lutte de classe / class struggle / lucha de clase FRA/ENG/ESP (1972-80) #20

24 Pages·2.431 MB·English

by  Lutte Ouvriere

CONTENTS
•The Reactionary Candidate Giscard Wan The
Presidential Election., But Nothino Fundamen
tal Has Been Lost By The Workers
•Toward The Creation of a Mass Social Democrat
Party in France?
• Portugal: Liberty Under Surveillance
J
Malthusianism and Ecology Versus The
Conscious Control Over All Economic Activity
Or How to Ensure The Survival of Mankind
June 1974
PRICE: FF3
CLASS STRUGGLE
CONTENTS
Page 2 The Reactionary Candidate Giscard
Won The Presidential Election,
But Nothing Fundamental Has
Been Lost By The Workers
Page 6 Toward The Creation of a Mass
Social Democrat Party in France?
Page11 Portugal: Liberty under Surveillance
Page17 Malthusianism and Ecology Versus
the Conscious Control Over Al I
Economic Activity-Or How to En
sure the Survival of Mankind
NUMBER 20
CLASS STRUGGLE
THE REACTIONARY CANDIDATE GISCARD
WON THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
BUT NOTHING FUNDAMENTAL HAS BEEN LOST BY THE WORKERS
The second round of the presidential election finally yielded the expected
result: namely the victory of the candidate of the Right, Giscard d'Estaing,
over Mitterrand, the candidate of the Left. This is a narrow victory indeed,
since Giscard-who got 13,396,203 votes and 50.8 percent of the votes ca·st
outpolled Mitterrand by some 424,599 votes only. This is the smallest majo
rity pol led in any of the three presidential elections held with universal
suffrage: in 1965 and in 1969, both De Gaulle and Pompidou had won over
their opponent-respectively Mitterrand and Poher-by a much larger majority.
The narrowness of the victory seemed to confirm what emerged from the
successive opinion polls (despite some variations) made between the two rounds
of the election-which showed that the candidates were constantly treading
on each other's heels in other words, that there was a unique occasion for
Mitterrand to win the election. Figures seem to support this assumption. And
figures are certainly what counts when the poll is declared. From this point
of view, Mitterrand narrowly missed his target, and therefore the hypothesis
that he might have become head of state was not to be ruled out, though this
was by far the less likely outcome.
But figures and politics are two different things. One must go beyond figures
in order to form an opinion as to what could have happened or where the failure
lies; as to what Mitterrand's heavy score actually means; and what political
weight it can have, or more precisely, what it reveals about French political
life.
The question is whether the victory ac cally speaking. No one can deny that an
tually lay close at hand for the French left, election only gives a distorted picture of the
whose usual results in general or presidential social and political reality of a country as well
elections range around 45 percent and rarely as of what takes place in the conscience of
reach beyond 46 percent in the best cases. large sections of the population as regards
If it had won more than 46 percent, it would their aspirations, their choice, or their poli
have been of paramount importance politi- tical engagement along some line or other.
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CLASS STRUGGLE
N1Nertheless it would have been of rrima1-y second round. Because it allows only two
rolitical importance that the left should have contestants to be left in the arena, the
improved its score by 4 percent-this being second ballot gives a fake picture of the
approximately the difference between Mit electorate. Whoever wants to signal his op
terrand's poll on the second round of this position to one candidate has to abstain or
elections and the votes totalled by the va vote for the other one-though an electoral
rious left-wing candidates on the first round choice is limited, in the second round,
of the 1973 general elections. there is no choice at all.
