ebook img

Marine Accident Report MAR-06-01 PDF

124 Pages·2006·3.34 MB·English
by  
Save to my drive
Quick download
Download
Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.

Preview Marine Accident Report MAR-06-01

National Transportation Safety Board PRSRT STD Washington, D.C. 20594 Postage & Fees Paid OFFICIAL BUSINESS Penalty for Private Use, $300 NTSB Permit No. G-200 Capsizing of U.S. Small Passenger Vessel Lady D Northwest Harbor, Baltimore, Maryland March 6, 2004 Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-06/01 PB2006-916401 Notation 7679A National National Transportation Transportation Safety Board Safety Board Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. Marine Accident Report Capsizing of U.S. Small Passenger Vessel Lady D Northwest Harbor, Baltimore, Maryland March 6, 2004 NTSB/MAR-06/01 PB2006-916401 National Transportation Safety Board Notation 7679A 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W. Adopted March 7, 2006 Washington, D.C. 20594 National Transportation Safety Board. 2006. Capsizing of U.S. Small Passenger Vessel Lady D, Northwest Harbor, Baltimore, Maryland March 6, 2004. Marine Accident Report NTSB/MAR-06/01. Washington, DC. Abstract: On March 6, 2004, the small passenger vessel Lady D, a pontoon water taxi with 2 crewmembers and 23 passengers on board, was en route from Fort McHenry to Fells Point, Maryland, when it encountered a rapidly developing storm with high winds. The pontoon vessel began to roll in the waves and eventually continued over onto its starboard side and capsized. Responders were able to rescue or recover all but 3 occupants of the Lady D and transport them to area hospitals within an hour of the accident. The bodies of the remaining victims were recovered from the waterway on March 14 and 15. As a result of this accident, 5 passengers died; 4 passengers suffered serious injuries; and 12 people sustained minor injuries. Major safety issues discussed in this report include passenger weight criteria for stability assessment; pontoon vessel stability standards; and policies and procedures pertaining to weather operations. As a result of its investigation of this accident, the Safety Board made safety recommendations to the U. S. Coast Guard. The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent Federal agency dedicated to promoting aviation, railroad, highway, marine, pipeline, and hazardous materials safety. Established in 1967, the agency is mandated by Congress through the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974 to investigate transportation accidents, determine the probable causes of the accidents, issue safety recommendations, study transportation safety issues, and evaluate the safety effectiveness of government agencies involved in transportation. The Safety Board makes public its actions and decisions through accident reports, safety studies, special investigation reports, safety recommendations, and statistical reviews. Recent publications are available in their entirety on the Web at <http://www.ntsb.gov>. Other information about available publications also may be obtained from the Web site or by contacting: National Transportation Safety Board Records Management Division, CIO-40 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20594 (800) 877-6799 or (202) 314-6551 Safety Board publications may be purchased, by individual copy or by subscription, from the National Technical Information Service. To purchase this publication, order report number PB2006-916401 from: National Technical Information Service 5285 Port Royal Road Springfield, Virginia 22161 (800) 553-6847 or (703) 605-6000 The Independent Safety Board Act, as codified at 49 U.S.C. Section 1154(b), precludes the admission into evidence or use of Board reports related to an incident or accident in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. iii Marine Accident Report Contents Abbreviations and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii Factual Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Accident Narrative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Taxi Operations at Baltimore Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Events On Board the Lady D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Escape and Rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Injuries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Damages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Crew Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Regulatory Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Master . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Mate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Vessel Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Regulatory Requirements for Small Passenger Vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 The Lady D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Safety Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Stability Certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Wreckage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Waterway Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 Management Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Parent Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Management Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Other Seaport Taxi Employees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Operational Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Docking Agreements with City . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Daily Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 Passenger Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 Weather Policies and Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 Maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 Meteorological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 National Weather Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 National Weather Service Postaccident Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 Digiwx System Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 Weatherbug Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32 Medical and Pathological Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 Medical Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 Toxicological Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 Survival Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 Aspects of Survival in Cold Water . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 City of Baltimore Consolidated Communication Center . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 Response Assets for Marine Incidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Response of Assets to Lady D Capsizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Contents iv Marine Accident Report Tests and Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 Safety Board’s Stability Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 Vehicle Performance Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 Other Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 Postaccident Actions by the Coast Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 Accidents Involving Pontoon Passenger Vessel Stability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 Previously Issued Safety Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 Status of Sister Vessels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 Exclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 Accident Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51 Cause of the Capsizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 Certification Error . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 Erroneous Sister Vessel Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 Passenger Overloading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Influence of Weight and Wind on Intact Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Passenger Weight Criteria for Stability Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58 Pontoon Vessel Stability Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60 Policies and Procedures Pertaining to Weather Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 NWS Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 Seaport Taxi’s Weather Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 Adequacy of Propulsive Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 Survivability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Construction and Arrangement of the Accident Vessel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Safety Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68 Lifejacket Use in Enclosed Deckhouses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69 Response Effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72 Probable Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .74 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 New Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Previously Issued Recommendation Classified in This Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .76 Appendixes A: Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77 B: Intact Stability Study of Lady D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78 C: U.S. Coast Guard Policy Letter 04-10, Evaluation of Stability and Subdivision Requirements for Small Passenger Vessels Inspected Under 46 CFR Subchapter T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 v Marine Accident Report Abbreviations and Acronyms ASOS Automated Surface Observing System AWOS Automated Weather Observing System BCFD Baltimore City Fire Department BCPD Baltimore City Police Department BWI Baltimore-Washington International Airport CAMI Civil Aerospace Medical Institute CESM Cold Exposure Survival Model CFR Code of Federal Regulations COI certificate of inspection dBZ decibels of Z (where Z = energy reflected back to radar) EMS emergency medical service ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization ISO International Organization for Standardization LCM-8 mechanized landing craft LWX Sterling weather radar station MSC Marine Safety Center MSO Marine Safety Office NCEP National Centers for Environmental Prediction NHS National Historic Seaport of Baltimore nm nautical mile NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NPRM notice of proposed rulemaking NVIC navigation and vessel inspection circular NWR NOAA Weather Radio NWS National Weather Service OCMI Officer-in-Charge, Marine Inspection PSST pontoon simplified stability test SAR search and rescue SST simplified stability test TDWR terminal Doppler weather radar UHF ultrahigh frequency VHF very high frequency Abbreviations and Acronyms vi Marine Accident Report WFO weather forecast office WSR-88D weather surveillance radar-88 Doppler vii Marine Accident Report Executive Summary On March 6, 2004, the small passenger vessel Lady D, a pontoon water taxi with 2 crewmembers and 23 passengers on board, was en route from Fort McHenry to Fells Point, Maryland, when it encountered a rapidly developing storm with high winds. The pontoon vessel began to roll in the waves and eventually continued over onto its starboard side and capsized. Personnel from the Naval Reserve Center Baltimore, a Navy training installation adjacent to Fort McHenry, witnessed the capsizing, called 911 to report the accident, and then launched a vessel to the scene to render assistance. Responders were able to rescue or recover all but 3 occupants of the Lady D within an hour of the accident. The bodies of the remaining victims were recovered from the waterway on March 14 and 15. As a result of this accident, 5 passengers died; 4 passengers suffered serious injuries; and 12 people sustained minor injuries. Vessel damage was estimated at $35,000. The Safety Board’s investigation of this accident identified major safety issues in the following areas: • Passenger weight criteria for stability assessment; • Pontoon vessel stability standards; and • Policies and procedures pertaining to weather operations. The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the capsizing of the pontoon-style small passenger vessel Lady D was its lack of intact stability, which was insufficient to withstand the strong winds and waves that the boat encountered. The lack of intact stability was caused by overloading, which resulted from a combination of the following: • The Lady D was erroneously granted sister status by the U.S. Coast Guard to a pontoon vessel with different design characteristics; • The Coast Guard certificated the Lady D to carry too many people as a result of an inappropriate stability test on the vessel to which it was granted sister status; and • The Coast Guard’s regulatory stability test standards on which the Lady D’s passenger allowance was based use an out-of-date average passenger weight. As a result of this investigation, the Safety Board makes recommendations to the U.S. Coast Guard.

Description:
a result of this accident, 5 passengers died; 4 passengers suffered serious injuries; and 12 people sustained .. Under 46 CFR Subchapter T
See more

The list of books you might like

Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.