Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics

257 Pages·1969·8.251 MB·English

by  H. J. McCloskey (auth.)

META-ETHICS AND NORMATIVE ETHICS
META-ETHICS
AND NORMATIVE ETHICS
by
H. J. McCLOSKEY
. .
~
MARTlNUS NIJHOFF I THE HAGUE I 1969
o
/969 by Marlinus NghoJ!, The Hague, N~therla"ds
Softcover reprint oltlle hardcover 1st edition 1969
All rights ftJer.ed, including the right to trans/ate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof ill any form
ISBN 978·94-011·8544·8 ISBN 978·94-011·9299-6 (eBook)
DQI10.1007/978·94-011·929%
PREFACE
The purpose of this work is to develop a general theory of ethics which ex
plains the logical status of moral judgments and the nature of the general
principles which we should adopt and on the basis of which we should act.
The enquiry into the logical function of moral judgments is entered into as
important in its own right and as a preliminary to the normative enquiry, for
it is on the basis of our conclusions in the area of meta-ethics, that we de
termine the appropriate method of reaching our normative ethic. The ap
proach followed in the meta-ethical enquiry is that of examining theories of
the past and present with a view to seeing why and in what respects they fail,
in particular, what features of moral discourse are not adequately explained
or accommodated by them. A positive theory which seeks to take full account
of these and all other logical features of moral discourse is then developed in
terms of a modified intuitionism of the kind outlined by W. D. Ross, 'good'
being explained as the name of a consequential property, 'right' in terms of
moral suitability, and moral obligations as consisting in our being constrained
to act in certain ways by facts we apprehend to constitute moral reasons
which constrain us so to act. In the normative enquiry, utilitarian, Kantian,
and Thomist natural law theories are examined and rejected as unsatisfacto
ry, and in their place a theory of a plurality of intrinsic goods, and of princi
ples of prima facie obligation (following Ross in some respects but diverging
from him in the account given of the content of the principles of prima facie
obligation) is advanced.
It is not possible in a work of this kind to examine every important theory
which has ever been developed in the areas discussed. As many important
theories as possible are examined, but the selection of theories for discussion
has been guided by consideration of how an examination of their short
comings will advance the argument of this work, as well as by consideration
of their importance in the history of ethics or in the contemporary ethical
scene. However, the reader will readily see how the sorts of arguments de-
VI PREFACE
veloped here admit of restatement or further development against different
formulations of these theories and against theories of different types.
As I have written on themes discussed here in a number of papers, I have
referred the reader ~ the relevant article where a fuller treatment of the
issues raised is to be found in the article. Some use has also been made of
material from a number of these articles, and I thank the editors of the
following journals for permission to do so: Australasian Journal of Philoso
phy ("Hare's Ethical Subjectivism", "Nowell-Smith's Ethics", and "Ross
and the Concept of a Prima Facie Duty"); Ethics ("Towards an Objectivist
Ethic"); Inquiry ("A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment"); Journal of
Philosophy ("Utilitarian and Retributive Punishment"); Philosophical Re
view ("An Examination of Restricted Utilitarianism"); Philosophical Studies
("D-Words, A-Words and G-Words"); Philosophy ("The Complexity of the
Concepts of Punishment").
In acknowledging my great endebtedness to others, I must make special
mention of the help and advice I have received from Professor W. G.
Maclagan, Mr. J. D. Mabbott, Dr. Mary A. McCloskey, Dr. Jan Srzednicki,
Dr. W. D. Joske, Dr. V. I. Rice, and, with the section relating to Kant's
ethics, Dr. W. D. Lamont. Whatever shortcomings have persisted in spite of
this help and advice are entirely the responsibility of the author.
