Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies

148 Pages·1948·12.804 MB·English

by  The Warburg Institute

MEDIAEVAL AND RENAISSANCE
STUDIES
EDITED BY
RICHARD HUNT RAYMOND KLIBANSKY
LOTTE LABOWSKY
VOLUME IV
THE WA RBURG INSTITUTE
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
)
MEDIAEVAL AND RENAISSANCE STUDIES is no longer
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MEDIAEVAL AND RENAISSANCE
STUDIES
EDITED BY
RICHARD HUNT RAYMOND KLIBANSKY
OxFORD MONTREAL
LOTTE LABOWSKY
LONDON
VOLUME IV
1958
THE WARBURG INSTITUTE
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
CONTENTS
PAGE
ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE IN A VICENNA F. RAHMAN I
ALEXANDER NECKAM'S KNOWLEDGE OF HEBREW
R. LOEWE 17
WITH AN APPENDIX BY R. W. HUNT 29
LE FLORILEGE MIXTE DE THOMAS BEKYNTON
III. RECUEIL DE TEXTES • • • • • A. WILMARTt 3 5
Grateful acknowledgement is made to the British JOHN BACONTHORPE'S POSTILL ON ST. MATTHEW
Academy for a grant from its Nuffield Fund towards B. SMALLEY 91
DEUX CATALOGUES DE BIBLIOTHEQUE DE LA HONGRIE
the cost of production of this volume.
MEDIEVA LE ET CE QU'ILS NOUS ENSEIGNENT
A. DE IVA NKA 146
LES ADVERSAIRES VISES PAR SAINT AUGUSTIN DANS LA
CITE DE DIEU . . . B. LACROIX 163
THE ENGLISH ORIGINS OF THE 'MIRACLES OF THE
VIRGIN' . . . . R. w. SOUTHERN 176
BOETHIUS' COMMENTARIES ON ARISTOTLE . J· SHIEL 217
LEON BATTISTA ALBERTI ET LES AUTEURS DU MOYEN
AGE . . . v. ZOUBOV 245
THE "LOST" PREFACE TO THE LIBER DERIVA TIONUM
OF OSBERN OF GLOUCESTER R. w. HUNT 267
INDEX OF MANUSCRIPTS. . 283
© The Warburg Institttle, 1958
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
EBENEZER BAYLIS AND SON, LTD., THE TRINITY PRESS
WORCESTER AND LONDON
......
*
ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE IN A VICENNA
I
IN several passages AriStotle treats of the idea of exiStence and of its
relation t.o the essence of~ t~ng, both in the Pof1erior Anafytics and the
lvfetapryszcs. At the begUlll111g of the second book of the Pof1erior
Anafytics we read that if we want to acquire knowledge of a thing, we
muSt firSt ask whether it exiSts or not, and only when we know that it does
can we ask what its essence is. This passage, however, concerns only the
order of our inquiry about a thing and does not deal with the relation of
essence and exiStence within the thing itself. But in the 7th chapter of the
same work, AriStotle makes a diStinction between exiStence and essence
within a thing itself: "What human nature is and the faB: that man exiSts
are different. It is by demonStration that the exiStence of a thing must be
proved, unless, indeed, to exiSt were its essence, and since being is not a
genus, it is not the essence of anything." In the Metaprysics, too, being is
described as not conStituting the essence of a thing, but as the moSt
universal predicate applying to everything. It is argued (Metaprysics 988,
b 17) that if being were conceived as genus, it could not be predicated of
the differentiae, each of which muSt be described as something which is or
exiSts. Now since exiStence is a moSt universal predicate-for everything,
whether it is a subStance or an attribute, "is"-it cannot be placed in any
category of the predicables.
What is the relation of this moSt universal predicate to the individual
things of which it is asserted? On this point AriStotle says that since
exiStence belongs to the essence of everything and is not accidental to it,
by describing something as exiStent we do not attribute to it some property
over and above its essence (Metaprysics iv, 2).
"" A fir~ draft of this paper was contributed to a Fe~schrift presented in typescript to Dr. S.
Van den Bergh on his 70th birthday. An article, partly based on the present one and entitled "Essence
and Exi~ence in Mairnonides" by Dr. A. Altmann, appeared in the Bulletin of the fohn Rylands Library,
Manche~er, April, 1953.
