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Politics & Society http://pas.sagepub.com Beyond the Arab Street: Iraq and the Arab Public Sphere Marc Lynch Politics Society 2003; 31; 55 DOI: 10.1177/0032329202250170 The online version of this article can be found at: http://pas.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/31/1/55 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com Additional services and information for Politics & Society can be found at: Email Alerts: http://pas.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://pas.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Downloaded from http://pas.sagepub.com at GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY on January 9, 2009 1PM0OA.1LAR1IRT7C7TI CL/I0YCS0 NL3&2EC 3SH2O9C20IE22T5Y0170 Beyond the Arab Street: Iraq and the Arab Public Sphere MARC LYNCH Thecommonviewofthe“Arabstreet”failstocaptureessentialdimensionsofthe roleofpublicopinionandpublicdiscourseinthepoliticsofArabstates.Therising importanceoftransnationalArabtelevisionandprintmediahascreatedapublic arenaoutsidethecontrolofstates.Argumentsaboutissuesofsharedconcerninthis Arabistpublicspherehavehadimportantimplicationsforpoliticalidentity,beliefs, expectations,andbehavior.ArabresponsestotheongoingcrisisinIraqdemon- strate the political significance of these debates. Keywords: Arab; public sphere; Iraq; public opinion; deliberation SincetheeventsofSeptember11,2001,andthesubsequentwaragainstterror, ArabandMuslimpublicopinionhasbecomeanissueofurgenttheoreticaland practicalconcern.Attemptstoengagewithithavebeenhinderedbytheshortcom- ingsofthemajortheoreticalapproachestoArabpublicopinion,however.Most discussionsofpublicopinionintheArabworldrevolvearoundtheconceptof“the Arabstreet,”whichmightormightnotriseuptochallengeandevenoverthrow governments that defy the convictions of an enraged public. This reductionist approach led many influential commentators to interpret the absence of wide- spreadArabriotsinresponsetotheAmericanwarinAfghanistanasevidencethat theUnitedStatesneednottakeArabpublicopinionintoaccountinitsMiddle IwouldliketothankMichaelHudson,DaliaKassemKaye,JillianSchwedler,MichaelBarnett, ShibleyTelhami,IbrahimKarawan,theparticipantsintheOakleyCenterResearchColloquium,and theeditorsofPolitics&Societyfortheirsuggestionsandcriticismsatvariousstagesofwritingthis article. POLITICS & SOCIETY, Vol. 31 No. 1, March 2003 55-91 DOI:10.1177/0032329202250170 © 2003 Sage Publications 55 Downloaded from http://pas.sagepub.com at GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY on January 9, 2009 56 POLITICS & SOCIETY East strategy. Some went even further, attributing to Arabs a deeply held and immutablehostilitytotheWest,encouragedbyavirulentlyanti-Americanmedia ratherthantoanyspecificAmericanpolicies.Suchhostile,emotional,andirratio- nalpublicsrespondonlytoforce,notreason,bythisargumentandshouldbesub- dued through overwhelming demonstrations of power rather than by reasoned argument.1Evenamongmoresympatheticanalysts,thetheoreticalreductionof Arab public opinion to the Arab street systematically distorts accurate under- standing of its dynamics. For example, warnings that Osama bin Laden would inflameArabpassionsoremotions,whichseemtoshowrespectforArabopinion, actuallydeflectattentionfromthespecificinterestsandpoliticalgrievancesactu- allyarticulatedbyArabpublics.2TheseconceptionsofArabpublicopinionare deeplyflawed,boththeoreticallyandempirically.Theyarealsodangerous.Many Arabwriters,awareofthedominanceofthesekindsofanalysis,warnthattheper- ceptionofAmericancontemptforArabpublicopinion,whichleadsittorefuseto engagewithitinareasonedfashion,directlycontributestotheescalatingconflict andmistrustbetweenArabsandtheUnitedStates.3Thisarticleoffersanalterna- tivetheoreticalapproachtounderstandingArabpublicopinion,movingbeyond