Malaya and Singapore 1941-1942 The Fall of Britain’s Empire in the East

100 Pages·2016·98.8 MB·English

by  Mark Stille

MALAYA AND
SINGAPORE 1941–42
The fall of Britain’s empire in the East
Patani 5XX N
Khlaung Ngae
X
Johore Bahru
00 50km 50 miles 1 Ma2l aMyaalayXaXSingapore
MARK STILLE ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNIS
22/06/2016 13:30
Author Illustrator
Mark E. Stille (Commander, United States Navy, retired) Peter Dennis was born in 1950. Inspired by contemporary
received his BA in History from the University of Maryland and magazines such as Look and Learn he studied illustration at
also holds an MA from the Naval War College. He has worked Liverpool Art College. Peter has since contributed to hundreds
in the intelligence community for 35 years including tours on of books, predominantly on historical subjects, including
the faculty of the Naval War College, on the Joint Staff and many Osprey titles. A keen wargamer and modelmaker, he is
on US Navy ships. He is currently a senior analyst working in based in Nottinghamshire, UK.
the Washington DC area. He is the author of numerous Osprey
titles, focusing on naval history in the Pacific.
Other titles in the series
CAM No: 226 • ISBN: 978 1 84603 501 2 CAM No: 247 • ISBN: 978 1 84908 605 9 CAM No: 255 • ISBN: 978 1 78096 154 5
CAM No: 263 • ISBN: 978 1 78200 268 0 CAM No: 284 • ISBN: 978 1 4728 0693 2 CAM No: 289 • ISBN: 978 1 4728 1125 7
CAM300 Cover.indd 2
CAMPAIGN 300
MALAYA AND
SINGAPORE 1941–42
The fall of Britain’s empire in the East
MARK STILLE ILLUSTRATED BY PETER DENNIS 
Series editor Marcus Cowper
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This electronic edition published in 2016 by Bloomsbury Publishing Plc ARTIST’S NOTE
Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the colour
First published in Great Britain in 2016 by Osprey Publishing,
plates in this book were prepared are available for private sale. The
PO Box 883, Oxford, OX1 9PL, UK
Publishers retain all reproduction copyright whatsoever. All enquiries
1385 Broadway, 5th Floor, New York, NY 10018, USA
should be addressed to:
E-mail: [email protected]
Peter Dennis, Fieldhead, The Park, Mansfield, Notts, NG18 2AT, UK
© 2016 Osprey Publishing Ltd
[email protected]
OSPREY PUBLISHING IS PART OF BLOOMSBURY PUBLISHING PLC
The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upon this
All rights reserved
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ISBN: 9781472811226
PDF e-book ISBN: 9781472811233
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Key to military symbols
Army Group Army Corps Division Brigade Regiment Battalion
Company/Battery Platoon Section Squad Infantry Artillery Cavalry
Airborne Air defence Air Force Air mobile Air transportable Amphibious
Unit HQ
Anti-tank Armour Air aviation Bridging Engineer Headquarters Maintenance
Medical Missile Mountain Navy Nuclear, biological, Ordnance Parachute
chemical
Reconnaissance Signal Supply Transport Rocket artillery Air defence a rtillery
movement
Key to unit identification
Unit Parent
identifier unit
Commander
(+) with added elements
(–) less elements
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CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 5
The rise of Singapore The British defence dilemma Japan on the march
n n
CHRONOLOGY 8
OPPOSING COMMANDERS 11
British commanders Japanese commanders
n
OPPOSING FORCES 17
The British Empire The Japanese Empire
n
OPPOSING PLANS 31
The strategic environment British defence plans The Japanese Plan
n n
THE BATTLE 37
The Japanese landings The fight for Kota Bharu The landings in southern Thailand The saga of
n n n
Force Z Force Z – an assessment The action off Endau Debacle at Jitra Jitra – the impact The
n n n n n
battle of Kampar The battle of Slim River British reinforcements The loss of Johore The air battle
n n n n
The final air battles The attack on Singapore The Japanese attack Battle for the Jurong Line
n n n n n
The final battles Capitulation
n
THE AFTERMATH 90
THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY 93
BIBLIOGRAPHY 94
INDEX 95

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The Malaya and Singapore theatre
Patani XX N
5
Khlaung Ngae
X
6 Ind III
X 56 18
15 Ind
Jitra
Alor Star Tumpat Kota Bharu
X
KEDDAH 8 Ind
Betong Gong Kedah
Sungei Machang
XX Patani Kroh
11 Ind II
Krohcol Kuala Krai
Butterworth
Grik
Penang Kuala Trengganu
KELANTAN
Taiping TRENGGANU
Port Weld Kuala Kangasar Kuala Dungun
X Ipoh
28 Ind
Kampar
Kuala Lipis
Tapah
Bidor
Telok Anson
Jerantur X
22 Ind
Slim River Kuantan
Raub
SELANGOR Bentong PAHANG Maran
Kuala Selangor
XX
9 Ind Kuala Lumpur
Port Swettenham XXX NEGRI
III Ind
Bahau
Seremban
Morib Endau
SEMBILAN Gemas
Port Dickson Tampin Segamat 22 Aus X
X Mersing
12 Ind Labis
MALACCA
Jemaluang
Malacca JOHORE Kahang XX
8 Aus
Muar Kluang X
Yong Peng 27 Aus
Ayer Rengani
Batu Pahat Hitam
SUMATRA Kota Tinggi
Johore Bahru
X
0 50 miles 1 Malaya Singapore
X
0 50km 2 Malaya
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INTRODUCTION
THE RISE OF SINGAPORE
Coming out of World War I, the British Government marked Japan as a
future potential threat to the British Empire and its interests in the Far East.