But there I ies the heart of the problem. Thus the evolution of the electorate
In spite of a widely-spread feeling of weari cannot be deduced from the results of the
ness after 16 years of Gaullist rule-not only second round of the election. And even less
among the working class but also in other so, because on the first round, the Right
social layers-there has not been much of was torn apart between its three main can
a left-wing advance in the electorate, at didates: Giscard, Chaban, and Royer. A num
least as expressed by the results of the first ber of the marginal members of the Gaul list
round. or pro-Royer electorate-although unambi
guously right-wing-felt they would be more
On the first round, Mitterrand, Krivine, disappointed in Giscard's pulling ahead of
and our comrade Arlette Laguiller totalled the other right-wing candidates than scared
46.06 percent of the vote. Even if one by Mitterrand's coming to office. The only
adds to this figure the votes gathered by way for them to vote against Giscard was to
Dumont, whose ambiguous electorate was vote for Mitterrand. So part of that right
only partly left-wing, the total does not wing electorate took this decisive step, just
reach 47 percent (46.73 percent to be like several Gaullist personalities did so pu
precise). If one compares these figures with blicly. They could take this step all the more
those of the general elections held in 1973, I ight-heartedly as between the two rounds
the advance can be fairly appraised: the CP, both Mitterrand and Marchais concentrated
the UGDS (which included the SP and the their efforts on convincing those of the
left Radicals), the PSU, and the revolution right-wing voters who had been most disap
ary candidates taken together had totalled pointed with Chaban's and Rover's scores
43.74 percent of the vote, a figure to which that casting a vote for Mitterrand would
one should probably add another 2.75 per not compel them to forsake their right-wing
cent obtained by the ill-defined category ideas. Thus the leaders of the CP and the SP
labelled as «various left-wing candidates» in called forth the most worn-out slogans of the
official statistics. Right, used chauvinism, and advocated the
preservation of the Gaull ist heritage-which
Now amounting to slightly less than Giscard would not fail to betray-in order
47 percent of the vote, the left-wing electo to win over a number of right-wing votes.
rate has somewhat grown between 1973 and
1974. But this figure signals both the advance And with some degrPe of success, too.
of the left and its limitations. Indeed it should Here again, the comparison between the
be noted that Mitterrand progressed between results of the first and second rountf is in
the two rounds owing to votes which were structive. Even without the votes of a Sebag
not left-wing. So, instead of claiming that or a Heraut-who are not openly rigthist
the left had been only a few votes short of politicians-the scores of Giscard, Chaban,
the absolute majority on the second round, Royer, Le Pen, Muller, and Renouvin totalled
it would have been more accurate to admit 52.31 percent. In other words, Giscard's
that the nature of the second round toge score on the second round was inferior to
ther with the political circumstances had the Right's high mark of the first round.
enabled Mitterrand to collect a number of
right-wing votes-needless to say that he These conclusions are · important for a
hardly turned them into left-wing ones! clear understanding of the true meaning of
First, let us analyLe the characteristics of the Mitterrand's «good score» and ultimate de-
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CLASS STRUGGLE
feat. They would have been even more im politician always involve a deadly danger for
portant if Mitterrand had come out a winner. the working class. This is true even when this
For indeed. he could have been elected-in coming to power is itself more or less a
the absence of a «move to the I eft »-had he consec.iuence of a greater mobiliLation of the
seduced more Gaullist votes than he ultima working class. The danger is even more
ly did. On such an ambiguous basis, his evident when such is not the case, i.e., when
election would in no way-not even i11 the the electoral victory is due to circumstances
distorted and misleading way typical of that have nothing to do with the workers'
elections-have meant an evolution of the degree of consciousness, i.e., when the work
working class or of the relationships between ing class is not politically and organization
it and other social layers, especially the petty ally prepared to fight against the hostile
bourgeoisie. reactions such a victory could start among
the others social layers.
But such was not the outcome. The pro
blem is not to deplore the fact nor.to delight In order to be able to fight back, the
in it, but to understand that this electoral workers need to know what they are threat
failure of the Left is a reflection of what its ened by, who are their al I ies, who their
victory would have been given its very limit enemies. and who their false brothers and
ed basis. leaders.
Perhaps, such a purely electoral victory The election of Mitterrand, even on am
might have made the workr>rs more confident. biguous grounds, certainly had every chance
But its positive aspects would have been of «unlocking» the situation, i.e., of sharp
counterbalanced by the fact that it was ening the relationships between the social
based on illusions and was, because of this, forces. Because, on the one hand. the work
very dangerous. ers, encouraged by what they would have
considered their victory, would have pushed
The revolutionaries, along with the work forward their demands; and because, on the
ing class, wished Giscard's defeat and, logic other hand, a whole fraction of the bour
ally enough, Mitterrand's victory. But at the geoisie would have co.nsidered the coming to
same time, they were conscious that the power of the Left's «Common candidate»
latter's victory could not, by itself, lead to flanked perhaps by Communist ministers
a greater class consciousness or a greater as a direct threat and would h·ave consequent
degree of organi1ation of the working class ly reacted.
which are ultimately the decisive factors.