the Arab street to explore the strategic and constitutive dynamics of discourse withinanemergingtransnationalArabistpublicsphere.ItusesthecaseofIraqto explore three important questions: what is Arab public opinion, how has it changed, and how does it matter? While Arab polities remain largely undemocratic, structural shifts in the meansofpubliccommunicationandopinionformationhavecontributedtothe emergenceofatransnationalArabpublicspherethatincreasinglyshapespolitics throughouttheregion.Newmedia,includingsatellitetelevisionstationssuchas al-Jazeera, Arabist and Islamist newspapers distributed free of charge on the Internet, and rapid distribution of news via e-mail, listservs, and instant messaging, have given citizens in states such as Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and throughoutNorthAfricaandtheGulfthemeanstounderminestatecensorship andcontrol.Thispublicspheredoesnotsubstitutefordemocracy;ithasfewinsti- tutionalchannelsbywhichtotranslateitspreferencesintooutcomes,andithas met with substantial state counter-pressures. However, it also has dramatically reshapedthedynamicsofArabpoliticsandconceptionsofArabpoliticalidentity. MichaelHudsonisnotaloneinarguingthatnewmediaformsare“beginningto exertarevolutionaryforceacrosstheArabworld...transformingArabpolitical culture.”4Inresponsetotheconsiderableskepticismaboutthesometimesexag- geratedtransformativeclaimsforthisnewmedia,Ipresenthereamorenuanced theoreticalaccountofthemechanismsbywhichthistransnationalpublicsphere affects political outcomes. Empirically,IuseArabattitudes,publicdiscourse,andpoliciestowardIraq since 1991 to illustrate how the changing structure of the public sphere has affectedArabpolitics.Thiscaseoffersausefulcounterpointtothemorecom- Downloaded from http://pas.sagepub.com at GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY on January 9, 2009 MARC LYNCH 57 monlystudiedissueofArabopinionstowardIsrael,inpartbecauseitispossible toobserverapidchangesinpublicattitudesandstatepositionstowardIraqover thecourseofthe1990s.5AtthetimeoftheGulfwar,theentireGulfCooperation Council(SaudiArabia,Kuwait,Bahrain,theUnitedArabEmirates[UAE],Qatar, Oman)tookstrongpositionsagainstIraq,asdidEgypt,Syria,Morocco,andLeb- anon, in spite of often pro-Iraqi public opinion. By the mid-1990s, only Saudi ArabiaandKuwaitremainedstronglysupportiveofAmericanpolicytowardIraq inpublic,evenifmanyArableadersprivatelycontinuedtosupportthecontain- mentofIraq.6Bytheendofthe1990s,mostArableadersopposedthesanctionsin private as well as in public. In March 2002, an Arab summit in Beirut finally broughtaboutapublicArabconsensusonrestoringIraqtotheAraborder,whilea succession of Arab leaders pointedly rejected American Vice President Dick Cheney’ssuggestionthattheyprivatelysupportedtheAmericanagendaofwar against Iraq. Theseshiftsinofficialpolicyfollowedtheemergenceofapublicconsensus againstthesanctions—butnotinfavorofSaddamHussein’sregime—acrossthe Arabworld.Publicopinionsurveys,wheretheyexist,tellpartofthisstory.An earlystudyofelitepublicopinionintheGulffoundadramaticshift,from86per- centagreeinginJanuary1991thatSaddamHusseinboreprimaryresponsibility forthecrisisto76percentinSeptember1991blamingexternalactors.7OneArab writer, observing the widespread mobilization against the American-British bombingofIraqinDecember1998,wrotethat“asthenightdoesnotresemblethe morning,thewinterof1998cannotresemblethesummerof1991...wherethe GulfcrisisdividedtheArabs,theseattacksunitedus.”8InanApril2002opinion survey,only3percentofEgyptiansfavoredanAmericanattackagainstIraq,and 84percentwereagainst;7percentofLebaneseforand84percentagainst;11per- centofSaudisforand80percentagainst;and13percentofKuwaitisforand61 percentagainst.9OnAmericanpolicytowardIraq,4percentofEgyptiansfoundit