Midway 1942 : Turning Point in the Pacific

98 Pages·2010·8.504 MB·English

by  Mark Stille

MIDWAY 1942
Turning point in the Pacific
MARK STILLE ILLUSTRATED BY HOWARD GERRARD
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CAMPAIGN • 226
MIDWAY 1942
Turning point in the Pacific
MARK STILLE ILLUSTRATED BY HOWARD GERRARD
Series editorMarcus Cowper
© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
CONTENTS
ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN 5
CHRONOLOGY 9
OPPOSING COMMANDERS 12
The IJN The US Navy
OPPOSING FLEETS 16
The IJN carrier force The US Navy carrier force Orders of battle
OPPOSING PLANS 33
The Japanese plan: Yamamoto gets his way The US plan
THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY 41
Opening moves The Japanese strike Midway The carrier battle of June 4
Midway attacks the 1st Kido Butai Nagumo’s dilemma Fletcher’s situation
The decisive phase The Japanese response Hiryuretaliates
Tomonaga attacks Yorktown The death of Hiryu Yamamoto’s dilemma
Yorktown’s ordeal Spruance’s battle The pursuit phase The accounting
THE AFTERMATH 92
FURTHER READING 94
INDEX 95
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Strategic situation June 1942
ds
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sdnalsI naituelA Midway Island Hawaiian Islands Pearl HarborJohnston Palmyra Christmas Island Samoa Islands Society Isla Cook Islands
N nds
CEA des Fiji Isla
O w bri
ee
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Kamchatka sdnalsI eliruK JAPANTokyo PACIF Bonin Islands Iwo JimaMarcus Island Saipan Mariana Islands Guam Truk Caroline Islands New IrelandNEW GUINEARabaulSolomon IslandPort Moresbys New BritainTulagiGuadalcanal LIA Brisbane Sydney
SSR monhan MANCHURIA KOREAPeking Seoul Nanking ShanghaisdnalsI ukuyROkinawa Formosa Hong Kong Luzon CH ManilaHINA Mindanao RNEOCelebes Timor DarwinBali AUSTRA Perth
U MONGOLIANo CHINA Chunking BURMAHanoi THAILANDonFRENBangkokINDOC Saigon MALAYASingapore BOSUMATRA Batavia Java
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an N
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NISTAN NEPAL INDIA Calcutta bay Madras Trincomalee ColomboCEYLON NDIAN OCEA Limit of Japanese control Supply lines to Australia
A m I
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ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN
Few battles are as well known as the battle of Midway fought in June 1942
between the carrier forces of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) and the United
States Navy. The resulting victory for the Americans has been hailed as the
most decisive naval battle of the entire war and an incredible victory against
overwhelming odds. In fact, neither statement is true and, despite all the
works about this engagement, few battles have as many myths still lingering
around them as does Midway 60 years after the event.
Through April 1942, the carrier fleets of the Imperial Japanese and United
States navies had yet to meet in battle. April 1942 was a key decision point for
the Japanese. From the beginning of the war, they had enjoyed an unparalleled
string of successes. Since assuming the defensive was unthinkable, there were
basically two courses of action open to them. One, advocated by the Navy
General Staff, called for the seizure of key islands in the South Pacific to cut
the sea lines of communications between the United States and Australia. The
other strategic option was to advance in the Central Pacific with the ultimate
Frank Jack Fletcher in the goal of seizing Hawaii. This was the option preferred by the Commander of
uniform of a vice admiral in the Combined Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, primarily because he saw
September 1942. As a rear the added benefit of forcing the remaining units of the US Pacific Fleet to give
admiral, he was in overall
battle. When this decisive battle was finally fought, the superior numbers and
command of American naval
forces at both Coral Sea and training of the Combined Fleet would surely prevail, so Yamamoto believed.
