Metaphysics: A Critical Survey of its Meaning

130 Pages·1963·8.471 MB·English

by  Takatura Ando (auth.)

METAPHYSICS
A CRITICAL SURVEY OF ITS MEANING
METAPHYSICS
A CRITICAL SURVEY OF ITS MEANING
by
TAKATURA ANDO
Professor of Philosophy at Ritumekan University, Kyoto
•
THE HAGUE
MARTINUS NI]HOFF
Ig63
ISBN 978-94-015-0244-3 ISBN 978-94-015-0760-8 (eBook)
DOl 10.1007/978-94-015-0760-8
Copyright I963 by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
FOREWORD
In the summer of I960 I visited Oxford and stayed there several
months. This book was written as some slight memorial of my days
in that ancient seat of learning. It is my pleasant duty to acknowledge
the great debt I own to Mr. D. Lyness in the task of putting it into
English. In addition I remember with gratitude Dr. J. L. Ackrill of
Brasenose College, who gave me unfailing encouragement, and also
Dr. R. A. Rees of Jesus College, who read my manuscript through and
subjected it to a minute revision. Lastly for permission to quote from
Sir W. D. Ross' translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics, I have to thank
the editors of Oxford University Press.
Kyoto, Japan T.A.
Sep. I961.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION I
I. THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF METAPHYSICS
1. Reimer's Theory 3
2. Aristotle's Metaphysics 6
II. THE TRADITION OF THE CONCEPT OF METAPHYSICS
I. Ancient Interpretations 17
2. Arabian School 20
3· Early Scholastics 25
4· Middle Scholastics 28
5· Later Scholastics 32
6. Wolffian School 35
III. KANT AND METAPHYSICS
1. The Stages of Kant's Philosophy 40
2. Critique and Metaphysics 47
3· The Stages of Metaphysics 54
4· The System of Critical Metaphysics 58
5· The Supremacy of Practical Reason and the Poverty
of Speculative Philosophy 64
IV. METAPHYSICS AND DIALECTIC
I. Hegel 71
2. Engels 79
V. METAPHYSICS IN RECENT PHILOSOPHY
I. Bergson 95
2. Heidegger 103
VI. CONCLUSION 124
INTRODUCTION
No science is subject to such contrary evaluations as metaphysics.
Sometimes it is called the queen of all the sciences, sometimes it is
outcast and forsaken like Hecuba. 1 The evaluation has changed several
times even since Kant. In the present situation, the number of its
admirers is matched by the number of its denigrators, and the final
outcome hardly seems to be predictable. Such instability is admittedly
natural to a position of great honour. But the problem is not, as Kant
considered it, just a matter of the ability of metaphysics to perform its
task. What is most perplexing is that we cannot find any single defi
nition of metaphysics common to both its admirers and its denigrators.
This, I think, is the most important reason why there has been no
correct evaluation of metaphysics. The neglect of definition which, as
Socrates maintained, should be the primary subject of philosophy,
has resulted in many of the disputes of contemporary philosophy. So
as to shed some light on this confusion, the present inquiry aims at
a concise survey of the usage of the term metaphysics. Metaphysics
must not be defined a priori; we must reach a definition inductively
from the history of metaphysics. For we have without doubt a history
of thought which is called metaphysics. An a priori concept, which
ignores this history, cannot claim universal validity. Even when one
wishes to express a completely original thought, one is not allowed to
neglect the history of the concepts one employs.
The history of metaphysics either covers the whole history of phi
losophy or at least forms more than half of it. But a History of Meta
physics cannot explain the concept of metaphysics itself. In order to
make a History of Metaphysics out of the whole of philosophy, one
must implicitly presuppose a definition of metaphysics. Therefore, a
classification of what philosophers meant by the term must precede a
History of Metaphysics. This is just what this inquiry aims at. A com
prehensive enumeration of historical usages would not necessarily be
effective. Such a task should be entrusted to a lexicon of philosophy.
Kant, K.d.,..V., Vorrede.
