Military Intelligence January-March 1996: Vol 22 Iss 1

59 Pages·22.3 MB·English

+ AE SUPERNIOR S NE UNIVERSIITY L
3 2797 001 143 455
Ad&huary-March 1996
Sete he ec Oe
FROM THE
Atlite Intelligence
EDITOR aw! S
Apply, Validate, and Disseminate
This issue of Military Intelligence, “Tools of Trade," is a timely introduction to some of the doctrine, organizations,
and equipment that make division intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) operations happen. The United States’
commitment of the 1st Armored Division to peacekeeping operations in Bosnia provides the Military Intelligence
Corps an excellent opportunity to apply and validate our latest doctrine, organizations, training, and equipment. We
will test our doctrinal principles of commander driven, synchronized, tailored, split-based, and broadcast intelligence
operations. We will see how well our institutional and unit training prepared intelligence soldiers for real-world opera-
tions. We will measure the promise of new systems like the All-Source Analysis System and Joint Surveillance
Target Attack Radar System against their contribution to successful ground operations. How well we learn from this
experience will depend upon intelligence soldiers, from private to general officer, recording and sharing their experi-
ences with others in the intelligence community. Commanders in particular must make after action discussion and
reporting an integral part of their standing operating procedures and orders. For the Military Intelligence Corps to im-
prove its tools of the trade and execution of intelligence and electronic warfare operations, those who have gained
new experience and knowledge in our trade must share it. The staff of the Military Intelligence bulletin stands
ready to assist you in presenting and disseminating your valuable experiences and lessons learned.
Now on the Worldwide Web
The Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin with the help of Master Sergeant Stacy Smith, 111th MI Brigade,
and Staff Sergeant Ken Taylor, Office of the Deputy Assistant Commandant, is now on the Fort Huachuca Home-
page (http://nuachuca-usaic.army.mil) of the Worldwide Web. Although we still have some work to do on our Web
page's style and content, we have begun to apply the potential of the Center Without Wallis to improve our ability to
keep intelligence professionals informed. Marte! C 7
1996 Worldwide CSM/SGM G2 Conference
The U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca will host the 1996 Worldwide CSM/SGM G2 Conference at Fort Huachuca, Ari-
zona, from 12 to 16 February 1996. The theme for this year’s conference is "Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow's Leaders: Paving the Way
to the 21st Century." The conference action officer is Sergeant Major Long; you can reach him at [phone] or DSN 821-5774. The
point of contact for administrative matters is Sergeant Bolden at [phone], DSN 821-1152, or E-mail boldenc%hual @huachuca-
emh11.army.mil.
The Fort Huachuca Billeting Office will not have rooms available during the conference. The Windemere Hotel and Conference Center (1-
800-825-4656), Sun Canyon Inn (1-800-822-6966), and the Thunder Mountain Inn (1-800-222-5811), all located in Sierra Vista, Arizona,
have rooms available for conference attendees. Those planning to attend must pass both their collateral and SCI clearances to this instal-
lation through their security offices. Forward collateral clearances to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca,
ATTN: ATZS-PSS-P, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-6000 or call [phone] or DSN 879-2105. Send SCI access certification via
SSO channels to SSO Huachuca or call [phone] or DSN 879-6808.
Writer of the Quarter
The Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin is pleased to announce the Writer of the Quarter (January-March 1996) is Captain
Michael W. Shellhammer for his article, " Lessons Learned from Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY." Congratulations to Captain Shell-
hammer and thanks to all of our authors for their great articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. It is contributions like yours that
make this bulletin the professional forum for the Military Intelligence Corps.
How to Submit an Article
1. Select a relevant topic of interest to the military intelligence community.
2. Write an outline to organize your work. Put the bottom line up front and write clear, concise introduction and conclusion paragraphs.
3. Follow proper rules of grammar. Consult DA Pamphlet 600-67 or William A. Mcintosh's Guide to Effective Writing, if necessary.
4. Maintain the active voice as much as possible. Write "Congress cut the budget" rather than “the budget was cut by Congress." (See
DA Pamphlet 600-67, Effective Writing for Army Leaders, paragraph 3-2,b[1].)
