Medieval philosophy: from St. Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa

492 Pages·1969·14.502 MB·English

by  John F. Wippel, Allan B. Wolter

Medieval
Philosophy:
From St. Augustine to
Nicholas of Cusa
Edited by
John F. Wippel
Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M.
The Catholic University of America
The Free Press, New York
Collier-Macmillan Limited, London
READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY
SERIES EDITORS:
PAUL EDWARDS, The City University of New York,
Brooklyn College
RICHARD H. POPKIN, University of California, San Diego
The Volumes and Their Editors:
GREEK PHILOSOPHY: THALES TO ARISTOTLE
Reginald E. Allen
CREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY AFTER ARISTOTLE
Jason L. Saunders
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM
ST. AUGUSTINE TO NICHOLAS OF CUSA
John F. Wippel and Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SIXTEENTH AND
SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES
Richard H. Popkin
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY
Lewis White Beck
Nl’NETEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY
Patrick L. Gardiner
TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY:
THE ANALYTIC TRADITION
Morris Weitz
In Preparation:
TWENTIETH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHY:
THE SPECULATIVE TRADITION
PHILOSOPHERS DEPICTED ON THE COVER ARE:
UPPER LEFT, ROGER BACON; UPPER RIGHT, MOSES MAIMONIDES;
LOWER LEFT, ST. THOMAS AQUINAS; LOWER RIGHT, ST. AUGUSTINE.
Copyright © 1969 by The Free Press
A DIVISION OF THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
Printed in the United States of America
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording,
or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the Publisher.
Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd., Toronto, Ontario
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 69-10043
First Printing
PREFACE
In this series of readings in the history of philosophy, the present
volume is unique in that it attempts to span some twelve centuries of
human thought, a time period fully half as long as that covered by the
remaining seven books conjointly. Some norms for narrowing down this
vast field were obviously needed, and the very meaning of medieval or
Middle Ages suggested to the editors one such limitation. For these
terms originally referred to the civilization that gradually evolved in
Western Europe after the barbarian invasions and Moslem conquests
had isolated it from Byzantium and Eastern culture. Yet this only
partially facilitated the editors’ task, because even in the Latin West
the twilight of learning was neither so long nor so complete as the
Renaissance thinkers who coined these pejorative labels would have us
believe. With the scores of new translations following in the wake of a
wealth of new primary source material on this period, it was no small
chore to select suitable samples for a volume of this size. In the main, we
sought to avoid duplicating material found in other collections or
anthologies and even to include a fair number of items as yet unavail¬
able in English translation. Where duplication seemed warranted in
virtue of the importance of the material, we tried to provide a more
readable translation.
Whether or not we succeeded in achieving our aims, we are deeply
grateful to all those who assisted us in any way. Particular thanks are
due to Father Ignatius Brady for making available unedited manuscript
material on Odo Rigaud; to Fathers J. A. Arnold, Owen Blum, and
Hermigild Dressier and to Professor Richard Frank for undertaking
special translations for this work; to Professor George F. Hourani for his
helpful suggestions as well as for the items he permitted us to reprint; to
Monsignor John K. Ryan for his kind advice and encouragement; to
Librarians Carolyn T. Lee and David J. Gilson for their gracious pro¬
viding of information; to Mary Linda Clarke for typing the manuscript;
and to Mary R. Homan for assisting with the Index.
Washington, D.C. John F. Wippel
Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M.
