Making the Alliance Work: The United States and Western Europe

221 Pages·1985·23.17 MB·English

by  Gregory F. Treverton (auth.)

MAKING THE ALLIANCE WORK
By thesameauthor
THE'DOLLARDRAIN'AND AMERICANFORCESIN
GERMANY:MANAGINGTHEPOLITICALECONOMICSOF
ALLIANCE
NUCLEARWEAPONSINEUROPE
LATINAMERICANINWORLDPOLITICS:THENEXT
DECADE
MAKING THE ALLIANCE
WORK
The United States and Western Europe
Gregory F. Treverton
M
MACMILLAN
©GregoryF.Treverton1985
Softcoverreprintofthehardcover1stedition 1985
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Firstpublished1985
Publishedby
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Companiesandrepresentatives
throughouttheworld
PrintedinHongKong
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData
Treverton,Gregory
Makingthe Alliancework.
1.Europe- Foreignrelations- UnitedStates
2.UnitedStates- Foreignrelations- Europe
I. Title
327' .094 D1065.U5
ISBN978-1-349-07401-3 ISBN978-1-349-07399-3(eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-07399-3
Contents
ListofTables VI
Preface Vll
1 The Natureofthe Alliance 1
2 The NuclearDilemma 25
3 Defenseand DetenteinEurope 59
4 DefenseBeyondEurope 92
5 The ImpactofEconomics 123
6 ManagingAlliancePolitics 156
Notes 193
Index 207
v
List of Tables
2.1 Sovietand Americanstrategicwarheadsplusintermediate-
range nuclear missile warheads, 1955-82 30
3.1 Importance of East-West trade, 1965-81 62
4.1 Oil imports from the Middle East and Gulf, 1960-80 98
vi
Preface
It is striking that politicians and those who work for them, men and
women whose careers are made and whose lives are comprised of
bargaining, compromise and detail, frequently are transformed when
it comes to foreign policy. Then, talk switches quickly to great quests
and concepts, new charters, directions or partnerships. There is .a
stubborn sense that foreign policy isdifferent, or ought to be. Surely
some sense of purpose and direction is necessary; without it, it
becomes diffficult to relate one issue to another, and everything
becomes simply a deal.
Yet too oftengrand effortsgrandlystatedignore, orrun against, or
are substitutes for the task of managing the grubby details on which
successwilldepend. It isto thattask thatthis bookisaddressed, inthe
context of relations between the United States and the nations of
western Europe hitherto regarded through shared purposes as allies,
and by common agreement as friends as well. It is a task for those
whom Michael Howard once called in another context "those grey
inconspicuous ranks of specialists, writers and officials who are in all
countries gradually incrementally working towards minimizing the
danger facing mankind, even if they cannot eliminate them
altogether".1
The tendency to talk of foreign policy as different encourages us to
think about itasdifferent aswell. Thataccountsfor the neglect of- or
even disdain for - domestic politics which so often characterizes
writing on foreign affairs. It also accounts for many of the wild
oscillations in commentaries about the US-European alliance: for
most of itsexistence inthe post-warperiodthat relationshiphas been,
depending on the commentator, on the brink of ultimate crisis or
merely passing through another ruffle in basically stable arrange
ments. Ofthe two, crisis-mongering has been more notable probably
because it is more noteworthy.
Yet we are accustomedinthe Western industrialworld to consider
able stability in domestic arrangements despite periodic turmoil.
VB
viii Preface
Indeed,wewouldworryifthatstabilityseemedcalledintoquestionby
changesofgovernmentorbyperiodsofeconomicbadweather. Hence
it would be surprising if the trans-Atlantic alliance were liable to
change dramatically from one year to the next, for it as much as any
aspect of foreign affairs isan extension of those domestic politics and
arrangements. By the same token, however, we would equally be
surprised if long-term changes in our societies did not produce
considerablechangeindomesticarrangements,changeswhich crystal
lized at particular moments. So, too, should it be surprising if the
Western alliance remained forever unaltered.
The problem isassessing what has changed, and by how much, and
what has not. That is the first set of questions to which this book is
addressed, across the range of central issues in European-American
relations: the nuclear issue, defense and detente in Europe, security
issues outside Europe, and economic dealings and their impact on