5. Send the article to Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-TDL-B, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. Please include with your article—
a. Pictures, graphics, and crests with an adequate description and photographer credits. (We can return photos if so requested.)
b. Acomputer diskette with the article in Word Perfect, ASCII, Microsoft Word or MultiMate.
c. A short biography with the full names of all authors of the article. The biography should include each author's current duty position,
other related assignments, and civilian education. (Tell us if we can print your telephone number and E-mail address with the biography.)
d. A cover letter with work, home, and E-mail addresses and telephone numbers, stating your intent to publish the article.
e. Arelease by your local security office to ensure your article is unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public.
6. Remember, content is the most important part of your article. When in doubt, send us your article—we can work out the details.
PB 34-96-1
Volume 22 Number 1
January-March 1996
STAFF:
Commanding General
Major General Charles W. Thomas
FEATURES
Director of Operations, Training, and
Doctrine
Colonel Robert C. White, Jr 6 mat es Operations Ill: The G2’ ps ieleit M E Ni T
Editor
Sergeant First Class Michael C. Taylor 10 Brigade IEW in a Force Projection Army
Associate Editor 15 Maiden. Voyage of a TEAMMATE rR ON 1996
Elizabeth A.M cGovern
16 Building a Division DISE
Art Director
Corporal Jeff A. Preuninger 18 Lessons From Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY...) ;. Snouldice Library
Graphics Specialist 21 Tailoring the MI Basic Load Lake Superior State University
Private Andrew M. Hobbs
23 Electronic Warfare-British Style Sault Ste. Marie, MI 49789
Administration
Cruz M. Martinez 27 APACHE S2: Improving Intelligence Support to Combat Aviation
29 Heroic Stand of an Intelligence Platoon: A Symbol of the Combat
Purpose: The U.S. Anny Intelligence Center Ability of MI Soldiers
and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) publishes the
33 Project Pathfinder: Breaking the Barriers to More Effective
Military intelligence Professional Buletin
quarterly under provisions of AR 25-30 and the intelligence Analysis
TRADOC Professional Bulletin policy letter. This
36 Medical Intelligence: A Case Study of Azerbaijan
bulletin disseminates material designed to keep
individuals knowledgeable of past, current, and 38 Thanks, Pythagoras: How to Visualize Three Dimensions on
emerging concepts, doctrine, materiel, training, Your Two-Dimensional Map
and professional developments within the
Military Intelligence Corps 40 One Team, One Vector: Reserve Component Intelligence
Submissions: Send manuscripts, letters to the
editor, photographs, and inquiries to
Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-TDL-B
Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. For further DEPARTMENTS
information, phone [phone] or DSN
879-1005
2 Vantage Point 45 Proponent Notes
Subscriptions: Subscription rates are $9.00 per
year (Domestic, APO, and FPO) and $11.25 per 3 CSMForum 49 Reserve Component
year (Foreign). Send change of address and
4 Letters 51 Professional Reader
subscriptions (see page 44) to Commander
USAIC& FH, ATZS-TDL-B, Fort Huachuca, AZ 42 Concepts and Doctrine 53 Unit Profile
85613- 6000. For further information, phone
[phone] or DSN 879-1015 45 Mi Corps Hall of Fame
Disclaimer: This publication presents profes
sional information, but the views expressed
herein are those of the authors, not the Depart-
ment of Defense or its elements. The content
does not necessarily reflect the official U.S
Amy position and does not change or super-
sede any information in other U.S. Army
publications. Use of news items constitutes 7) Official: / ,
neither affirmation of their accuracy nor product
endorsement. The Military Intelligence By Order of the ‘ - in. Plarriser
Professional Bulletin reserves the right to edit Secretary of the Army /| Yvonne M. Harrison
submitted material DENNIS J. REIMER Administrative Assistant to the
General, United States Army Secretary of the Army
Chief of Staff 00989
VANTAGE
POINT
by Major General Charles W. Thomas
the warfighter. UAV support is tiered (by echelon)
with system access and control ranging from eche-
lons above corps to brigade. The specific vehicles
are yet to be determined, but the Army leadership
views the UAV as critical, and we can be sure that
this essential system will remain in our architecture.
The intelligence balance further improves with the
human intelligence (HUMINT) capability that is part
of every DS MI company. Counterintelligence and in-
terrogation remain important, particularly in the force
projection nontraditional missions like Somalia, Haiti,
and what we face in Bosnia, where the need for
HUMINT is high. In fact, often it is the most critical
collection capability we have, especially against un-
sophisticated, technologically ill-equipped opponents.