Midway. His roles in these However, what resulted from the strategic debate between the Navy
American victories have been General Staff and the Combined Fleet was a fatal compromise. In May,
largely forgotten. (US Naval
limited operations would be conducted in the South Pacific with the goal of
Historical Center)
seizing the strategic airfield at Port Moresby on New Guinea as a foundation
for further expansion against Australia’s sea links with the US. This would be
followed in June by a massive operation against the US-held atoll of Midway
in the Central Pacific some 1,300 miles from Hawaii and against selected
points in the Aleutian Islands chain. Forced to defend Midway, the Pacific
Fleet would be committed to action against the assembled might of the
Combined Fleet.
Unfortunately for the Japanese, the American naval commander in the
Pacific, Commander of the Pacific Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, had not read
Yamamoto’s script. Yamamoto was right to believe that the Americans would
fight for Midway, but it was under conditions controlled by Nimitz. More
than anything, Nimitz was determined to engage the Japanese aggressively as
soon as favorable conditions existed. To Nimitz, favorable conditions included
committing his few precious carriers even when outnumbered by the Japanese
if surprise could be gained.
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The four ships of the Kongo The first effect of Nimitz’s policy of seeking to engage the Japanese resulted
class were the only Japanese in the battle of the Coral Sea, fought between May 7 and 8, 1942. The
battleships with speed ramifications of Coral Sea on the clash at Midway are not fully understood.
sufficient to provide escort to
The battle was the first ever contest fought between and decided by aircraft
the 1st Kido Butai. Kirishima,
shown here in 1939, was carriers. The Japanese assembled two invasion forces: one dedicated to Port
assigned to the 1st Kido Butai Moresby and the other to the island of Tulagi in the Solomons. The invasion
for the Midway operation. forces were covered by a force of heavy cruisers and a light carrier while a
Behind her is Akagi.
carrier division of two fleet carriers on loan from the Combined Fleet provided
(Yamato Museum)
strategic cover against intervention by American carriers. After quickly seizing
Tulagi on May 3, the tightly synchronized Japanese plan began to unravel. The
main Japanese carrier force swung into the Coral Sea from the east to engage
any American naval force there, but in spite of the fact that it had approached
from a totally unexpected direction, it failed to find and destroy the two
American carriers present. On May 7, both sides launched all-out strikes from
their carriers. The Japanese strike totally miscarried, finding and sinking only
an oiler and a destroyer. The American strike fared better, though it did not
find the main Japanese carrier force. It did, however, locate and sink the light
carrier covering the Port Moresby Invasion Force. On the following day, the
clash of carriers finally occurred. The Japanese carriers succeeded in locating
and attacking both American carriers. One was struck by a single bomb and
suffered only moderate damage. However, the second was hit by both aircraft
bombs and torpedoes and sank later that day. In return, a poorly coordinated
American strike located only one of the Japanese carriers. They succeeded in
putting three bombs into this target, but it escaped. The second Japanese carrier
was untouched, but losses to Japanese carrier aircraft were very heavy.
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The clash at Coral Sea had exacted a high cost from both sides. For the
Japanese, the price was extremely high and constituted both strategic and
tactical disaster. Strategically, the Japanese suffered their first reversal of the
war. While the island of Tulagi in the Solomons was captured, the main
objective of the operation, Port Moresby, remained in Allied hands. More
importantly with respect to the upcoming Midway engagement, the battle had
resulted in all three Japanese carriers engaged being removed from the order
of battle for Midway. The light carrier Shohowas sunk by American carrier
aircraft. The two fleet carriers that Yamamoto lent from the Combined Fleet
fared better, but were both unavailable in early June. Shokakuwas hit by three
bombs and would be under repair until July 1942. Her sister ship, Zuikaku,
was undamaged, but her air group was so battered that it would take weeks
to rebuild. These losses added to the strategic disaster for the Japanese. The
secondary operation at Port Moresby thus cost the Combined Fleet three of
its 11 operational carriers. Most importantly, two of Yamamoto’s six fleet
carriers were now unavailable for Midway. As a unit, the six fleet carriers of
the Kido Butai (Striking Force) was guaranteed a marked numerical advantage
over any combination of operational American fleet carriers. Now this
advantage was gone, and the Kido Butai would face its most severe test yet
with only four of its carriers present.