2. MEDIAEVAL AND RENAISSANCE STUDIES ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE IN AVICENNA 3
These remarks of AriStotle on the nature of exiStence provided the the same complaint againSt A vicenna, 1 although, following A vicenna, he
source of the diStinilion made by the Arabs between essence and exiStence. had himself, as we shall see, diStinguished between essence and exiStence
Al-Farabi, in his "RingStones of Wisdom", diStinguished between essence and had posited exiStence as a tertium quid, besides form and matter.
and exiStence by the following argument: if the essence of a thing implied Professor Gilson (Thomism, 5th edition, p. 56, note) speaks of the "indif
its exiStence, then one would ipso jaf!o underStand that it exiSts when one ferent" or "neutral" character of exiStence and essence in A vicenna.
conceives its essence. But in fact this is not the case, for, even though we Manser, in Das Wesen des Thomismus, page 5I 9, criticizes Avicenna for
are able to conceive what a thing is, we do not know whether it exiSts until having made exiStence an "ens in alio", i.e., something which resides in
we acquaint ourselves with it by sense-perception or prove it by demonStra something else juSt as an accident supposedly resides in a subStance.
tion. Al-Farabi, however, differed from AriStotle in holding that one Finally, Miss Goichon in La Diftinf!ion de !'Essence et de !' Exiftence d' apres
could know the essence or quiddity of a thing without firSt knowing that Ibn Sina (p. 136) quotes P. Geny who says, "ExiStence is something added
it exiSts. He further conceived of the relation between essence and exiStence to the essence which it actualizes; nevertheless, the exiStence of a subStance
as accidental: since exiStence lay outside the essence of a thing, it could not is subStantial and cannot, therefore, be ranged among the accidents. The
be a conStitutive element of the latter; but neither was it a necessary expressions of A vicenna seemed to exceed a little in the firSt direction; so
attribute of the essence; it is a pure accident. St. Thomas has corrected him." Miss Goichon, commenting on P. Geny,
The evidence in Al-Farabi's works on this subject does not go beyond remarks, "The expressions of Avicenna did indeed exceed a little, because
what has juSt been said, and it would be difficult to press the diStinction any he did not give exiStence a higher place than other accidents."
further and speculate about it. In Avicenna's Metapf?ysics, however, the This overwhelming array2 of criticisms and correilions which, for the
diStinction plays a fundamental role, since his theory of Being is based upon moSt part, emanate from some of the moSt auguSt authorities both in and
it. But before proceeding to describe this metaphysical theory, I should on mediaeval philosophy, leaves no doubt as to the nature of the theory
like to State Avicenna's doctrine of exiStence from the logical point of view. of exiStence which it seeks to reject. With a unanimous verdict we are
It is necessary to do so because almoSt all those who have written about told that Av icenna held the view that exiStence logically behaves like any
Avicenna's dofuine of exiStence seem to me to have confused the logical other accident; that, consequently, even if you remove this accident from
and the metaphysical issues. Since they have found in A vicenna utterances an object, you can Still go on talking about it; and that, therefore, even if
to the effect that exiStence is an accident, in some peculiar sense of the a thing does not exiSt, it nevertheless "is" in some mySterious sense,
word, of the essence, they have interpreted these utterances in a logical qualified by the attribute of "non-exiStence". Did A vicenna, in fact, hold
sense. This interpretation has inevitably led to the erroneous view that, that view?
according to Avicenna, exiStence, in relation to objef!s, behaves as any other What follows is a Statement of A vicenna' s own analysis of this subject.
accident does, e.g. black, round, etc. Thus, A verroes in his Commentary on Negatively it will show, I hope, that he did not hold the fantaStic theory
Ariftot!e's Metapf?ysics accused A vicenna of violating the definition of sub of which he has been accused. Positively, we shall see that he saw the
Stance as that which exiSts by itself.! Aquinas, following A verroes, lodged absurdities involved in the very doctrine which has been laid to his charge,
1) Averroes' Arabic Commentary on Ariffotle's Metaphysics, Catholic Press, Beirut, part I, p. 313:
"Unity and exiStence reduce themselves to the subStance of a thing of which they are asserted; the 1) Commentary on Arif1otle's Metaphysics, IV, 2..
essential characteriStics of a subStance are not something added to the subStance, like white, black, etc., • 2) ~otations to this effect could be multiplied. But my aim is not so much to name individual
which do not conStitute a subStance but presuppose it." Also, ibid., p. 3 I 5, where Averroes, after wnters as to point out that this is the official view. It seems to have become the official view thanks to
ascribing to Avicenna the doctrine that a subStance exiSts not by itself but by an extra attribute, infers Thomas Aquinas who was influenced here by Averroes. And it is againSt this official view, not againSt
an infinite regress (as does later St. Thomas Aquinas) from the do&ine, cf. ibid., part 2., p. 557· any particular writer, that I direct my argument.