The GBCS system of the general support MI com-
pany replaces several ground-based SIGINT and
electronic warfare systems, consolidates functionality
of the old systems, and is a technological step for-
ward. GBCS, in concert with the divisional Advanced
QUICKFIX helicopter, provides more detailed and ac-
curate SIGINT than ever before.
ASAS Provides the Fusion
pSAU.h.r omtyo
The A-series division table of organization and equip- Again, not much organic collection belongs to the
ment (TO&E) that emerged from the military intelli- brigade, but the analysis and control team of the DS
gence (Ml) Gulf War retrospective is a better Mi company has enormous capacity, primarily
balanced organization than its 1990 predecessor. through the ASAS architecture, to pull timely intelli-
While there is less organic signals intelligence gence and accept broadcast products efficiently.
(SIGINT), there is more countervailing access to ASAS merges the information of the tactical systems
SIGINT through broadcast intelligence and the with information from higher echelons, including na-
emerging Ground-Based Common Sensor (GBCS) tional level, to optimize the clarity of the intelligence
systems. The divisional direct support (DS) Mi com- picture. Equally important to this balance is the inte-
panies in support of ground maneuver brigades pro- gration of all reconnaissance, intelligence, surveil-
vide this balance by vertically integrating all-source lance, and target acquisition (RISTA) capabilities in
intelligence to the brigades. the division.
The RISTA effort is a critical source of information
All-Source Collection
for the warfighter. First, we focus the systems by illu-
Access to systems outside the brigade is enhanced minating the threat for the commander. Second, the
by the new architecture that includes the All-Source ASAS correlates and places into context the col-
Analysis System (ASAS), the Joint Deployable Intelli- lected information obtained through RISTA. Finally,
gence Support System (JDISS), and associated following the correlation, we make target recommen-
communications systems. Through the Common dations, based on our analysis of the enemy situ-
Ground Station the DS MI company can provide the ation, and feed these targets through ASAS directly
supported brigade with available Joint Surveillance to the appropriate warfighting system. The vertical
Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) informa- and horizontal proliferation of ASAS makes it possi-
tion that can highlight enemy unit movements and ble to more quickly add to situational awareness and
serve as a cue to other sensors. One of these sen- targeting databases. While the current generation of
sors is the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The UAV ASAS makes this a fusion of multiple inputs from nu-
provides the best near-real-time imagery available to merous sensors and human sources, it is only the
Military Intelligence
first step on the path to vastly greater efficiencies in ments of RISTA—making the whole division part of
battle space visualization. the process.
Our Responsibility
Employing the Architecture
MI officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and
The efficient use of this architecture requires care- civilians have an obligation to learn our architecture
fully refined tactics, techniques, and procedures and refine the TTP that implement it. It will not work
(TTP) with accompanying training. Divisional units without a focused effort. We will not be ready for the
develop most TTP through training programs; G2s, ever-increasing pace of change in our architecture’s
S2s, and MI battalion commanders develop and or- technical capability if we cannot use the efficiencies
chestrate them. Frankly, our MI technical architecture currently available.
will not work without these homegrown TTP efforts | am convinced that the high quality officer and
and training. We cannot do this alone from Fort NCO corps that we have today are up to this chal-
Huachuca—it has to be a cooperative effort with the lenge. If you are not, then stand back for those who
field. When it is done with resourceful determination, ‘will take it on. It is too important to allow deterrents—
this architecture not only works, it works with daz- it is a very real leap into Information Age warfare.
zling efficiency. It truly draws together all of the ele- ALWAYS OUT FRONT!
CSM
FORUM
by Command Sergeant Major Randolph S. Hollingsworth
into focus the need for raising their levels of
technical knowledge and skills. NCOs need these in-
creased levels of knowledge and skills to integrate a
new generation of sophisticated systems and doc-
trine into the Intelligence Battlefield Operating Sys-
tem. Our jobs as NCOs is to make the systems
work!
To meet these challenges successfully, the NCO
has a major role to play. First, for NCOs to be effec-
tive, they must be technically and tactically compe-
tent. Second, they must be leaders and trainers at all
times. With this in mind, | want to emphasize the im-
portance of NCOs in making the steady transition to
the new systems and doctrine.
