Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences: The Critical Background to Modern Science, 1800–1905

353 Pages·2009·5.1 MB·English

by  Colin Howson (editor)

Method and appraisal in the physical sciences

Method and appraisal in the
physical sciences
The critical background to modern
science, 1800-1905
EDITED BY
COLIN HOWSON
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, LOGIC AND SCIENTIFIC
METHOD, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE
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© Cambridge University Press 1976
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without the written
permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 1976
This digitally printed version 2009
A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication data
Main entry under title:
Method and appraisal in the physical sciences.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
CONTENTS: Lakatos, I. History of science and its rational reconstructions.
-Clark, P. Atomism versus thermodynamics.-Worrall, J.
Thomas Young and the 'refutation' of Newtonian optics, [etc.]
1. Science-Methodology. 2. Science-History. I. Howson, Colin.
Q175.M5417 500.2'01 75-44580
ISBN 978-0-521-21110-9 hardback
ISBN 978-0-521-11308-3 paperback
Contents
Editorial preface vii
c. HOWSON
History of science and its rational reconstructions 1
IMRE LAKATOS
Atomism versus thermodynamics 41
PETER CLARK
Thomas Young and the ' refutation' of Newtonian optics: a case-
study in the interaction of philosophy of science and history
of science 107
JOHN WORRALL
Why did oxygen supplant phlogiston? Research programmes in
the Chemical Revolution 181
ALAN MUSGRAVE
Why did Einstein's programme supersede Lorentz's? 211
ELIE ZAHAR
The rejection of Avogadro's hypotheses 277
MARTIN FRICKE
On the critique of scientific reason 309
PAUL FEYERABEND
Index of names 340

Editorial preface
This volume constitutes the first collected edition of work so far done in
illustrating an important new development in the philosophy of science,
'the methodology of scientific research programmes', with case studies
drawn from the history of the physical sciences. This material, no doubt the
forerunner of more complete accounts of the fit between Lakatos's ideas
and scientific practice, is prefaced with an exposition of the methodology
of scientific research programmes by its author, Imre Lakatos, who, sadly,
died before the material was assembled in this volume; and there is a
concluding critical appraisal both of Lakatos's theory and of the illustra-
tions of it, by Paul Feyerabend.
Briefer versions of Clark's, Musgrave's and WorralPs papers were
delivered at a conference on Research Programmes in Physics and Economics
in Nafplion, Greece in September 1974. Lakatos's paper was published
originally in Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, VTI; Zahar's paper was
first published in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science > 24, 1973.
I should like to thank Miss Gillian Page and D. Reidel Publishing
Company for permission to reprint Lakatos's paper, and the author and
editor of the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science for permission to
reprint Zahar's paper. Finally, I should like to express my profound
gratitude to the secretaries in the Philosophy Department at the London
School of Economics and Political Science, and particularly Anne Smith,
for their help in preparing these papers for publication, and to thank
Mr Alex Bellamy for compiling the index to this volume.
L.S.E., June 1975 c. HOWSON
vn

History of science and its rational
reconstructions*
IMRE LAKATOS
Introduction
1 Rival methodologies of science; rational reconstructions as guides to history
A Inductivism
B Conventionalism
C Methodological falsificationism
D Methodology of scientific research programmes
E Internal and external history
2 Critical comparison of methodologies: history as a test of its rational recon-
structions
A Falsificationism as a meta-criterion: history 'falsifies5 falsificationism (and
any other methodology)
B The methodology of historiographical research programmes. History - to
varying degrees - corroborates its rational reconstructions
C Against aprioristic and antitheoretical approaches to methodology
D Conclusion
Introduction
'Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of
science without philosophy of science is blind.5 Taking its cue from this
paraphrase of Kant's famous dictum, this paper intends to explain how the
historiography of science should learn from the philosophy of science and
vice versa. It will be argued that (a) philosophy of science provides nor-
mative methodologies in terms of which the historian reconstructs 'internal
history' and thereby provides a rational explanation of the growth of
objective knowledge; (b) two competing methodologies can be evaluated
with the help of (normatively interpreted) history; (c) any rational recon-
struction of history needs to be supplemented by an empirical (socio-
psychological) 'external history'.
The vital demarcation between normative-internal and empirical-
external is different for each methodology. Jointly, internal and external
historiographical theories determine to a very large extent the choice of
problems for the historian. But some of external history's most crucial
* Earlier versions of this paper were read and criticised by Colin Howson, Alan Musgrave,
John Watkins, Elie Zahar, and especially John Worrall. The present paper further
develops some of the theses proposed in my [1970]. I have tried, at the cost of some
repetition, to make it self-contained.