4 MEDIAEVAL AND RENAISSANCE STUDIES ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE IN AVICENNA
and that, although he did not possess the technique of modern logic, he either aB:s or suffers, but both these terms do not define but presuppose
nevertheless Struggled to solve the difficulties in the logic of exiStence. We eX.I Stence "1.
shall then, after a brief account of Avicenna's views on the universal and This is enough to show, I hope, how far Miss Goichon's Statement
the particular, be able to indicate the meaning of the term "accident" in that Avicenna "did not give exiStence a 'higher' place than the reSt of the
this context. accidents" is miStaken. ExiStence does not enjoy a "higher" place among
A vicenna Starts his discussion of exiStence in Kitab-al-S hifc/, Meta the accidents for the simple reason that it is not one of the accidents.
pf?ysics, book r, ch. 5,! by saying that exiStence is one of the primary or Nevertheless, these criticisms arise from a genuine misunderStanding, the
basic concepts. JuSt as in the sphere of judgement we Start from certain source of which I hope to show in the course of this article.
basic premises which cannot be deduced from more ultimate ones, simi Av icenna then goes on to discuss the view of those who say that a
larly, in the sphere of concepts there are those which serve as basic ones. non-exiStent thing muSt, nevertheless, "exiSt" in some sense, so that we
If there were no basic concepts and underived ideas we should have to go can describe it as non-exiStent. He says, "Those people who entertain this
on ad infinitum. The ideas of exiStence and of unity, therefore, are the opinion, hold that among those things which we can know (i.e., be
Starting-points on which all the reSt of our concepts which apply to reality acquainted with) and talk about, are things to which, in the realm of non
are based. ExiStence is not, indeed, a moSt general idea in the sense that being, non-exiStence belongs as an attribute. He who wants to know
it is obtained from abStraB:ion. It is not the higheSt genus under which more about this should further consult the nonsense which they have
we subsume all the categories, but is an immediate and primary idea which talked and which does not merit consideration."2 It is intereSting to hear
renders the application of the categories to reality possible. 2 Far from Avicenna's own opinion on such non-exiStent "things". He cannot, of
saying that exiStence is an accident or an attribute attached to objeB:s in course, maintain that we are in any way acquainted with such mySterious
themselves non-exiStent, Avicenna holds that it is the primary condition entities, for there are none. He, therefore, believes such things muSt always
of asserting any informative propositions about them. It follows that be negatively described. He says, "A thing which is absolutely non
mere assertion of exiStence of an objeB: is a tautology. It is because of its exiStent cannot be positively described; even when something negative is
primary and immediate charaB:er, he says, that any attempt to define asserted of it, it is given some sort of exiStence in the mind .... How can
exiStence muSt fail. He says, "some people define the exiStent as that which something positive be asserted of it? For to say that 'the non-exiStent is
such and such' is to say that 'such and such charaB:eriStic belongs to the
non-exiStent' ."3 This he rejeB:s because it implies the exiStence of the sub
1) My §latement of Avicenna's dochine in this section is based on this chapter which deals with jeB: which has been assumed to be non-exiStent. The conclusion he accepts
the problem of being and exi§lence. is that the non-exiStent subjeB: can never tolerate the ascription of a positive
1) Avicenna, Met. I 5 [Venice, 15o8]: "Dicemus igitur quod ens et res necesse talia sunt quod predicate to it.