Of course, the big bourgeoisie has no fear
The majority of the Trotskyist extreme of Mitterrand who proved long ago he was
left itself believed and proclaimed that a reliable member of the bourgeoisie's poli
Mitterrand's coming to power could only tical staff. In fact, it does not tear him even
reinforce the working class-some even saying with his CP allies, who are sometimes indeed
there was no other way toward the mob i Ii very useful. (However, it is doubtful whether
Lation of the working class. and its maturing the big bourgeoisie conscious of its inter
toward greater consciousness. ests considered it appropriate to let the CP
come to government at a time when they
To endow the mere election of a left did not feel compelled to do that). The fact
wing bourgeois politician with such virtues that it is Mitterrand, a well-tried bourgeois
is properly stupid on the part of would-be politician, who is working toward the even
revolutionary organizations. tuality of a CP participation in government
means that the big bourgeoisie is in any case
The illusions of the working class cannot preparing itself to use this type of solution
be a strength. And to believe the opposite, which of course does not mean that it is
under the pretext that illusions lead to action, ready to agree to it simply because the Right
is a criminal folly. The illusions bread by the is unhappy about Giscard. But such a risk
coming to power of a left-wing bourgeois exists in any election ...
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CLASS STRUGGLE
But let us not forget that the bour Would the above-mentioned eventuality
geoisie includes all the propertied classes, have rapidly led to struggles for which the
small or large, who live on the exploi working class was not ready? Such was at
tation of others. To this r<!ilCtionary mass, any rate the main risk. This is why it was
clinging blindly to its priveleges, the mere then urgent-instead of babbling about the
word «Communist» as well as labor union possible victory of the Left-to caution the
rights are themselves intolerable attacks on workers against all ii lusions over the outcome
private property, and they consider the of the electoral victory so that they be poli
Gaullist-style profit-sharing to be a step tically, morally,and as soon as possible mate
toward communism. To them, the coming rially ready to cope in full consciousness
to power of Mitterrand and the CP means with any struggle to come.
a great threat to their properties. Their fear
of seeing the left in power-even if their fear If the candidate of the Right wins,
is groundless-is a political and economic nothing is yet lost for the working class; if
factor with numerous and serious conse the candidate of the Left wins, nothing is
quences. Economic factor because it could yet won-such was the main axis of our
mean a massive flight of capital with the ine election campaign. Everything ultimately
vitable consequences on a monetary situation depends on the degree of consciousness and
already decaying. Political factor, in that a mobilization of the working class, not on
steeper inflation rJte-even if it were due election results: this truth is more easily
precisely to these flights of capital-would forgotten precisely in the event of a victory
stir up the hatred of the exploiters, large or of the Left which would breed so many
small, as well as that of the non-exploitive hopes and ii Iu s ions.
petty bourgeoisie-shopkeepers, tradesmen,
professionals-against this government and Most workers were without doubt disap
the social layers which it supposedly would pointed after the narrow victory of the
represent, these layers being primarily the Right's candidate, Giscard d'Estaing. This
working class. disappointment is growing deeper and is even
fed by the pol icy of austerity of the new
Such a deepening of social tensions was government.
probably one of the greatest dangers feared
by the bourgeoisie, had Mitterrand come to Though the aspirations of the greai: major
power. ity of workers to see the Left defeat the
Right did not materialize, revolutionaries
They certainly feared s1Jch a spontaneous cannot say often enough that the workers
deepening of social tensions more than the were not beaten in these elections, and that
decisions Mitterrand could have taken once they did not miss a great deal.
elected president, if he had «unexpectedly»
won the elections. And unquestionably, all If workers now start fighting with
bourgeois politicians, even right-wingers like their own weapons-as they would
Giscard, tried not to dramatize the issue, but have been compelled to do in any case had
to mitigate the fears over a coming to power Mitterrand won-everything is still possible
of Mitterrand. even if there are no elections in view.
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CLASS STRUGGLE
TOWARD THE CREATION
OF A MASS SOCIAL DEMOCRAT PARTY IN FRANCE?
The recent presidential election has strengthened that trend of what is
commonly called the non-Communist left in France which supported Mitterrand.
Of course this trend was already getting off the ground. So-called leftists
like Regis Debray, the ex-supporter of guerilla warfare in Latin America
have been for months the champions in France of the «realistic alternative»
proposed by the election of Mitterrand for president. Michel Rocard, one of
the PSU leaders, publicly sided with Mitterrand from the beginning of the
campaign. His rallying was no surprise for it had been obvious for a long time
that he was impatient to join the brain trust of the SP's Secretary General. Many
self-styled leftists were to tread the same path and to use the Maoist-oriented
daily Liberation as a tribune.
As for the leaders of the CFDT, they abandoned their formal reserves
regarding the Common Program of Government, and fully supported the
candidacy of the SP's Secretary. This is no surprise either, for the preferences
of the CFDT leaders had been obvious for a long time.
Now that elections are over, the need to organize the electoral following
established around Mitterrand's candidacy is being considered both by the
SP and the CFDT. Mitterrand took the initiative right after the 19 May
election by proposing a «National Congress for Socialism» in the coming
fall. This was immediately given wide approval by the PSU leaders. And
Edmond Maire, the CFDT Secretary General, in an interview published in the
Nouvel Observateur, declared that he was in favor of the idea of a «mass
socialist party.» And following suit, several dozen CFDT officials have
published an appeal in which they insisted that a «framework be established
as soon as possible, through which all socialists could compare their experiences
and work out a blueprint for society.» So from all angles, people are busy
building up a Socialist party capable of «balancing the forces within the left»
as Mitterrand put it. Will all that come true? So far, they are still dealing
with the preliminaries. The leaders of the various organizations involved are
as usual prudently hazy in their statements. «National Congress for Socialism,»
or «mass Socialist Party,» or «a framework»-all the structures suggested are so
vague that all and everything could be included in them. In this vein, neither
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CLASS STRUGGLE
Mitterrand nor Rocard nor Maire has broken with the social-democrat tradition
which consists in hiding their gerrymongerings with statements as general as
possible.
So at the moment, it is too early to decide on the chances of such an out
come. At most, we can only observe and analyse the interests which are at
stake.
As far as Mitterrand is concerned, the pos1t1on he has now secured for
himself on the political scene and within the Left is not dependent on the
existence or absence of a big party of which he would be the leader. He
acquired his position as a referee and as the right man for the Left throughout
political ups and downs, especially in the course of the elections which have
marked out his career since 1958. And paradoxically, it was the French CP
which was largely responsible for putting him upon the pedestal from which he
dominates the Left as a whole, CP included. As early as 1958, the CP
started to praise him and present him as one of the few political figures worthy
of the title of authentic republican, since he had not accepted the Gaullist
Constitution of the Fifth Republic. In the 1965 presidential election, the CP
unconditionnally supported his candidacy, though he was not even a member
of the SP yet. At last in 1974, he became the common candidate of the Left
right from the first round. It is highly significant that Mitterrand resigned from
his political responsibilities within the SP during the presidential election to
become a candidate above the parties. For this, a large party, well-organized,
and influential was not necessary to Mitterrand. Would it have been useful? It
is not sure.
The PSU has been longing for months for such a party. In fact it has been
longing for it since its very beginnings. For the party of Depreux, then of
Rocard, had left the old social-democrat house in the late fifties only on the
grounds that the latter was on the verge of collapse. The ambitions of Depreux,
Martinet, Mendes-France and the like, were at the time to set up a better
looking party, built on the same model as the one they had just left. The
project failed. The PSU has remained a social-democrat organization on the
side lines-in spite of its leftist positions after May 68. At most, this sort of
attitude raised some illusions among the rank and file, but it did not change
the nature of this organization. Whereas a new political figure capable of
gathering under his name the reformist current had arisen with in the SP
after 1969. Mitterrand was going to succeed where the PSU had failed.
After that, there were no more reasons left for the PSU's existence. The
politicians who had taken it as a refuge, in the hope that it would be an electo
ral spring-board, have progressively left.
Those who have tried to use the PSU for their political ambitions in face of
a decaying SF 10 realize today that Mitterrand's SP is occupying the position.
If they persist on staying on the side lines, they might be kept there for
good. This is why the PSU has now become impatient to join the old house
now cover~d with a brand-new coat of paint. If the project comes true, the
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CLASS STRUGGLE
PSU will have only been a 15 year digression, and the Social Democrats will
get together again in the same organization.
The CFDT leaders are acting in quite the same spirit. Those who pretend
to be upset by the turn operated by Maire and his friends only forget that the
CF DT has always supported a reformist theory which proposes a better
management for this society. And if up until then the CFDT had kept
away from politics (most of the time that is, as the CFDT called to vote
Poher in the 1969 presidential election), it was essentially for tactical reasons
based on opportunity and not-on principles. But the leaders of this confedera
tion now have what seem more serious reasons to rally to a movement which,
though it is still in the opposition, might in a near future be called upon to
help manage society as a whole . .For Giscard's «opening» to the opposition
may well lead up to an appeal to the Socialists-and more precisely to
Mitterrand-to take part of the Right's responsibilities for the measures imposed
by the crisis. The CFDT in keeping with the principles that presided over
its birth-and that are still in use today-, does not want to be left aside.
