Metaphors We Live By

128 Pages·2013·7.4 MB·English

METAPHORS
We Live By

GEORGE LAKOFF and MARK JOHNSON

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The University of Chicago Press

Chicago and London
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Prefice

Acknowledgments

|. Concepts We Live By
. The Systeimatcity of Meraphorical Concepts
. Mewaphorical Systematichy: Highlighting and

Hiing

, Orientationsl Metaphors

‘Metaphor and Cultural Coherence,

- Ontological Metaphors

Pensonifcation
Metanyay

(Challenges to Metaphorisal Coherence
Some Further Examples

~The Partial Nature of Metaphorical

Structuring
How Is Our Conceptual System Grounded!
‘The Grounding of Structural Metapbers

Cansation: Purdy Emergent and Party
Metapborical

‘The Cohereat Stmictating of Experience
‘Metsphorical Coherence
. Complex Coberences seruw Metaphors

I8. Some Consequences for Theories of
Canceptual Strveture

19, Deliaition and Understanding
20, Tow Metaphor Cun Give Meaniag to orm,
24, New Meaning

22. The Creation of Similarity

22, Metaphor, ‘eth, and Action

24, Truth

2S, The Myths of Objectivism and Subjectivism

26, The Byth of Objectivism in Western
Philosophy und Lingus

27, How Metaphor Reveals the Limitations of
the Myth of Objectivism

28, Some Inseequacies of the Myth of
Subjectivissa

29, The Exnerieatiaist Alternative: Giving New
Mcaping to de Old Myths

30, Onderstanling
Afterword

References

Preface

‘This book grow aur of a concen, oa both our patts, sith
how people understand their laguage nd their experience
When we first me, in early January 1979, we fund that we
sated, als, a dente that the dominant views am mea in
Westen philosophy nud linguistics are insulegueste—that

‘meaning’ in theoe taditions his very Title to do with
‘what people fled meaningfd in thse lives.

‘We were brought toxsther by a join. interest in motapbor.
Mark hod foul that most @adlitional philowonhieal views
permit metaphor litle, # aay, sole in understanding our
‘world and oucselvex. George had diseovered linguistic evi-
ddeace showing Lut metaphor is pervasive in everyday lan-
guage and thought-~cvideace that did aot fit any contem-
Poraty Anglo-American theory of mesning within either
linguistics er philosophy. Metaphor fas traditionally been
viewed in bath fields a5 8 matter of peripheral intcreat. We
shared the intuition that itis, insteai, a mavter of eemtal
‘concern. perhaps the key to givine an ademas accaunt af
inderstanding

‘Shorly after we met, we decided to eatlabunue on what
vc thought would be a brief paper giving some linguistic
cvideace ta paint up shortcomings ia recent theories of
meaning, Within a work we discovered thut certain ase
sumptions of comtemporary philosophy and linguistien that
have been taken for granted within the Western tradition
singe the Greeks precluded us from even taising the kind of
issues we wanted fo adress. "The problem was not one of
cealending or patching up some existing theory of meaning
central assumptions in ihe Western plilo
sophical wadifion, Tn pantcular, this meunt rejecting the
possibility of aay objective or absolute cuth and a host of
related assumptions, Tt also meant supplying an alternative
account in which human experience and understanding,
rathor then objective truth, played the centea role, In the
process, we have worked ont clements of an experientialist
approach, not only to issucy of language, ruth, and under
standing hut to questions about the mesningfiinese of our
‘everyday experience.

Berkeley, California

Faby 1, 1939

Acknowledgments

Ideas don't come out of thie siz. The genetal eas in this
ook repiesent a synthesis uf Yarivus intellectual traditions
‘and show the inlltence of our teachers, colleagues. stir
dents, and fiends. In addition, swany specific deus have
‘come from discussions with literally bundreds of people.
We cannot adequately acknowledge al o the traditions and,
people to whom we ate indebted: AU we can do is 10 ist
some of them and hope thatthe rest will Know who they ure
and tbat we appreciate them. The following are among the
sources of our geneval ideas,

oln Robert Koss and Ted Cohen have shaped our ideas
about linguistics, philosophy. aif in a gret many ways

Pete Becker and Chatlotte Linde have given us an appre
ciation for the way people create coherence in their lives.

Charles Fillmore’s work om frame semastics, Terry
\Wwinngrad’s ideas about knovledge-representation systems,
‘and Roger Schauk’s conception of sevipts provided the
basis for George's original conception of linguistic gestalt,
which we have generalized to e perientiat yesualt

Gur views about family reseniblences, the prototype
theory of categoiization, and tazziness in categorization
come from Ludwig Witigenstein, Bleanor Rosch, Lotti
Zadeh. and Joseph Goguen.