§latim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione que non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se. - Sicut
&redulitas [Arabic: ta~dik = judgment] que habet prima principia ex quibus ipsa provenit per se, et e§l
alia ab eis sed propter ea ... similiter in imaginationibus [Arabic: tapwwurat = concepts] sunt multa que 1) Ibid.: Arabic text op. &it., p. 292.
sunt principia imaginandi [Arabic = conception] que imaginantur per se. Sed cum voluerimus ea signi 2) Avicenna, Met. I, 5: "Sed apud homines qui tenent hanc sententiam se&undum quod s&itur et
ficare non faciemus per ea [i.e. per signa] certissime cognosci ignotum sed ftet assignatio aliq ua transitUJ annun&iatur de illo, s&ili&et, non esse, sunt res que non habent similitudinem &um eo quod debet loqui de non esse [wrong
per animam [Arabic: but is drawing the attention of, or bringing to the notice of the mind] nomine ~ranslation; cf. the English quotation]. Qyi scire voluerit legat inania verba eorum que non merentur
vel signa quod aliquando erit in se minus notum quam illud ... si autem omnis imaginatio egeret alia 1nspic'1 • " - A rab1·c text, op. &it., p. 296.
precedenti imaginatione, procederet hoc in infinitum vel circulariter. Qye autem promptiora sunt ad ') Ibid.: "unde de non esse absolute non enunciatur aliquid affirmative. Sed si enunciatur aliquid
imaginandum per seipsa sunt ... sicut reset ens et unum etc."-Arabic text, Teheran, 1303 A. H., p. 291. negative, etiam certe jam posuerunt ei esse aliquo modo in intellectu ... quomodo enim de non esse
In the text of this essay I have relied directly on this Arabic text and have quoted the corresponding ~ot~ enunciari res [i.e. affirmative = Arabic]. Sensus enim no§lre diaionis quod non efl tale [compare
Latin in the footnotes, pointing out major discrepancies. nghsh quotation] e§t quod talis dispositio aduenit in non esse." Arabic text, op. &it., p. 295·
6 MEDIAEVAL AND RENAISSANCE STUDIES ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE IN AVICENNA 7
A vicenna ends this passage by an important remark, viz., if you have . ages in our minds, we can talk of their relationship to reality and, indeed,
a proposition in which an attribute is denied of a real subject, then you can :Ow we can have a common objeB:ive world at all.
always affirm the opposite attribute of the same subject and get a positive In this chapter Avicenna, following the Stoics,1 diStinguished the
proposition. But, he says emphatically, you can never do so with regard concept "thing" or "something" from what he calls the concept of a
to a non-exiStent subject.1 He did not see that a subject of which we are positive, (spatio-temporally) determinate exiStent; the latter is what we
to deny all opposites is in itself contradiB:ory. This line of argument should underStand by individual objeB:s, e.g., chairs, tables, etc.; but the former
have led him to perceive that such a subjeB: cannot be a real subjeB: at all. has a much wider use. It is applicable not only to exiStent objeB:s but also
There is, however, no evidence that he ever thought so. to essences, e.g., we can say that animal, or black or white is "something".
Next, Avicenna notices that we do in faB: sometimes talk of certain The concept "something" therefore, cannot be used to convey the idea of
non-exiStent beings. What precisely these non-exiStent entities are, we are exiStence. JuSt because the word "something" has the wideSt possible use,
not told; A vicenna does not explicitly name any fiCtitious or mythical so that anything can be said to be "something", whether it is an entity
entities. Probably what he has in mind are the sort of fiCtitious animals or not, the propositions in which "something" occurs as a predicate are
and fairies of which the Stories are told in such widely read works as the leaSt "profitable" because they do not say anything at all. While
Ka/ila wa Dimna, the Arabian Nights, etc., or, what is more likely, he might making this diSt:inB:ion between "something" and "exiStence", seeing that
be thinking of the centaur and the goatStag-examples which appear in "something" itself is allied to a moSt general notion of being or "is-ness",
AriStotle. Now Avicenna decidedly rejeB:s the view that these entities exiSt Avicenna draws a further diSt:inB:ion between two very different uses of
in a universe of their own. How is it then that we are able to assert so "exiSts". This diSt:inB:ion is moSt important for the right underStanding of
much about them? This queStion seems to have troubled him and, in faB:, his theory of essence and exiStence, and I have no doubt that it is by ignor
led him aStray. The faB: that we can discourse not only about exiSting ing this diSt:inB:ion that his critics have misunderStood his theory. By nus
things but also about non-exiStents [Avicenna includes under this category conStruing his utterances such as "exiStence is an accident of the essence"
also the things of the paSt and the hypothetical events of the future-e.g.,
the events of the Day of ResurreB:ion] led him to think that we are able added from the Arabic] ... ManifeSl:um eSt igitur quia [correct: quod] id quod enunfiatur de eo, scilifet, non
to do so because things exiSt in our minds, i.e., we have some sort of me [correct: id de quo enunciatur] necesse eSt ut aliquo modo habeat esse in anima. Enunciationes
enim re vera non sunt nisi per id quod habeat esse in anima et secundum accidens sunt per id quod eSt
mental picture or image of them. All our propositions refer direB:ly to
in cxterioribus."-Arabic text, op. fit., pp. 296-97.