This is why it considers favorably the plans for a regrouping of the so-called
non-Communist left, in which it has a role to play.
Thus everybody stands for the regrouping.Will it ever come into being? And,
more important, if it ever exists, what form will it take? The answer to these
questions ultimately rests with Mitterrand, because of the position he won
himself as arbiter of the left. Now, what does Mitterrand want?
If his plan is to create an election-oriented regrouping, things are quite
simple. We can say that such a regrouping is within easy reach, thanks to the
spontaneous effects of the «dynamic of unity»-as it is called-and which is
even reinforced by electoral success. Even before the presidential election we
could see SP militants selling their paper, or posting bills-quite an unusual
sight in the previous years, when practically no SP militant was to be found
anywhere. Membership seems to be growing now and at a faster and faster
rate, if the SP leadership is to be believed. In this context, it is highly probable
that PSU or CFDT members will eventually join the new SP. This is already
the case anyway. As to the regrouping with the PSU and CFDT, it could take
many forms, as the aim here is not to create a coherent political force, capable
of intervening with some impact in the struggles, capable in other words of
competing successfully with the CP. At best, we can witness the establishing
of a vast federation of organizations, the leaders of which would form a
Bureau that would issue a communique on the political situation from time
to time.
A more ambitious project would consist in trying to build up a militant
Socialist Party. That is, a party capable of playing an active role in the political
life of the country through the mobilization of large fractions of the population;
a party capable-like the CP-of organizing struggles for economic demands
or for political aims, in all layers of the population; in short, a party that would
cease being an election committee and become an active militant mass party.
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CLASS STRUGGLE
Talking about such a possibility today is of course talking about Mitterrand's
intentions. Does he want such an organization? Let us not be duped by his
words here. Mitterrand's affirmed will to balance the forces within the Left
up to and including the organizations of the Left-is in fact a publicity trick.
His aim is to proclaim his decision not to leave the CP a clear field and to
enter the competition, even though Marchais' party has the monopoly in
that field. It is but a way for Mitterrand to assert that he will not be the CP's
hostage with respect to his electorate and above all the bourgeoisie. But
for that, does he need a party capable of matching the CP? Not at all, for his
control over the CP is even greater now-thanks to his position on the political
scene-than it would be if he had troops to oppose the CP on the factory
level.
Now, even if he really wanted to build up such an organization, could he
achieve this? On what forces could he rely? In the factories,on the CFDT.
Then, would the CF DT's contribution be worthwhile? The mere regrouping
in a new organization of already existing militant forces would not give the
SP more militant impact. Now, what do we see today on the factory level?
Those militants of the CFDT who are ready to truly commit themselves on
the political level-and not simply take their membership card-have already
done so, and are in the PSU, or even in the SP. In fact, most of the time,
CFDT militants are reluctant to appear politically in their factories and they
yield to the pressure of the milieu. Thus, their contribution to the SP in its
competition with the CP would be rather weak. Indeed, such a competition
implies regular interventions on the basis of a clear list of demands; it implies
that the SP's active militants take initiatives, play a role in the struggles, and
appear as militants capable of taking the position that CP militants have occu
pied for many years, and no longer be satisfied with signing common commu
niques. Does Mitterrand really want such a competition? Is it his interest any
way? In fact, he does not need all this in order to convince the bourgeoisie
that he was and still is a credible politician who represents something.
On the other hand, what forces can the SP rely upon in order to have an
impact on a community level? On its own new members? They are too few to
enable the SP to seriously challenge the CP. And being young militants who,
for most of them, come from spontaneist leftist groupings, they are a priori
hostile to any organizational framework and will not help the SP very much
-even if they do play a role here and there in limited local actions. The compe
tition with the CP cal Is for a much more systematic, more pugnacious action.
Could the SP rely on the militants from the PSU? Here again, the picture is
rather bad as regards the number of militants as well as their militancy. In fact,
the wen party would have to base its politics on a program, or at least a list of
demands and a platform which could mobilize the militants. It is highly im
probable that Mitterrand wants such an outcome. For the SP to become a mili
tant party straight away, it needs young people, willing to militate. These
young people exist already. But they are either in the CP or in Trotskyist organ
izations: the AJS, the FCR or Lutte Ouvriere. The SP's only chance of develop
ing a base among young militants capable of intervening in the struggles would
be to absorb one of these groups.
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