basic alliance arrangements.
The tendency to treat foreign policy,"andthe Atlantic alliance, as a
thing apart has another effect. It breeds the temptation to conjure a
"golden age" of the alliance when common purposes were clear and
leadership strong, and to judge current travails by light of past
successes as they are now remembered. Yet in a cursory look at the
historyof the allianceit isstrikinghow oftenthe allies havedisagreed,
even on issues that appeared central to their common purposes. That
raises the secondset of issues that are myconcern: assumingthe allies
willcontinuetosharesomecommonpurposes,eveniftheirdifferences
aregreater, how commondo theirpolicieson particularissues needto
be? Put the otherway around, to what extent are different policieson
major issues tolerable in light of shared purposes?
Thatleadsdirectlyto thethirdset ofquestions. Thetendencyto talk
and write of alliance relations as different leads to curiously - and
unhelpfully- abstract analyses. Most treat boththe UnitedStatesand
its allies as unified governments - what modern political analysis
borrowing from economics would call "rational actors" - making
calculations of national interests, examining various alternative poli
cies in light of thoseinterestsandchoosingaccordingly. Thatmodelof
international relations, to the extent it ever approximated reality
(especiallyfor the UnitedStates), has long been afiction. A fewother
discussions, ones written by Europeans or by those sympathetic to
Europe, try to understand the political currents around, say, the
emotive nuclear issue that make it difficult for any government in
Bonn to take forthright positions on nuclear deployments, Yet those
Preface ix
tend to do less well at comprehending American politics; they often
treat inconsistencies in US policies as an aberration, and frequently
end with strong calls for more "coherent" approaches.
Thus,mythirdtask isaskinghowmuchspace thereisinthe domestic
politics of the allies, and the alliance politics among them, to fashion
policies that reflect an adequate degree of unity in pursuit of shared
purposes. That means bringing together an understanding of politics
and interests on both sides of the Atlantic. Long-term changes in
American politics - the shift of power away from the East or the
gradual enfranchisement of large Latin populations- willbearon US
relationswith Europe. Some inconsistencyinAmericanpolicymay be
afact of political life, and it may not be allbad: itreflects the range of
domesticgroupsinterestedinforeign policyand the intensitiesofthose
interests. It also reflects the fact that most Americans have been and
continue to be little interested in foreign affairs and probably lag in
realizing why they have reason to be more interested.
It isimpossiblefor an Americanwriting on theseissuestoescapethe
tendencyto talkofthe "Europeans"(or "Americans,"for thatmatter)
as though theyexisted, to understate differenceswithin countries and
among them. I do not escape that tendency. Nor do I escape the
obverse: seizing those "European" attitudes thatconfirm myanalyses
or myprejudices. Ifthereisajustificationfor occasionallyreferringto
the "Europeans" in shorthand, it is to sharpen differences from the
"Americans" where those are important. I do try to point out
differences among Europeans when those are critical.
As usual, this book accumulated, in seminars, conversations and
drafts for related purposes, more than it was "written." That means I
owe intellectual debts to many who willnot recognize their paternity
for ideasexpressed here (andindeed might reject itifthey recognized
it). But I single out Richard E. Neustadt and Robert E. Klitgaard,
friends and colleagues, who offered help and criticism of many
different sorts at different times, and Francis Bator, Derek Leebaert,
Ernest May, Iris Portny, and Raymond Vernon, whose comments
enriched the book. I also happily acknowledge my debts to Bert van
Barlingen,for hispatientresearchassistanceduringthe latterstages of
the writing, and to Caroline Coleman, for doing the endless revisions
of this last of the pre-ward-processor era manuscript.
Also as usual, lowe a number of more tangible debts: to the Fritz
ThyssenFoundation, whichsponsoredthe early partofthe project; to
the Rockefeller Foundation, which provided earlysupport and a stay
inthatmost conduciveofresearchsettings, the VillaSerbelloni;to the