Technical and tactical competence is the bread and
butter of all NCOs. You cannot effectively lead or
train if you do not “Be, Know, Do.” In particular, |
challenge all Ml NCOs to focus on their proficiency in
the major system that they operate or supervise,
whether a collection device, interrogation team, mo-
tor vehicle, or the All-Source Analysis System
(ASAS). Plan to integrate the systems into your rou-
tine and make it happen. The price of this integration
will be a great deal of effort and naturally a few mis-
pSAU.h.r omtyo t akes. Make the mistakes and learn from them now,
After visiting the many commands and talking with rather than on some future battlefield where the price
lots of soldiers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), is blood. The direct benefit derived now will be the
and their leaders, | have seen the tremendous capa- discovery of new capabilities and limitations in our-
bilities and initiative inherent in our military intelli- selves, our soldiers, and our systems.
gence (MI) NCOs. At the same time, | have noticed One concern | have is for the soldiers who operate
that the challenges our soldiers face are increasing in our powerful information systems. | know that in or-
frequency and complexity. This is complemented by der to maintain a unit as fully mission capable, it will
organizational and technological changes that bring require solid and strong leadership from the com-
January-March 1996
mand sergeants major, first sergeants, and senior cornerstone of technically and tactically competent
NCOs. Effectively employing the ASAS, for example, NCOs.
will require a true positive commitment, leadership, The officer will concentrate on the planning and re-
and a “can do” attitude to make it work. This new sourcing of a mission; the NCO will direct the team
system is a real challenge because the skills and
and soldiers in the tasks. The soldier will concentrate
knowledge that enable us to succeed require a high on operating the tools of the trade. This means that
degree of familiarity and experience with it. | have the NCO’s primary duty is to integrate, take on board,
seen some outstanding leaders emerge as a result of and focus the new tools of the trade. This is the con-
their dedication and professionalism to obtain this fa- cept on which our Army has been based—a focus on
miliarity. The point is that once these systems are getting the mission accomplished!
given to us, our mission is to make them work! Just
There are many techniques and procedures for
emphasize what you can do, not on how hard it is or
leading and training. Each option has its pluses and
what it cannot do.
minuses. But the bottom line is, “Build your team,
All NCOs at each level need to ask themselves
train your team, and care for your team.” It is the best
some basic questions about their focus. Do they
guidance we can give our professional NCO for to-
have the right amount of realistic hands-on training?
day and the future.
Do they understand the necessary context and doc-
trine? Have they planned for cross-training, practiced | would like to acknowledge Master Sergeant Michael F.
interoperability, and performed crew drills? These are Fallon for assisting me in writing this column. Thank you
the fundamental elements of any plan to develop and for a job well done!
maintain a team’s proficiency. This proficiency is the ALWAYS OUT FRONT!
LETTERS
To the Editor: time and place using its full syner- targets. With this information, the
istic effect. commander and S3 can develop
We take issue with Major Lamber- g This concept is true at all eche- a plan that targets the enemy’s
son's letter to the editor (July-Sep-
lons. The battalion S2 has every critical structure. If the S2 fails to
tember 1995), particularly where
reason and obligation to identify or incorrectly identifies the en-
he states that identifying the en-
the enemy’s center of gravity. For emy’s center of gravity, it dilutes
emy’s center of gravity is a frivo-
example, if the friendly battalion is the friendly effort.