excellentorgood,while83percentfounditso-soorpoor;4percentand90per- centinLebanon;17percentand55percentinKuwait;9percentand83percentin SaudiArabia.Whatismore,aZogbypollfoundthatchangesinpolicycouldlead to dramatic changes in public opinion: 80 percent of Egyptians said that their opinionoftheUnitedStateswouldimproveifitliftedthesanctionsonIraq,asdid 77percentofSaudisand75percentofLebanese.Similarly,inanopinionpollin SaudiArabiainthesummerof2001,86percentofSaudissaidthattheirattitudes towardtheUnitedStatesweremostlybasedonitspolicies,notitsvalues.10While suchopinionpollsaresuggestive,theydonotinthemselvescapturetherichness andthedynamismofArabpublicopinionformationorthecentralityofpublicdis- courseratherthanlargelyunmeasuredmassattitudestoitspoliticalexpression. Tothatend,thearticledrawsonacollectionofmorethanthirteenhundredopin- ionessaysaboutIraqintheArabiclanguagepress,aswellasalmostonehundred Downloaded from http://pas.sagepub.com at GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY on January 9, 2009 58 POLITICS & SOCIETY interviewsinJordan,Egypt,theWestBank,Syria,andLebanon,toreconstruct the development of public opinion toward and arguments over Iraq.11 THEORIZING THE ARAB PUBLIC SPHERE As a historical trauma and an ongoing issue about which endless argument seemedpossible,Iraqservedasthefocalpointfortheemergenceofanissue- specifictransnationalArabpublicsphere.ItisnotobviousthatIraqshouldhave beensuchavehicle.Iraq’sinvasionofKuwaitshatteredArabnormsagainstinter- Arabwarfare,thedissensionattheCairoSummitof1990decimatedtheofficial Araborder,resentmentsandhatredsweregeneratedbytheKuwaitiexpulsionof PalestiniansandJordanians,andtheintensedivisionsbetweenpopularsupport for Iraq and official support for the coalition in many Arab states exacerbated politicalandsocialcleavages.TheGulfwarsuggestedArabdisunityanddivision ratherthanaresurgentArabidentity.Thecollectivetraumaofthewar,andthefail- ureoftheArabordertodealwithit,openeduptheterrainforpublicargument.As Kanan Makiya, generally a fierce critic of Arab political discourse, noted in 1995,“Individualsaresteppingintotheresultingvacuum...towrite,question, and think as they never have before.”12 Thepublicspherereferstothosesitesofcommunicationwithinasocietyin which members of an identifiable public discuss matters of collective concern beforeanimaginedaudience.13Incontrasttothemoregenericconceptofpublic opinion,whichcouldmeananythingfromthedistributionofviewsthroughsoci- etytotheoutcomeofopinionsurveys,thepublicsphereshouldbeunderstood morespecificallyintermsofpublicargumentsanddebates.Ratherthanpositing theexistenceofasinglepublicsphere,itmakesmoresensetoconceiveofmulti- plepublicspheresthatemergearoundparticularissuesandinvarioussettings. Thispublicsphereconcept,originallydevelopedinJurgenHabermas’sinterpre- tationofbourgeoisEuropeansociety,offersuniquelyusefulwaystothinkabout non-Westernandevennondemocraticsocieties.Separatingthespecificdimen- sion of public argument before an imagined common audience about issues of sharedconcern,fromthemoregeneralconceptofpublicopinionandfromspe- cific democratic institutions, allows us to analyze the complex formation and articulationofpublicopinionevenundertheconditionsofstaterepressioncom- monintheArabworld.Transnationalpublicsphereslackdirectmechanismsby whichtotranslateevenastrongpublicconsensusintopolicyoutcomes,asenvi- sionedinHabermas’stwo-trackconceptionofmoderndemocraticsystems,but theweaknessofthesetransmissionmechanismsdoesnotimplytheabsenceofa public sphere itself.14 The argument presented below demonstrates a range of more indirect, more tentative, and yet very real pathways by which the public sphere can affect political behavior and political outcomes. Still,manywoulddisputetheexistenceofapublicspherewithinArabsociet- iesbecauseoftheauthoritariannatureofArabgovernmentsandtheirrigidcontrol Downloaded from http://pas.sagepub.com at GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY on January 9, 2009 MARC LYNCH 59 overthemediaandpublicdiscourse.TheassumptionthatArabandIslamicsoci- eties,bytheirnature,lackanypublicspherewithinwhichtopubliclydebateand discuss political issues seriously misrepresents these societies. The relatively uniquetransnationaldimensionofArabpublicsphereshaslonganddeeproots.In contrasttothewiderinternationalsystem,wherethenetworksofnon-stateactors, globaldialogues,andglobalizedmediaassociatedwithglobalizationrepresenta noveldevelopment,theArabworldhasdecadesofexperiencewithpoliticalargu- mentationatthetransnationallevel.15Preciselybecauseoftherelativeclosureof domesticpublicspheres,alongwiththesenseofcollectiveidentitybornoutofthe OttomanandIslamicexperience,Arabshavelongturnedtothetransnationallevel forpoliticaldebate.Sinceatleastthe1950s,ithasbeenagivenofArabpolitics thatallstatesmustjustifyandexplaintheirbehaviorbeforeanactivelyengaged public sphere made of states, political parties, movements, and intellectuals claimingasharedArabidentityandhencetherighttoanopiniononmattersof collectiveArabconcern.16Thecombinationoftightlycontrolleddomesticpublic spheresandalessconstrainedtransnationalpublicsphere,alongwithastrongly held political identity transcending state borders, gave particular resonance to Arabistpublicarguments.InlinewithBohman’sconceptionofacosmopolitan public,thisArabistpublicsphereproducesopinionthatis“madeknownandrec- ognizedinsuchawaythateventhesupremepoliticalauthoritiesofthestatecan- notavoidacknowledgingthem.”17WhatdefinestheexistenceofanArabpublic sphereispreciselythefactthatself-identifiedArabsdoinfactaddressandinvoke anArabpublic,viamediathatreachtheprospectivemembersofthepublic,about matters collectively defined as of common interest. As James Bohman puts it, “thisconcernofthepublicfortheexistenceofthepublicspheredefinesapublic quapublic.”18 Asecondcommonobjectionisthattheabsenceofpublicopiniondatameans thatpublicopinioncannotbeknownotherthanthroughitsviolentexpressionin thestreets.AsJohnZallerasks,“ifthepublichadanopinionandtherewasno pollsteraroundtomeasureit,wouldpublicopinionexist?”19Thisisaproblem,but notassignificantasmanybelieve.Indeed,criticaltheoristspointtothedistorting effect of public opinion polls, which privilege the less engaged over the more engaged and which can be readily manipulated through sampling bias, word choice,andothermethodologies.20Ratherthananobviouslyfatalweakness,the limited use of public opinion polling in the Arab world empowers the public spherebyprioritizingdiscourseovermeasuresofmassattitudes.Publicopinion researchintheUnitedStateshasconsistentlyshowntheimportanceofelitedis- courseforshapingmassattitudes.21Elitepublicopinioncanclearlybeseeninthe spirited, engaged political discourse in a transnational Arab public sphere. Indeed,theabsenceofregularpublicopinionpollsgivesmorepowertothispublic sphere,asitbecomestheprimary,ifnottheonly,sourceofinformationforArabs about the beliefs of other Arabs. Downloaded from http://pas.sagepub.com at GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY on January 9, 2009 60 POLITICS & SOCIETY Athirdobjectiontotheapplicationoftheconceptofthepublicsphereliesin the quality of political discourse. Major Arab intellectuals such as Burhan GhalyounandMohammedAbedal-Jabiri,nolessthanWesterncritics,detailthe deficienciesofArabpoliticaldiscourse,particularlythesubversionofrational- criticaldiscoursebyconfrontationalclashesofrigidideologiesandanavoidance ofself-criticism.22Inherentintheseinternalcritiques,however,istheassumption ofthepotentialtotranscendthedeficientpracticeofdialoguethroughdeveloping theconditionsforrational-criticaldiscourse.Furthermore,thedistinctivenessof thecorruptionofArabdiscourseshouldnotbeoverdrawn.Afterall,Habermas’s critical analysis of the public sphere