‘Our observations sbont how a language can reflect the
onceptual xyslem af is Rpeakers derive in great part from
the work af Faward Sapir, Benjamin Tee Whori, and others
‘who have worked in Ut eadtion

Our ideas about the relulisnship between metaphor and
‘inal derive from the anthropological truition of Bronislaw
Malinosiski, Claude 1 évi-Strauss. Vielor Turner, Chord
Geertz, und thers

‘Our ideas ubout the way our conceptual system i
by eur constunt successful fn
cultural envisonmient come parily from the (cation of te
search in human development bcgua by Jeun Piaget and
party from the wadition in ecological paycholugy growing
‘out of the work of J.J. Gibson und James Jenkins, particu
Ianly as represented in the work af Robert Shas, Michael
Turvey, and others.

ur views about the auture of the homaa sciences have
beou signiticantly influenced by Pavl Ricoeur, Robert
‘McCauley, and the Continental Lralition in philosophy.

Sandra MeMortis Johnson, Jamex Melchert, Nowtou and
Helea Hacrivon, and David and Tie Antin have enabled us
to see the commam thread in aesthetic experience and other
aspects of our experience,

Don Acbitblit has Tincured our attention an che political
and ecamomic implications of aur ideas.

YY. C. Chinn has allowed 1s to see the relationship be-
tween bully experience and modes of viewing oncuelF und
the world,

‘We also owe a very important debt ty those cantemno-
rary figures whe have worked out in great detail the philo-
suphical ideus we are reacting against. We teepect the work:
of Richanl Montague, Saul Ktipke, David Lewis, Donald
Davidson, und others as important contributions uo the
‘usditional Western conceptions of meaning and truth. This
their clatificution of theve traditional philanphicsl concepts
‘at has enubled us ta nee where we diverge fiorn the tnud
tion and where we proscrve elements of i

Our claims rest largely on the evidenes al linguistic
exsunples. Many if nut most of these have come aut of
discussions with calleaguos, students, aad frfends. John
Robert Ross, in particular, has provided a steady sttcam of
examples via phone calls and postcards, The bul af the
examples in chapters (6 und 1 came from Claudia Bugs
mau, who also gave us invaluable assistance in the prepares

tion of the manuscript, Other examples huve come from
Don Arbitbit, Goune Bergman, Dwight Bolinger, Ann
Borkia, Matthew Brasou, Clifford Hil, D. K. Houlgate
TM, Dennis Tave, Tom Mandel, John Maokey-Buscr,
Monica Bacouley. James D, MeCowley. William Nagy,
‘Reza Nilipoor, Geoff Nunbers, Margaret Rader, Michael
Reddy, Kon Silliman, Eve Sweetser, Marta Tobey, Karl
Zimonsr, as well a6 Various sludews at che University of
Calitoraia, Berkeley, and at the San Francisco Art In-
stitute,

‘Many of the individual idews im this work have emerged
from informal discussions, We would particularly Tike wo
thank Jay Ads. Paul Bonmaceruf, Betsy Branch, Dick
Brooks, Eve Clark, Hoth Clark, J. W. Coffman, Alan
[Boodes, Glenm Erickson, Charles Tilmore, James Geiser,
Leanne Hinuon, Paul Kay, Les Lamport. David Lewis,
George McClure, George Rand, John Searle, Dun Slobia,
Steve Yainee, Lew Talmy, elizabeth Warren, uml Bob
Wilensky.
METAPHORS WE LIVE RY
a

Concepts We Live By

Metaphor is for most peuple a device of the poctis imuginn-
tion and the rhetorical Rouriah—a matler vf extraordinary
rather than ordinary language, Moreaver, anetaphor is typi-
Cally viewed ws characteristic of language alone, a matter of
‘vorls rather Unan thought ot action. Tor this reason. mnost
pouple chink Uney can get along perfectly well withoot
metaphor, We have found, vn the eoutrary, thal metaphor
Je pervasive in everyday life, not just fa language but in
‘thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in
terms of which we both think and act, is fondameatally
metaphorical in nature

“The concepts that govern wus thought ure aot just matters
of the intellect. They also govern our everyday Functioning.
down to the most mundane decails, Que concepts stwetwre
what we perceive, how we get around in the work, and boss
‘we relate to other people. Que conceptual system thus plays
‘2 ceatral role in defining our everydJuy realities. If we arc
Tight in suggesting that oue conceptual system is largcly
metaphorical, then the way we think, what we experieicc,
fand what we 40 every doy is very aweh a matter of
metaphor,

‘But our camcepeusl system is nol something se are nor
mally aware of. In most the little Ubings we do every dy,
‘we simply think and nct more or less automaticaly alone
Certain fines. Just whot Unese lines are Is by na meats obvi
fous, One way (9 find out is by looking at language, Sines
Comuimicalion is bused om the same conceptual system
that we use in thinking and acting, language fs an important
obits of evidence for what Unat system is like

a
4 nareun one

Primarily an the basis of linguistic evidence, we ave
found that most of our ordinary concepmal system ik
uctaphorical in quture. And we have Found a way to begio
10 ideotity in detalljust what the metyphors are chat stric-
lure how we perceive, how se thiak, and what we do.

