Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought

422 Pages·2000·2.96 MB·English

by  Michael I. Handel

MASTERS OF WAR

By the same author
Israel’s Political-Military Doctrine (1973)
Weak States in the International System (1981)
The Diplomacy of Surprise (1981)
Clausewitz and Modern Strategy (ed.) (1986)
Strategic and Operational Deception in The Second World War (ed.) (1987)
Leaders and Intelligence (ed.) (1988)
War, Strategy and Intelligence (1989)
Intelligence and Military Operations (ed.) (1990)

MASTERS OF WAR

Classical Strategic Thought

MICHAEL I.HANDEL
Professor of Strategy, US Naval War College

THIRD REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION

FRANK CASS
LONDON • PORTLAND OR.

First published in 1992
This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis
or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to
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Second edition published in 1996

Third revised and expanded edition published in 2001 in Great Britain by FRANK CASS
PUBLISHERS Crown House, 47 Chase Side, Southgate, London N14 5BP

and in the United States of America by FRANK CASS PUBLISHERS c/o ISBS, 5824 N E
Hassalo St Portland, Oregon 97213–3644

Copyright © 1992, 1996, 2001 Michael I.Handel

British Library Cataloguing in Publication data Handel, Michael Masters of War: classical
strategic thought. 3rd edn. 1. Sun Zi 2. Clausewitz, Carl von, 1780–1831 3. Military art and
science—History I. Title 355'.02'09

ISBN 0-203-01774-9 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-7146-5091-9 (Print Edition) (cloth)
ISBN 0-7146-8132-6 (paper)

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data Handel, Michael I. Masters of War: classical
strategic thought/Michael I.Handel.— 3rd rev. and expanded edn. p. cm. Includes bibliographical
references and index. ISBN 0-7146-5091-9 (cloth).—ISBN 0-7146-8132-6 (paper) 1. Military art
and science—History. 2. Sun-tzu, 6th cent. B.C. Sun-tzu ping fa. 3. Clausewitz, Carl von, 1780–
1831. Vom Kriege. 4. Jomini, Antoine Henri, baron de, 1779–1869. Précis de l’art de la guerre. I.
Title. U27.H36 2000 355.02–dc21 00–035874

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a
retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher of this book.

Third Revised and Expanded Edition

To Jill, Yael, Benjamin, Ethan and Sarah

Contents

List of Maps, Figures, and Tables
vii

Acknowledgements
xi

Introduction
xiv

1. Strategy: Past Theories, Modern Practice

1

2. Comparing Sun Tzu and Clausewitz
14

3. The Definition of War: A Question of the Level of Analysis
24

4. Clausewitz and Mao Tse-tung on Theory and Practice in War
30

5. ‘Attacking the Enemy’s Plans’ and the Concept of ‘The Center of
Gravity’: Eastern Psychology and Western Mechanics
39

6. The Primacy of Politics and the Military Commander
48

7. The Rational Calculus of War: Correlating Ends and Means
58

8. Clausewitz on the Role of ‘Moral Forces’ in War
61

9. The Supreme Act of Judgment: Understanding the ‘Nature of War’
and the ‘Trinitarian Analysis’
69

10. The First Element of the Remarkable Trinity: The People in Arms 90

11. The Ideal and the Real: Victory without Bloodshed and the Search
for the Decisive Battle
102

12. Speed, Numerical Superiority, and Victory
118

13. The Principle of Continuity and the Culminating Point of Victory:
The Contradictory Nature of War
126

14. Clausewitz on War Termination
150

15. Deception, Surprise, and Intelligence
165

16. On Military Leadership
196

17. Boldness and Calculation
210

18. Corbett, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu
213

19. Conclusions: Towards a Unified Theory of War
228

AppendixA: Contradiction and Paradox in the Theory of War
231

AppendixB: The Weinberger Doctrine
234

AppendixC: Clausewitz’s Ideal-Type Method Applied to Sun-Tzu’s The Art of
War
248

AppendixD: Clausewitz’s On War as a Gestalt or a Systemic Theory
260

AppendixE: The Problem of the Level of Analysis and the ‘Tacticization of
Strategy’
267

AppendixF: Clausewitz and the Principle of Concentration
274

Notes
280

Bibliography
352

Index:

Conceptual Index to the Classical Strategists
367

General Reference Index
377

List of Maps, Figures, and Tables

PULLOUT MAPS AND CHARTS

1. Napoleon’s Russian Campaign (1812) (opposite p. 195)

2. The Culminating Point of the Attack in the Western Desert
Campaigns, 1940–43 (opposite p. 195)

3. The Clausewitzian System (opposite p. 351)

4. The Interrelationship of Clausewitz’s Operational Concepts as
Presented in On War (opposite p. 351)

5. Sun Tzu on the Use of Non-Violent and Violent Means of War
(opposite p. 389)

FIGURES

page

3.1 Sun Tzu and Clausewitz: A Broader and Narrower Concept of
War
34

5.1 A Possible Organizing Concept for Sun Tzu’s Theory of War
38

6.1 The Three Levels of War as a Complex Model of Interaction
75

8.1 Limits to the Rational Conduct of War
89

9.1 The Importance of Understanding the Nature of War as the
Basis for all Strategic Planning
101

9.2 The Three Dominant Tendencies of War
104

9.3 The Trinity as a ‘Vector Analysis’
105

9.4 Guerrilla Warfare
105

9.5 The Nature of Each War is Defined by the Interaction of the
Trinities of all Participants
107

9.6 The Material and Technological Environment: Squaring the
Triangle
110

9.7 The Three Dominant Dimensions of War in the Context of a
Material Environment
110

13.1

Clausewitz on the Advantages and Disadvantages of Invading
the Enemy’s Territory and the Culminating Point of
Victory/Attack

182

13.2 The Culminating Point of the Attack/Victory
186

13.3 Clausewitz’s Two-Phased War and Mao Tse-tung’s Three-
Phased War
193

14.1 Clausewitz’s Rational Calculus of War
205

14.2 The Optimal Point of War Termination
208

14.3 Two Different Views of the Same Situation
209

14.4 A Stalemated War
212

14.5 War Termination in the Russo-Japanese War
414

14.6 The Best Time for Germany to Negotiate Was While It Was
Stronger Than the Allies
416

14.7 Reversals of Power on the Korean Battlefield (June 1950–June
1951)
419

18.1 Corbett, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu Compared
296

18.2 The Limitation of War According to Political Objectives and
the Scale of the Means Used
432

19.1 A Comparison of Clausewitz and Mao Tse-tung’s Theories of
War, on a Number of Key Issues
435

C.1 War in Theory and Reality Compared
333

C.2 The Ideal Way of Waging War Compared with the Realities
337

E.1 The Traditional Hierarchy of Influence and Decision-Making in
War
354

E.2 The Three Levels of War as a Complex Model of Interaction
357

E.3 The Relative Importance of Each Level for Political Control
and the Direction of War
357

TABLES

2.1 Sun Tzu and Clausewitz as Opposing Paradigms of Waging
War
22

5.1

Sun Tzu and Clausewitz’s Reversed Priorities in Identifying
‘Centers of Gravity’ for Strategic and Operational Planning in
War

61

15.1

Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini Compared: Command and
Control, the Roles of Intelligence, Surprise, Deception, and
Forecasting in War

252

B.1 The Six Tests/Criteria of the Weinberger Doctrine from
Vietnam to Kosovo
326

C.1 Sun Tzu contra Clausewitz
339

C.2 Clausewitz contra Sun Tzu
341

Shortly after the third edition of Masters of War was published, Frank Cass Publishers
learned with great regret that Professor Michael Handel died on 14 June 2001. His
professional life was dedicated to the study of international relations, strategy and
intelligence and their effects on international politics and political and military strategy.
He was Professor of Strategy at the US Naval War College from 1990 to 2001.

