Table Of Content

PB 34-92-1 JANUARY-MARCH 1992 Volume 18 Number 1 2 Vantage Point 4 From the Editor 5 Letters 36 Proponent Notes 39 Total Force 40 Career Notes 43 Training Notes 45 Subscription Form 48 Professional Reading FEATURES 6 Intelligence Analysis in the 21st Century by Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Hall According to this author, our analytical system is failing to support commanders because we haven't learned to answer the all-important question of "So What?" Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in a Field Artillery Battalion by Second Lieutenant David H. Dotson Initiative and good intelligence work keep combat soldiers alive—to include in the field artillery. Countersurveillance Operations by David Guaglianone A former NTC chief of reconnaissance explains what every S2 should know about preventing enemy reconnaissance—how to keep enemy eyes away. Delusions of Grandeur: Ethnocentrism and Wehrmacht Intelligence Analysis by Captain Justin L. C. Eldridge Preconceived personal or class bias can have devastating effects on analysis, as this historical example shows. The First Steps: Battalion S2s in World War | by Captain Michael E. Bigelow Starting with the American Expeditionary Force in World War |, the author recounts how America’s first modern intelligence system came into being, and shows that many of the precepts applied back then are still valid today. The New Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course by Colonel Robert B. Mangold The Director of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine gives us a look at the new MIOAC for the nineties and how the changes impact on the intelligence community. Your Career...What’s Happening! by Colonel Lanning M. Porter, Major Robert A. Smith, and Captain Kelly A. Crosby This article provides some invaluable tips on how to keep up with or get ahead of the competition for the fewer career opportunites that will exist in tomorrow’s Army. The Commander’s Weather Brief by Captain Thomas M. MacJarrett Captain MacJarrett discusses the importance of the weather brief, and details how to graphically present it so the commander will remember it long after the briefing is over. STAFF: Commandant: Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr. Director of Training and Doctrine: Colonel Robert B. Mangold Editor: Captain Linda A. Gorsuch Associate Editor: Annette Castro Art Director: Dutch Poggemeyer Editorial Assistant: First Lieutenant Edward Riehle Administration: Marie Valenti Typesetting: Roger Johnson Carolyn A. Korona By Order of the Secretary of the Army: GORDON R. SULLIVAN General, United States Army Chief of Staff Official: MR. MILTON H. HAMILTON Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army Military intelligence, an authorized publication of theD epartment of the Army, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca, AZi,s publishedq uarterly under provisions of AR 25-30 and the TRADOC Professional Bulletin Policy Letter. This publication presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. Use of news items constitutes neither affirmation of their accuracy nor product endorsement. Use of the third person pronoun "he" and any of its forms is intended to include both mascualnd ifenmienin e genders. Inquleitterrs itoe thse e,dit or, manuscripts, supporting grapahndi sucbscsrip,tio n requests should be sent toC ommander, U.S. Army intelligence Center, ATTN: ATSI-TDL-B, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. For further information telephone AUTOVON 879-0674 or commercial (602) 538-0674. Personal subscriptions are $6.50 per year (domestic) and $8.15 per year (foreign). Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr. While this edition of our Military Intelligence approved four recommendations of the Relook Professional Bulletin concentrates on predictive Team and deferred two others for additional study. analysis, | want to use this space to continue to The GOSC approved the following recommenda- keep you informed of major changes impacting our tions: branch and our corps; and much has happened C) Fix intelligence dissemination by first field- since our last MIPB issue. ing proven nondevelopmental item of com- We have seen the retirement of one senior munications and automation, as the near MI general officer and the reassignment of several term solution. Then integrate validated Ml others. We have completed the Mi Relook Study communications requirements into the ob- and have started to plan the implementation of jective Army communications architecture those recommendations approved by its General over time, as the long range solution. Officer Steering Committee (GOSC). We have Develop an implementable imagery process- begun a new and significantly different MI Officer ing and dissemination architecture to sup- Advanced Course (MIOAC), which will provide far port commanders across the force down to better trained MI officers to the field and will cause maneuver brigade. some changes to MI officer personnel manage- Correct the focus and balance of MI or- ment. We have seen the launch of the Space ganizations across echelons and disciplines. Shuttle which carried into orbit an Mi warrant Realign Army production responsibilities to officer from the Intelligence Center staff, as part meet future requirements in the face of of the first