To give some idea of whut it could mean for x concept to
be metaphorical und for such x concepl in sbructine an
everyday activity, Jet us start With the codcept awaL MENT
and the couveplusl metaplior ARGUMENT 18 WAR, TBS
metaphor is reflected in our everyday Innguage by a wide
variety of expressions

‘Yor css ae tense

Heacked err er pint ry agua
Fis criticisms were righs on target, in

I eemaltt Wesspient

1 Secever no an aretocat with Nay

You danres? Oks hood

Ey se it sry, ie son
shor down allo hy wun

10s importa fo ste tha we don't jot talk aboot argn-
swons Intern of wars We can aefally win or Tos et
ions, We se the porta we are mig With OPPO.
rent. We stack his postions nnd we defend ont own We
{non lose round, We plas amd ose stale, we find
2 postin Indeene we can kaon fa oko 8 Re
ine of atack. Many ofthe things we do Im argu re
partly sacred Wythe concept of ats Thou ther
to physical bate, ref webu! tle, and te sete
Sf tn wgumentetrck, defeme, coumtelach, eee
Fett is tts thn cose fat Ene snus 6 an
‘metaphor i ane that wove by ts colt rannes
the eotons we perfom inguin.
"yo magi «clue where segments are rok viewed
inteons of war, whedt Ao ome vin ot loss, hare (here
no Sense of slacking or defeoding. sxning or losing

‘CONCLETS Wu LIVE BY 5

ground, Imagine a culture where an argument is viewed as@
ance, the particinumis are seen as pesformers, ane the
goal is co perform ina bulanced and aesthetically plsasing
way, Lu avch # culture, people would view arguments dif
fevently. experionce them iffereutly, camry them out dilfer-
ently, nad talk ahout them differently. But we would prob-
ably nt view them as arguing at all: they would simply be
doing womething differest, It would seem strange even Lo
‘call what thoy wore doisg “arguing.” Perhaps the most
nepiral way ofdescribing this difference between their cul-
‘mre aud ours would he to say that we have a discourse form
structured in terms af battle and they have one structure in
terms of dance,

‘This is an exumple of what it means for a metaphorical
voncept, namely, ARCUMENT 18 wan, (0 structure (at Ieast
i part) what we do and how we understand what we ure
doing when we urpue. The essence of mennphor ix under
standing and exprriencing one kind of Dhing in terms of
‘another, ig nov thal arguments are a subspecies of war.
‘Arguments and wars are diferent kinds of thingy—verbal
‘iseonrse and armed canfliet—and the actions performed
fare different kinds of uctions, But agUMPNT is partially
Steneturod, understod, peiforaied, and talked about in
terms of wan. The concept is metaphorically suuctared,
the activiy is metaphorically structured, and, con.
sequenily, the leaguage is metaphorically structured,

Moceuver, cis isthe ordinary way oT having an argnment
sna taking about one. The normal way for us to tll about
trucking a positiva is to use the wor "ulluck x posit.”
Our conventional ways of eafking about arguments peer
suppose u metaphor we are barely ever conscious of. The
rmeluphor ix aot merely in the words we seit isin our
ery concept of an argument, The language of argument is
snot poetic, fanciful, or rhetsrieul; i is itera. We talk about
arguoents that say becune se conceive of them that
‘way—and we act according to lhe way we conceive of
‘things.
6 CHAPERONE

‘The most important vlaim we have made sa far i thet
‘metaphor is not just a matter of langnage. Wut is, af mere
‘words, We shall agec that, on the contrary, tuman thonghr
procastes ste largely metaphotionl. This is what we mean
when we say thul the Roman conceptual system i
metaphorically stvictured and dlefimed. Metaphors as line
{uistic exprossions ate possible precisely heenuse there ure
‘metaphors in © persou’s concentual sysiem. Therefore,
whenever in this book we speak of metuphars, stich ax az
GUMIEN' 18 WAR, if should be understood that metaphor
means metaphorical concept

2

The Systematicity
of Metaphorical Concepts

Arguments usually follow patterns; thats, there are gertain
things we typically do aod do not do in arguing. The fact
that we in purl eonceptualize arguments in terms of battle
systemulicully induences the shape arguments tae and the
‘way we talk about what we do in arguing, Bosuuse the
metaphorical concept is systematic. the language we use Lo
talk about that aspect of the concept ie nystematic.

‘We saw in the ARGUMENT IS WH metaphor thet expres
sions from the vocabulary of war, ¢.g.. atank a position,
Indefensible, strategy, sew line of attack, wn, gain grovnd,
flc., form a systematic way of talking about the halting
aspects uf arguing, It is uo accideat that those expressions
rmeun what they mean when we use them to ‘talk about
arguments. A portion of the conceptual network of buille
partslly characterizes the concept of an argument, und the
language follows suit, Since metaphorical expressioms in
‘our lauguage are tied to metaphorical eancepis ina system
atic way, we can use metaphorical Linguistic expressions to
study dhe nature of mctaphoricel concepts und La guin un
understanding of he nictaphorieal aguure of que activitien.

‘Tu get an idea of how metaphorical expressions in every
‘day language can ive us insight into the metaphorical na-
ture of the concepts that structure our overyUsy activites,
let us consider the metaphorical conccpl TIME IS MONEY as
‘is reflected in contemporary aglish

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