Lord Lothian and the genesis of the Anglo-American alliance, 1939

440 Pages·2017·4.5 MB·English

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LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
2008
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Craig Edward Saucier
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College
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Saucier, Craig Edward, "Mr. Kerry goes to Washington: Lord Lothian and the genesis of the Anglo-
American alliance, 1939-1940" (2008). LSU Doctoral Dissertations. 1947.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/1947
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MR. KERR GOES TO WASHINGTON:
LORD LOTHIAN AND THE GENESIS OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE,
1939-1940

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
Agricultural and Mechanical College
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of History

by
Craig E. Saucier
B.A., Louisiana State University, 1981
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1995
August 2008
© 2008
Craig Edward Saucier
All rights reserved

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To Triche

Je suis perdu sans toi

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation would not have come to fruition without the support, assistance, and
encouragement of countless individuals. In the Department of History at Louisiana State University, I
thank first and foremost the members of my doctoral committee, who not only accommodated my
outrageous teaching schedule, but kept the faith and hung in there with me for over seven years. Thanks
most of all to my major professor, Dr. Meredith Veldman, whose enthusiasm for this project became for
me a source of motivation and rededication, particularly during my very few moments of fatigue and self-
doubt. Her careful reading and rereading of the manuscript enabled me to produce a meaningful, tighter,
and far more coherent body of work. I am equally indebted to Dr. Suzanne Marchand and Dr. Victor
Stater, who also carefully read the text, and made invaluable stylistic and organizational suggestions,
which helped to clarify and invigorate my writing. I deeply appreciate their enthusiasm for my research
and their encouragement, as well as a lot of great hours in consultation over course work prior to general
examis. I am both grateful and apologetic to Dr. Charles Shindo, who got dragged into this process at a
fairly late stage prior to my general exams and helped me complete my minor field in United States
history. I thank Dr. James Stoner of the LSU Political Science Department, the Dean’s representative in
both my general examination and dissertation defense, and who brought an entirely different cosmology
and much food for thought as I look toward getting this dissertation in shape for publication.
I thank Dr. Stanley Hilton, who worked with me on United States military history, and Dr.
Maribel Dietz, who got me up to speed in Medieval history and sat on my examining committee. I owe
an immense debt of gratitude to the Chair of the History Department, Dr. Gaines Foster, who helped me
procure money from the Peggy W. Seale Fund, which enabled me to travel to the United Kingdom in
order to complete my research. I also thank his predecessor as Chair, Dr. Paul Paskoff, who helped calm
troubled waters following sudden and untimely changes in the graduate faculty. I owe a special thanks to
Ms. Darlene Albritton and Ms. Sandra Kirby, for all of their assistance and acts of kindness over the past
years. I owe a special and fundamentally unpayable debt to Dr. Karl A. Roider. From the time I was a
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freshman in his western civilization classes, through his supervision of my Master’s thesis, visiting in his
office or in his living room, through the streets of London and Edinburgh, he has been my friend and
mentor. More than most, Dr. Roider taught me how to be a historian.
At the National Archives of the United Kingdom in Kew, London, I thank Ms. Julie Ash, Ms.
Joanna Ward, and Mr. Greg Cole. And thank god to whoever made the decision at Kew to allow scholars
to photograph documents with digital cameras. At the National Archives of Scotland, in Edinburgh, I
thank Mr. Robert Gibb, Mr. Alex Cochrane, Mr. John Fairgrieve, and Mr. Stu McMillan for their
assistance and relentless good cheer. I look forward to my return to Edinburgh.
I deeply appreciate and thank all of my colleagues in the Department of History and Political
Science at Southeastern Louisiana University in Hammond, Louisiana. Unknowingly probably, but at all
times, especially on days when I found my will and stamina weaken, their support for and understanding
of what I was doing, helped me to remain focused. They loaned me books, allowed me to pick their
brains, or shared their own stories and experiences. I am particularly indebted to the department Chair,
my friend and fellow Beatles disciple, Dr. Bill Robison, who facilitated my progress by providing me,
semester after semester, with a teaching schedule that afforded me large blocks of more or less
uninterrupted time to read, read, and read.
I give thanks to all my friends everywhere, both within graduate school and without, whose
support and love helped bring me back to earth from time to time: Dr. Bobby Matthews, Dr. Gary
Winston, Mary Johnson, Mark Beard, Keith and Val Altazin, Marshall and Beth Schott, Ronald and
Alison Barr, Harley Anton, Robert Melson, and David O’Brien.
Finally, and most important, to my family -- I neglected all of them over the past seven years as I
pushed through the Ph.D. process. I know I’ll never be able to make up lost time, and I am truly sorry for
that. I thank them so much, from the bottom of my soul, for their love and support. My parents, Charles
and Irene, who provided me with the opportunities; my sister Carrie and brother Scott; my daughters
Gabrielle, Sydney, and Amy. Most of all, my wife, Triche. I owe her everything and I will spend the
remainder of my life trying to somehow be worthy once again of her love.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS………………………………………………………………….……. iv