University of Melbourne
1968
CONTENTS
Preface V
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTORY: META-ETHICS, NORMATIVE ETHICS AND
MORALITY
1. Levels of Theorizing 1
2. Meta-Ethics 2
3. Normative Ethics and Morality 3
4. Inter-relations between Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics 5
5. The plan of this work 7
PART A. META-ETHICS: A DEFENCE OF AN
INTUITIONIST ETHIC
CHAPTER 2. THEISTIC AND NATURALISTIC META-ETHICAL THEORIES
1. Theistic Ethics: God as Creator of Morality 11
2. Thomistic Natural Law Ethics 17
3. Naturalistic Theories 23
The Naturalistic Fallacy 23
Approval Theories 29
(a) What is an attitude? 29
(b) What is it to approve? 31
(c) "Good" means "I approve" 33
(d) Relativism as a meta-ethic: 'Good' means 'Society approves' 38
(e) 'Good' means 'approved by the impartial observer' 41
CHAPTER 3. NON-COGNITIVIST META-ETHICAL THEORIES
1. 'Good' as expressing feelings and attitudes 45
2. 'Ought' as expressing and commanding 50
3. Stevenson: 'Good' means 'I approve; do so as well' 50
4. Hare's Ethical Subjectivist Prescriptivism 66
5. Nowell-Smith's Ethics 80
VIII CONTENTS
CHAPTER 4. A POSITIVE APPROACH: INTUITIONISM AND THE NATURE OF
THE OBJECTIVE MORAL FACTS
1. The Factual Character of Moral Discourse 93
2. Moral Principles: Their Synthetic A Priori Character 96
3. Moral Perplexity: Deliberation and Reasoning 99
4. Moral Advice 101
5. Teaching and Learning Moral Concepts and Truths 104
6. Similarities and Differences Between 'Good', 'Right', 'Ought', and 'Duty' 109
7. The Accounts Suggested by These Logical Features of Moral Expressions 112
(a) 'Good' as the name of a property 112
(b) 'Right' as the name of a relation 122
(c) 'Ought' and Reasons for acting 126
CHAPTER 5. INTUITIONISM: How WE COME TO GAIN MORAL KNOW
LEDGE
1. Intuitive Insight as Rational Apprehension of Necessary Truths: The
Powers of Reason 136
2. Synthetic a priori propositions 138
3. Truth Tests and Intuitive Insights 142
4. Intuitionism and Tolerance 146
5. Multiple Intuitions 147
6. Summary of Conclusions 151
Note A. Meta-Theories of Rights 153
Note B. Concerning Revisionary Meta-Ethics 155
PART B. NORMATIVE ETHICS:
THE CASE FOR ETHICAL PLURALISM
INTRODUCING PART B. FROM META-ETHICS TO NORMATIVE ETHICS
CHAPTER 6. INTRINSIC GOODS
1. Pleasure and Happiness 163
2. Knowledge 164
3. Rationality and Rational Belief 166
4. Beauty and Aesthetic Excellence 167
5. Moral Goodness 169
6. Self-perfection 171
CHAPTER 7: MONISTIC THEORIES OF ABSOLUTE OBLIGATION: UTILI
TARIANISM
1. Varieties of Utilitarianism 173
(a) Radical and Conservative Utilitarianism 173
(b) Hedonistic, Eudemonistic, and Ideal Utilitarianism 175
(c) Act and Rule Utilitarianism 176
2. Act Utilitarianism 176
3. Rule Utilitarianism 186
CONTENTS IX
CHAPTER 8. PLURALISTIC THEORIES OF ABSOLUTE OBLIGATION: KANT
AND NATURAL LAW
1. The Kantian Theory 199
(a) Formula 1 200
(b) Formula 2 207
2. Thomistic Natural Law Ethics 211
CHAPTER 9. A POSITIVE ApPROACH: Prima Facie DUTIES 8
1. Presumptions in Favour of a Theory of Prima Facie Duties 220
2. The Nature of Prima Facie Duties 222
(a) Promotion of Good, Elimination of Evil 225
(b) Justice 231
(c) Respect for persons 234
(d) Honesty 239
3. Interconnexions between prima facie duties 241
4. The Prima Facie Character of Prima Facie Obligations 241
5. Prima Facie Ought and 'Can' 244
Bibliography 247
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTORY:
MET A-ETHICS, NORMATIVE ETHICS AND MORALITY
1. Levels of Theorizing
Within the general area of ethics and morality we encounter problems and
theorizing about them at different levels. For example, we encounter such
problems as: 'Ought I really to tell him the truth when it is simply going to
make him miserable?', 'What kinds of things and actions are good and obliga
tory?', 'What am I doing when I make a moral judgment?' Although the
conclusions arrived at on one level may bear on those of other levels, it is
useful to distinguish the problems and levels of theorizing. Three levels are
commonly distinguished: (i) Morality and ordinary moral judgments. This
is an area in which every moral agent is a participant. In expressing what he
thinks he ought to do, the moral agent is giving expression to his morality;
and his morality may have no theoretical background but be simply the col
lection of his moral judgments. (ii) Normative ethics which is directed at
discovering the kinds of things, actions and the like, which are good, right,
obligatory, i.e. which judgments and principles are to be adopted and why.