2 THE ORIGAN OF THE CONCEPT
Our scope must be limited to the most important usages. It is not cer
tain whether the various usages may be reduced to a single meaning
or whether they form a continuous series of development. Any meta
physical presupposition must be strictly prohibited. The attempt to
arrive at a systematic explanation is of course of extreme importance.
But it must be preceded by plain observation of historical facts.
CHAPTER I
THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF METAPHYSICS
1. REIMER'S THEORY
The concept metaphysics originates from the Greek words 'rOC lU'roc
'rOC qlUGLXeX, which is the name of a work by Aristotle. There is a tra
ditional explanation of this name which has been universally accepted.'
The main work of Aristotle which has come to be called metaphysica"
or more strictly speaking the essential part of that work, was called
by Aristotle himself 1tPW't'1) qlr.AOGOql(oc, '&eoAoYLxlj, or merely GOql(oc. The
title "metaphysics" originated later, viz. when Andronicus of Rhodes,
a Peripatetic in the first century B.C., published the complete works
of Aristotle, and placed this book after physical treatises. Originally
it was not a complete work written continuously but was made up of
several lectures delivered in different periods, and the author did not
give it a definite title. Andronicus, therefore, embarrassed at the lack
of a suitable title, called it 'rOC [.Le'roc 'rOC qlUGLxeX, which means the books
placed after physical treatises; hence came the word metaphysics.
Now, as the word [.Le'reX may also mean trans, .the term metaphysics
might have come to mean the science concerned with transcendent
reality or intelligible being, and so by chance suited the content of the
first philosophy. This seemingly reasonable explanation, though un
critically accepted by most philosophers and historians and admitted
as orthodox, appears to be a little far-fetched. For it would have been
too much of a coincidence for the concept metaphysics, which origi
nally indicated a mere editorial sequence, to be successfully adapted
so as to contain the science of transcendent reality. Kant actually
declared his suspicion saying that the expression is too felicitous to
be regarded as the result of chance. 1 It is not really an exaggeration
to call it a scandal, as Max Wundt is reported to have done, that mo
dern philosophers paid no serious attention to this point. Hans Rei
mer, 2 therefore, deserves the highest praise for recently pointing out
1 M. Heinze, Vorksungen Kants uber M etaphysik aus dl'ei Semestern, x894, S. x86. (Abhand.
d. Sachs. Akad. d. Wiss. XIV. Nr. VI. phil. -hist. Klasse, p. 666)
2 HallS Reimer, 'Die Entstehung und urspriingliche Bedeutung des Namens Metaphysik.'
(Zeitschr. t. Philosoph. Forsch. VIII. 2. 1954)
4 THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT
this misinterpretation and explaining the real origin of the word meta
physics.
According to Reimer, it would have been a quite arbitrary procedure
to christen the science, which Aristotle himself called the first philoso
phy, and Theophrastus the first theology, with a name derived by
chance from the mere editorial sequence of the work. The interpreta
tions of this book by Alexander of Aphrodisias and by Asc1epius, on
which modern scholars like Brandis, Zeller, and Bonitz base the above
mentioned hypothesis, tell us in reality, that the book was called 't'a
p.e't'a 't'a CPUO'LXcX, because it came after the physical sciences. Rather
than mentioning anything about its origin from Andronicus' arbitrary
arrangement, Alexander and Asc1epius said that the order was 't'cX~L<;
7tpOC;; ~(.LOCc;;. Anyone who has learned a little about Aristotle's philosophy
must know that 7tpOC;; ~(.LOCC;; ()O''t'epov is the contradictory opposite of
7tpOC;; ~(.LOCC;; 7tpo't'epov, which on its side, is the contrary of cpuO'eL 7tpo't'epov.
