Local Commons and Global Interdependence PDF
Preview Local Commons and Global Interdependence
LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE LOCAL COMMONS AND GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains edited by Robert O. Keohane and Elinor Ostrom Published under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University ® SAGE Publications London • Thousand Oaks • New Delhi © Sage Publications 1995 This edition first published 1995 Previously published as a Special Issue of the Journal of Theoretical Politics; Volume 6 (1994), no. 4. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without permission in writing from the Publishers. SAGE Publications Ltd 6 Bonhill Street London EC2A 4PU SAGE Publications Inc 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320 SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd 32, M-Block Market Greater Kailash - I New Delhi 110 048 British Library Cataloguing in Publication data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 0 8039 7962 2 ISBN 0 8039 7963 0 pbk Library of Congress catalog card number 94-68900 Typeset by Colset Pte Ltd, Singapore Printed in Great Britain by The Cromwell Press Ltd, Broughton Gifford, Melksham, Wiltshire CONTENTS Notes on Contributors vii 1 Introduction Robert O. Keohane and Elinor Ostrom 1 Part I: Theoretical Puzzles 2 The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships Or an R. Young 27 3 The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and Institutions Duncan Snidal 47 4 Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems Lisa L. Martin 71 Part II: Evidence from the Laboratory 5 Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution: Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts Steven Hackett, Dean Dudley and James Walker 93 Part III: Evidence from the Field 6 Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action Elinor Ostrom 125 7 The Conditions for Successful Collective Action Gary D. Libecap 161 8 Self-interest and Environmental Management Kenneth A. Oye and James H. Maxwell 191 9 Heterogeneities at Two Levels: States, Non-state Actors and Intentional Oil Pollution Ronald B. Mitchell 223 Index 253 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS DEAN DUDLEY is Assistant Professor of Economics in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy. Current working papers include individual Choice in Common Pool Resource Environments: An Experimental Approach', 'Forecasting Behavior in Experimental Common Pool Resource Appropriation and Public Good Provision Environ- ments' and individual Provision Choice in Voluntary Contribution Public Good Environ- ments: An Experimental Approach'. Current research focuses on strategies for downsizing large organizations. ADDRESS: Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY 10996, USA; [email protected] STEVEN HACKETT is Assistant Professor, School of Business and Economics, Humboldt State University and Research Associate of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. His principal research focus is on contracting and the activities of firms, with recent attention to problems of ex-post contractual negotiations. Recent public- ations include 'A Comparative Analysis of Merchant and Broker Intermediation', Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization; incomplete Contracting: A Laboratory Experimental Analysis', Economic Inquiry; and 'Bottlenecks and Governance Structures: Open Access and Long-Term Contracting in Natural Gas' (with T. Lyon), Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. ADDRESS: School of Business and Economics, Humboldt State University, Arcata, CA 95521-8299, USA; [email protected] ROBERT O. KEOHANE is Stanfield Professor of International Peace, Harvard Univer- sity. He is the author of After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy; co-author of Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research and co-editor of Institutions for the Earth: Sources of International Environmental Protection. ADDRESS: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; [email protected] GARY D. LIBECAP is Professor of Economics and Director of the Karl Eller Center at the University of Arizona, Tucson, and Research Associate with the National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA. He received his PhD in economics from the University of Penn- sylvania in 1976. His research areas involve investigations of property rights and regulatory arrangements, as well as bureaucratic behavior. ADDRESS: Karl Eller Center, University of Arizona, McClelland Hall, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA; [email protected] LISA L. MARTIN is John L. Loeb Associate Professor of the Social Sciences in the Govern- ment Department at Harvard University. She received her PhD in Government from Harvard in 1989. She studies international cooperation and international institutions, and is the author of Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions. ADDRESS: Center for International Affairs, 1737 Cambridge Street, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA; [email protected] JAMES H. MAXWELL is a visiting scholar at MIT's Center for International Studies and has served as Co-Director of MIT's Technology, Business, and Environment Program. He received his PhD in the field of Public Policy from MIT. He has written numerous articles on environ- mental policy, including recent articles on the political economy of the CFC phase-out, corpo- rate environmental practices among the Japanese automobile transplants and on the policy Vlll NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS issues surrounding recycling. ADDRESS: Center for International Studies, MIT, E38-648, 292 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. RONALD B. MITCHELL holds a PhD in Public Policy from Harvard University and is cur- rently an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Oregon. His book, Inten- tional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance» will be published by MIT Press in 1994. ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, 1284 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1284, USA; [email protected] ELINOR OSTROM is Co-director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis and the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Bloomington. She is the author of Governing the Commons and Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems; co-author with Larry Schroeder and Susan Wynne of Institutional Incen- tives and Sustainable Development and co-author with Roy Gardner and James Walker of Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. ADDRESS: Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, 513 North Park, Bloomington, IN 47408-3895, USA; [email protected] KENNETH A. OYE is Director of the Center for International Studies and Associate Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is author of Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange: World Political Economy in the 1930s and 1980s; co- editor of Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era. ADDRESS: Center for International Studies, MIT, E38-648, 292 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA; [email protected] DUNCAN SNIDAL is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Harris Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago. His research focuses on issues of international cooperation and the role of international institutions. ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 5828 South University Avenue, Chicago, IL 60737, USA; [email protected] JAMES WALKER is Professor of Economics and Associate Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. His principal research focus is the use of experimental methods in the investigation of behavior related to the voluntary provi- sion of public goods and the use of common-pool resources. Recent publications include 'Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible' (with Elinor Ostrom and Roy Gardner), American Political Science Review, 'Probabilistic Destruction of Common- Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence' (with Roy Gardner), Economic Journal; and 'Group Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Large Groups* (with R. Mark Isaac and Arlington Williams), Journal of Public Economics. ADDRESS: Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA; [email protected] ORAN R. YOUNG is Director of both the Institute of Arctic Studies and the Institute on International Environmental Governance at Dartmouth College. He is the author of Resource Regimes: Natural Resources and Social Institutions; International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment; and International Governance: Protec- ting the Environment in a Stateless Society. ADDRESS: Institute of Arctic Studies, Dartmouth College, 6193 Murdough Center, Hanover, NH 03755-3560, USA;oran.r.young@dartmouth. edu 1. INTRODUCTI ON Robert O. Keohane and Elinor Ostrom Neither modern states nor small farmers in remote areas of poor countries can appeal to authoritative hierarchies to enforce rules governing their rela- tions with one another. In world politics, the lack of a world government means that states must find ways to cooperate with one another and to reach agreements that can be maintained through the use of reciprocity rather than through hierarchy. For small farmers in Asia, as well as many other people seeking to appropriate resources from a common pool, national govern- ments are too remote or uncomprehending to be helpful in encouraging productive cooperation - whether such cooperation involves maintaining irrigation systems or other ways of sustaining common-pool resources (CPRs). It is popularly believed that the actors involved in common-pool resource problems, whether individuals or governments, are trapped in an inexorable tragedy of the commons' from which they cannot extract themselves (G. Hardin, 1968). Empirical and theoretical work on multi-period CPR situations, however, has shown that the Inexorable' nature of the problem results more from the assumptions used by theorists than from constraints that are universally present in all CPR situations. Indeed, research on local CPR problems has demonstrated that under some circumstances solutions worked out by those individuals directly affected prove more successful and enduring than resource regimes imposed by central political authorities.1 Many successfully governed CPRs have survived for centuries relying on self-monitoring and self-enforcing patterns of human interaction. It is encouraging to realize that reliance on self-help schemes can be a positive advantage in small-scale CPR regimes. Students of international politics have often made similar claims to those of observers who believe that the tragedy of the commons can only be over- Support of the National Science Foundation in the form of grant number NSF SBR-9308633 is deeply appreciated. The authors wish to thank Nazli Choucri, Steve Hackett, Lisa Martin, Ron Mitchell, Duncan Snidal, Jimmy Walker and Oran Young for comments on an earlier draft and all participants in the October 1993 conference for their stimulating discussion leading to this introductory paper. We are particularly indebted to Patty Dalecki for her editing and pro- duction skills and to Stanra King and Brenda Bushouse for assisting us in putting this collection together. 1. See Berkes, 1989; Blomquist, 1992; Bromley et al., 1992; Feeny et al., 1990; Matthews, 1993; McCay and Acheson, 1987; McKean, 1992; Netting, 1981; E. Ostrom, 1990; V. Ostrom et al., 1993; Pinkerton, 1989; Tang, 1992.
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