Military Man in Space (MMIS) experi- changes being dictated by Defense intel- ment. And we are now seeing vertical construc- ligence in the nineties, for example, the for- tion rising from the soil of Fort Huachuca, as the mation of Joint Intelligence Centers. facilities to accommodate the consolidation of the The two recommendations the GOSC deferred Intelligence School Devens at the home of MI begin for further study include: to take shape. () Create a new linguist MOS for the Active Component as well as the Reserve Com- General Officer Changes ponent; and establish a program with incen- Starting with general officer changes, as men- tives to ensure we recruit, train, and retain tioned in our last issue, Lieutenant General Charles sufficient linguists, fully qualified in the lan- Eichelberger retired from the Army. In October, guages needed to support the Army’s con- Lieutenant General Ira C. (Chuck) Owens replaced tingency responsibilities. him. Major General Mike Pfister, formerly DCSINT of (1) Adopt a new strategy for creating a viable USAREUR, replaced Lieutenant General Owens as Reserve Component MI structure at division, ADCSINT, DA. Replacing Major General Pfister in corps, and EAC. USAREUR is Brigadier General (Promotable) John We at the Intelligence Center are responsible for F. Stewart, Jr. All other MI general officers will stay developing implementation plans for the four ap- in place, at least for the time being. proved recommendations. | have appointed Colonel Tom McLaulin, who was my senior repre- Mi Relook Study sentative on the Relook Task Force, to head a team The MI Relook Task Force, under the leadership which will include full-time representatives from HQ of Brigadier General Stewart, finished its work in INSCOM and DCSINT, DA. Together, they will seek mid-September 91. The Task Force briefed its support from throughout our corps to develop im- recommendations to a GOSC, co-chaired by the plementation plans which will bring the approved ADCSOPS-FD (Major General Granrud) and Relook recommendations to fruition. In fact, some ADCSINT, DA (Major General Owens). The GOSC (Continued on page 46) Military Intelligence Command Sergeant Major James A. (Art) Johnson We can expect many changes as our Army tant that our NCOs stay on top of these changes. reshapes itself. These next few years will see our The new changes will ensure only the very best are Army draw down to a smaller, more highly trained allowed to stay in the Army. force. Of course, the MI Corps will also feel the Again, the interim change to AR 601-280, Total effects of the drawdown. These are going to be dif- Army Retention Program, is out. This interim ficult times for those soldiers who have to transition change provides new policy for qualification for to civilian life. With the help of our leadership, both discharge, immediate reenlistment, immediate officer and NCO, this transition can be less painful. reenlistment eligibility, extension action, and length- Our soldiers and their families deserve your sup- of-service requirements. It mandates bar to reenlist- port. ment proceedings on some soldiers and makes One area where we'll see several changes is the numerous administrative changes. retention of soldiers. You must remember reeniist- We will have our Command Sergeants Major/G2 ment is a privilege and the Army will offer it only to Sergeants Major Training Conference from those soldiers who demonstrate, through their per- February 16 to 21. February 21 is set aside for formance and conduct, the potential for future Command Sergeant McKnight and the INSCOM development. Soldiers must reenlist when they’re Sergeants Major. Hope to see as many attend as within 4 to 8 months of ETS. Once they are 3 possible. It’s very important that you be kept in- months from ETS, as of January 1, 1992, they are formed of the many changes taking place in MI. ineligible for reenlistment without DA approval. Recent changes also require a bar to reenlistment for soldiers failing two consecutive APFTs, or making no satisfactory progress in the overweight | ~]-A77Z See - program, or being removed for cause from NCOES. Bar reviews are now at 3 and 6 months. Keep in mind the Army will reduce reenlistment options as it downsizes. Once a soldier is within the reenlistment window, current authorization will dic- tate options available. In addition, the Army will not authorize option F-3 (retrain for new MOS) for shortage or balanced MOSs without prior approval from DA. These are just some of the policy changes that are effective now or will be in the future. It’s impor- = January-March 1992 Happy New Year! A key lesson that we, as Military Intelligence professionals, learned in DESERT STORM was that we need to do a better job at predictive analysis. Intelligence analysis needs to forecast future events, and not simply reiterate past events. That is the feature topic of this issue. Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Hall’s article tells us how to move from simple analysis to the more difficult task of synthesis: Completing a picture by tying together information we already have, and making logical predictions from that information. His ideas and suggestions are in line with the measures the MI community is implementing to train our analysts to predict. To successfully predict events, an analyst must take the initiative to taylor information to his needs. Cap- tain Thomas M. MacJarrett shares with us a way he has structured weather information to make it a more useful tool for decision making. Second Lieutenant David H. Dotson shows us how he modified the doctrinal IPB process to make it useful in support of field artillery bat- talions. Both articles are good examples of how an analyst, with a little common sense and initiative, can ensure he provides his commander with useful, predictive estimates. Finally, articles by Captains Michael Bigelow and Justin L. C. Eldridge provide historical examples of past lessons learned in collection and analysis. While both relate to our feature topic, they also stand alone as interesting, informative glimpses into the history of intelligence. In closing, congratulations to our Writer of the Year, Captain Michael Bigelow; our Runner-up, USAR Captain Aaron Danis; and Honorable Mention Winners Captains Rick Ugino and Gilles Sea finthy, Writer of the Year Award The Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin is pleased to announce that Captain Michael E. Bigelow is the winner of our Sixth Annual Writer of the Year Award. The time period of this award is October 1990 through December 1991. Captain Bigelow’s articles, “Van Deman* (October-December 1990), "Eisenhower and Intel- ligence" (January-March 1991), and ‘The Faw Peninsula: A Battle Analysis" (April-June 1991) earn him this award for 1991. MIPB has also published six book reviews by Captain Bigelow during the juRdugninneg rp-eurpi odf.or this award is Captain (USAR) Aaron Danis. for hi. s arti. cles, “Afghanis. tan Revis. ted: Soviet Lessons Learned" (October-December 1990) and "Iraqi Army: Operations and Doctrine" (April-June 1991). Captain Dar.is is also a regular contributor to our Professional Reading section. Honorable mentions go to Captains Rick Ugino and Gilles Van Nederveen for their prolific con- tributions to our Professional Reading section. Military Intelligence Dear Editor: demand Cut in user countries. With- gency operations," as Captain Collins The article, "Small Scale Agriculture: out this, local prices will rise again indicates. U.S. Army doctrine states How the United States Can Win the when the price of a kilo of cocaine the first category is "support for insur- Drug War," leaves a false impression rises in the U.S. and Europe in gency and counterinsurgency" (FM to those not involved in counter-drug response to the reduced availability 100-20, p. 1-10). operations. The fact is the premise of of cocaine. Captain Collins also says that U.S. the article is wrong: Small scale agri- Besides politics, as noted in the arti- forces may prevent escalation, as in culture will not win the drug war, nor cle, another factor that limits our the "peacekeeping role." Army doc- will eradication programs, nor any ability to deal with the coca farmer is trine says that peacekeeping forces other program focused on the coca the fact that coca can be grown in maintain a peace already achieved farmer. The only place for any of other areas besides Peru and Bolivia. diplomatically, and are usually forbid- these programs is as part of a larger, Already there is some coca growing den to use force at all, except in self- more comprehensive strategy in Colombia and coca can also be defense (FM 100-20, p. 1-11). focused on eliminating demand at all grown at Brazil’s lower elevations. Finally, Captain Collins lists the final Stages of the cocaine production True, it takes more effort to process LIC imperative as “legitimacy of ef- process. As long as there is a this coca, but if there is demand for fort." Legitimacy of effort implies demand, and therefore profit, some- cocaine, there will be money to be something operational; but according one will grow coca and produce made. to Army doctrine, the LIC imperative cocaine. His recommendation for the devel- "legitimacy" has nothing at all to do Captain Ligon presents a valid argu- opment of a realistic agriculture with operations, and everything to do ment for using the Benson Institute’s program to help the farmer is good. with politics. The "legitimacy" referred agriculture program to improve the Programs designed to persuade farm- to is the legitimacy of the government small farmer's nutrition intake, and ers to stop growing coca have their in question in the eyes of its own he’s correct in stating the positive ef- place and they do increase the traf- people (FM 100-20, p. 1-9). fect it would have on campesino- ficker's difficulty in producing These three errors are minor in government relations. cocaine. Like so many other elements and of themselves. I’m not trying to But he overstates the value of the of the counter-drug war, it is often a dance with Captain Collins on the small farmer in the process when he patch-work of many efforts that lead heads of pins. The problem is that Calls him the "strategic center of to success. But it is wrong to believe these errors, in fact, reflect a preoccu- gravity," and he ignores the basic that focusing on the farmer, as the ar- pation throughout the article with reason the small farmer grows coca, ticle states, would have a significant military operations. Each error is a which is money. impact on the drug trade. misunderstanding of doctrine slanted Besides the fact the average coca And it’s not over yet. Consider the in- toward