McNabb, Tyler Dalton (2016) Closing Pandora's box: a defence of Alvin Plantinga's Epistemology ...

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McNabb, Tyler Dalton (2016) Closing Pandora's box: a defence of Alvin
Plantinga's Epistemology of Religious Belief. PhD thesis.

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Glasgow Theses Service
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Closing Pandora’s Box: A Defence of Alvin Plantinga’s Epistemology
of Religious Belief

Tyler Dalton McNabb

BA, MA

Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of PhD

School of Humanities

College of Arts

University of Glasgow

June 2016

© Tyler Dalton McNabb 2016
i

To
Eden, Elijah, and Ezra
May the content contained within this work aid you in the development of your faith.
Autumn Priscilla
May God grant us many more years and many more adventures.
The City of Glasgow
May you flourish by the preaching of His Word and the praising of His Name.

John 14:6
Jesus said to him, ‘I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No one comes to the Father except
through me.’
ii

ABSTRACT
CLOSING PANDORA’S BOX: A DEFENCE OF ALVIN PLANTINGA’S
EPISTEMOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

I argue (1) that Alvin Plantinga’s theory of warrant is plausible and (2) that, contrary to the
Pandora’s Box objection, there are certain serious world religions that cannot successfully use
Plantinga’s epistemology to demonstrate that their beliefs could be warranted in the same way
that Christian belief can be warranted. In arguing for (1), I deploy Ernest Sosa’s Swampman
case to show that Plantinga’s proper function condition is a necessary condition for warrant. I
then engage three objections to Plantinga’s theory of warrant, each of which attempts to
demonstrate that his conditions for warrant are neither necessary nor sufficient. Having
defended the plausibility of Plantinga’s theory of warrant, I present and expand his key
arguments to the effect that naturalism cannot make use of it. These arguments provide the
conceptual tools that are needed to argue for (2): that there are certain world religions that
cannot legitimately use Plantinga’s theory of warrant to demonstrate that their beliefs could be
warranted in the same way that Christian belief can be warranted.

Tyler Dalton McNabb
Advisors: Victoria Harrison and Adam Rieger
School of Humanities
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .viii
Chapter
1. ALVIN PLANTINGA AND HIS THEORY OF WARRANT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
1.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
1.1 Warrant: The Current Debate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
1.2 Warrant and Proper Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
1.3 Perception. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4 Testimony. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5 Warranted Christian Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
1.6 Warranted Theistic and Christian Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
1.7 Objections to Plantinga’s Religious Epistemology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16
1.8 Evidential Argument From Evil. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.9 The Problem of Religious Diversity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.10 Religious Belief Are Not Properly Basic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.11 The Great Pumpkin Objection(s). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
1.12 The Pandora’s Box Objection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
2. THE PLAUSIBILITY OF
ALVIN PLANTINGA’S THEORY OF WARRANT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28