precisely emphasized the deterioration of public discourse in Western societies. While Arab states and actors engage in morethantheirshareofname-calling,propaganda,deceptiveclaims,andblatant lies,fewhonestobserversofAmericanpoliticswouldfindthisexceptional.With ahealthycynicismbredbylongexperienceofofficialpropaganda,Arabsregu- larlydrawsophisticatedinferencesfromeventightlycontrolledofficialmedia.As RobertFiskcynicallynotes,“Arabshavelongrealizedthattheactiontakenby theirgovernmentsisinexactlyinverseproportiontotheirwords.”23Thecorrosive impactofdecadesofstatepressures,censorship,andself-censorshipshouldnot bedismissed,butsuchcautionshouldnotdenytonewgenerationsthepotentialto fight against and transcend these legacies. Finally, many object to the content of Arab discourse, specifically its anti- Americanandanti-Semiticrhetoricandfrequentresorttoconspiracytheories.It iscrucialforanunderstandingoftheArabpublicspheretorecognizethatinits self-conception it is a subordinate, dominated counterpublic.24 Frustration and resentmentatthepoliticalandeconomicstagnationoftheregion,atWesterndom- ination, and at Israeli treatment of the Palestinians permeates the public arena. Arabpublicsdefineacollectiveidentityinpartagainstthissenseofsubordination andexclusionfromaglobalizinganduniversalizingWesternpublic.Following JamesScott’ssubtleanalysisoftherhetoricalpracticesofthedominated,itshould notbesurprisingwhenArabspeakersaimforpreciselytheareasmostlikelyto outrage the powerful—whether outrageously anti-Semitic rhetoric, rhetorical assaultsonWesternidealsofdemocracy,oremotionalrhetoricaboutmurdered Iraqi babies.25 TheimportantquestionisthereforenotwhetherArabpublicopinionexistsor whetheritcanbeexpressedbutratherhowitmatters.Arableadersdopayclose attentiontopublicopinion:recentJordaniangovernmentshavereliedonregular, privatepublicopinionpolling;Egypt’sHosniMubarakkeepsavigilanteyeon public opinion in shaping his foreign policy; Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has pointedly aligned himself with public opinion; even Hafez al-Asad madeapointofmaintainingclosecontactwithtrendsinSyrianpublicopinion.26 Inthenextsection,IdetailthedevelopmentoftheArabpublicsphere;inthefol- lowing three sections, I demonstrate that Arab states interact with this public Downloaded from http://pas.sagepub.com at GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY on January 9, 2009 MARC LYNCH 61 sphereincomplexwaysthatgofarbeyondanyconceptionoftheArabstreetas something to be feared, controlled, manipulated, or ignored. STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN THE ARAB PUBLIC SPHERE SuccessivetransformationsofpublicsphereshaveshapedthecontextofArab politics, from the radical pan-Arabist radio broadcasting of the 1950s, to the Saudi-dominated conservative television and newspaper public sphere of the 1980s,tothenewmediaofthelate1990s.Duringthe1950s,thepoliticalradio broadcastingbegunbyEgypt’sGamalAbdal-Nasserandimitatedbyhisrivals allowedpan-Arabmovementstofundamentallychallengethelegitimacyofrela- tivelynewArabstates.Asthesestatesbecamemoreinstitutionalized,thelocusof powershiftedtonationalcapitals,andbordersbecamelesspenetrable.Thiscoin- cidedwiththedeclineofArabismbroughtonbythecatastrophicdefeatofthekey ArabstatesbyIsraelinthe1967war.Inthe1970s,SaudiArabiauseditsdramati- callyincreasedoilwealthtoestablishadominantpositionovermuchoftheArab pressandelectronicmedia.Priortothesatelliterevolution,televisionbroadcast- ing, which required greater capital expenditure and proved far less suitable to politicalmobilization,helpedconcentratemediapowerinstates.Inthe1990s,in thecourseoftentativeliberalizationprocessesinanumberofArabstates,national public spheres of varying openness emerged, which promoted debates about domesticissuesandencouragednationalidentities,diminishingtheappealofthe