American losses were highlighted by the loss of Lexington, while Yorktown
suffered moderate damage. Coral Sea left only two fully operational carriers
in the Pacific. These, Enterpriseand Hornet, had missed the Coral Sea battle
because of their involvement in the April Doolittle Raid against the Japanese
home islands. Quickly dispatched by Nimitz to the Coral Sea, they arrived
after the battle. The carrier Saratoga had been torpedoed by a Japanese
submarine in January 1942 and was still under repair on the US West Coast.
She was not expected back in service until late May. Thus Yorktown’s survival
was key to the upcoming battle. Even without her, Nimitz was still determined
to risk Enterpriseand Hornetto take on the Japanese at Midway. However,
alone they would face four Japanese fleet carriers – a daunting 1:2 inferiority.
If Yorktowncould be repaired in time, her inclusion in the battle would go far
to even the odds.
Hornetat Pearl Harbor during
the short respite between Coral
Sea and Midway. Hornet’s Air
Group performed dismally
during the battle owing to a
combination of inexperience,
bad decisions, and bad luck.
The ship is in a Measure 12
(modified) camouflage scheme
which she would retain until
her loss at the battle of Santa
Cruz in October 1942. (US Naval
Historical Center)
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As planned by the Japanese, the operation to invade Midway and engage
the remaining strength of the US Pacific Fleet would be the ultimate effort of
the IJN. All eight of its operational carriers were committed, as well as the
fleet’s 11 battleships. Of 18 heavy cruisers, 14 were assigned roles in the
operation, as were the bulk of the navy’s light cruisers and destroyers. This
force was under the command of 28 admirals. The IJN’s largest operation of
the war would consume more fuel than an entire year of normal operations.
Such a force was certainly guaranteed success. Once the Pacific Fleet had
been crippled, the Japanese would again turn south to cut off the sea lines of
communications between the US and Australia. Hawaii itself, devoid of
protection from the US Navy, was also a potential target.
For his part, Nimitz had the invaluable advantage of superior intelligence
regarding his enemy’s strength and intentions. This intelligence was far from
omniscient, but, combined with Nimitz’s innate aggressiveness and strategic
insight, it guaranteed that America’s remaining naval strength was placed in
the best position to do the most potential damage to the Japanese. Nimitz
committed all his remaining strength to defending Midway, including all three
of his carriers. Pearl Harbor had not eliminated the US Navy’s battleship
strength in the Pacific, despite popular myth, and by June 1942 seven
battleships were operational in the Pacific. Mindful of the lessons taught to
him at Pearl Harbor, Nimitz resisted repeated demands that he aggressively
employ his battleships and instead moved them to the West Coast out of the
way. Unlike Yamamoto, Nimitz’s plan for the upcoming battle was almost
totally dependent upon the carriers of the Pacific Fleet. With Yamamoto
throwing the entire strength of the IJN at Midway, and Nimitz prepared to
defend it with his entire remaining strength, the scene was set for the single
most dramatic and important battle of the Pacific War.
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CHRONOLOGY
May 7 Carrier battle in the Coral Sea. After a 0925hrs – PBYs spot Transport
series of incorrect scouting reports by Group.
both sides, the Americans and Japanese
launch their main carrier strike forces 1225hrs – Midway-based B-17s depart
at secondary targets. Aircraft from to attack Transport Group; no hits are
carriers Yorktownand Lexingtonsink scored.
Japanese light carrier Shoho. In return,
Japanese carrier dive-bombers sink a June 4 0130hrs – PBYs conduct night torpedo
destroyer and an oiler. attack against Transport Group hitting
tanker Akebono Maru.