(iii) Meta-ethics which is concerned with the analysis of ethical expressions,
i.e. with their meanings, import, and, more generally, their logical functions.
We enter morality when we make or accept moral judgments. We move
from simply holding a morality, having moral beliefs, and making moral
judgments to developing a normative ethic, when we reflect about our moral
beliefs and seek their justification and explanation. This usually leads to the
formulation of a general theory - e.g. hedonism, utilitarianism - which gives
order and coherence to our moral judgments, and by reference to which we
seek to justify them. We enter the sphere of meta-ethics when we reflect
about what we are doing when we make a moral judgment, for instance,
whether we are reporting on the nature of certain moral facts, or simply
expressing our feelings, or reporting on what we believe to be willed by God,
etc.
2 META-ETHICS, NORMATIVE ETHICS AND MORALITY
The terminology 'meta-ethics' and 'normative ethics' is by no means a
completely satisfactory one; some of its defects will become apparent in the
subsequent discussion. However, because it points to two types of enquiry
which are different in very important respects, and because it is a terminology
which is now too well established easily to be changed, I propose to use it
here.
2. Meta-Ethics
The distinction between meta-ethics, normative ethics and morality (day
to day moral judgments) might suggest a parallel with those between philoso
phy of science (meta-science), and day to day judgments and predictions
(e.g. 'If the wind does not abate the fence will collapse'). However, the
parallel does not hold in the way the terminology may lead one to expect it
to hold. For instance, philosophy of science would not be possible without
science, whereas even if no normative ethic were ever to be formulated, meta
ethics in all its aspects would still be possible. All that is required for it to be
possible is the existence of moral language, the occurrence of moral
judgments. It does not depend on the occurrence of theorizing about moral
judgments in the form of normative ethics. However, in so far as there are
normative ethical theories, meta-ethical theories would relate to the uses of
moral expressions in these contexts, as well as to their day to day uses.
At first sight there may appear to be some uncertainty in the writings of
those engaged in meta-ethics or in reflection about its nature as to precisely
what it is about. We are told that it is concerned with analysing moral
concepts, with the logical study of moral language, with discovering the
logical functions of moral expressions; and if we looked at writings of less
recent date, we should no doubt find what we now call meta-ethics explained
as being concerned to elucidate what it is for a standard to be a moral
standard, a fact to be a moral fact. Many and various theories are pointed to
as examples of meta-ethical theories. Thus emotivist theories that moral
judgments express the speaker's feelings, imperativist theories that moral
judgments are imperatives enjoining action, relativist theories that moral
judgments report community attitudes, theistic theories that 'good' means
'willed by God', and intuitionist-moral property theories that moral
judgments refer to moral properties which may be directly apprehended by
intuitive insight, are all cited as examples of meta-ethical theories. Part of the
reason for the apparent uncertainty among meta-ethicists concerning the
nature of meta-ethics is that any account of its nature tends to be in terms of
the particular meta-ethical theory held by the person concerned, i.e. to pre-