a military interpretation of what farmer sees nothing inherently wrong creased use of heroin in the United remains at heart a political problem. with growing coca (it’s been used in States and the increased production While Captain Collins pays homage the Andean ridge countries for cen- of that drug in response to demand. to the idea that LIC is a political end turies), the bottom line is he can Already, the Cali Cartel is growing that may end employing armed make more money growing coca and processing poppies for this "new" means, virtually his entire discussion than other food or cash crops. The cash crop. focuses on the means, ignoring the drug trade is capitalistic to the core end. In order for MI to function effec- and is gov-erned by the law of supply Major Raymond W. Levesque tively in a LIC environment, we and de-man4d. It’s true if he can feed Chief, Counter-Drug Tactical have to internalize a number of hard his family and make money growing Analysis Team realities: food he'll be happy, but he'll be hap- Panama @ We can't “deter a guerrilla war like pier if he can grow food and make P.S. | also was in charge of the we deterred Soviet aggression for 50 more money growing coca. The only counter-drug tactical analysis team in years. LICs occur because of time we saw farmers in the Chapare Bolivia for a year. economic and social injustice. You region of Bolivia stop growing coca can repress the desire for justice; was when the price of the leaf fell Dear Editor: you can only eliminate unrest caused below the cost to produce it. This led | have some disagreement with Cap- by it, by meeting the needs of the many farmers to join the govern- tain David Collins’ (USAF) article in people. ment’s eradication program and led July-September MIPB on "MI in Low- @ To do that, we need long-range others to leave the valley. Intensity Conflict." Strategic vision and long-term But even this local (tactical) suc- The first of the operational cate- HUMINT intelligence [sic] systems to cess is transitory without a prolonged gories of LIC is not “counterinsur- (Continued on page 47) January-March 1992 2Q > w | x < - aleL i O Lu — — — o > N Y) sige’ ee 6 Military Intelligence end product should be synthesis, which is combin- ing analyzed information into a coherent whole, thereby drawing a conclusion. Analysis and synthesis involve the highest and most difficult levels of thinking. Going from singularly focused traditional analysis to synthesis as an end product creates new possibilities. Using synthesis, analysts can make intelligent predictions, gain insight, and discern complex relationships. The new process recognizes inextricable, complex relationships: Analysis and synthesis, analysis and collection management, collection management and synthesis, to name a few. Analysts who follow this process use a disciplined approach to seeking and understanding information. They use structured thinking and tasking to relate collected information to the com- By Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Hall mander’s concept of the operation. To achieve synthesis, the analyst must under- The situation...An order of battle analyst is briefing stand and act upon fundamental concepts: a division commanding general. The briefer is relat- (1) To be meaningful, intelligence collection has ing findings from the interrogation of an enemy to focus on the commander’s information re- prisoner. The analyst gives the general many one- quirements. line sentences describing what the prisoner said. (1) The analyst must learn to ask specific ques- The analyst then abruptly changes topics and tions which will provide specific information. moves on to the enemy situation shown on the (1) The analyst must do some analysis before briefirig map. The general, with a perplexed look on tasking, to understand the relative value of in- his face, says with irritation, “Wait a minute. What formation as it arrives, before synthesizing it. does ail that information from the prisoner mean?" Intelligence analysts cannot be dull, unin- To a commander in a modern battle situation, quisitive purveyors of information, who simply the question “what does it mean" frequently arises. provide it to the commander and expect him He’s constantly bombarded with fragmentary infor- to find meaning. Instead, they have to mation from a seemingly chaotic battlefield. How deduce the meaning, provide it to the com- does he interpret information; what does it mean? mander, and make the difficult predictions How does he assemble it into a coherent picture? themselves. The commander has many information gathering (1) This entire approach must be holistic. resources. He has endless opportunities to make A holistic approach is based on wholes, which decisions and to understand the enemy, weather, nest within one another. Wholes aren't usually dis- and terrain. But how does he use the information to crete entities; they relate to other entities. Analysts, make sound battlefield decisions? How does he using mental energy, can discover these wholes use his resources to the best advantage, to know and the links which bind them together. what’s happening, and to determine how to direct Theory or redirect events to satisfy his intent? The U.S. Army’s intelligence system worked ex- Even the most seemingly insignificant piece of ceptionally well during DESERT SHIELD