Metaphysics is posterior to physical sciences in the order in which we
learn things, and this is consistent with calling metaphysics 7tPWTI)
CPLAOO'OCPLOC, first philosophy, i.e., prior in the order of being. Bonitz
quotes also from Themistius and Simplicius. But the former quotation
refers to the distinction between 7tpOC;; ~(.LOCC;; and -r1i cpuO'eL, while the
latter mentions the Platonic interpretation of (.Le't'a 't'a CPUO'LXcX, viz. the
transcendency of the object of metaphysics beyond nature - tntep
CPUO'LV, E1tSXeLVoc'rwv CPUO'LXWV. Neither of these quotations can prove the
interpretation of the bibliographical origin of the term.
The name metaphysica, Reimer proceeds, cannot be found even in
Diogenes Laertius, the oldest catalogue of Aristotle's works. The first
person to use this title is Nicolaus of Damascus, who lived in the latter
half of the first century B.c. In a commentary on Theophrastus'
metaphysics - this book had also originally another name - we find
that Nicolaus of Damascus wrote a book on Aristotle's (.Le'ra'ra CPUO'LXcX.
Alexander of Aphrodisias is connected, on the one hand, to Andronicus
of Rhodes through Adrastus of Aphrodisias, and on the other, to Ni
colaus through Alexander, so that the origin of his interpretation can
be traced back to Andronicus and Nicolaus. Seeing that Averroes and
Avicenna, who must have been acquainted with the book by Nicolaus,
also maintain the interpretation by Alexander and Asc1epius, it may
safely be inferred that Nicolaus agreed with them. So the editorial
order by Andronicus must be construed as expressly following the
order in which we learn things. According to the general inclination
of the Peripatetics towards empiricism, Andronicus also might have
THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT 5
attached a lot of importance to educational order, which Aristotle
called 7tpO~ ~!J.oc~, and assuming the name 7tpw'r'Yj CPLAoO'ocp(oc to be un
suitable to this science he might have preferred the name !J.e:"t'oc "t'oc
cpuO'~x&. But the name is not his invention; it must be traced back
earlier. Though as we have already said we cannot find it in the list of
Diogenes Laertius, it seems very probable that it was included in an
earlier list - that of Hermippus (ca. 200 B.C.) - and was by some
chance dropped from the list of Diogenes. According to Howald,
Ariston of Ceus who was master of the Peripatetic school from 228-5
B.C., made a list of philosophical works before Hermippus and Dio
genes presumably used this when he made his list. ~
The origin of the name of metaphysics, thus traced back to one
century after Aristotle's death, might be safely conjectured to reflect
the sequence which Aristotle himself followed. The name 'first phi
losophy' is due to the Platonic line of thought characteristic of Aris
totle's early period. When Aristotle in later years inclined to empirical
thought, the order 7tpO~ ~!J.oc~ 7tp6't'e:pov became the predominant prin
ciple of his philosophy. One piece of evidence for this is the fact that
his metaphysics quotes the other works most often.
Eudemus, Aristotle's immediate disciple, the author of the History
01 Theology, and the first editor of his teacher's works, is supposed by
Reimer to have invented the name 't'oc !J.e:'t'oc 't'oc cpuO'~x&. Reimer also
conjectures that as well as indicating its educational position next
to the physical treatises, the word had for Eudemus the Platonic
meaning, '!J.e:"t" exe:'i:voc, rnexe:woc' appropriate to his inclination to Pla
tonism. When Eudemus edited the works, the science which from a
Platonic standpoint Aristotle called the first philosophy, was attached
to other relevant treatises, and was given the title 't'oc !J.e:'t'oc 't'oc cpuO'~x&.
Andronicus followed Eudemus and preferred the name !J.e:'t'occpuO'~x&
because he considered the original name of 'first philosophy' to be
unsuitable to educational order. In doing this Andronicus was fol
lowing orthodox Aristotelianism, so, Reimer concludes, we must re
ject the hypothesis of the accidental bibliographical origin of the term.
Reimer's theory seems to me quite persuasive and his proof is suf
ficient to dispel the long-standing mistake about the origin of the
word 'metaphysics.' The word 'metaphysics' did not originate from
somebody's being at a loss as to what to call a book, but rather, as
Kant suggested, is the most suitable designation of the first philoso
phy, a concept presumably based on the orthodox tradition from
Aristotle and his immediate followers.