ABSTRACT……………………………………………………………………………………… vii

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION………………..………………………………………….. 1

CHAPTER TWO: THE MYTH OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP……………….……….. 9
The Great War, The “Great Divide”…………………………………………………………… 10
“Financially in Our Hands”: Economic and Financial Strains……...…………………………. 26
Naval Rivalry…………………………………………………………………………………... 34
The Great Depression…………………………………………………………………………... 47
The Growing Question of Security…………………………………………………………….. 52

CHAPTER THREE: LORD LOTHIAN –A DIPLOMATIC APPRENTICESHIP……….…… 77
South Africa and the Round Table……………………………………………………………... 77
Kerr at Downing Street…………………………………………………………………………. 90
Kerr in the 1920s……………………………………………………………………………….. 109
Lothian the Appeaser…………………………………………………………………………… 119
Appointment to the United States……………………………………………………………… 141

CHAPTER FOUR: LOTHIAN DURING THE PHONEY WAR………………………………. 149
Lothian Assumes the Position …………………………………………………………………. 150
The Phoney War………………………………………………………………………............... 164
Continuing British Skepticism about the United States…………………………....................... 174
Lothian Confronts American Public Opinion…………………………………………………... 188
Before the Storm……………………………………………………………………………….. 218

CHAPTER FIVE: THE DESTROYERS DEAL……………….……………………………….. 222
Churchill and Lothian Begin the Dialogue with Washington………….………………………. 226
France Collapses………………………………………………………….…………………….. 242
Lothian Takes the Offensive -- Reopening the Destroyers Question………………….……..… 258
Lothian Takes the Offensive -- Selling the Drama……………………………………..………. 263
Lothian Leads the Roosevelt Administration to Water……………………….………………... 289
The Destroyers-for-Bases Agreement……………………………………………………….…. 308
Significance: Lothian Helps to Bake the “Sugar Cake”………………………..……………… 321

CHAPTER SIX: LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR LEND-LEASE……………...………. 327
Selling the Drama, Continued……………………………………….…………………………. 328
London Awaits the Fifth of November……………………………………………………….... 340
Meet the Press………………………………………………………………………….………. 359
The Letter…………………………………………………………………………….………… 377
“Good Night, Philip”…………………………………………………………………….……... 387
Significance: Lothian Nudges the United States to “Unsordidness”………….………….……. 399

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION…………………….……………………………………... 406

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………...……………………………... 425

VITA………………………………………………………………………………….………….. 432

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine and assess the role of Philip Henry Kerr, eleventh
Marquis of Lothian, the British ambassador to the United States from August 1939 to December 1940.
While much of the historiography of Anglo-American relations during the Second World War focuses on
the Roosevelt-Churchill axis, this dissertation contends that Lord Lothian played a vital, if not the
principal, role in creating that axis and in forging closer relations during the vital months before Pearl
Harbor. More generally, this dissertation contends that Lothian is a vital, if not the principal, architect of
the “Special Relationship.” Anglo-American relations during the interwar years were characterized by an
underlying discord, caused by economic disparity, naval rivalry, and divergent approaches to international
security. By December 1940, however, relations were stronger and closer, as many Americans came to
appreciate that Britain’s survival was critical to keeping the United States out of the war.
Although not exclusively responsible, Lothian played a significant role in affecting this
transformation in public opinion. First, he established a British public relations apparatus and initiated a
vigorous publicity campaign in the United States, which generated greater awareness of Britain’s
increasingly dire military predicament and more widespread popular support for Britain. Second, Lothian
helped to broker the celebrated Destroyers-for-Bases deal, by which the United States agreed to provide
Britain with fifty destroyers in return for land rights in various British possessions in the Western
Hemisphere. Third, Lothian helped to lay the foundations for the Lend-Lease program. Following a brief
autumn visit to Britain, he intimated to the American press that London was running out of cash with
which to purchase American military supplies. He also urged Churchill to outline the realities of Britain’s
position in a long, detailed letter to Roosevelt. These two initiatives presented the Roosevelt
administration with a comprehensive view of Britain’s desperate situation that compelled the president to
take action. The result was the Lend-Lease Act, which provided Britain with a program of American
assistance, hardly compatible with neutrality, and ultimately became the foundation of the Anglo-
American alliance during the Second World War.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine and assess the role of Philip Henry Kerr, eleventh
Marquis of Lothian, who served as the British ambassador to the United States from August 1939 to
December 1940. Lord Lothian was ambassador for only a brief time, but it coincided with a crucial
period in relations between Britain and the United States -- the first fourteen months of the Second World
War, when Britain faced Nazi Germany essentially without allies, while the United States remained
neutral. While much of the historiography of Anglo-American relations during the Second World War
focuses principally on the Roosevelt-Churchill axis, this dissertation contends that, in a fundamental way,
Lord Lothian played a vital, if not the principal, role in creating that axis and in forging closer Anglo-
American relations during the vital months before Pearl Harbor. More generally, this dissertation
contends that Lord Lothian is a vital, if not the principal, architect of the “Special Relationship.” The
United States and Britain are often seen as natural allies, held together by ties of kinship, language, and a
commitment to democracy and constitutional government. But there was nothing particularly “special”
about Anglo-American relations during the interwar years, which were, in fact, characterized by an
underlying discord, caused principally by economic disparity, naval rivalry, and divergent approaches to
international security.
Anglo-American discord emerged from the transfer of global economic leadership from Britain to
the United States. As early as 1919, the United States had replaced Britain as the leading creditor nation
in the world, its industrial production exceeded that of Britain, France, and Germany combined, and its
share of world trade began to displace the British. Furthermore, the United States kept its markets tightly
closed; the Fordney-MacCumber Tariff of 1922 imposed the highest import tariffs in American history.
Most important, however, although Britain hoped that the United States might agree to a general
cancellation of debts once the war was over, Wilson and American bankers made it clear that they
expected to be paid back. The severity of Britain’s repayment terms, particularly compared with the more
lenient terms ultimately granted to France and Italy, provoked considerable resentment in Britain and
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remained a source of persistent ill feeling in both countries. The onset of the Great Depression helped to
exacerbate these economic strains. In 1932, faced with a sterling crisis and tighter protectionism in the
United States, Britain decided to follow the American example and adopted a system of Imperial
Preference, provoking American denunciations of British policy, ironically, as protectionist. When the
United States Senate passed the “Johnson Act,” which proposed to ban all loans to countries that had
defaulted on previous debts, the British, who considered the legislation as a decidedly unfriendly gesture,
made a few more token payments and finally defaulted in 1933.
Another source of tension and misunderstanding during the 1920s was rivalry over naval
supremacy. As early as the First World War, London took the position that the American demand for
“absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas” represented a direct challenge to Britain’s sea power and
its right of blockade. Washington warned that if agreement could not be reached, the United States would
launch an all-out race to build the most powerful navy in the world. Although the Washington Naval
Conference of 1921-1922 temporarily improved Anglo-American naval relations, the persistence of a
fundamental incompatibility of strategic requirements provoked mutual suspicions and endless haggling
about the size and number of cruisers. Continuing tensions led to the break-up of the Geneva Naval
Conference in August 1927 and even a brief war scare from late 1928 to early 1929. The ferocity of this
naval rivalry continued unabated until the late 1920s, when elections in both countries brought to power
administrations intent on reaching compromise.
In addition, Anglo-American relations sputtered during the 1930s as a result of their divergent
attitudes toward the question of international security. Serious differences emerged as early as 1919 with
the American rejection of the peace treaties. Having followed Woodrow Wilson’s lead, and hoping for a
continuation of a cooperative spirit into the post-war period, British leaders felt a profound sense of
betrayal and thereafter found it difficult throughout the entire interwar period to place much confidence in
the assurances of the United States. During the 1930s, in particular, as the international situation became
increasingly dangerous, Washington and London often operated at cross-purposes. For example, in
response to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, in 1931-1932, Britain and the United States acted