our mental images, and only indireB:ly to reality; also the images of unreal 1) Sec Stoiforum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. II, p. 117, quotations from Alexander of Aphrodisias
objeB:s can be spoken of because they have "some sort of relation to and Seneca, especially the following quotation from Seneca: "Primum genus Stoicis quibusdam videtur
reality".2 He does not raise the problem how, if we talk only about the 'quid': quare videatur subiiciam. In rerum, inquiunt, natura quaedam sunt, quaedam non sunt. Et haec
autem, quae non sunt, rerum natura complectitur, quae animo succurrent, tamquam Centauri, Gigantes
et quicquid aliud falso cogitati omne formatum habere aliquam imaginem coepit, quamvis non habeat
1) Ibid.: "Si vero forma [Arabic = attribute] non fuerit in non esse, tunc remota eSt forma a non subSl:antiam." Avicenna, Met. I, 5: "Dico autem quod intentio entis et intentio rei imaginantur in
esse. Si autem hof non erit remotio forme a non esse [omitted in Latin, added from the Arabic], cum re· animabus due intentiones. Ens vero et aliquid sunt nomina multivofa unius intentionis [wrong translation;
moverimus formam a non esse, erit oppositum huic. lam igitur forma erat in eo [Arabic: et forma erit in ~orrect: "exiStent, positive and determinate are synonymous words"]. Nee dubitabis quoniam intentio
eo, i.e. affirmative]; et hoc [totum: added after the Arabic] eSt falsum."-Arabic text, op. fit., p. 296. IStorum non [sic; should be deleted] sit jam impressa in anima legentis hunc librum; sed reset quicquid
2) Ibid.: "Illi [i.e. those who believe that non-exiStents muSt somehow exiSt so that they can be equipollet ei significat etiam aliquid in omnibus linguis. Unaqueque enim res habet certitudinem qua
spoken of] aucem non inciderunt in errorem ilium nisi propter ignorantiam suam de hoc quod enun eSt id quod eSt ... si autem diceres quod certitudo hujus eSt res, erit etiam hec enunciatio inutilis ad id
ciationes non sunt nisi ex [de] intentionibus que habent esse in anima, quamvis sint de non esse [in qu~d ignorabamus."-Arabic text, op. fit., pp. 293-95. This quotation and the one in the next note form
exterioribus, added from the Arabic]; ita tamen ut enunciatio fiat de illis secundum hoc quod habent a stngle text and should therefore be read together. Although Avicenna mixes up the two discussions,
comparationem aliquam ad singularia, verbi gratia, si dixeris quod resurrecHo erit, intellexiSl:i resur (I) that of the relationship of "exiStence" and of "something" and (2) the equivocity of exiStence, yet
What be ·
recHonem et intellexiSl:i 'erit', et predicaSl:i 'erit' quod eSt in anima de resurrectione [que eSt in anima: Wants to say becomes clear from a careful reading of the passage.
8
MEDIAEVAL AND RENAISSANCE STUDIES ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE IN AVICENNA 9
and "exiStence is added to the essence", they have been led to believe as not underStood, philosophers and hiStorians of philosophy have been
the term "accident" is here used in the technical sense as in logic ~d to think that exiStence is an "accident" of the quiddity or essence.
accident is opposed to subStance and attached to it, as it were, from
outside.