v
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CONTENTS
PREFACE v
INTRODUCTION 1
I ST. AUGUSTINE 31
A Critique of Skepticism 33
How Great Is the Soul? 43
On the Existence of God 63
II BOETHIUS 82
Divine Foreknowledge of Human Actions 84
How Substances May Be Good in Their Essence
Without Being Good of Their Essence 07
III FRIDUGIS 103
Letter on Nothing and Darkness 104
IV JOHN SCOTUS ERIUGENA 109
Philosophy, Faith, and Reason 111
The Dialectic of Nature 116
On the Division of Nature 118
V ST. PETER DAMIAN 140
On Divine Omnipotence 143
VI ST. ANSELM AND GAUNIL ON 153
St. Anselm on the Existence of God 154
A Reply to Anselm on Behalf of the Fool 158
Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilon 163
VII HONORIUS OF AUTUN 175
A Picture of the World 177
VTII PETER ABELARD 187
On Universals 190
IX PETER LOMBARD 204
How Creatures Manifest God As One and Triune 206
X RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR 210
On the Trinity
Selections from Book One 212
Selections from Book Three 223
vii
XI AVICENNA 227
Essay on the Secret of Destiny 229
XII AVER ROES 233
On God’s Knowledge 235
The Future Life 241
XIII MOSES MAIMONIDES 244
The God of the Philosophers 246
XIV ODORIGAUD 263
Is Theology a Science? 265
XV ROGER BACON 273
Opus Maius
Part I: Causes of Error (Selections) 275
Part VI: On Experimental Science (Selections) 288
Part VII: Moral Philosophy (Selection) 292
XVI ST. BONAVENTURE 298
Is God’s Existence a Truth That Cannot Be Doubted? 300
Theory of Illumination 314
Theory of Seminal Reasons 318
XVII ST. THOMAS AQUINAS 328
On the Composition of Essence and Existence in
Created Substances 330
Does God Exist? 335
On the Power of God 339
XVIII SIGER OF BRABANT 358
On the Intellective Soul 360
APPENDIX: The Parisian Condemnations of 1270 366
XIX BOETIUS OF DACIA 367
On the Supreme Good, or on the Life of the Philosopher 369
XX HENRY OF GHENT 376
Can Creatures Be Used to
Demonstrate God’s Existence to Man? 378
XXI JOHN DUNS SCOTUS 390
On the Existence of God 392
XXII AGENT INTELLECT 421
Beatitude and the Agent Intellect 423
XXIII WILLIAM OCKHAM 445
On Possibility and God 447
XXIV NICHOLAS OF CUSA 455
On Learned Ignorance 457
BIBLIOGRAPHY 465
INDEX 477
viii
INTRODUCTION
In any discussion of the philosophy of the Middle Ages the
question inevitably arises as to when to begin and end. Difficult
though it is to assign any fixed dates, certain periods and/or
figures stand out as turning points. Thus the closing of the
Athenian Academy by the Emperor Justinian in 529 is
often cited as the official ending of the period of pagan philoso¬
phizing. However, one particular aspect that sets medieval
Western philosophy apart from its Greco-Roman antecedents
is the fact that the various thinkers of medieval Christendom
believed in a definite divine revelation. Found in Scripture and
tradition, this revealed message was accepted on faith and re¬
garded as an unquestioned source of truth. As Christian schol¬
ars began to philosophize and to reflect on the content of their
religious belief, questions as to the proper relationship between
faith and reason were bound to be raised.
If one accepts this as a distinguishing feature of Western
medieval philosophy, a case might be made for carrying its
history all the way back to the first apologists and fathers of
the Church. However, practical considerations suggest that we
set the limits of this volume somewhat more narrowly. Never¬
theless, one mighty figure towers above all others in the patris¬
tic age in terms of his influence on subsequent philosophy and
theology. No apology need be offered for beginning this set of
readings with St. Augustine, in the light of his own thought and
his commanding influence throughout the medieval period.
When we turn to the close of our period the same difficulty
appears again. One might conclude with the decline of scholas¬
ticism and the rise of nominalism in the fourteenth century.
But if we have found it good to begin with one pivotal figure
who was not himself a “scholastic,” it seems advisable to con¬
clude with another who was also not a scholastic. Nicholas of
Cusa was turned against scholasticism by the sterile school
disputes of its declining years. He is another personality who
seems to mark the end of one period and the beginning of
1
2 INTRODUCTION
another and who might therefore be included either in a volume
on Renaissance philosophy or in this set of readings in medieval
philosophy.
Period of Transition
ST. AUGUSTINE
Augustine was born in 354 in North Africa of a Christian
mother and a pagan father and was thoroughly trained in rhet¬
oric. He died as Bishop of Hippo in 430. His thought is pro¬
foundly personal and reflects his own search for wisdom. His
early acceptance of the Manichean position, his flirtation with
the skepticism of the New Academy, his subsequent contact
with Neoplatonism, and his conversion to Christianity—all of
these factors are reflected in the problems he subsequently
considered and, as regards Neoplatonism and Christianity, in
many of the solutions he embraced. Neoplatonism enabled him
to account for evil as an absence of good rather than to persist
in the dualistic solution offered by the Manicheans. It also
freed him from Manichean materialism by suggesting to him
the spiritual nature of the divine. After his conversion to Chris¬
tianity his pursuit of wisdom became a pursuit of Christian
wisdom. Because of this there can be no real separation be¬
tween his philosophy and his religious thought. Together they
form one great whole. He is not interested in constructing a
philosophical system but rather seeks a deep understanding of
the soul and of God. Granted this, however, one can at least
single out certain elements in his thought of paramount im¬
portance to the history of philosophy.