2.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

2.1 Sosa’s Swampan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

2.2 The Gambling Demon Scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

2.3 Nozick’s Truth-Tracking Account. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
iv

2.4 Holographic Demons, Clairvoyant Subjects, and Epistemic Closure. . . . . . . . . . . . .36

2.5 Cartesian Truth-Tracking. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

2.6 Epistemic Environment Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

2.7 The Truth-Aimed Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

2.8 Plantinga’s Theory Getterized?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44

2.9 BonJour, Norman, and Clairvoyance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

2.10 Warrant-as-Proper Function and its Need to Presuppose Internalism. . . . . . . . . . . .49

2.11 Clarifying Internal Irrationality and the Design Plan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

2.12 Objections and Replies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

2.13 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55

3. CLOSING PANDORA’S BOX: NATURALISM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

3.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56

3.1 What is Naturalism?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57

3.2 Naturalistic Attempts At Proper Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58

3.3 Non-Theistic Evolutionary Accounts of Proper Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59

3.4 Non-Evolutionary and Non-Theistic Accounts of Proper Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

3.5 Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

3.6 A Reformational View on Paul. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66

3.7 Naturalism and its Current Endeavour in Metaphysics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72

3.8 A New Perspective on Paul. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75

3.9 Natural Selection, Deism, and Naturalism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76

3.10 XX Pills and Undercutting Defeaters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

3.11 The Evolutionary Argument Against Metaphysical Beliefs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78

3.12 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79

4. CLOSING PANDORA’S BOX: HINDUISM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80
v

4.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .80

4.1 A Brief Biography of Shankara. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .82

4.2 Shankara’s Philosophy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

4.3 Advaita Vedanata and the Proper Function Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85

4.4 Advaita Vedanta and the Truth-Aimed Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

4.5 The Preconditions of Warrant and Advaita Vedanta. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89

4.6 The System of Kapila. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

4.7 Samkhya and Warrant-As-Proper Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

4.8 Samkhya and the Proper Function Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96

4.9 Samkhya and the Preconditions for Warrant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97

4.10 Samkhya and the Truth-Aimed Condition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98

4.11 Possible Responses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

4.12 Conclusion. . . . . … . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

5. CLOSING PANDORA’S BOX:
BUDDHISM AND NEO-CONFUCIANISM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

5.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .104

5.1 Buddhism 101. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

5.2 Different Traditions of Buddhist Thought. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .106

5.3 The Middle Way Tradition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

5.4 Enlightenment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

5.5 Nagarjuna’s Epistemology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

5.6 Warranted Middle Way?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114

5.7 Confucianism 101. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

5.8 Neo-Confucianism: The Metaphysics of The Learning of the Mind Tradition. . . . 118

5.9 Wang Yangming’s Epistemology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
vi

5.10 Warranted Neo-Confucianism?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .120

5.11 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .122

6. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUCCESS
AND FAILURE OF CLOSING PANDORA’S BOX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124

6.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .124

6.1 Pluralism, Plantinga, and the Problem of Religious Disagreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . .126

6.2 Suggested Work for the Future. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

6.3 Does Reformed epistemology Rise or Fall with Proper Functionalism?. . . . . . . . . 129

6.4 Internalism: Classical Foundationalism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

6.5 Internalism: Phenomenal Conservatism. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132

6.6 Externalist Theories of Justification: Reliabilism and Virtue Reliabilism. . . . . . . . 133

6.7 Benefits of using a Proper Functionalist Theory of Warrant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

6.8 Tien’s Trouble and the Steadfast View. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .136

6.9 Objective Probability and Religious Diversity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

6.10 Final Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

APPENDIX I: A DEATER FOR ISLAMIC BELIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
A1.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143
A1.1 Islam 101. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
A1.2 Islam and Proper Function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
A1.3 Islam, the Truth-Aimed Condition, and Undercutting Defeaters. . . . . . . . . . . . . .148
A1.4 Reply. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .152
A1.5 Tu quoque and Christian Belief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
A1.6 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
APPENDIX 2: CATHOLOCISM AND
PLANTIGIAN EPISTEMOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
vii

A2.0 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

A2.1 Plantinga Meets Aquinas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

A2.2 God as a Precondition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161

A2.3 Aquinas and His Reformed Epistemology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162

A2.4 Balthasar and Reformed Epistemology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

A2.5 Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
viii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My hope is that this thesis will contribute to several projects. First and foremost, I take my
thesis to be a work aimed at furthering the project of reformed epistemology. The Pandora’s
Box Objection is luckily for me, an objection that really has not been responded to. I say
luckily because I’m not sure how I would be able to contribute to the literature pertaining to
reformed epistemology if I hadn’t stumbled across this objection. Secondly, my work should
be seen as a defence of proper functionalism. This can be seen primarily in Chapter two.
Lastly, this project should be seen as a comparative study of Eastern religious philosophies.
Overall, I think my thesis will contribute uniquely to each of these fields.
Contributing uniquely to a field can hardly be done alone. First, I want to thank my
wife whose encouragement, support, and motivation aided me greatly in the completion of this
project. Words can’t describe the blessings that she has been to my life and my work. Of
course, with thanking my wife, I must also thank my children for allowing daddy to work so
many hours on this project. Coming home to their loving smiles and warm greetings was a
constant reminder of God’s presence in my life. On a similar note, I want to thank other
members of my family such as my parents, Rodney and Michelle, for their love and generosity
towards me during this time. My trips home refreshed me from my work and they renewed my
focus. I would also like to thank Max Andrews for his friendship and comradery during my
stay in Scotland. I am not sure how I would be sane during my time in Scotland if he wasn’t
there.
This acknowledgement wouldn’t be complete without thanking my supervisors,
Victoria Harrison, Martin Smith, and Adam Rieger. They read and reread the chapters in this
thesis countless times. This project wouldn’t be what it is without them (in fact, it might not
even be recognizable without them!). I can’t say enough on how grateful I am to have had
them as my supervisors. I especially want to thank Victoria. I came to Glasgow primarily
because of her expertise and she never let me down. I’m sure at times I pained her with sloppy
writing and inarticulate ideas, but she stood by with patience and helped me. I am deeply
indebted to her for her work and her mentorship.