A vicenna' s diStinction comes precisely to this :1 we often
some sort of exiStence to quiddities. In such propositions, as we have II
before, the assertion of exiStence alone does not add anything new to
subject of which it is being asserted, since exiStence in this usage equals " A brief account of the relation between the universal and the indi
something", and therefore such propositions are not "profitable"! Bu vidual may here be appropriate. According to Avicenna, an essence, e.g.
secondly, we also assert spatia-temporally defined exiStence of quiddities, "man", is, in itself, neither universal nor particular, neither one nor many.
e.g., we say that the species elephant2 exiSts, and in this case the affirmation "Being man" or "manness" is one thing, "being universal" or "univer
of exiStence is "profitable" because it says something new of the subj sality" another, although "man" is certainly in one sense a universal. Now,
and therefore gives some information about reality. Now it is clear from it muSt be noted, that whenever af!Y two concepts are not the same either in whole
this latter sort of proposition that exiStence in this case means "instan or in part, but nevertheless are found together, Avicenna employs the term "accident"
3
tiation". The proposition "the species elephant exiSts", therefore, · or "necessary accident" to describe their relationship. He, therefore, says that
equivalent to the proposition, "there exiSts an inStance (or there exist universality is an "accident" which happens to "man" .1 Thus an essence
inStances) of the species elephant" or to the proposition "the species taken in itself, is juSt what it is, viz. an essence and is neither one nor many,
elephant has an inStance (or inStances)". The "profitability" of such neither universal nor individual. He says that if "man" were one and
propositions, then, depends on the fact that the conception of the quiddity universal in itself, it would be impossible that it should be many and
in itself does not tell us whether it has any inStance in reality or not and particular. This being so, we cannot speak of an "individuation" of the
to affirm or deny that it has inStances is, therefore, saying something more essence Strictly speaking. Essence, in this sense, does not exiSt anywhere
about the quiddity. Hence, "exiStence", or, as it should be better put, in reality (fi'l a'yan) although, Avicenna says, it is described as being a
"inStantiation" of the quiddity, being something more than the quiddity nature prior in exiStence to the natural exiStent and as possessing a divine
itself is said by A vicenna to be "a further fact about it", or "to be some exiStence.
thing added to it". Since the right meaning of "exiStence" as inStantiation What is the relation of this essence to the individuals exemplifying
it? Does "it" exiSt identically in all of them? To this queStion Avicenna's
reply is "no"! He says "it is impossible that a single essence should exiSt
1
) Avicenna, Met. I, 6: "quia verbum ens signat et multas intentiones ex quibus eSt certitudo identically in many". This is because there is no essence which can be
[Arabic: J:!a~i~a or essence] qua est unaqueque res ... Unaqueque res habet certitudinem [ArAbic 2
J:!a\ci~a] propriam que e§t ejus quidditas; et notum eSt quod certitude cuiusque rei que e§t propria described as an exiStent per se in reality and which then moves into various
ei e§t preter esse quod multivocum efl cum aliq uid [incorrect translation; Arabic: "which is equivalent to
positive (i.e. concrete) exi§tence"] quoniam cum dixeris quod certitude [i.e. quiddity] talis rei e§t in
singularibus vel in anima vel absolute ... tunc bee intentio apprebensa et intellefla [sic; correct: "it has a 1) Avicenna, Met. V, 1: "Igitur universale ex hoc quod e§t universale e§t quoddam, et ex hoc
definite and determinate meaning", i.e. because it refers to a definite concrete object]. Sed dum dixeris quod e§t quiddam cui accidit universalitas e§t quiddam aliud ... quia cum ipsum [sc. universale) fuerit
quod certitude huius vel certitudo illius eSt certitude [i.e. if you merely assert that, e.g., "there is such a h~mo vel equus, erit hec intentio alia preter intentionem universalitatis, que e§t humanitas vel equinitas.
quiddity as man"], erit superflua enunciatio et inutilis. Arabic text, op. cit., pp. 293-95. See previous note. ~~~nitio enim equinitatis e§t preter diffinitionem universalitatis ... uncle ipsa equinitas non eSt aliquid
32) The example is my own. IllS! equinitas tantum ...." -Arabic text, op. cit., p. 483.
) My reasons for not using the misleading term "individuation" will become clear in the dis ") Avicenna, Met. V, 2: "Non e§t autem possibile unam et eamdem intentionem exi§tere in
cussion of the que§tion of the universal and the particular which follows. tnultis ·" - A ra b"1 c text, op. &.t t., p. 490.