Since the size of the Royal Navy was much reduced after the war, it was not
large enough to commit powerful forces to the Far East on a permanent
basis. This led to the strategy that called for the British to send a powerful
fleet to the Far East in times of crisis. To execute this strategy, a large naval
base would have to be available.
The Admiralty considered several possibilities for such a base. Among the
choices were Hong Kong, Australia and Singapore. Hong Kong was ruled
out because it was too close to Japan and could not be properly defended;
Australia, particularly Sydney, was ideal from several perspectives, but was
simply too far from the interests that it was supposed to be protecting. The
only remaining option was Singapore. It was ideally located at the strategic
chokepoint from the South China Sea into the Indian Ocean and was far
enough from the nearest Japanese bases to offer it strategic depth from attack.
Most of all, it was immediately accessible to the areas needing defence.
The British government announced its decision to build a new naval
base at Singapore in 1921. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 and its
associated agreements increased the importance of Singapore since the
construction of additional naval bases was prohibited. The treaty reduced
the size of the Royal Navy and made it unlikely that it would be big enough
to meet requirements in both Europe and the Far East. Part of the 1922
agreements was a treaty to restrict the construction of fortifications near
Japan. However, this excluded Singapore, which now became the most visible
symbol of British might in the Far East.
THE BRITISH DEFENCE DILEMMA
The rise of Japanese militarism resulted in the seizure and annexation
of Manchuria by Japan in 1931–32. In 1934, Japan renounced the
Washington agreements. This was followed by the invasion of China in July
1937. Concurrent with Japanese expansion in China, tensions in Europe
dramatically rose. In 1938, Germany pressured Czechoslovakia for territorial
concessions in the Sudetenland. The British policy of appeasement meant
5
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war was averted, but it was soon apparent that continued German demands
would lead to war. Great Britain began to re-arm.
Work continued on the Singapore naval base. It was officially opened in
February 1938, though not actually completed. As war loomed in Europe,
the British plan to deploy a large fleet to Singapore during a crisis began to
look even more hollow. In July 1939, the period required to deploy a large
force to Singapore was extended to 90 days from the 70 days set in March
1938. Until the arrival of the fleet, Singapore would have to hold out with
whatever means were available.
When war did come in September 1939, only Germany entered the
conflict. Italy and Japan remained on the sidelines, but still had to be watched.
The period for getting a fleet to the Far East was extended to 180 days. The
British situation worsened when France fell to the Germans in June 1940,
which prompted the entry of Italy into the war that same month. The British
had already decided that the Mediterranean would have priority over the
Far East and, of course, both were secondary to the security of Great Britain
itself, which was under the threat of invasion. The worsening situation forced
the British to suspend their plan to send a large fleet to the Far East in a crisis.