lous matter for battalion and
to attack an enemy company
brigade S2s. We contend that it is Captain Lisa Bennett and’
strongpoint, that strongpoint de-
critical and the most important in- Captain Bruce Niedrauer
fense has a specific center of
telligence the S2 provides his Fort Huachuca, Arizona
gravity. There is one crucial ele-
commander. If the S2 does not
ment that the enemy commander
identify the center of gravity, then
will rely on for success. To the Editor:
the commander cannot focus his
If the S2 identifies this, then the
efforts. If the S2 omits the center Throughout history, formulaic
of gravity, he infers everything the friendly commander can mass his thinking has been the high road to
enemy has is important. If every- effects against it. Defeating the military disaster. The French out-
thing is important, then nothing is center of gravity defeats the en- numbered the British by odds of
important. When the S2 overlooks emy. Therefore, this process over 3:1 at Agincourt, but numeri-
the center of gravity, he forces the allows the friendly effort to con- cal advantage turned out not to
commander and his staff to piece- centrate on the one sure thing be the deciding factor, and the
meal their effort. whose defeat will directly corre- prevailing idea that armored cav-
However, if the S2 correctly spond to friendly mission success. alry would always defeat infantry
identifies the center of gravity, Identifying the enemy's center proved wrong. | In 1806, the army
then all friendly effort can focus of gravity is not hard. Each situ- of Prussia had one of the most im-
on the one entity that will ensure ation and possible enemy course pressive reputations in Europe,
enemy defeat. When the staff fo- of action is analyzed. It is impor- but Prussia’s mastery of 18th-
cuses on the center of gravity, tant to think as the enemy com- century "chessboard warfare"
their efforts are synchronized. mander thinks: what is he relying could not save it from Napolean’s
Synchronization allows employ- on for success? Once identified, onslaught.” The Wehrmacht man-
ment of the battalion’s battlefield this center of gravity is broken aged to smash through France's
operating system at the critical down into its parts or high value defenses in 1940, not because
Military Intelligence
Germany possessed any supe- and solve the equation in order to that all human options come
riority in either numbers or quality predict the outcome of strategic down to economic calculation, the
of men and machines, but be- events. real difficulty in military operations
cause the French had anchored Mountains Without Molehills (or politics) lies in the details of
their strategy upon a rigid and mis- Although quantitative modeling carrying out those options. This,
guided concept of warfare” (the claims to be "objective" and "sci- perhaps, is the meaning behind
Maginot mentality). A possibly entific," all of its variants rest upon Clausewitz’s remark that although
apocryphal story tells that when the assumptions of the modelers. everything in war is simple, the
President Nixon took office in Furthermore, once one accepts a simplest things are difficult.
1969, members of the new admini- model, one gives up much of Captain Resch sums up the op-
stration applied a computer model one’s ability to test these assump- position to quantitative analysis
to determine how long it would tions against reality. In order to by citing Mr. James Finley's inten-
take to win the Vietnam war and, turn human events into numbers, tionally narrow criticism of the
after entering data concerning researchers must translate real- method. With all due respect to
body counts, kill ratios, gross na- world phenomena into arbitrary Mr. Finley’s perfectly reasonable
tional products and the like, re- symbols. Therefore, these models observations, we prefer to invoke
ceived the answer: "You won the inevitably reflect the intellectual others in our critique. The nuclear
war in 1964." prejudices of their inventors. If, for strategist Bernard Brodie, for in-
This fallacy of rigid and abstract instance, the French general staff stance, notes that while intangible
thought is not dead. In our opin- had made a model to predict the issues of morale, political ideol-
ion, such false logic seems espe- events of a German invasion in ogy, and national will may decide
cially flagrant among the political 1940, we can safely assume that wars, these ideas do not fit nicely
scientists who attempt to analyze the resulting model would have into models. Therefore, those who
strategic affairs using what they produced results reflecting the as- find models appealing too often
call “formal modeling" or "quantita- sumption that the defensive would end up shunting these factors
tive methodologies." In the April- always be the strongest form of aside. As Brodie wrote about his
June 1995 issue of the Military warfare. experiences at RAND—
Intelligence Professional Bulle- The assumptions formal model- Within RAND itself there was a
tin, Captain David Resch intro- ers make about human psychol- quiet but strongly-felt differential be-
duces readers to those ogy seem especially question- tween those who knew how to handle
techniques. However, we urge able. Most current theories in graphs and mathematical sym-
military intelligence professionals quantitative political science rely bols...and those who merely knew
to approach academic theory with on the idea that people behave as how to probe political issues. Ele-
caution. what economists call "rational ac- gance of method is indeed marvel-
The Nature of the Theory tors." According to the "rational ac- ously seductive, even when it is
One should not confuse formal tor hypothesis," people make irrelevant or inappropriate to the ma-
modeling with less pretentious sta- decisions by calculating the rela- jor problems.
tistical methods, such as opera- tive costs and benefits of different Professor Hedley Bull wrote
tions research. Those who options available to them and what has become the classic mod-
practice quantitative methodology then take the path which maxi- ern criticism of such methods. Dr.