transnational public sphere. By the 1990s, then, the Arabist public sphere seemed to have been conclu- sivelydowngradedbythecombinedimpactoftheGulfwar,thepeaceprocess, andtheseeminglyinexorableconcentrationofstatepower.27Asrecentlyasthe 1990-91Gulfwar,Arabaudiencesprimarilyturnedtoforeignradiobroadcasts, especiallytheBBCandRadioMonteCarlo,forinformationratherthantoany domesticorpan-Arabsources,whileonlyhigh-rankingelitesandwealthybusi- nessmeninluxuryhotelshadaccesstoCNN.28Thereversalofthistrendinthe pastfiveyearshasfacilitatedareturntotransnationalpoliticsintheArabworld, withmobilizedArabopinionfiercelydebatingtheIraqsanctions,thePalestinian cause, economic reform and democratization, and Islamism.29 JustasradiobroadcastingtransformedthepotentialforArabpoliticalactionin the1950sbybringingArabistpoliticalspeechdirectlytotheincreasinglymobi- lizedmasses,newtechnologieshaverecasttherepertoireofpoliticalactioninthe 1990sbyrestoringthecapacityforregionaldebate.30Crucially,whereVoiceof theArabs,therevolutionaryEgyptianradioserviceofthe1950s,directlyserved the interests of a powerful state, the key new media tend to be only indirectly linkedtostates(al-HayatisownedbyaSaudiprincebutrunbyLebanesenewspa- perveterans;al-JazeerawasestablishedbytherulerofQatarbutrunbyBBC- trainedprofessionals).Whilethesemediaarecommercial,drivenmorebymarket Downloaded from http://pas.sagepub.com at GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY on January 9, 2009 62 POLITICS & SOCIETY sharethanbyideology,thestructuraleffectistocreateatransnationalmediawith acommondiscoursedefiningissuesassharedArabissuesthatdemandshared Arabsolutions.31Whilemanyobservershavebeenexcitedbythedemocratizing prospects of the new media in the Arab world, others worry that thenewArabmediahelpscoalescefeelingsofresentmentagainstIsrael....Broadcasters areseekingtobuildasbroadaregionalaudiencefortheirprogrammingastheycan,and outrageoverthewayPalestiniansaretreatedisaconsensusbuilderinaregionwhichissplit over the treatment of Iraq.32 TechnologyalsohelpedtheArabistpressdevelopintoamajorforumforinter- Arab discussion and debate.33 Prior to Internet distribution, sensitive regimes couldeasilystopsuchnewspapersattheborder,andatanyratethenewspapers wereoftentooexpensiveformostpeopletoreadregularly.Disseminationonthe Internetgivesthesenewspapersfargreaterreachthaneverbefore.AsJonAnder- sonandDaleEickelmannote,theseonlineArabnewspapers“collectivelyconsti- tuteanewcommunityofcommunicationthatistransnational,opentomorepar- ticipants,andinteractiveinawaythattraditionalbroadcastinghasnotbeen.”34 Furthermore,thesatellitestationsregularlyprogramroundupsofthenewsand opinion published in the major Arabist newspapers, extending the reach of the press to those who lack the access or capabilities to read them on their own. These new Arab media have created a rich information environment that directlychallengesthestate-controlleddomesticmedia.Forexample,whilemost Jordanians continue to buy the state-owned al-Rai for its wedding and death announcements, most prefer satellite television for political news and debates, particularlysincetheapplicationoftherestrictive1997PressandPublications Lawcrippledwhathadforashorttimebeenavibrantdomesticpublicsphere.35 Thosenewspapersandstationsthatwereperceivedasindependentofstatecontrol andthatadoptedanArabistperspectivetendedtostandoutthemost.Thus,the Palestinian-ownedal-Qudsal-ArabistoodoutfromtheSaudi-ownedal-Sharqal- Awsat, and Al-Jazeera stood out from MBC and Orbit, its larger and better- financedcompetitors.Al-Qudsal-Arabiandal-Jazeera,eachfreeofSaudicon- trol,attainedprominencebyconcentratingontheissuesofcentralconcerntothe Arabistdiscourse—Palestine;Arabunity;thedemandforandabsenceofdemoc- racyintheArabworld;andthesanctionsonIraq—andbytheirfocussharpened the Arab response to these