Acknowledgements

There cannot be a more exciting and creative place for thinking about, writing on, and
teaching strategy than the Department of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War
College. For their stimulating discussions and ‘strategic excitement’ I thank all of my
civilian and military colleagues past and present. I am particularly indebted to the
Chairman of the Department, Professor George W.Baer, without whose support I could
not have brought this new edition into print.
The development and growth of the third edition of Masters of War owes much to
Professor Bradford A.Lee, for a number of comments and suggestions and for elaboration
of his concept of the theory of victory; to Professor David E.Kaiser, for many arguments
on various issues in On War, especially our discussions on Clausewitz’s trinitarian
analysis; to Professor William C.Fuller, for his comments on the Weinberger Doctrine,
and the culminating point of victory in Napoleon’s invasion of Russia; to Professor John
H.Maurer, particularly for a number of comments on Chapter 18; Professor Alberto
R.Coll, for his valuable advice and for sharing unusual travel adventures; and Professors
Steven T.Ross, Thomas M.Nichols, Thomas G.Mahnken, Andrew R.Wilson, and John
A.English. Among my military friends and colleagues I would like to thank in particular
Captain Bryan Lucas, Captain Robert E.McCabe, Commander (Ret.) Lisa B.Squire,
Colonel Neil Hartenstein, Captain James P.Butler, Captain Dorothy K.Grant, and my
friend Captain (Ret.) James O’Rourke.
I have also benefited greatly over the years from the challenging arguments and tough
questions posed by American and foreign students, particularly in my Clausewitz
elective. I cannot fail to mention my student Captain James Dell for giving me the hardest
time of them all. He represents so many other students who have made teaching such a
rewarding experience.
As always, I would like to thank Professor Richard K.Betts, Director of the Institute of
War and Peace at Columbia University, and John Ferris, Chairman of the History
Department at Calgary University, for their encouragement and support. In the United
Kingdom, I would like to express my gratitude to RAF Official Historian Sebastian Cox,
for his good advice, gracious hospitality, friendship, and humor; Professor Andrew
Lambert of King’s College, London, for his comments on Chapter 18, especially
Corbett’s work; my publisher, Stewart Cass, for his encouragement and support; and my
editor, Andrew Humphrys, for his dedication.
In addition, I would like to thank all of the librarians at the U.S. Naval War College
for their cheerful and efficient help with my research and numerous queries.
Finally, I want to thank my wife, Jill, for her inspired insights, criticism, and editorial
help. This book is dedicated to her and to our children, Yael, Benjamin, Ethan, and Sarah,
with all of my love and gratitude.
MICHAEL I.HANDEL
Department of Strategy and Policy
U.S. Naval War College

Newport, RI
June 2000

And as water has no constant form there are in war no
constant conditions.

Sun Tzu, The Art of War

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts
its characteristics to the given case.

Clausewitz, On War

Introduction

When first comparing the works of Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz, I assumed that
these two great theorists of war represented what scholars have traditionally held to be
the radically different Eastern and Western approaches to the art of war. Yet after a
careful study of these two ‘opposing paradigms’, I concluded that the basic logic of
strategy, like that of political behavior, is universal. To say otherwise would be akin to
asserting that Russia, China, Japan, and the United States each follow distinct theories of
physics or chemistry. Nevertheless the logic of war also differs from that of the natural
sciences because it is based, as Jomini aptly put it, on ‘…nothing but usages, the
principles of which are unknown to us’. That is to say, the conduct of war is based less on
a formally developed theory and more on intuition, experience, and an understanding of
the rules or ‘laws’ of action.
The development of the study and theory of war is (and probably will always remain)
in a pre-Newtonian, pre-scientific, or non-formal stage. However, even as the laws of
gravity operated irrespective of their discovery by Newton, the universal logic of war still
exists whether or not it is codified. In the absence of a formal strategic theory, political
groups or states have had to construct one based on their own historical experiences and
particular strategic and geographic environments. As this book shows, however, despite
the fact that each political group or state developed its own strategic concepts, none could
defy the as yet unarticulated universal logic of strategy with impunity; this in turn meant
that they independently and ineluctably arrived at similar conclusions.
On a normative level, for example, every war must be decided upon and directed by
the political leadership. Political leaders are charged with developing a coherent policy
and clear objectives to be executed by a subordinate military group or organization (the
primacy of politics in waging war). Likewise, any war conducted in a rational,
instrumental manner requires the meticulous correlation of ends and means; the
identification of a strategic and/or operational center of gravity and the recognition that,
while success on the battlefield should be exploited to the fullest, every offensive reaches
a culminating point of victory after which further action could become counter-
productive. To these we can add the advisability of avoiding a war with more than one
major enemy at a time and the observation that, all other things being equal, a shorter
decisive war is always preferable to a war of attrition. Finally, the support of the people
should be mobilized and maintained throughout the war. Such insights into the
fundamental logic of war were equally apparent to Sun Tzu, Thucydides, Machiavelli,
Clausewitz, and Jomini—as much as they ought to be to the leader of any tribe or state at
war.
All of these classical theorists can be said to have contributed significantly to the
traditional strategic paradigm for the understanding and direction of war. This paradigm
is based on the following assumptions and observations: