Locke’s Moral Man PDF
Preview Locke’s Moral Man
’ Locke s Moral Man This page intentionally left blank ’ Locke s Moral Man Antonia LoLordo 1 3 GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries #AntoniaLoLordo2012 Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted FirstEditionpublishedin2012 Impression:1 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressCataloginginPublicationData Dataavailable ISBN 978–0–19–965277–8 Printedandboundby MPGBooksGroup,BodminandKing’sLynn LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. Acknowledgments Thisisashortbook,butI’vehadalotofhelpwritingit.Theinitialidea camefromaseminardiscussingsomeconnectionsbetweentheEssayand TwoTreatises.I’dliketothankthestudents,especiallyJesseNewton. Ipresented aversionofChapter1,withavery different conclusion,at SPAWN 2009. Lisa Downing’s comments led me to revise the paper radically and to see the importance of Locke’s discussions of animal minds. Without her comments, I would have written a very different book. I’d also like to thank Melissa Frankel and Kara Richardson, who organized the conference, and the other participants. A version of Chapter2 was presented at the 2008 Atlantic Canada Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy. I owe thanks to the organizer, Tom Vinci, and the audience. It was presented again at the 4th Biennial Margaret Wilson memorial conference at Cornell, later that summer. At the 5th Biennial MargaretWilsonconference,inBoulderin2010,Ipresentedaversionof Chapter3. It’s a pleasant coincidence that both conferences were organized by Ruth Mattern, whose work on Locke I’ve learned a great dealfrom.I’mgratefultoherandallthepeopleshebroughttogetherfor these events. I presented an overview of the whole project at UNC- ChapelHillinthesummerof2011.IthankAlanNelsonfortheopportu- nityandeveryonethereforadiscussionthathelpedmefigureoutthefinal shapeoftheproject. The Canadian Journal of Philosophy published an earlier version of Chapter2, as “Locke on substance, mode, person and ‘the moral Man.’” Ithanktheeditorsforpermissiontoreusethatmaterial. Manypeoplehavereadallorpartofthemanuscriptatdifferentstages. MarthaBolton,StewartDuncan,BrieGertler,PaulLodge,AnikWaldow, Shelley Weinberg, and Ken Winkler gave helpful feedback on drafts of individualchapters.MikeJacovidesreadthewholemanuscriptandhelped mesolveamajorproblem.HealsoofferedencouragementwhenIreally neededit.Iowehim.WalterOttgavemealongandvery helpful setof comments,arecordsixdaysafterIsenthimthemanuscript.Mycolleagues Trenton Merricks,JorgeSecada, and John Simmonsread alate draft and saved me from some embarrassing mistakes. Trenton deserves special vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS thanksforhisrareattentiontostyle.TwoanonymousreviewersforOUP gavemedetailedcomments.Thebookismuchbetterforthem,although Idoubtthateitherwillbecompletelysatisfied. Finally, I’d like to thank my partner, Missy, for things that have very littletodowiththisbook.It’sdedicatedtoher. Contents Introduction 1 1. Liberty 25 2. Personality 64 3. Rationality 103 Conclusion 133 Bibliography 136 Index 143 This page intentionally left blank Introduction I Lockefacesaproblemfewphilosophersbeforehimfaced.Ononehand, he denies that species boundaries exist independently of human conven- tion,holdsthatthehumanmindmaybeeitheranimmaterialsubstanceor a material one to which God has superadded the power of thought, and insists that animals possess the abilityto perceive, will and even reason— indeed, in some cases to reason better than humans. Thus, he eliminates anysharpdistinctionbetweenhumansandtherestoftheanimalkingdom: “inallthevisiblecorporealWorld,weseenoChasms,orGaps”(3.6.12).1 On the other hand, in his ethical and political work Locke assumes that thereisasharpdistinctionbetweenmoralagentsandotherbeings.There arenovaguecases,nobeingswithonlysomeoftherightsanddutiesthat natural lawaccords tofull-fledged moralagents.2Lockethus needs tobe abletodelineatethesetofmoralagentsprecisely,withoutrelyingonthe sortofmetaphysicalandphysicalfactshispredecessorsappealedto.Moral agencycannotbeamatterofbelongingtoacertainspecies,possessingan immaterialsoul,orevenpossessingthecapacitytoreason.Whatthendoes itconsistin?3 1 AllreferenceswithoutfurtheridentificationaretotheEssay,whichiscitedbybook, chapter,andsectionnumber. 2 Tobeprecise,nobeingsstartoutwithonlysomeoftherightsanddutiesthatnaturallaw accordstofull-fledgedmoralagents.Oncewestartinteractingwithothers,wecanloseor gainparticularrightsanddutiesthroughfreealienationandforfeiture. 3 Lockeisnot,ofcourse,thefirstphilosophertofacequestionsaboutthebasisofmoral agency.Writersinthenaturallawtraditionhaveoftenwantedtogivesomeaccountofthe relevantfeaturesofhumannature.ButLockefacesthequestioninasomewhatstarkerform. Previousphilosophersfeltconfidentthattheclassofmoralagentsincludedhumanbeingsbut nootheranimals.Whattheyneededtodowastoexplainwhichfeaturesofhumanbeingsare relevanttomoralagency.Incontrast,Lockefacesnotonlythequestionofwhatproperties
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