Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy

16 Pages·0.166 MB·English

by  Hall R., Deardorff A.

AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol.100,No.1 February2006
Lobbying as Legislative Subsidy
RICHARD L. HALL
ALAN V. DEARDORFF UniversityofMichigan
Professional lobbyists are among the most experienced, knowledgeable, and strategic actors one
can find inthe everyday practice of politics. Nonetheless, their behavioral patterns often appear
anomalous when viewed in the light of existing theories. We revisit these anomalies in search
ofanalternativetheory.Wemodellobbyingnotasexchange(votebuying)orpersuasion(informative
signaling)butasaformoflegislativesubsidy—–amatchinggrantofpolicyinformation,politicalintelli-
gence,andlegislativelabortotheenterprisesofstrategicallyselectedlegislators.Theproximatepolitical
objective of this strategy is not to change legislators’ minds but to assist natural allies in achieving
theirown,coincidentobjectives.Thetheoryissimpleinform,realisticinitsprincipalassumptions,and
counterintuitiveinitsmainimplications.Empirically,themodelrendersotherwiseanomalousregularities
comprehensibleandpredictable.Inalatersection,webrieflybringpreferencesbackin,examiningthe
importantbutrelativelyuncommonconditionsunderwhichpreference-centeredlobbyingshouldoccur.
Studentsofdemocraticinstitutionshavelongwor- underrepresented groups have proliferated (Berry
riedaboutthereachofprivateinterestsintopub- 1999). Can they now “seize their opportunities”? If
lic affairs. Private sector inequalities often get so,how,andwhy?
capturedinthepracticeofinterestgrouppolitics,giving To these questions we have no general answers.
risetowhatGrantMcConnell(1966,25)oncecalledthe Empirical research on interest group influence has
“mostseriousandperplexingproblems”ofAmerican accumulated for decades, but this literature is note-
democracy.Theremayexistan“accessibilitytoashare worthyforthenoncumulative,frequentlyinconsistent
in power for almost any coherent and determined nature of its findings (Baumgartner and Leech 1998;
group,” McConnell observed, but “some groups have Smith1995).Theoreticalworkonlobbyinghasslowly
usedtheiropportunitywithmuchgreatereffectiveness emerged over the last two decades. Here, too, the lit-
thanothers,forsome,indeed,havebeenunabletoseize eratureisheterogeneous,withatleasttwodistinctap-
theopportunityatall”(25). proachesprominent:onethatconceptualizeslobbying
One of the most important ways in which groups as a form of exchange, the other as persuasion—–both
seize their opportunities is through lobbying elected mechanismsforchanginglegislators’preferencesover
representatives. Early in the twentieth century, policies.
McConnellfound,professionallobbyistsoperatedvery We propose a fundamentally different but funda-
muchintheshadows.Bycentury’send,however,their mentally simple theory of lobbying. The main idea
numbershadgrownsorapidlythattheirubiquityguar- is that lobbying is primarily a form of legislative
anteed visibility. Lobbying disclosure laws have only subsidy—–amatchinggrantofcostlypolicyinformation,
thrownabrighterlightontherangeandmagnitudeof political intelligence, and labor to the enterprises of
lobbyingatthefederallevel(BaumgartnerandLeech strategicallyselectedlegislators.Theproximateobjec-
1999).Interestgroupstodayspendoverabilliondollars tiveofthisstrategyisnottochangelegislators’minds
ayearlobbyingCongress,morethantheyspendinPAC buttoassistnaturalalliesinachievingtheirown,coin-
contributions and independent expenditures to con- cidentobjectives.Theirbudgetconstraintthusrelaxed
gressional campaigns combined. But how much “ac- bylobbyists’assistance,alreadylikemindedlegislators
cessibilitytopower”dotheyget,towhom,underwhat act as if they were working on behalf of the group
conditions?Whatimpactdolobbyistsultimatelyhave wheninfacttheyareworkingonbehalfofthemselves.
on the behavior of legislators once access is gained? In this sense, our theory is “budget-centered” rather
And through what mechanisms? In the decades than“preference-centered.”
since McConnell (1966) wrote, public interest groups Thetheory,weargue,issimpleinform,realisticinits
lobbying on behalf of new interests and previously principalassumptions,andcounterintuitiveinitsmain
implications.Empirically,itresolvesseveralsignificant
anomaliesthatappearwhenlobbyingisviewedsolely
RichardL.HallisProfessor,UniversityofMichigan,AnnArbor,
MI48109([email protected]). through a preference-centered lens. It also generates
Alan V. Deardorff is Professor, University of Michigan, Ann several distinctive hypotheses for subsequent testing
Arbor,MI48109. aboutwhowillbelobbied,thecontentofthelobbying
For helpful comments we thank Scott Ainsworth, Matt
communications, and the effects of lobbying on legis-
Beckmann,DanCarpenter,ChrisDeering,LarryEvans,MattGabel,
KenKollman,KrisMiler,RyanRynbrandt,ChuckShipan,RobVan lators’behavior.
Houweling,FrankWayman,RichardZeckhauser,threeanonymous Wedonotmaintainthatlobbyingisneveraboutpref-
referees, and seminar participants at Columbia, George Mason, erences, however. In the early sections, we set prefer-
Harvard,Northwestern,Princeton,andtheUniversityofNebraska.
encestothetheoreticalside.Inalatersection,webring
Hall also thanks the National Science Foundation (SES-0004419)
preferencesbackin.Wethenarguemorebroadlythat
and The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation for financial support.
Weareresponsibleforallremainingerrors. lobbying refers to a class or menu of strategies from
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LobbyingasLegislativeSubsidy February2006
whichlobbyistschooseastheypursuetheirproximate latorsengagedinmutuallybeneficialifimplicittrades,
political objectives. Viewed in this light, our model typicallycampaigncontributionsforvotes(seeAusten-
of lobbying as legislative subsidy is a complement to, Smith 1996; Morton and Cameron 1992). Lobbyists,
rather than a substitute for, theories of exchange or in effect, were agents of exchange. The theoretically
persuasion. At the same time, we argue that the con- problematicissueinthisapproach,inturn,iscommon
ditions under which lobbyists will adopt preference- to models of economic exchange. Given the inherent
centered strategies are relatively uncommon. Even incentives of each party to renege and the absence of
whenpreference-centeredlobbyingdoesoccur,itoften anyneutral,third-partyenforcement,whatmakesthe
operates through different mechanisms than previous dealsstick?
modelsassume.Finally,webrieflyspeculateontherole Efforts to answer this question have taken differ-
playedbyPACcontributions,speculationsthatlikewise entroutesandproduceddifferentpredictions.Forin-
cutacrossthegrainofconventionalresearch. stance, Snyder (1992, 18) argues that interest groups
makelong-terminvestmentsinpoliticians,withtrades
self-enforcing through mechanisms of repeat play,
THEORIES OF LOBBYING trust,orreputation.McCartyandRothenberg(1996),
in contrast, emphasize that conflict between short-
Lobbyistsareamongthemostexperienced,astute,and
and long-term incentives undermines the ability of
strategic actors one can find in the everyday practice
each side to credibly commit to a long-term alliance.
of American policymaking. They often come out of
Stratmann (1998, 88) argues that a contract with
the same institutions or have backgrounds similar to
roughly contemporaneous payoffs solves the enforce-
the governmental staff or elected officials they lobby.
mentproblem.Thedealsstickbecauseofexantedown
They typically specialize in a limited range of issues.
payments by the group and ex post rewards (addi-
They deal repeatedly with many of the same players.
tional contributions) once the legislator’s behavior is
Andtheygetpaid—–andpaidwell—–towin.Ifthereisa
observed.
classofactorsforwhomrationalchoice–evencomplete
Regardless of approach, however, systematic evi-
information–modelsshoulddogoodexplanatorywork,
dence of votebuying is at best mixed. This is true
lobbyistsoughttobeit.
despite the quality of the data on PAC contributions
Instead,lobbyistshavelongexhibitedbehaviorthat
androll-callvotinganddespitetheuseofincreasingly
has befuddled us. In their classic study of business
sophisticatedmethodologies(BrownarsandLott1997;
influence in American trade policy, Bauer, Pool, and
Grenzke1989a;Wawro2001;Wright1996).Stratmann
Dexter(1963,398)reportedthatlobbyistslobbiedmost
(1998; see also Baldwin and Magee 2000; Stratmann
thosewhoseviewstheyleastneededtochange—–their
1992)offersoneofthemostcarefulattemptstodisen-
alreadystrongsupporters.Lobbyistsweremainly“ser-
tangletheconnectionbetweenmoneyandvotes.Ana-
vice bureaus” or “adjuncts” to staff. Other promi-
lyzing the timingof agricultural PAC contributions to
nentworkscametosimilarconclusions(Dexter1969;
candidates,hefindsthatfarmgroupscontributedboth
Milbrath 1963; Zeigler 1964; see Austen-Smith and
shortlybeforeandselectivelyafterkeyfarmbillvotes.
Wright 1994, 26–8). And although groups did pro-
According to his results, however, farm PACs bought
videlegislatorswithinformation,legislatorsfilteredit
votesbyincreasingtheircontributions,ceterisparibus,
throughtheirownpolicypredispositions.Inlisteningto
byonly$180duringdebateonthe1985omnibusfarm
witnesses,Milbrath(1963,210)observed,“mostmem-
billand$130duringthe1990farmbill.Theremaining
bersofCongresshearwhattheywanttohear.”Onthe
puzzle,then,isthatlegislatorswerenotsomuchselling
whole,thesestudiessuggestedthatthepowerofinter-
theirvotesasgivingthemaway.Atthatprice,eventhe
estgroupswasgreatlyoverstated.AsBauer,Poole,and
impoverishedreaderofpoliticalsciencejournalscould
Dexter(1963,399)putit,lobbyists’persuasivepowers
buyavoteeveryonceinawhile.
on Capitol Hill were more “propaganda” than fact.
More puzzling, in our view, are related regularities
One can only wonder why lobbyists went to so much
thatexchangetheorydoesnoteasilycomprehend.The
trouble,nottomentionwhydemocraticreformershave
firstpuzzleparallelsthetendencyinlobbyingbehavior
worriedsomuchaboutthem.
highlightedabove:PACmanagersgivemosttolegisla-
tors who already agree with their group, independent
of group contribution (e.g., Brownars and Lott 1997;
Exchange Theories
Grier and Munger 1986; 1991; Grenzke 1989b). That
Theoreticalworkoverthelasttwodecadeshassought is,theypurchase access tothoseforwhom access will
to make better sense of interest group behavior. At beneededleastratherthantargetpivotalorundecided
least two lines of explanation have been prominent. legislators.
One has drawn on McConnell (1966), Lowi (1969), Building on Denzau and Munger (1986), Hall and
and Stigler (1970), among other prominent social sci- Wayman (1990) address this puzzle with an alterna-
entists,who criticizedthepluralistviewas inaccurate, tive theory. Campaign contributions are intended not
if not hopelessly na¨ıve. In the revisionist view, inter- to buy undecided legislators’ votes but to buy the
est groups were rational opportunists, bent on rent- timeoractivityofalreadysympatheticallies.Halland
seekingifnotcapturingpublicauthorityaltogether.In Wayman fail to deal with other problems common to
political science and economics, the principal class of the exchange story, however. One is the workability
models assumed that interest group agents and legis- of contract enforcement, discussed earlier. A second
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AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol.100,No.1
puzzle,reflectedinStratmann’s(1998)analysisofvote- costlyinformationaboutdistrictopinion(ortheconse-
buying,arisesinthetypicalmagnitudesofPACgiving. quencesofpolicies)andstrategicallytransmitittoin-
Seldommentionedinthreedecadesofstudies,theme- fluencelegislators’choiceofpolicies.EchoingHansen
dian nonzero PAC contribution has been consistently (1991), Wright (1996, 81)1 concludes: “The point at
small,wellunder$1000,farbelowtheceilingsimposed whichaccessendsandinfluencebeginsisthepointat
by campaign finance laws in place since 1974. Legis- which legislators adjust their beliefs on the basis of
lators, in turn, receive thousands of contributions per lobbyinginformation.”
cycle,althoughtheirdiscretionarytimeisfrustratingly AsAusten-SmithandWright(1994)pointout,how-
scarce.Howmuchofalegislator’stimemightarational ever, the apparent irrationality identified by Bauer,
PACmanagerexpecttobuyforsuchasum? Pool,andDexter(1963)andtheircontemporarieschal-
A final empirical regularity throws doubt on both lenges incomplete information theory as well. In fact,
variantsofexchangetheory.Ifthestrategyofthelob- morerecentandmoresystematicresearch(Baumgart-
byististoofferlegislatorsareelection-enhancingtrade, ner and Mahoney 2002; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998,
thenwhatarewetomakeoftheaccessthatlegislators 1999) confirms the clear tendency of groups to lobby
give to public interest groups that have few electoral their allies. In general, lobbyists concentrate on their
resources to trade? For example, the Cato Institute, allies, avoid their enemies, and lobby undecideds in-
theCenterforBudgetandPolicyPriorities,TheCenter frequently(BaumgartnerandLeech1997;Schlozman
forScienceinthePublicInterest,andcountlessother andTierney1986;butseeKollman1997).
