Meaning without Truth

247 Pages·2013·0.967 MB·English

by  Stefano Predelli

Meaning without Truth
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Meaning without
Truth
Stefano Predelli
1
3
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To David Kaplan
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Preface
‘In the winter of 1995, as I was conducting my annual tour through the
delightsofDemonstratives,Ipausedatafamiliarfootnote.Itstruckme,for
thefirsttime,asintriguing.’Thusbeganmydissertation,writtenatUCLA
under David Kaplan’s supervision. The footnote in question had to do
withoperators on character,and provided the impetus for myinterest in
lessthanstraightforwardusesofindexicalexpressions.Myruminationson
recordingdevices,monsters,andotherescapesfromtheGeworfenheitofthe
here-and-noweventuallyledmetoextendKaplan’sfootnoteintoawhole
book,Contexts(Predelli2005a).
Icannowrecyclemylittleinsiderjoke,adaptingittoanotherjuncture
inDemonstratives(andAfterthoughts),thistimeacoupleofsentencesdealing
with the very aims and scope of semantic theorizing.1 What struck me
during my more recent annual tours, a few years ago, had to do with
Kaplan’s distinction between verities and vagaries—a distinction I had
alreadybeguntotackleinContexts,butwhichgrewuncontrollablyinits
importancewithinmylucubrationsonlanguage.Aspartoneofthisbook
indirectlytestifies,Iendedupconsideringtheobliterationofthatdistinc-
tionastherootofallsemanticevils,aconfusion soperniciousandyetso
temptingthatIdetecteditspresenceinprettymucheverythingIdisliked
within my theoretical surroundings. With apocalyptic overtones, I now
give that mistake an appropriately high-sounding moniker: the Fallacy of
MisplacedCharacter,themainfocusofchapterthreeinthisbook.
Yet, like the Hegelians, one sometimes loves a synthesis. Or, at least,
onefalls inlovewiththelandscapeofthefrontier—inmycase,withthe
calm and collected whisperings that lie between the loud vulgarity of de
factousesandthedizzyingsilenceofdejurecharacters.Thewhisperings(in
Kaplan’ssenseofthemetaphor)aretheprovinceofnontruth-conditional
meaning:meaningallright,withalltheaccompanyingverities,butnotthe
1 Fortheoutsiders,thejokehastodowiththebeginningofKaplan’s‘Opacity’:‘In1978,
as I was conducting my annual tour through the delights of [Quine’s] “Quantifiers and
PropositionalAttitudes”,Ipausedatafamiliartransactionpoint.Itstruckme,forthefirst
time,aspuzzling’(Kaplan1986:229).
viii PREFACE
sortofmeaningthat,likecharacter,endsuphavinganimpactonmatters
of truth.2 Thus emerged my interest for ‘meanings without truth’—an
interest that eventually led me to what I now call the Theory of Bias,
presented and developed in parts two and three of this Meaning Without
Truth.
Agenotwithstanding,myHegelianleaningsnever(atleastwilfullyand
consciously) embrace the lunacy of contradiction. Indeed, I have always
understood my Theory of Bias not only as firmly consistent with my
disdain for Misplaced Character, but as giving that fallacy even greater
urgency:whatnowriskstobeimproperlyclassifiedamongtheveritiesof
characterarenotonlythevagariousregularitiesofaction,butalsothevery
differentveritiesofbias.
Itwasnotsosurprising,then,thatKaplan’sshadowcontinuedtobecast
over my first timid ventures beyond the truth-conditional borderline.
In fact, it should have been utterly obvious from the beginning, since,
already inthe nineties,Kaplanmanifested the first signs of hisfascination
for‘ouch’and‘oops’,andforsomeofthephenomenaItackleinparttwo.
ThereasonwhyIremainedlukewarmthen,andwhyittookmesolongto
understand the considerable significance of non truth-conditional mean-
ingforsemanticsatlarge,maywellhavehadtodowithKaplan’srhetoric
at the time: to my horror, nothing less than a rejuvenated version of
that infamous slogan, ‘meaning is use’. What an unwelcome intrusion of
that Wittgensteinian anathema among the austere verities we aimed at
unveiling,thoseWednesdayafternoons!3
Iamnotsosurenow.ButIhavetheimpressionthat,whenitcomestoa
few aspects of the big picture, I am still not in complete agreement with
Kaplan’s new approach to meaning at large. At least as far as slogans go,
meaningisformestillmostdefinitelynotuse,inthesenseofuseIdiscussin
partone.And,accordingtoparttwo,somekindofmeaning,namelybias,
maywellhavetodowithuse(inaverydifferentsenseoftheterm‘use’),
but is most definitely not all there is to meaning. Indeed, if I have
2 I am thinking here of Kaplan’s allusions to ‘whispered asides’, which I now (highly
contentiously)regardasprecursorsofhisinterestforthenontruth-conditionaldimension(see
Kaplan1989).
3 TheUCLAWorkshopinphilosophyoflanguage,whereIfirstheardKaplan’sideason
‘ouch’and‘oops’,usedtomeetinDoddHall,onWednesday,at3p.m.
PREFACE ix
preciouslylittletosayaboutcharacterinthisbook,thatispreciselybecause
myventuresintobiasedterritoriesleavenotracewithintheincorruptible
provinceoftruth-conditionalmeaning.
Thatisnottosaythatcharacterandbiasfollowparallelpaths,andnever
interact with each other in semantically interesting, and sometimes sur-
prising ways. Indeed they do, as I explain in part three, where I discuss
issuesinthevicinityofwhatIcallobstinacy,theeffectofbiason(indexical)
character. It is here where I dare to boldly go where no semanticist has
gone before. I start with allegedly ‘philosophically marginal’ phenomena
such as vocatives, dates, and signatures, and I argue that their analysis
provides the key to well-known topics of semantic befuddlement: pure
quotation,theGiorgione-Barbarellipuzzle,thereflexiveuseoflanguage,
the significance of demonstrations for demonstratives, and, more gener-
ally,therelationshipsbetweenmeaningandcontext.WhatIendupwith
are,toputitmildly,unexpectedresults—amongmyfavourites,theideaof
context-insensitiveindexicals,andthedefenceofthesubstitutivityofco-
referentialexpressionswithinquotationmarks.IfIweremistakeninanyof
this,Iwouldnotbemistakeninthesenseofbeingsubtlyconfusedor,in
that trite locution from the most inept philosophical rhetoric, of being
‘profoundlymistaken’.IfIwerewronginpartthree,Iwouldbewrongin
the sense of being, obviously and superficially, off the wall. No worries:
IherebyassertthatIamnotwrong.
The main theme of this book is philosophical or ‘meta-semantic’: my
discussion of the divide between vagaries and verities indirectly paints a
certainpictureoftheaimsandscopeofdifferentareasoflinguisticenquiry,
withparticularattentiontotheirrelationshipswithsemantics,inthesenses
of ‘semantics’ relevant for my project. The reader interested in unveiling
thegeneralpictureshouldreadthebookfrombeginningtoend,but,ifin
a hurry, can afford to skip the starred sections and/or chapters. As
I proceed towards the finished painting, I drop my pearls of wisdom
regardingthisorthatlinguisticphenomenon,andthisorthatphilosophical
problem (only very occasionally with the aim of presenting a complete
theory or of defending a decisive solution). The reader interested in my
views about the topics mentioned in the main chapter headings may
perhaps jump straight to the relevant sections, but chapters four and