Description:This study asks why some militaries are more adept than others at reinventing themselves and why some efforts succeed rapidly while others only gather momentum over time or become sidetracked or even subverted. Unlike its British rival, Germany quickly mastered the Blitzkrieg strategy with devastating effectiveness. Surging ahead of both British and Japanese navies, the US Navy gradually came to appreciate the centrality of air power in honing carrier warfare. With contemporary policymakers scrambling to digest the lessons of recent wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as to meet the unfolding challenges of the new Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), understanding the sources and impediments to adjustment has become critical. This book explicates the conditions under which military organizations have both succeeded and failed at institutionalizing new ideas and forms of warfare. This study will be of interest to students of military innovation and scholars of organizational theory and institutional behavior in particular and those interested in military studies more generally.