publicinterestgroups,nonprofits,andthinktanksreg- Austen-Smith and Wright (1994) extend their ear-
ularly lobby or “educate” elected officials, but only a lierworkoncompetitivelobbyinginanefforttocom-
smallpercentagehaveanaffiliatedPAC.Manyofthem, prehendthesepatterns.Theyarguethatlobbyistswill
likewise,lackasignificantmassmembershipbasethat sometimes lobby their allies to counteract lobbying
they might mobilize, or credibly threaten to mobilize, by the other side. However, their formal model im-
forpolicymakingleverage.Nonetheless,legislativeof- plies that neither side will lobby legislators for whom
ficesregularlycallthemtotestify,givethemconsider- the probability of changing their position is small
able access, or even seek access to them (Berry 1999; (32,36),especiallythosewhoaretheirclosestallies(or
Whiteman 1995). From an exchange perspective, one theirfarthestenemies).Thecloserthe“ally”istothe
canonlywonderwhy. fence(p = 1/2),rather,themorebothsideswilllobby
(onepersuasively,theothercounteractively).Inshort,
groupsdolobbytheirallies,buttheylobbyonlytheir
weak allies, do so no more than their weak enemies,
LOBBYING AS PERSUASION
and do so less than undecided legislators (33, 34). In
One limitation of most exchange models is that they lightofbothqualitativeandquantitativeevidence,this
seldom conceptualize lobbying vividly or model lob- doesnotappearfullyconsistentwiththefacts.
bying behavior explicitly. This is true in virtually all A second puzzle for informative signaling models
of the works cited in the previous section. Interest appears in the abundance of heterogeneous informa-
group agents presumably execute the exchange, but tion sources other than lobbyists. Committee reports,
the money, not the information or arguments of the party whip reports, colleagues’ cues, calls from White
lobbyist,isthevariabledoingthebehavioralwork. Housestaff,andnumerousothersourcesprovidemore
A second, more recent class of models conceptual- orlessheterogeneoussignalstotheundecidedlegisla-
izes lobbying as a mechanism of persuasion, not ex- tor(Kingdon1989[1973]).Sotoowithdistrict-relevant
change. In the newer view, information transmission information.Legislatorsnowspendmoretimeathome
is at the heart of the lobbyist–legislator relationship, than they do in Washington, traveling to the district,
butcontrarytotheolderpluralists,thatinformationis holding local forums, and meeting with local leaders
not innocuous. Hansen (1991) argues that reelection- (Arnold 1990). They commission polls, catalog con-
minded legislators often prove uncertain about the gressional mail, monitor local articles and editorials,
positions they should take to gain reelection. Inter- and call on their political informants. The key point
estgroupsthatenjoycomparativeadvantages(relative here is that informative signaling models of lobbying
to,say,parties)inobtainingprivateinformationabout require information merely sufficient to decide be-
constituency views can use it to persuade legislators tweenthepairedalternativesofavotechoice.Sohow
thatelectoralself-interestliesintakinggroup-friendly muchmoreuncertaintymightthelegislatorreduceby
positions.Lobbiesareinfluential,Hansenargues,“be- addinglobbyists’signalstothemultitudeofcues?And
cause they determine the kinds of information about what additional value might the voting legislator find
constituents that are available and the kinds of infor- not simply in lobbyists’ signals but in their expansive
mationthatarenot”(3). testimony, policy analyses, reports, publications, and
The theoretical problematic in this type of model
is not that legislators (or lobbyists) have an incentive
to renege but that lobbyists have an incentive to dis- 1A promising view of lobbying as persuasion holds that lobby-
semble. This point is central to the recent scholarship ing is frequently an exercise in framing or issue definition (e.g.,
Baumgartneretal.2003;McKissick1995).Atpresent,however,this
thatformalizeslobbyingasagamewithasymmetricin-
approachoffersnoclearpredictionsaboutwhyagivenframe,used
formation(forreviews,seeAusten-Smith1996;Potters
bythestrategiclobbyist,wouldstructurealegislator’sperceptionin
andvanWinden1996,350–56).Groupsacquireprivate, awaythatcannotbecounteracted.
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LobbyingasLegislativeSubsidy February2006
otherdetailedmaterialsthattheyprovidetolegislative Thetheoryoflobbyingaslegislativesubsidyrestson
offices?2 five main assumptions about legislators,3 all of which
Insum,twobroadclassesofmodelsunderpinmost aregroundedinourcommonknowledgeofCongress.
of what we now know about lobbying. At the same
time,theygiverisetosignificantanomalies,suggesting Assumption 1
thatsomebasiclimitationsinourunderstandingoflob-
byingremain.Fortunately,puzzlescanbetheoretically For a legislator to have much influence on policy, she
useful things. They make us rethink our conventional must work at it. That is, she must participate or oth-
understandings.Inwhatsortoftheoreticalworldmight erwise expend “effort” in the legislative process (e.g.,
these otherwise anomalous regularities make sense? Evans 1991; Hall 1996; Wawro 2000). Indeed, mem-
And can that account be constructed in a way that bersseekoutcommitteeassignmentsinordertocreate
avoidsnewandglaringanomaliesofitsown? opportunitiestoparticipate(e.g.,Fenno1973;Shepsle
1978). On particular bills, legislators might influence
policy by making proposals: they author bills, pro-
LOBBYING AS LEGISLATIVE SUBSIDY poseamendments,orotherwiseshapetheagenda(e.g.,
Sinclair 1989). They try to build (or break down)
By focusing on the aforementioned anomalies, we do
coalitions, negotiate compromises, lobby other mem-
not mean to suggest that the explanatory glass of
bers (e.g., Arnold 1990; Cox and McCubbins 1993).
preference-centered models is altogether empty. The
They participate in filibusters (e.g., Binder and Smith
informativesignalingliteraturereinvigoratedthestudy
1997) or exploit other opportunities for obstruction
oflobbyingbyrefocusingattentionontheroleoflob-
(e.g., Dion 1998). And they show up for votes. A key
byistsas purveyors of informationand, aswetakeup
feature of such activities, with the noteworthy excep-
next,byfocusingattentionontheattributesoflegisla-
tionofvoting,isthattheyrequirecostlyeffortbythe
torsforwhominformativesignalsshouldmattermost.
legislator.
Likewise,theexchangemodelsofDenzauandMunger
(1986)andHallandWayman(1990)havefocusedour
Assumption 2
attentiononthepossibilitythatinterestgroupspursu-
ingbetterpoliciesmayneedtochangesomethingother Legislators’ resources are scarce. Together with their
than legislators’ votes. Legislators husband their time staffs, legislators form what Salisbury and Shepsle
and allocate effort to advance their legislative goals (1981)callalegislative“enterprise,”whosemissionis
(Fenno1973;Hall1996).Iflegislatorsthinkthattheir to advance the legislator’s goals. However, such en-
effortsareworthwhile,mightnotinterestgroupsthink terprises have limited capacity—–in time, information,
so as well? And if interest groups (with or without labor,andhenceagendaspace—–toaddressthenumer-
PACs) do so, might not they develop strategies for ousissuesonwhichthelegislatorwantstobeinvolved.
influencinglegislators’efforts? Andalthoughsomelegislators(e.g.,committeechairs)
Withthepreviouslymentionedpuzzlesinmind,we have additional staff capacity on certain issues, none
propose a different theory of lobbying. Direct lobby- canengageinalloftheactivitiesneededtomakemax-
ing,inourview,typicallyisnotastrategyforchanging imum progress toward all of the objectives that they
legislators’ preferences over policies. Nor is it about and their constituents care about. Like a household
keepingthemfrombeingchanged.Rather,itisanat- or a firm, the legislative enterprise faces scarcity and
tempttosubsidizethelegislativeresourcesofmembers thereforemustmaketradeoffs.
who already support the cause of the group. In short,
lobbying operates on the legislator’s budget line, not
Assumption 3
on his or her utility function. It is akin more to a gift
thanatrade.Itismorelikea“servicebureau”thana For any given period, individual legislators care about
signalingprocess.Butthatservicefunction,treateddis- influencingmorethanonepolicyatatime(e.g.,Evans
missivelybythemidcenturypluralists,iswhylobbying 1989; Fenno 1973).Among other reasons, they have
isimportant,notwhyitisnot. varied personal policy commitments, and they have
Thismodel,weargue,issimpleinform,realisticinits reelection-relevantconstituencieswhocareaboutdif-
principalassumptions,andcounterintuitiveinitsmain ferent real-world conditions, which different policies
implications.Anditmeetstheempiricalstandardthat affect.
wehaveappliedtoexchangeandinformativesignaling
models.Itexplainssomelongstandingempiricalregu- Assumption 4
laritiesthatpreviouslyappearedanomalous.Indeed,it
makesthemquitepredictable. Legislators care about some issues more than others
(e.g., Hall 1996; Sinclair 1989). In choosing the issues
2Insomesignalingmodels,lobbyistsengageinstrategicinforma- 3The realism of these assumptions is supported by a number of
tiontransmissiontodiminishtheuncertaintyofallies.Ourmodel works,includingEvans1989,Fenno1973,Hall1996,Sinclair1989,
presupposesthatthelegislator’sproblemislessincompleteinforma- andWawro2000.Textualcitationsaretoworksthatarespecificto
tionthanthecapacitytouseinformation.Cheaptalkwillnotdoin thatassumption.Additionalassumptionsinclude:(i)legislatorsand
thiscontext.Timeandcapacityarevaluablefortheproblem-solving lobbyistsareutilitymaximizers,and(ii)preferencesarehomothetic
legislator(seeJones2002). andstrictlyconcave.
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AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol.100,No.1
FIGURE1. LobbyingasaSimpleGrant,TwoLegislators
P = Progress on other issues, O
o
U'
i
U
i
b'
P ' i
oi
P
oi
bi Uj'
U
j
B'
B
P P ' P P '
ai ai aj aj P = Progress on
a
target issue, A
towhichtheywilldevoteresources,legislatorsconsult legislator increases the probability of such a change.
theirandtheirconstituents’policyinterests.Onemem- Orthelegislator delays abad policy’s enactment. For
bermightvalueprogresstowarduniversalhealthinsur- purposesofexposition,wedesignatetheparticularis-
ance more than progress toward higher crop prices. sueinwhichthelegislatormaygetinvolvedasissueA,
Another might value higher crop prices more than theprogressonwhichisdesignatedP ,thehorizontal
a
expanded health coverage. Either might value smog axisinFigure1.
reductionmoreorlessthaneitherofthesethings.Each Forpurposeslaterinthepaper,wealsoobservethat
ofthemmightdislikethepolicyobjectiveoftheother, onelegislator’sprogresscanbeanotherone’sregress,
takingittobenotapolicygoodbutapolicybad. and we designate regress, −P —–the horizonal axis to
a.
theleftoftheverticalintercept.Finally,thereareleg-
islatorsclosetotheverticalaxis,whosepolicycommit-
Assumption 5
mentsareweakoruncertain.5
Relativetolegislators,lobbyistsarespecialists(Esterling Assumption3statesthateachlegislatorcaresabout
2004). Whereas most legislators simultaneously care more than just one issue. We use the vertical axis to
about multiple issues, a lobbyist focuses on relatively representtheprogressonotherissues,Po,thattheleg-
few.Thelobbyistthushasgreaterissue-relevantexpe- islator seeks. Given Assumption 2, the legislator has
rience, expertise, and time to invest in assisting legis- a finite amount of legislative resources—–what we will
lators.Theseresourcesaredevelopedtopromoteonly call“effort,”e,butwhichincludesthelegislator’stime,
thepolicyobjectiveofthegroup. staff time, their collective expertise and information,
Withtheseassumptionsinplace,themainelements andanyotherlegislativeresourcesthelegislatorhasto
of the theory can be represented in a simple microe- allocate.Thisisrepresentedbythedownwardsloping
conomic framework familiar from consumer theory budgetconstraint,lineB,inFigure1.LineBrepresents
or introductory policy analysis,4 which is depicted in that in order to make more progress on issue, Pa, the
Figure1andformalizedinthemathematicalappendix. legislatormustwithdrawsomeofthoseresourcesfrom
Ingeneral,legislatorsareinterestedinissuesonwhich workingonotherissues,andthusreduceprogress(Po)
theywishtomake“progress.”Progressinthiscontext onthem.