May 8 In an exchange of strikes against each
other’s main carrier force, the 0430hrs – Nagumo launches 108-
Americans score three bombs on aircraft strike against Midway.
carrier Shokaku, putting her out of
action. The Japanese place two 0530hrs – Japanese carriers sighted by
torpedo and two bomb hits on PBYs.
Lexington. This damage eventually
proves fatal and the ship sinks later 0620hrs – Air battle between Midway
that evening. One bomb hit is scored fighters and Japanese fighter escort.
on Yorktowncausing moderate
damage. 0630hrs – Midway bombed, suffering
heavy damage. Antiaircraft defenses
May 27 The Kido Butai departs the Inland Sea. account for 25 Japanese aircraft
destroyed or rendered non-
May 28 Enterpriseand Hornetdepart Pearl operational.
Harbor.
0700hrs – 116 aircraft launched from
May 30 Yorktowndeparts Pearl Harbor. Enterpriseand Hornetagainst
Japanese carriers.
May 31 Operation K, the plan to surveil Pearl
Harbor with long-range flying boats 0702hrs – First American air attack on
refueled by submarine, is cancelled. Japanese carriers. Six Midway-based
TBF Avengers and four B-26s score no
June 2 US carriers rendezvous northeast of hits.
Midway.
0705hrs – Japanese strike leader against
June 3 0843hrs – Midway-based PBYs spot Midway informs Nagumo a second
Minesweeper Group. strike is needed against the island.
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0715hrs – Nagumo orders his reserve 1025hrs – VB-3 attacks Soryu; three hits
aircraft armed to attack Midway. are scored causing uncontrollable fires.
0740hrs – Japanese scout aircraft 1026hrs – Three Dauntlesses attack
reports American ships located north- Akagiscoring a single hit; this damage
northeast of Midway. ultimately proves fatal.
0745hrs – Nagumo orders re-arming 1040hrs – VT-5 concludes attack on
process stopped. Hiryu; no hits are scored.
0800hrs – 16 Marine Dauntlesses 1050hrs – Hiryulaunches strike on
from Midway attack Japanese carriers; American carriers.
no hits are scored.
1209hrs – Hiryudive-bombers
0820hrs – 14 B-17s attack Japanese commence attack on Yorktown
carriers; again no hits are scored. scoring three hits. Yorktownis set
afire and temporarily comes to a stop.
0825hrs – 11 Marine SB2U-3s attack
battleship Haruna; no hits are scored. 1331hrs – Hiryu’s second strike departs.
0830hrs – Japanese search aircraft 1427hrs – Strike detected by American
confirms presence of carrier in cruiser radar.
previously reported American task
force. 1443hrs – Japanese torpedo aircraft
put two torpedoes into Yorktown
0905hrs – Yorktownlaunches her strike. bringing the ship to a stop and causing
a severe list.
0915hrs – Start of VT-8 attacks
against Japanese carriers; all 15 1445hrs – Hiryuspotted by Yorktown
aircraft lost for no hits. scout.
0918hrs – Nagumo completes recovery 1705hrs – Hiryuattacked by dive-
of Midway strike; now plans a 1030hrs bombers from Enterpriseand
strike against the American carriers. Yorktown; four hits set the Japanese
ship afire.
0940hrs – Start of VT-6 attack; 10 are
lost for no hits. 1811hrs – Fletcher passes tactical
control of battle to Spruance.
1002hrs – Enterprise’s dive-bombers
sight the 1st Kido Butai. 1913hrs – Soryusinks.
1003hrs – Yorktownstrike spots the 1925hrs – Kagasinks.
1st Kido Butai.
June 5 0255hrs – Yamamoto cancels Midway
1010–1030hrs – VT-3 and fighter operation.
escort duel with Japanese fighters;
most defending fighters drawn to low 0230hrs – Cruisers Mogamiand
level. Mikumacollide within 50 miles of
Midway heavily damaging Mogami.
1022hrs – The majority of Enterprise’s
dive-bombers attack Kaga; four hits 0520hrs – Akagisinks.
are scored causing mortal damage.
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