would reduce all of war, indeed all mizes their own self-interest. Dif- Bull notes that—
of human affairs, to mathematical ferences in culture, political I know of no odel that has assisted
equations. Quantitative theorists system, or individual character af- our understanding of international re-
aspire to formulate what they de- fect military or political behavior lations that could not just as well
fine as "scientific" laws of human only to the extent that they reflect have been expressed as an empirical
behavior, with the ultimate goal of perceived self-interest. Moreover, generalization. This, however, is not
answering political questions in political scientists tend to interpret the reason why we should abstain
the same definitive way that natu- rational-actor theory in a rigid from them. The freedom of the model-
ral scientists discuss the activity fashion, which denies the exist- builder from the discipline of looking
of subatomic particles. This quest ence of any altruistic motivations at the world is what makes him dan-
has taken many forms, but all of such as honor, duty, or commu- gerous; he slips easily into a dogma-
its variants use the same underly- nity spirit. tism that empirical generalization
ing technique. Researchers make Furthermore, in the real world, does not allow, attributing to the
a series of assumptions about the the costs and benefits of each "op- model a connection with reality it
nature of strategy and politics, so tion" are often blurred. If com- does not have....He has provided an
that they may then express a real- manders can improve their ability intellectual exercise and no more.
world situation in terms of nu- to carry out operations, they can Crystal Balls
meric variables. Then, such completely rearrange the "cost- Those who employ the quantita-
researchers enter these variables versus-benefit" analysis. Even if tive approach to political science
into the formula they have created we accept the dubious premise (Continued on page 50)
January-March 1996
the decisions they support." The
G2 synchronizes the intelligence
effort to provide tailored products
that satisfy priority intelligence re-
quirements (PIR)* by the com-
The G2's Intelligence
mander’s suspense.
The intelligence synchroniza-
tion process describes the
Synchronization Plan method by which the G2 satisfies
individual intelligence _require-
ments. While it requires actions in
each step of the intelligence cy-
cle, it does not replace the cycle.
by Major John F. Lady Although he wrote these words The G2 normally will employ a
before the 1994 manuals ap- phased approach to intelligence
peared, three years of Battle synchronization (see Figure 1).
Editor’s Note: See the July-
September 1995 issue of the Command Training Program For PIR 1, he may be executing
(BCTP) Warfighter Exercise step five of the intelligence cycle
Military Intelligence Profes-
(WFX) observations confirm his (disseminate). For PIR 3, the ef-
sional Bulletin for Directing
comment's continuing relevance. fort may be focusing on step one
Intelligence Operations I and II
Only the effective application of (plan and direct). The G2 should
intelligence synchronization plan- not expect to operate concur-
Intelligence synchronization first ning will render General Sullivan’s rently in the same step of the in-
established itself as a useful tech- comment forever obsolete. telligence cycle for ali PIR. The
nique in 1991 during Operation decisions that the decision points
DESERT STORM when the G2, Defining Synchronization (DPs) support typically require
Third U.S. Army, employed it with Intelligence synchronization products at different times.
great success. Intelligence syn-
contains both a purpose (to sup- Just as intelligence synchroni-
chronization first appeared in
port decisionmaking) and a zation includes a purpose and a
Army intelligence and electronic
product (the delivered answer). product, it excludes several ideas.
warfare (IEW) doctrine in 1992
FM 34-2 provides this definition As FM 34-130, Intelligence Pre-
with the publication of FM 34-8,
on page 2-4, “Intelligence syn- paration of the Battlefield,
Combat Commander’s Hand-
chronization is the process that states, intelligence synchroniza-
book on Intelligence. This idea
ensures the intelligence system tion “is more than simply ensuring
did not receive much doctrinal
provides answers to intelligence that collection systems of various
emphasis, however, until FM 34-
requirements in time to influence sorts are operating 24 hours a
1, Intelligence and Electronic
Warfare Operations, and FM 34-
2, Collection Management and
Synchronization Planning, in
1994. These manuals introduced
intelligence synchronization and
related terms like the intelligence
synchronization matrix (ISM). Un-
fortunately, these manuals have
focused primarily on a by-product,
the ISM, without explaining the
planning process that must pre-
cede an ISM. Effective intelli-
gence synchronization requires
the G2 to develop and execute a inate MISSION
synchronization plan.
