicker, NRT reporting that the UA will receive over 17,000 and people reach up, down, and lat- and fusion that our current dissemi- reports per hour from organic sen- sors alone. Some of these inputs will be fully automated, some will require human cognitive interaction, and some will be automation-assisted actions. The UA will have a varying requirement for outside intelligence support as it moves across the spec- trum of operations. The UA will be heavily dependent on outside sources during deployment and en- try operations (much like we are de- pendent on higher and national today). It will be heavily dependent on organic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) during decisive operations (similar to today, NETS but with much greater organic /; J4V.ila y d, capabilities). The challenge is making Parnye,od d uc, ‘g en it all come together faster and with a smaller forward footprint. kp. io¥ye hn Automated sensor exploitation and sensor correlation provides a degree of data and information fusion, but only a human can generate knowl- edge. Knowledge-centric warfare means that precise, detailed, timely, Figure 1. Planning factors and data formats. January-March 2003 nation channels simply cannot pro- Dynamic Thinking: The Mi. Leaders and analysts use them cess quickly enough. Commanders Necessary Synthesis across all three networks (Unclassi- now demand intelligence reporting in fied, Collateral, SCI) to conduct a Skills minutes and hours, vice hours and variety of intelligence functions. We It is our job to understand the deci- days. We now use voice reporting, will increase our reliance on these sion-maker’s intelligence require- classified E-mail, and web postings systems as we move towards multi- ments and manage our efforts to to share information with consumers level security networks and virtual in- meet those needs. Synchronizing quickly. Despite U.S. Message Text telligence centers that tie together the chaotic information sphere is criti- Format (USMTF) requirements, in re- subject matter experts working in cal to our success. Are we thinking ality, formats are no longer standard- collaborative environments. multidiscipline? Are we cross-Ccueing ized and vary with each unit, We need to develop our analysts assets based on single-source tip- command, and operation. No current and leaders better so that they are offs? Are we monitoring all available system is capable of taking these capable of dealing with the dynamic NRT collection systems and corre- various inputs and correlating them nature of our business. Our leaders lating what we see against both an into a common database without sig- must understand how to set the ana- all-source database and the COP? nificant human effort. lytical focus of our intelligence orga- When leaders ensure these types of The Intelligence Community has things are happening, the people in nizations and they must clearly significantly evolved since the birth our organizations will virtually guide understand the commander's re- of our first flagship system, the All- themselves to answering the quirements, his language terms, and Source Analysis System (ASAS). commander's needs. It is not magic, recognize where trade-offs may have We have added significant real- it takes trained people who know to occur to reach those objectives. time and NRT intelligence collec- their assigned systems, know where Our leaders must recognize the im- tion systems that provide a variety to look for the necessary inputs, and, pacts that the fluid nature of battle of visual product formats. As a re- most importantly, constantly com- has on their intelligence operations. sult, the Ml Branch capabilities municate with each other. The dan- We must be dynamic in our thinking have evolved and the timeliness of ger is that we become “COP-centric” and our actions. We must synchro- our information has dramatically in our focus and fail to be predictive nize intelligence support to multiple improved in our assessments and mission full-spectrum fights while constantly performing a mental ISR wargame of Our current challenge is to process planning. possible branches and sequels to properly the increasing quantities of As | stated ea*lier, it is at this stage the current analytical effort. information that come in many dif- that we must synchronize the flow ferent formats and fuse it into us- of information, to keep it alive, chan- Developing intelligence soldiers of able intelligence support to our neled to the right places, and con- all ranks is crucial. We may need to commanders. ASAS is the fusion stantly adjusting focus to meet the reverse current trends and start jun- system that will take us from the changing needs of our commanders. ior soldiers and officers working at Legacy to Objective Force. In the | strongly believe technology is the the higher echelons of the Intelli- Objective Force, the new Distributed number one enabler for our MI sol- gence Community to learn both the Common Ground System-Army diers. Technology will never replace analytical process and the resources (DCGS-A) will be the key ISR pro- the analytical power of the human of the information environment. We cessor at all echelons, receiving and brain but, in the hands of a good will need our best and most experi- —. managing data from national and analyst, it is a major combat multi- enced MI soldiers serving on the front Joint ISR sensors, aerial common plier. We should embrace technoi- lines in the UA. sensor, tactical UAVs, Prophet, and ogy and experimentation at every The Future all the way down to UA organic sen- opportunity. This is not always a As we continue with transformation, sors. conventional approach, but it has we need people who are “master” in- always been a learning experience Despite all of these challenges, telligence analysts, understand the the major drawback with visualiza- for our soldiers and an improvement language and meaning of tactical to the way we produce intelligence. tion and integration is that it tends operations, are automation system No task is impossible. We just lack to ignore our information gaps. This smart, and know our U.S. and coali- the imagination to see the solution. is where dynamic thinking comes tion information sphere well enough into play. We must remember that While MI is clearly a system of to know where to look for the an- machines are only tools of our trade systems, many of us fail to recog- swers we need. You do not learn this and we cannot rely on them to hand nize that computers and other tech- us the correct answers. nologies are the weapons system for (Continued on page 14) Military Intelligence

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