His period of skepticism had left him highly concerned
about man’s capacity to know anything with certainty. Not
surprisingly, then, one finds a detailed critique of the skeptical
position in his writings. It is sometimes objected that the senses
are unreliable. Nevertheless, replies Augustine, the fact that
things perceived appear to us cannot itself be denied. Error
may occur when one attempts to distinguish between reality
and distorted images of reality and, because of this, one may
wish to limit sense knowledge to the level of opinion. But
absolute doubt proves to be completely self-defeating when
one turns inward toward oneself. At the very least we are
certain that we exist and that we know that we exist. Someone
may suggest that we are deceived even here. Augustine replies:
INTRODUCTION 3
“But if I am deceived, I exist!” His refutation of skepticism
is interesting from another point of view, in that it reveals the
inwardness of his thinking. It implies that the mind enjoys
direct and immediate knowledge of at least one spiritual
reality: itself. Further, in turning within, the mind discovers
certain truths such as those of mathematics and other “eternal
verities,” which are necessarily and unchangeably true. Finding
that he cannot account for their necessary and immutable
character either by appealing to the world of sense or to the
soul itself, since all such things are subject to change, Au¬
gustine concludes to some kind of contact with eternal and
unchanging truth by any mind in possession of such truths.
Thus, in knowing ourselves and in knowing that we can know
truth we are led to affirm the existence of God.
The above procedure illustrates his primary concern with
the soul and God. At the same time it raises questions as to the
nature of the soul’s contact with God as the source of all truth.
Although commentators on Augustine disagree as to the mean¬
ing of his theory of divine illumination, there seems to be some
consensus on the following points. Divine illumination is not to
be equated with mystical experience. At least in his mature
writings, Augustine rejects any theory of learning by recollec¬
tion or by means of innate ideas. He does not maintain that the
human intellect directly contemplates eternal truths in the
divine essence. Illumination cannot be reduced to or equated
with the action of an Aristotelian agent intellect. Because of a
certain lack of clarity and fuller development in Augustine’s
writings, positive description of divine illumination is more
difficult. However, he seems to mean that in some way the
eternal truths found in the divine mind are the source of truth
in our minds without thereby implying that we enjoy any direct
vision of the divine ideas.
Augustine’s theory of rationes seminales further empha¬
sizes the creature’s dependence on God. All things were created
by God in the beginning. Many, however, were not created in
perfect and completed form, but rather remain latent (“in
seed”) until their time comes to emerge into fully formed be¬
ings. The implication is that no second cause can really bring
new forms into being. It can only aid a form already existing
in its seminal principle to emerge. As in the theory of divine
illumination, the role of the created agent is minimized so as to
emphasize divine omnipotence.
Augustine’s concentration on the soul raises certain prob-
4 INTRODUCTION
lems as to its mode of union with the body. He knows that the
body is also part of human nature, but he frequently describes
man as a soul using a body. The soul is not related to the body
as form is to matter. The union is rather one of “vital atten¬
tion.” The soul watches over the body and is present as a whole
in all parts of the body. Since the lower cannot act on the
higher, the body cannot act on the soul. To account for sensa¬
tion he suggests that because of this “vital attention,” the soul
is aware of any changes that the body or bodily senses un¬
dergo. It is not the body, however, but the soul that senses. He
also strongly stresses the will and its power of choice. Love is
viewed as the power that moves the will in its act of choice. To
choose rightly one must love rightly. To love rightly is to love
God above all else. For this Augustine insists upon the need
for divine grace. Love is also the driving force of society. Two
loves lead to his well-known distinction between two societies
or two cities. Those who love God are united in the City of
God. Those who love the world and self rather than God are
united in the City of the World.
BOETHIUS
Boethius (480-524/25) appeared at a critical moment in
the history of Western philosophy, when the classical age was
coming to an end and the very survival of learning was soon to
rest in the hands of the emerging “barbarian” nations. At this
time translation and preservation of the learning of the past
became critically important. Boethius was the ideal figure to
exercise the choice necessary for this situation. Trained in
Greek philosophy and in the Greek language, he proposed to
translate Plato and Aristotle into Latin and to establish their
fundamental harmony. Although an untimely death prevented
completion of this ambitious project, his translations and com¬
mentaries on Aristotle’s logical works and on Porphyry exer¬
cised considerable influence during the early Middle Ages. In
addition, his widely read Consolation of Philosophy and a
series of short theological treatises were to have their effect for
many centuries to come. His own thought betrays both Aris¬
totelian and Platonic-Neoplatonic influences, but his first loy¬
alty seems to be the latter tradition.
In his second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, he
repeats Porphyry’s three questions about the nature of iini-
versals and thus passes on this problem to subsequent philos-