common concerns. It is quite striking that Arabist debateshavecoalescedaroundapositioncontrarytothatofSaudiArabia,despite the latter’s enormous investment in owning and controlling Arab news outlets. Contrarytowidespreadperceptionsandcriticisms,nosingle,monolithicdis- course has dominated this Arabist media. The editorial content of al-Quds al- Arabiandal-Hayat,thetwomostimportantpan-Arabnewspapers,bothcovered Iraqheavilybutofferedsharplydifferentapproaches.BetweenJanuary1999and June 2002, Al-Quds al-Arabi ran no fewer than 391 editorials primarily about Downloaded from http://pas.sagepub.com at GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY on January 9, 2009 MARC LYNCH 63 Iraq,whileal-Hayatpublishedatleast265.36Thisisanaverageofmorethan15 essaysamonthinthetwopapersandmorethan7percentofalleditorialcontent, anditsuggeststheintensityoffocusontheIraqissue—onlythePalestiniansitua- tion received slightly more coverage. Where attention to Iraq in the American mediatendedtodirectlyfollowpoliticalcrises,thesetwopaperspublishedsome 227editorialsonIraqin1999,ayearwithveryfewsignificantcrises.Atotalof 158differentwritersfromeighteendifferentcountries(aswellasKurdsandself- described“Arabs”)contributedessaystothetwopapersinthisperiod.Awide rangeofleadingIraqiintellectualsandoppositionfigurescontributed,butwriters ofallnationalitiesdealtwithIraqasanArabratherthanasanarrowlyIraqiissue. Al-Qudsal-ArabiadoptedapositionhighlycriticalofthesanctionsandAmer- icanpolicyintheregion,withmorethan90unsignededitorialsfrom1999to2001 presenting a coherent vision of an urgent Arab problem in Iraq. It published numerous Iraqi opposition figures, however; regularly debated possible post- Saddam futures; and rarely hesitated to criticize Saddam Hussein. The paper’s strongestsupportersofIraqincludedPalestinians,Sudanese,Syrians,andself- identifiedArabs,whoalwaysdiscussedIraqwithinawiderArabcontext,convey- ing the impression of a popular Arabist consensus. Al-Hayat, by contrast, approachedtheIraqiissuefromamoreinternationalperspective,conveyingthe impressionofadividedArabpublicbypublishingessaysthatrangedfromstrong criticstostrongsupportersofthesanctions.Theeditorswerefarmoreambivalent abouttheIraqisituation,despisedSaddamHussein(thechiefeditoroncewrote thatSaddamwaspersonallyresponsibleforeveryproblemintheArabworldfor thepasttwentyyears37),andwerelessreflexivelysuspiciousoftheUnitedStates. Overtime,however,theeditoriallinegrewincreasinglyskepticalaboutAmerican policyandconcernedaboutIraqisuffering.Thecommentarybyitssinglemost prolific writer on Iraq, the New York–based UN correspondent Ragheda Dergham,balancedatough-mindeddisgustwiththeIraqiregimewithsharpcriti- cismoftheinactionofArabstatesandofAmericanmanipulationoftheSecurity Council.ItsmostprolificIraqiwriter,GhassanAttiyeh,wroteincisivelybutcriti- callyabouttheIraqiopposition.AsthemostprestigiousArabistnewspaper,al- HayatsoughtthecenteroftheArabpoliticalspectrumwhileattractingmanylead- ing political and intellectual figures. Al-Hayat regularly published the fiercely anti-Saddam Kuwaiti Mohammed al-Rumayhi, alongside Iraqi opposition fig- ures,MadeleineAlbrightalongsideEdwardSaid,andprominentEgyptian,Leba- nese, and Palestinian intellectuals of all persuasions. Majornationalnewspapersalsocontributedtothisprintpublicsphere,espe- ciallywell-establishednewspaperssuchasEgypt’sal-Ahram.Arabnewspapers typically reprinted essays by important figures originally published in national newspaperssothatanessaybyMohammedSidAhmedorGamilMattarorigi- nallypublishedinal-Ahramoral-Sharqal-Awsatreceivedwidedistributionin nationalandtransnationalnewspapersthroughouttheArabworld.Al-Zaman,run Downloaded from http://pas.sagepub.com at GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY on January 9, 2009
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