couldmeanthatthelegislatormovesapolicycloserto The preferences of legislator i in this model are re-
his or her preferred policy, say, by amending a bill or flected in his or her willingness to pay—–in terms of
interveningwitharegulator.Oritcouldmeanthatthe reducedprogressonotherissues(O)—–forprogresson
issueA.Thisisrepresentedbytheindifferencecurve,
4The decision-theoretic setup of the model is similar to that of
DenzauandMunger(1986),buttheydonotconsidertheeffectof 5Note that although the horizontal axis distinguishes among
groupsonlegislators’budgetlines(theirE¯,whichtheyleavefixed), progress, regress, and uncommitted on issue A, the axis is not a
onlytheeffectsofelectoralresources(e.g.,campaigncontributions) conventional policy or ideological dimension, along which mem-
onalegislator’sexpectedutility(definedintermsofvotersupport). bers’ positions can be aligned. For instance, a member might be
Althoughunrelatedtointerestgroups,Shepsle(1978,252–54)ana- aphilosophicalenvironmentalist,butifheorshewereafirst-term
lyzestheeffectsofaddingstafftooversightsubcommitteesusinga representativewithnorelevantcommitteeassignment,themember
simplemodelanalogoustotheoneweusehere. mighthaveavalueofAclosetozero.
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LobbyingasLegislativeSubsidy February2006
U, which reflects the individual’s amalgam of policy public interest groups without any electoral portfolio
i
andconstituencyinterests.6Thepointoftangency(P , are able to produce and provide much of it. Indeed,
ai
P )betweenthebudgetlineandU istheoptimalallo- Berry(1999,130–42)arguesthatcredibleresearchand
oi i
cation of legislator i’s effort. The legislator can do no expertiseprovidecitizengroupswithasubstantialcom-
betterwiththeresourcesathand. parativeadvantageamongWashingtoninterestgroups.
Thisiswherelobbyistscomein.Inourmodel,they The most basic implication of the model is now
affect the legislator’s budget line, not the parameters apparent in Figure 1, namely, that, if lobbying is a
of the utility function. In its simplest form, lobbyists form of legislative subsidy, interest groups will lobby
mightprovideprofessionallabor,servingas“adjuncts theirallies—–inFigure1,thosewhoseutilityrisesmov-
to staff.”But, as the incomplete information theorists ing to the right of the vertical axis. The lobbyist se-
have argued, probably the most important resource lects legislators already predisposed to work toward
legislatorsreceivefromlobbyistsfallsundertherubric anobjective(A)coincidentwiththatofthegroupbut
of “information.” Of course, there are different types whose enterprise is limited by its budget constraint.
ofinformationapplicabletopotentiallydifferentpur- The lobbyist then subsidizes the legislator’s work on
poses.Wedistinguishamongthree.Onetype,empha- that objective—–in the model, progress on issue A.
sizedinthesignalingliterature,concernsconstituency The lobbyist provides, say, the material to formulate
interestsandopinions(e.g.,Austen-SmithandWright proposals, make arguments, offer amendments, insert
1992; Hansen 1991). Consistent with that work and report language, plot strategy, or otherwise help
consistentwithourassumptionaboutU,wetakethat the legislator take self-interested actions to produce
tobeapreference-centeredmatterandreturntoitin outcome-improving policies or promote the probabil-
alatersection. ityoftheirpassage.
Herethemainconcernistheprovisionbylobbyists Inthefieldofpolicydesign,subsidiestakedifferent
of costly information that legislators require for their forms. The most basic is a simple grant or “income”
work in influencing legislation. The first includes in- supplement,theeffectsofwhichareshowninFigure1.
depth policy analysis, reports, or expertise (Esterling In the present context, a group would be making a
2004;SchlozmanandTierney1986,297–99;Whiteman simplegrantif,say,itprovidedlegislatoriwithmaterial
1995; Wright 1996). Acquiring and assimilating such foraspeechthati hadalreadydecidedtogiveonthe
informationposesabudgetaryproblemforthelegisla- chamber floor. The effect would be to push legislator
tiveenterprise.Fortunatelyforlegislators,lobbyistsare i’s budget line out parallel from B to B(cid:1). Note here
specialists (Assumption 5). They analyze, synthesize, thatsubstitutioneffects7 limittheextenttowhichthe
andsummarize—–inapoliticallyuser-friendlyform,in- lobbyist’s subsidy goes to promote the group’s policy
formationtopromotethepolicygoalsthattheirgroup objective, progress on A. The legislator uses part of
(cid:1)
andthelegislatorshare.Lobbyists“canprovidemuch thetimesavedtopursueprogressonissueA(P –P ),
(cid:1) ai ai
of the research and speech-writing chores of the sen- butallocatesmostofit(P –P )tomakingprogresson
oi oi
ator’soffice,”Matthews(1960,182)observed,quoting otherpriorities.Notethatsuchsubstitutionoccurseven
onesenator:“Theycantellmeinthirtyminutesorless iftheinformationalsubsidybearssolelyontheissueof
what it would take me hours to learn through read- commoninteresttomemberandinterestgroup.
ingandstudy.”Providingthisinformation—–apractice One way to limit such substitution is to lobby leg-
Matthews (182) refers to as “backstopping”—–enables islators who, by their own preferences, would choose
the legislator to make a greater effort on the issue, to allocate much of their resources to the issue of in-
givenhisorherinitialresources. terest. Suppose, as also shown in Figure 1, that there
A second kind of legislative information is politi- is another legislator, j, whose indifference curves are
(cid:1)
cal “intelligence” (Schlozman and Tierney 1986, 299– those shown as U and U. This legislator would, with
j j
300;Whiteman1995,45;Wright1996,82–87).Lobby- thesamebudget,devotemoreresourcestoissueAthan
ists monitor legislative developments that affect their would legislator i. Furthermore, when given a simple
group. They tend to be well positioned in issue net- grantofadditionalresourcesbythelobbyist,legislator
works (e.g., Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer 1998) j will devote more of it to issue A than would legis-
or “lobbying enterprises” (Ainswworth 1997). Thus lator i, thus increasing progress from P to P(cid:1) . Thus
aj aj
canindividuallobbyistsprovideinformationnecessary thelobbyistwillnotsubsidizeallalliesequally;rather,
to anticipate other players’ reactions, generate head- the lobbyist will subsidize more those whose stronger
counts, proffer procedural advice, and otherwise en- interest in A inclines them to devote a larger part of
able legislators to more fully approximate informed theirresourcestoit.
strategicactorsinseekingpolicy“progress.”Thisinfor-
mation is especially helpful to bill sponsors and party
andcommitteeleaders.