When war came between Great Britain and Japan it would be centred
on Singapore and Malaya. This was the strategic centre of gravity for the
British in the Far East. The two areas held not just the naval base and a
number of airbases, but were strategically positioned to dominate Southeast
This view of the naval base at Asia. Although the British were stretched to the limit by the war, they still
Singapore was taken in March believed that Singapore could be defended. Even though it was third in
1941. This facility was the focus priority for allocation of forces, behind the defence of Great Britain and
of the entire campaign from
the Mediterranean, much had been done to bolster the fortress defences.
the British perspective, though
the Royal Navy was unable to According to British calculations, it was unlikely that the Japanese Army,
devote adequate forces to use still tied down by the conflict in China, would be bold enough and have the
it. It fell into Japanese hands logistical capabilities to attempt to launch an attack on the heart of British
after only moderate damage
power in the Far East. Therefore, depending on the state of the conflict in
and served as a major IJN base
throughout the war. (AWM) northern Europe and the Mediterranean, the British would still have adequate
time to reinforce the
fortress. However, no
British plan foresaw
the direction the war
would take in 1940–41.
The British had suffered
defeat after defeat, and
were being pressed to
maintain the security
of the sea lanes in the
Atlantic, defend the
home islands from
attack, and protect
their key position in
Egypt. This undermined
any real hope of
providing significant
reinforcement to the
Far East when the
Japanese attacked.
6
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JAPAN ON THE MARCH
The crumbling of the Allied position in Europe directly affected the
strategic situation in Southeast Asia. The fall of France meant that French
possessions in Indo-China came under the control of the Vichy Government.
The Japanese were soon able to gain approval from Vichy French authorities
to occupy first northern Indo-China and, later in July 1941, southern
Indo-China. This greatly increased the threat to Singapore since it placed
Japanese air and naval bases within easy range of the fortress.
Allied weakness in the Far East created a window of opportunity for
the Japanese that they were determined to exploit. This determination was
fed by the strong American reaction to Japanese expansionism that created
A key part of the Singapore
a situation in which the Japanese could not afford to give in to American fortress was a strong battery of
demands, therefore making war their only choice. The Japanese move into coastal defence artillery. Shown
here is one of Singapore’s five
northern Indo-China prompted the United States to retaliate in September
15in. guns. None was used to
1940 by placing an embargo on scrap metal to Japan. In November, the
engage Japanese ships during
Japanese received a secret British report captured by the Germans, which the campaign. Four of the
stated that Britain was unable to send strong reinforcements to Singapore weapons were actually able to
in the event of war. The Allied position in Southeast Asia looked weaker engage land targets to the
north, but none was used in
then ever.
this role because of a lack of
In June 1941, the entire war changed when Germany attacked the Soviet high-explosive shells. (USAMHI)
Union. This gave the Japanese an
opportunity to join the Germans
against the Russians, Japan’s
traditional enemy in the Far East.
However, a choice had to be made
since Japan did not possess the
capability to attack both Russia and
Great Britain. In order to gain the
resources needed to support its war
economy, the choice was made to
attack south and seize Malaya and
the Dutch East Indies.
A vital prerequisite was realized
in July 1941 when the Japanese
pressured the Vichy French into
allowing them to occupy southern
Indo-China. This directly threatened
Malaya and Singapore. This move
cost the Japanese dearly since it
resulted in a total embargo of all
materials from the United States
to Japan. The British and Dutch
also slapped an embargo on Japan.
With no access to oil, and current
stocks limited, and Japan unwilling
to accede to American demands for
withdrawal from China, the path
to war was inevitable. Both sides
prepared for war, which would decide
the fate of Malaya and Singapore.
7
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CHRONOLOGY
1941
4 December Japanese invasion convoys depart from Hainan Island.
6 December British receive first reports of Japanese convoys; British forces are
placed on alert, but a move into Thailand (Operation Matador) is
placed on hold.
7 December Brooke-Popham again hesitates over Operation Matador. 
8 December Japanese troops make coordinated landings at Singora and Patani in
southern Thailand, where token Thai resistance is quickly overcome,
and at Kota Bharu, where resistance from Indian troops is heavy.
Japanese bombers make first raid on Singapore, and begin a series of
raids against British airfields in northern Malaya in order to seize air
superiority.
9 December Japanese seize Kota Bharu airfield and town; forces driving from
Singora cross the border into Malaya by midnight.
10 December Battleship Prince of Wales and battlecruiser Repulse are sunk by
Japanese air attack off Kuantan.
11 December British fighters withdrawn to defend Singapore and supply convoys,
giving the Japanese air superiority over northern Malaya.
Battle for Jitra results in a major British defeat and decides the fate of
northern Malaya.
14 December Japanese capture Alor Star airfield virtually intact.
16 December British evacuate Penang Island which is occupied by the Japanese the
following day.
18 December Percival and Heath decide to give up northern Malaya.
21 December British forces ordered to retreat behind the Perak River.
8
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