How well does the Army con- ~
duct intelligence synchronization? Produce Process
Former Chief of Staff General
Gordon R. Sullivan (Retired), de-
livered this indictment in Septem-
ber 1992, "We often fail to follow
up on PIR, leaving key intelli-
gence questions unanswered. ' Figure 1. Phased Approach to Intelligence Synchronization.
Military Intelligence
day."° Intelligence synchroniza- "The commander establishes— him the intelligence he needs,
tion is more than a trendy phrase. What he wants (intelligence when he needs it, and in the form
It orchestrates the action of each required), When he wants it that he will find most useful.
G2 element and supporting IEW (LTIOV), and How he wants it There is, therefore, no substitute
assets to provide required prod- (format, method of deliveryl)."”
for the commander's involvement.
ucts in the specified timeframe. It The commander explains the The commander may find it wise
comprises the very core of the required intelligence by specifying to establish a standing operating
G2’s role in the unit. the scope he wants in the report.
procedure (SOP) which formal-
This guidance may include these
izes his requirements. Likewise,
Developing the Plan categories: geographic area, spe-
the aggressive G2 should antici-
cific units, types of units, antici-
The intelligence synchroniza- pate and recommend as many
pated events, or other relevant
tion plan describes how the G2 components of this guidance as
factors. Additionally, he may limit
will satisfy a single intelligence re- possible.
the length of the report.
quirement. Each PIR requires a
The G2 completes the intelli-
separate intelligence synchroni- If possible, the commander also
zation plan. An information re- states the time at which he ex- gence synchronization plan
quirement supporting a decision pects to make his decision. He based on the commander's re-
may also require an intelligence should specify how old the intelli- quirements. Essential planning
synchronization plan. gence can be before it no longer tasks include—
The G2’s intelligence synchro- supports his decisionmaking 0 PIR and information require-
nization plan must consider all needs. He also should say ments development.
whether he wants interim updates
five steps of the intelligence cy- C1) Indicator and specific informa-
(and, if so, when) or everything in
cle. However, the G2’s_intelli- tion requirements (SIRs) de-
one report.
gence synchronization plan need
Before stating how he —
not address tasks for those steps
done outside the section. The fol- wishes to receive the in- Intelligence des iz |
lowing paragraphs address those tell. igence, the com- | CSyeclmei nes Who What TTaimsek ed |TDiomnee
steps applicable to the G2’s intel- mander should consider
ligence synchronization planning both the product format |}, Pian!| car |i nSiience suppor
process. Figure 2 is an example and his location at the f—
of an intelligence synchronization anticipated time of re- wile =_
plan worksheet. ceipt. Does he require a LRSTEs)_UNNT TYPEES) AREA
The commander must drive in- verbal report, a written 1.b. Car | CoiputeQpod mpenreqaes
telligence synchronization. With- report, a graphic prod- GRAPHIC ORAL WRITTEN
out his involvement in the uct, or some combina- Designate when intelligence
process, the intelligence syn- tion of the three? Does iIsN rIeTqIuAiLr ed:U PDATE(s) FINAL
chronization effort will probably he want anyone else to 1d.
Car State how old intelligemnayc eb e
fail. He accomplishes this vital receive the same re-
task in two ways: port? His expected loca-
G2 Develop latest time information
C) First, he designates his DPs tion at the time of of valus (LTIOV)
that require intelligence sup- decision will also influ-
Cdr State expected location for
port. Once he has selected his ence the format of the first report
report. If he expects to :
DPs, the commander should
place them in the operation or- be away from a com- %. GP2la ns Draft PIR for approval
der. He also should consider mand post when mak-
tracking DPs alongside PIR ing his decision, for 1. G2__ | Psyrnecpharroen iiznatteilolni gepnicaen
during the operation. This ac- example, he should re-
tion will emphasize DPs to the quire a verbal report. 1. Cdr Approve PIR
staff and subordinate units, These requirements
and may overcome the omis- of the commander might ‘4 ACE | Kentify resources (analyst(s),
ASi equipment) to prepare report(s) |
sion of DPs in the current op- appear formidable, par-
eration order format. Too often ticularly under the time 1k. ACE Develop indicators & SIRs |
ASI
the G2 alone emphasizes pressures that usually
DPs, since he must recom- accompany tactical op- 11. ACE | Establish events alarms,
mend PIRs to support them. erations. Yet, intelli- ASI i necessary
[) Second, the commander must gence synchronization ACE Prepare collection plan
give guidance regarding the is for the commander. It CM
intelligence he needs to make describes the process Figure 2. Intelligence Synchronization
his decision. FM 34-1 states, by which the G2 gives Plan Worksheet.