7Weusetheterm“substitutioneffect”heredifferentlyfromthat
With respect to both kinds of information—–policy
intheeconomicsliterature.There,thesubstitutioneffectrefersto
expertise and legislative intelligence—–we note that
the portion of an increase in demand for a good due to a fall in
itsrelativepricethatwouldoccurholdingutilityconstant,anditis
contrastedwithanincomeeffectofthepricechange.Hereweuse
“substitution effect” to mean the extent to which the total effort
6Infact,theindifferencecurveisasamplefromafamilyofindif- devotedtothelobbyist’sissuefailstorisebythefullamountofthe
ferencecurves,whichtogetherrepresentpreferences.Greaterutility subsidy,thelegislatorsubstitutingpartofthesubsidyforwhatthe
accruesasalegislatormovestohighercurves. legislatorwouldotherwisehavedone.
74
AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol.100,No.1
FIGURE2. LobbyingasaMatchingGrant
P = Progress on other issues, O
o
U''
i
U
i
b'
P '
o
P
o
b
b''
P ''
o
B B'
Pa Pa' Pa'' Pa= Progress on
target issue, A
As Assumption 1 states, however, for legislators to wouldhaveworkedonotherwisebut,inordertotake
influence progress on a policy, they must work at it. advantageofthematch,hadtoforego.8
They must bring something to the endeavor that the In sum, lobbyists freely but selectively provide la-
lobbyistcannot—–theirconstitutionalaccesstothepro- bor, policy information, and political intelligence to
cess, their network of legislative and extra-legislative likeminded but resource-constrained legislators. Leg-
contacts, their political capital with colleagues, and islators, in turn, should seek policy-relevant services
their effort.The betteranalogy tolobbying, then,isa from likeminded lobbyists.9 The effect is to expand
matchinggrantratherthanasimplegrant.Inamatch- legislators’ effort at making progress toward a policy
inggrant,therecipienthastokickinsomeofhisorher objective that lobbyists and legislators share. Recall
own preexisting resources in order to take advantage Milbrath’spuzzleaboutlegislatorslisteningonlytolob-
oftheofferedsubsidy.ThisisshowninFigure 2,where byistswhotellthemwhattheywanttohear.Milbrath
the budget line in the presence of matching lobbying thusconcludedthatlobbyistswereaccomplishinglittle.
is rotated counterclockwise from its initial position.
Here the resources provided by the lobbyist increase
with the amount that the legislator devotes to their 8Still,eveninthiscase,somesubstitution mayoccur. Depending
commonobjective,progressonA.Thereforetheextra onhowwillingthelegislatoristosacrificeprogressonotherissues
(as reflected in the curvature of the indifference curve or, more
progressmadepossiblebylobbyingislargerthelessis
formally,theelasticityofsubstitution betweenprogresson Aand
theprogressonotherissues.
progressonO),thepostsubsidyallocationcouldbeanypointonthe
Thiswetaketobethemoreverisimilarrepresenta- lineb(cid:1)tob(cid:1)(cid:1),whereb(cid:1),showstheproportionalexpansionofbothA
tion of the lobbyist–legislator relationship. Lobbyists andOthatwouldoccurwithasimplegrantunderourassumption
do much more than make “info-drops.” To be legisla- aboutpreferences.Thus,whilePa mustrisemorewithamatching
tively effective, they must work with and through a grant than a simple grant, Po may rise or fall with the matching
grant, depending on the legislator’s elasticity of substitution. This
member’soffice.Inthetypicalcase,thelegislatorwould adds another more subtle dimension to the lobbyist’s problem of
have to reallocate at least some staff time in order choosingamonglegislators,sincethosewithahigherelasticitywill
to take advantage of the lobbyist’s offer.Imagine, for bemoreresponsivetoamatchinggrant.Presumably,onlylobbyists
withclose,recurringrelationshipswithalegislatorcouldestimate
instance,thatalobbyistgivesthememberagoodidea
thispropertyofherpreferences.
for an amendment to a forthcoming bill. Liking what 9Here and throughout, we contend that legislators are able to
shehears,thelegislatortellsherlegislativeassistantto discern—–indeed, have an incentive to determine—–the policy ob-
dropwhathe’sdoingandworkwiththelobbyistin,say, jectives of an interest group and thus whether the legislator and
developing the details, writing a speech, and building groupshareacommonpolicyobjective.Inpractice,thisisseldom
difficult.Theinterestsofmostgroupsactiveonanissuetypicallyare
supportamongcolleagues.Theresult?Thelegislator’s
allocationshiftsdecidedlytowardissueA,frombtob(cid:1)(cid:1), transparent—–madesobypastandpresenttestimony,reports,press
releases,websitepostings,andotheractivitiesthatpubliclycommit
withtheresultthatgreaterprogressismadetowardA, themtoaposition.Inpartbecauseofthis,attemptstodeceiveleg-
(P(cid:1)(cid:1)–P >0). But less progress is made on other issues islatorsareuncommon.LyingcanruinalobbyistonCapitolHill,
a a
(P(cid:1)(cid:1)–P <0).Ifthestaffmemberdropswhatheisdo- andareputationforweakerformsofit,forexample,“dissembling,”
o o canshutdoorsanddamagetrust(Ainsworth2002,132).Onlobby-
ing,somethingeventuallyhastogive,namely,efforton
ists’selectivelymatchingthemselvestolegislatorswithcompatible
an issue far down the list of priorities that the staffer preferences,seeDenzauandMunger(1986).
75
LobbyingasLegislativeSubsidy February2006
Understoodintermsoflobbyingassubsidy,however, it is uncertain whether they favor progress or regress
the puzzle is not so puzzling. In the limit, legislators on A. Lobbyists cannot be sure whether grants given
listentothosewhomtheycantrustimplicitlybecause toapparentlyuncommittedlegislatorswillbeusedfor
their interests agree perfectly. Lobbyists, in turn, are the group’s cause or simply wasted. Again, this hy-
not irrational for lobbying their strongest allies. They pothesis is counterintuitive when one views lobbying
are rationally allocating resources to those members asinformativesignalingorvotebuying.Suchaccounts
most likely to use them to advance the lobbyists’ ob- predictthatlobbyistswilllobbyuncommittedmembers
jective. generallyandlobbyweakalliescounteractively.