IO MEDIAEVAL AND RENAISSANCE STUDIES ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE IN AVICENNA II
individuals. In each individual exemplifying the essence, the essence ·
der the influence of Neoplatonism, believed that essences firSt exiSt in
different. Thus "it (i.e. absolute manness) is not the manness of 'Amr; ~;e mind of God and tha~ ?od :hen, to make thC:m "reall~ exiStent", gives
is different from it thanks to the particular circumStances (a'ra<:I).
hern exiStence. Further 1t 1s pomted out that this led A v1cenna to believe
particular circumStances have a role in the individual person of Zaid ..
that exiStence is something added to the essence and is therefore a sort of
and also a role in the 'man' or 'manness' in as much as it is related
:ccident of it. Now, undoubtedly, A vicenna did believe1 that essences
him" .1 It seems clear from these Statements that what exiSts in reality exiSt in the rnind of God. But if they do exiSt in His mind, how can
not essences as such, nor yet essences as such plus conglomerations
exiStence be their accident? What exiSts outside His mind, as we have
accidents-indeed, essences do not have a positive exiStence at
seen, are not essences or quiddities but individual objects which are
individuals which are in a unique relationship with essences. This re1anon.
obviously not accidents or attributes of the quiddities in God's mind.
ship obviously is not the relationship of individuation; it can
described as a relationship of exemplification or inStantiation.
What is then universality, if it characterizes neither the essence-in.
III
itself, nor the real individuals? A vicenna says, "it is clear then that
nature (i.e. an essence) cannot be found in real objects as an actual
Now that it has become clear that the relation of exiStence to essence
such that it be identically common to all the objects (exemplifying it)
universality happens to a nature (i.e. an essence) when it is conceived · is not the relation of an accident or an attribute to its logical subject, but
the mind".2 Universals, therefore, are only concepts which that, nevertheless, the inStantiation of an essence by an individual which
A vicenna says, as exiStents in the mind are particular, function as exemplifies it is something different from the essence itself, we pass from
logic to metaphysics. This celebrated theory which is theological in its
with regard to the external objects to which they are related.
inspiration, arises out of a desire to formulate a fundamental distinction
Now we see what is meant by the term "accident" in this context: it
between God and created objects. It works with AriStotelian concepts and
is not the meaning of, nor part of the meaning of, essence to be ei
within the framework of the basic AriStotelian principles; it is concerned
universal or particular. It acquires these meanings, they "happen" to
with an analysis of the individual into three conStituent elements, since the
when it comes into relation with an individual exiStent in external reality
traditional analysis of it into matter and form is found to be insufficient.
or with a concept in the mind. No matter how much we may quarrel
Av icenna holds that if you analyse a thing into two conStituent elements
the terminology of this doctrine, it seems to me certain that the rash
only-matter and form-you will not be able to account for its exiStence
charges of "accidentality" or "mutual indifference" of essence and exiStence
as an individual. Matter, taken by itself, is non-exiStent since it is pure
are unjuSt and miss the point of a doctrine which represents an attempt to
potentiality of exiStence. Form or essence, too, since it is conceptually the
diStinguish between certain concepts. Again, in order to explain A vi
id~ntical element in the individual objects falling under one class, and is a
cenna's theory, some people have drawn attention to the fact that Avicenna,
tuuversal, does not exiSt. What exiSts is the individual inStantiating the
universal. How to derive then from a potentially exiStent matter on the
1) Avicenna, Met. V, 1 (the firft few words in the Latin are different from the Arabic from which one hand, and from a non-individual and therefore non-exiStent quiddity
I have quoted): "poftquam autem humanitas Platonis non eft sua nisi propter accidentia, tunc hec acci
on the other, a real concrete individual? He says: "Everything except the
dentia habent actiones in individuo Platonis ... et habent actionem in homine vel in humanitate, eo
O~e who is by His essence One and the ExiStent who is by His essence
quod referuntur ad hominem [correct: ad Platonem]"-Arabic text, op. cit., p. 485.
2) Avicenna, Met. V, 2: "Manifeftum eft igitur non esse possibile ut una natura habeat esse in his -Existent, acquires exiStence from something else. . . . In itself, it (i.e.
sensibilibus, ita ut in actu fit universalis, id eft, ipsa una fit communis omnibus. Universalitas enim non
accidit nature alicui nisi cum ceciderit in formatione intelligibili." -Arabic text, op. cit., p. 491. 1) a. above, p. 9, lines 17-19; also Met. VIII, 7; IX, 4·