January-March 1996
©) Resource allocation within the SIRs form the basis for event (1) Supported DP and its related
analysis and control element alarms to alert the analyst to key PIR.
(ACE). incoming reports. The ACE col-
O) List of relevant collection as-
0) Collection plan, intelligence lection manager also uses those
sets.
synchronization plan, and ISM SIRs to develop the collection
Each ISM should address only
preparation. plan. He should attach a number
one PIR. It should depict relevant
(1) Collection plan and synchroni- to each SIR” when converting it collection assets which the collec-
zation plan approvals. to a specific order or request tion manager has tasked or re-
(SOR) for collection tasking. This
The intelligence synchroniza- quested to answer the PIR on the
step highlights the significance of
tion plan details the steps neces- matrix. The ACE collection man-
sary to deliver the required incoming reports for processing. ager may show how the assets
intelligence on time to support the The collection manager begins are tasked by listing the SIR num-
DP. To quote FM 34-1, "The plan to develop the collection pian for bers tasked or requested from
includes the collection, process- the PIR by evaluating assets. each asset, or by showing how
ing, and dissemination required to Which assets are available? many SORs he has sent to the
support each intelligence require- Based on the commanders sus- asset.
ment." penses, which of those assets Typical problems observed in
Ideally, the G2 will have already could receive tasking, collect, and ISMs during BCTP WFXs center
recommended the PIR during report soon enough for the ACE around the lack of linkage be-
wargaming and has obtained the to conduct analysis and prepare tween the collection assets and
commander's approval. If not, the the product in time? Based on the PIR portrayed. This lack
G2 must accomplish this task this evaluation, the collection manifests itself in several ways:
first. Rapid approval of PIR facili- manager selects the best assets [1 The ISM shows a collection
tates equally rapid indicator, SIR,
to conduct the mission. schedule of all available as-
and collection plan development.
While deciding which assets to sets, instead of showing only
The ACE chief begins his part task, the collection manager de- those assets actually tasked to
of the intelligence synchronization velops the ISM. The ISM serves support the PIR.
process by identifying resources
as the tool by which staff officers OO The ISM attempts to show
to accomplish the task. How
confirm intelligence support to the synchronization for more than
many analysts must develop the
commander's decisionmaking re- one PIR, and therefore actu-
products? If automation systems
are available, how many must quirements and plans when to ally shows it for none.
support answering this PIR? provide reports. The ISM, as de- (1) The ISM does not state when
The designated analyst then picted in Figure 3, should contain to provide information to an-
develops indicators and SIRs that the following elements: swer the PIR.
he expects to answer the PIR. If O) Planning and execution time- The G2 should obtain-the com-
the unit has automation systems, lines. mander’s approval of the collec-
Time SIR(s) |251700) 251800 251900) 252000 |2 52100 252200 | 252300/ 260001 b
Decision Point G-2 (LTIOV) - | . ISM: PIR 3, Edition C,
Friendly Event Brief 15 as of 241230 JUL
; t ; ; 4 —— — —
aes Ai eee Regt |R evt Rey ca6t37w coordina [“P4 z1a7
y at NAI at NA! |a t NAI at NAI
Event 33 33 «36 36
Collectors CA6199) |PZ1300
QUICKFIX. = £OSC) |
LRS Team 3 2: KEY
ime Joint STARS: Joint
Non-Organic:| Surveillance Target Attack
GUARDRAIL PO3C1.: Radar System
PO3C4
a LRS: Long-Range Surveillance
UAV |PPOO33CC5 } LTIOV: : L Latest Time Information
Joi:n t STARS £0O33C>3..1! whoa
RC-13 P0312] t t t t t t i NAI: Named Area of Interest
“135 P03C4.3 aa UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Figure 3. Intelligence Sychronization Matrix.
8 Military Intelligence