Lobbyists are not the only ones who provide infor- Thesefourhypothesesregardinglobbyingbehavior
mation and services, of course. As we noted earlier, have corollaries in several hypotheses about the be-
legislativeenterprisescanacquireinformationfroma havioroflegislators,conditionalonbeinglobbied:
wide variety of external sources, including executive (H.5)Aslobbyingincreases,sowilltheparticipation
agencies,constituents,congressionalsupportagencies, or“effort”ofallies.Accordingtothesubsidyaccount,
and nongovernmental policy shops (Whiteman 1995). this is the principal purpose of lobbying—–to mobilize
But of these, lobbyists are distinctive in that they allies. This hypothesis and the next are similar to the
(i)varyacrossthecompletespectrumofpolicypriori- exchangehypothesesofHallandWayman(1990),but
tiesmakingitpossiblethatlegislatorscanfindlobbyists theyflowfromadifferentcausalmechanism.
with coincident objectives; (ii) can provide labor for (H.6) Lobbying will increase most the participation
legislators’specifictasks;(iii)produceinformationand of the lobbyist’s strongest legislative allies. This is a
argumentscustomizedtopromotethelegislator’sand corollary of the second hypothesis. Strong allies have
group’scommoncause;and(iv)provideissue-specific ahighermarginalwillingnesstopayforprogressonA
legislative intelligence, useful in plotting effective and thus will use more of the subsidized resources to
strategy. expandtheireffortpromotingA.
Asamatterofdescription,then,thepluralistshadit (H.7) Lobbying uncommitted legislators or enemies
right.Lobbyistsserveas“servicebureaus”or“adjuncts (to the extent that this happens) will not increase those
to staff.” As the next section explores, however, they legislators’ participation. Legislators who are appar-
had it wrong in concluding that interest groups had entlyuncommittedhaveatmostlowmarginalratesof
little influence on legislators. Lobbyists’ subsidies are resource expenditure on advancing issue A. Inadver-
theverymechanismoftheirinfluence. tentsubsidiestoopposinglegislatorswouldbewasted,
given that a group’s policy information, political in-
telligence,andlaboraretailoredtopromoteprogress
onthegroup’sissue.Withfewexceptions(say,private
IMPLICATIONS
headcounts) such information is not divertible to the
Asdevelopedthusfar,avirtueofthemodeloflobbying oppositeside’scause.
aslegislativesubsidyisitssimplicity.Variousextensions Twohypothesesfollowregardingtheaccessofpub-
cometomind,twoofwhichwetakeupnext.Nonethe- lic interest groups to legislators and the effect of the
less, in this simple form, the model does a better job formeronthebehaviorofthelatter:
of explaining previously puzzling regularities in the (H.8) Legislators will give access to (be lobbied by)
behaviorofbothlobbyistsandlegislators.Inaddition, like-mindedpublicinterestgroups,evenifthelatterhave
thetheoryproducesseveralimplicationsthatarecoun- no reelection-relevant assets. This is because such lob-
terintuitiveorotherwisedistinctiveinlightofexisting byists can provide policy information, political intel-
scholarship.Wesummarizethemhere,thentakeupin ligence,andlegislativeassistanceusefulinlegislators’
thenextsectionssomeimportantqualifications. Washington work, even if they cannot help with their
If lobbyingisatypeoflegislativesubsidy: reelection efforts. Exchange models and reelection-
(H.1)Lobbyistswilllobbytheirallies,where“allies” centeredsignalingmodels,incontrast,donotcompre-
refertolegislatorswhosharethesamepolicyobjective hendlobbyingbysuchgroups,inthatlegislatorshave
asthegroup.Quitesimply,allieswilluseresourcesto noincentivetogivethemaccess.
worktowardprogressonA,notagainstit(−A).Thus, (H.9) Lobbying by public interest groups without
the pattern that was anomalous in light of previous reelection-relevantassetswillincreasetheparticipation
frameworksisapredictionofthepresentaccount. or “effort” of allies. Such groups, Berry reports, see
(H.2) Lobbyists will lobby most their strongest al- themselves as having a comparative advantage with
lies, where strength refers to the legislator’s marginal legislators in policy research and information, mainly
willingnesstopayforprogresstowardthepolicyobjec- becauseoftheirreputationforaccuracyandcredibility
tivethememberandgroupshare.Again,thiscontrasts (Berry 1999; Browne 1995). Frequently these groups
starklytothepredictionsofmostprevioustheories. conduct or commission their own research. Their re-
(H.3) Lobbyists will not lobby their enemies. As a ports,inturn,aremorelikelytoreceivefavorablepress
matter of logic, legislative subsidies do not work in coverage than information provided by corporations,
reverse.Onecannot“de-subsidize”alegislator’soffice, trade associations, or other financially interested par-
shortof,say,kidnappingthestaff.Nor,obviously,would ties(Berry,120–42).
onewanttosubsidizethosewhoworkagainstyou. (H.10)Lobbyistswilllobbylegislativeallieswiththe
(H.4) Lobbyists will seldom lobby uncommitteds, most productive enterprises. This hypothesis follows
whereuncommittedherereferstolegislatorsforwhom fromanextensionofthebasicmodel,whichwepresent
76
AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol.100,No.1
FIGURE3. SimpleGrantstoanOrdinary(1)andaMoreProductive(2)Legislator
P = Progress on other issues, O
o
b'
2
b
b' 2
1
b
1
B'
2
B B1' B2
1
∆P1 ∆P2 Pa= Progress on
a a target issue, A
inFigure3.Evenamongequallycommittedallies,some subsidy yields a greater increase in progress toward
legislators are more efficient in producing progress the targeted issue if provided to the more productive
toward a common goal than others. Leaders of the legislator.
committee of jurisdiction, for instance, tend to be es- In choosing whom to subsidize, in sum, lobbyists
peciallyproductive,owingtoamoreprofessionalstaff will consider a second attribute of the legislator—–the
andgreatercontroloverthecommittee’sagenda.Ma- productivity of the legislator’s enterprise—–as well as
joritypartyleaders,likewise,haveproceduralprerog- theresourcesthatenterprisemightputin.Asaconse-
ativesinvolvingfloorschedulingandtheappointment quence,finally:
ofconferees,suchthattheymightaccelerate,delay,or (H.11)Lobbyingwillincreasetheparticipationofthe
killlegislationwithrelativelylittleeffort.10 Inahighly lobbyist’smostproductiveallies.