and information has potential power. To release this DESERT STORM. It was a major contributor to vic- power, an analyst must relate the piece of informa- tory and to the unbelievably low casualty count. tion to other pieces. The analyst must assess the However, as well as it worked, we must improve on information for complicated relationships, then syn- one area of the intelligence system: Its ability to thesize it into a whole. The seemingly insignificant make information mean something. act of recognizing that each and every piece of in- Battlefield experience shows that, to be of maxi- formation has potential power is critical: It is the mum benefit, the end product of intelligence needed first step to understanding and implement- analysis should not be analysis, which is studying ing synthesis. something to understand its nature. Instead, the What are wholes? Wholes are mental and physi- January-March 1992 cal constructs. Wholes represent things (physical) information. Analysis involves pulling something and ideas or concepts (mental). Wholes are com- apart and examining each of the parts. It lets us posed of smaller wholes and comprise larger thoroughly understand parts of wholes, and then wholes. Related wholes are linked together and task correctly. This is the process we use when we have overlapping boundaries. analyze indicators and SIRs to develop specific Wholes are composed of bits and pieces of in- taskings. Using such analyses to focus tasking formation. We can't find or develop complete links collection and analysis to the commander’s in- wholes, only varying degrees of partial wholes. Par- formation requirements. tially complete wholes, however, provide us with an Synthesis means putting pieces of information explicit power: The power to predict. By determin- into a coherent, meaningful whole, the parts of ing probabilities and predicting, we can use a par- which fit together. Synthesis results in under- tial whole to form conclusions about a complete standing the whole and making predictions from whole. When we understand these concepts, we that whole. Synthesis is the end product of the gain an entirely new perspective of understanding. analytical effort. It enables us to conclude, predict, We can easily apply the theory of wholes to intel- and understand. By-products in the march toward ligence collection and analysis. The focus of most achieving synthesis include performing trend and military endeavors is the enemy. Every organized pattern analyses, and identifying and under- force has an order of battle. This appears as a standing relationships. hierarchical series of connected wholes. Also, the Analysts study information to understand it. functions of enemy battlefield operating systems Through understanding, analysts can synthesize appear as wholes, reaching horizontally and verti- (combine) the analyzed information into a relevant Cally. Additionally, an enemy’s C? nodes appear as and coherent whole. From the whole, analysts can wholes, connecting below, above, and laterally. discern other wholes, develop them further, predict Those wholes then become the focus of our intel- outcomes or intentions, and understand even more ligence collection and analysis. complex phenomena. Indicators and specific information requirements Current State of Nature (SIRs) analyses, discussed in Army intelligence doctrine, are techniques we use to task collection In practice, Army intelligence analysts usually systems for information. SIRs are detailed ques- don't synthesize well. There are several reasons for tions whose answers identify specific types of ac- this shortfall. Many of our officer and enlisted tivity, technical data (like frequencies and call analysts don’t know how to discipline their minds to signs), and types of information we want the collec- achieve the higher-level thinking synthesis requires. tion system to find. We analyze these by first view- Typically, they do well when they concentrate on ing a series of wholes of the environment under what they know how to do: Analyze. study. “Another point is that "Synthesis is the end people rarely think about product of the analytical thinking—how they think, effort. It enables us to how their commanders conclude, predict, and think, and what the results understand." of thinking should be." For example, take any of the above mentioned Synihesis, though, is a higher step in the wholes (order of battle, battlefield operating sys- process of thinking. It’s difficult to do and difficult to tems, nodes). Analyze your intelligence indicators learn. Additionally, our doctrine doesn’t explain how and SIRs. Then concentrate collectors to find infor- to go through such a sophisticated mental process. mation related to the whole. This produces In fact, our intelligence doctrine doesn’t discuss focused, relevant, and disciplined collection. Once either synthesis or the effect of synthesizing infor- the information returns, you must synthesize it into mation into wholes. wholes, give understanding and coherency to Another point is that people rarely think about otherwise confusing data, and predict, perhaps thinking—how they think, how their commanders even shape, the future. think, and what the results of thinking should be. Analysis is always important to understanding When a person neither knows how nor what the Military Intelligence