partisan chamber, majority party membership alone Beforeconcluding,itbearsnotingthatinaworldin
shouldrenderamembermoreefficient. whichlobbyingisatypeoflegislativesubsidy,theoret-
Figure3illustratesthisbyshowingthebudgetlines, ical problems at the heart of other accounts happily
before and after a simple grant, for two different leg- disappear. First, contract enforcement—–the central
islators with identical preferences but different levels probleminexchangemodels—–isrenderedmoot.Lob-
ofproductivitywithrespecttoissueA.Legislator1is byistsgivelegislatorsgrants,notbribes.Legislatorsdo
shown with solid lines and curves, Legislator 2 with notactasagentsoflobbyists;legislatorsactasifthey
dashed ones. Legislator 2 is more productive than 1, were group agents even though they are acting only
andthushisorherinitialbudgetline,B ,extendsfur- in the interests of themselves. There exists no quid
2
theralongtheP axisthanB .Asaresult,evenprior pro quo, implicit or otherwise; there is no incentive
a 1
to any subsidy, Legislator 2 achieves greater progress torenege.
on the issue than Legislator 1, both because the ef- Second, in this theoretical world, dissembling—–the
fort is more productive and because that productivity core problem in incomplete information models of
providesanincentivetodevotemoreofhisorherre- lobbying—–appears less troublesome. If lobbying is a
sourcestotheissue. formofsubsidy,lobbyistshaveanincentivetoseekout
Asimple(notmatching)subsidyisnowprovidedto andassistlegislatorswithwhomtheyalreadyagree.To
bothoftheselegislators.11Thisshiftstheirbudgetlines theextentthatthepolicyobjectivesofthelobbyistand
(cid:1) (cid:1)
from B to B for Legislator 1 and from B to B for legislatorarecoincident,inturn,thereisnoincentive
1 1 2 2
Legislator 2. The resources provided by the grant are forthelobbyisttodissemble;rather,theincentiveisto
themselvesassumedheretobenomoreproductivefor providethebestinformationandadvice.
Legislator 2 than for 1; if they were, the result would Third, lobbying as legislative subsidy implies a dis-
beevenstronger.Andtheresult,shownbythechanges tinctiveconceptionofaccess.Accessisnotsomething
inprogressmarkedas(cid:1)P1and(cid:1)P2,isclearlythatthe thatneedbeboughtbythegrouporgrudginglygiven
a a
by legislators. To the contrary, legislators should also
initiate contacts with lobbyists, specifically those lob-
10Leadersorotherlegislatorsexperiencedinanissuedomainare
byists whom they already know support their objec-
alsomostlikelytohavewell-establishedviews,makingpreference-
centeredlobbyinganevenlesseffectivestrategy. tives. In fact, Whiteman (1995) finds precisely that:
11Amatchingsubsidywouldhavesimilarimplications. Legislative offices often call on likeminded lobbyists
77
LobbyingasLegislativeSubsidy February2006
FIGURE4. TheEffectsofPreference-CenteredLobbyingonLegislativeEffort
P = Progress on other
o
issues, O
Outside Lobbying: Outside Lobbying:
Cross-Pressuring Enemies Mobilizing Allies
U
3
U'
3
U'
2
U
2 U
4
U '
4
U'
1
U
1 Banti Bpro
–P = Regress on P = Progress on
a a
Target Issue, A Target Issue, A
forassistance.Inthisrespect,lobbyistssometimesfeel down to the last decisive vote? Clearly, this lobbying
“pressure” from the legislator to “produce”—–just the is considered important by all concerned, and even
oppositeoftheconventionalpressuregroupstory. a casual observer of Congress can cite high-profile
Finally, in the theoretical world represented here, casesthatturnedontightlycontestedrollcalls.Increas-
there is little directly competitive lobbying. Specifi- inglycommon,likewise,aregrass-rootsor“outsidelob-
cally, different groups will lobby on different sides of bying” campaigns, orchestrated to bring constituency
an issue, but they do not lobby the same legislators. pressure to bear on undecided or wrong-headed rep-
Eachsidelobbiesitsknownallies,notlegislatorswho resentatives(Goldstein1999;Kollman1998).
exhibitweakcommitments.Inthisrespect,mattersof Ourmodeldoesnotcomprehendsuchbehavior.In
strategic lobbying look very different. One does not focusingonthebudget,B,wehaveassumedthatUwas
lobby“counteractively,”inAusten-SmithandWright’s outofplay—–anassumptionthatdoesnotsquarewith
(1994)sense,anddecisionstolobbyindividualsbyone either the logic or evidence of competitive lobbying
sidetendtobeindependentoflobbyingbytheother. of undecided legislators. To avoid trading one set of
anomaliesforanother,weneedtoreconsiderwhenlob-
byistswilldecidethatinducingachangeinlegislators’
preferenceswillbetheirproximatepoliticalobjective.
BRINGING PREFERENCES BACK IN
In our model changing a legislator’s preferences
To this point, we have assumed that legislators’ pref- meansshiftinghisorherfamilyofindifferencecurves,
erenceswerefixed,theirbudgetlinesthesolefocusof sothatthetangencywithagivenbudgetlineismoved.
lobbying strategies—–just the reverse of conventional WeuseFigure4firsttoillustratehow,underspecifiable
theories. This simple model seems to accord remark- conditions,preference-centeredlobbyingandlobbying
ably well with several well documented but puzzling as legislative subsidy can be complementary. Figure 4
regularitiesinthebehavioroflobbyistsandlegislators. differs from the previous figures in that it represents
The principle of parsimony might lead us to stop the thebudgetandutilityfunctionsofbothproponentsof
theoreticalexercisehere.Butamodelthatistoopar- policyA(U andU )andopponents(U andU ),who
3 4 1 2
simoniouscancreatetoomany,differentanomaliesof seekwhatwecallregressonA.Thefigurealsoshows,
itsown.Thus,wepointtotwoextensionsofourbasic as dashed curves, shifts in each of these four legisla-
modelinwhichwebringpreferencesbackin.Theresult tors’ indifference curves, representing the changes in
will be to conceptualize lobbying more generally as a preferencesfromgrass-rootslobbyingthatwediscuss
class or menu of strategies, defined by the proximate next.
politicalobjectiveofthelobbyist. In contrast to our earlier figures that included only
Werelobbyingsolelyaformoflegislativesubsidy,we proponentsofpolicyA(legislators3and4),whoprefer
haveargued,lobbyistswouldrarelylobbyenemiesor to move up and to the right in this figure and there-
undecided legislators. What, then, are we to make of fore have downward-sloping indifference curves, op-
highly visible floor fights, frequently reported in the ponents(legislators1and2)wouldgainbymovingup
press and often studied by academics, in which ad- and to the left. If lobbying were solely a form of sub-
vocates ambush legislators at Gucci Gulch and lobby sidy, we suggest above, legislator 1 would be the best
78