Linguistic Creativity: Exercises in ‘Philosophical Therapy’

201 Pages·2000·4.646 MB·English

by  Eugen Fischer (auth.)

LINGUISTIC CREATIVITY
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES SERIES
VOLUME 81
Founded by Wilfrid S. Sellars and Keith Lehrer
Editor
Keith Lehrer, University ofA rizona, Tucson
Associate Editor
Stewart Cohen, Arizona State University, Tempe
Board of Consulting Editors
Lynne Rudder Baker, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Radu Bogdan, Tulane University, New Orleans
Allan Gibbard, University of Michigan
Denise Meyerson, University of Cape Town
Franc;ois Recanati, Ecole Poly technique, Paris
Stuart Silvers, Clemson University
Nicholas D. Smith, Michigan State University
LINGUISTIC CREATIVITY
Exercises in 'Philosophical Therapy'
by
EUGEN FISCHER
Institute for Philosophy,
Ludwig-Ma ximilians-Unive rsity,
Munich, Germany
r...
"
SPRINGER SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
A c.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN 978-94-010-5841-4 ISBN 978-94-011-4243-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-4243-4
Printed an acid-free paper
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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 2000
Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 2000
No part ofthe material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
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PREFACE
Both linguists and philosophers have wondered how it is that we can
understand the sentences we hear or reacl. While linguists tended to
concentrate more on the question of how we can recognise those sentences
as structured in a certain way, as systematic concatenations of familiar
words and phrases, philosophers focused on the obvious follow-up
question of how we can get to know the meaning of a sentence we have
thus recognised. Our achievements seem all the more remarkable the
moment we remind ourselves that the rules of our mother tongue allow for
infinitely many sentences we have not yet encountered, indefinitely many
of which we could understand if we encountered them. The philosophers'
question concerning this impressive competence is put, more properly, as
that of how it is that a speaker can get to know the meaning of any of
indefinitely many sentences he has never encountered before. Together, the
philosophers' and the linguists' query confront us with what is known as
the 'problem of linguistic creativity'. The philosopher's part of the
problem might thus be called the 'problem of semantic creativity'. This
problem is the topic of this book.
Its aim is not so much to solve that problem, or to answer the questions
that confront us with it. Rather, this book starts out, more modestly, as an
attempt to say a bit more clearly than before what our problem is. As we
consider more closely the questions that articulate it, we shall find that
these questions, and some others that go with them, are not particularly
good ones to ask. Indeed, this exercise will not only make us give up our
initial questions, it will also reveal that the questions we are left with do
not pose any such thing as a 'problem of semantic creativity'. In a sense to
be made precise by working through the example, we will thus not solve,
but 'dissolve' that problem. To this end, we will use a method first
outlined by Ludwig Wittgenstein's collaborator Friedrich Waismann, and
will develop a new technique that might come close to something
Wittgenstein had in mind himself, when speaking of 'philosophical
therapy'. If they prove fruitful, success will lend charm to these at first
sight unattractive methods. The dual aim of this book is to dissolve the
problem of semantic creativity; and to develop, and explore the potential
VI
of, the unfamiliar methods employed to this end. The aim is, more
generally, to cope with a core problem in the philosophy of language; and,
by reflecting on this paradigm, to get more clear on one way of practising
philosophy as an activity of clarifying thoughts.
The prime value of this undertaking, if successful, should lie in
bringing out the philosophical virtues of being modest and unpretentious.
Of always asking oneself whether one really knows what one means by
one's words. Of drawing as few cheques on future scientific progress as
possible, in explaining what exactly one is saying now. Of preferring
vocabulary one not only knows how to use in the lofty heights of abstract
argument but is also able to relate to down-to-earth talk about concrete
situations. Of being more interested in coping with specific problems than
in framing general theories. Of bothering as much about how one got into
the problem as about how to get out of it. Of paying close attention to
what kind of problem one is dealing with, before rushing to deal with it.
And, again and again, of taking small steps, and of being prepared to make
them yet smaller, should the need arise. Those who survived this sermon
might even enjoy the practice that tries to live up to the preaching.
This book is the descendant of an Oxford DPhil-thesis. My department,
of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University, Munich, kindly reduced my
administrative obligations and left me with ample time in which to turn a
thesis into a book. During my doctoral work, I enjoyed the generous
financial support of the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes. For
academic support, I am indebted to Martin Davies, Stephen Williams, and
Timothy Williamson, whose comments on various drafts saved me from
error again and again. Peter Sullivan and Jose Bermudez prevented the
process of redrafting from coming to a premature end. Gordon Baker
supervised my thesis-work throughout, read each draft of this book, and
persistently encouraged new ideas even at embryonic stages at which one
might well have had little patience with them. I take pleasure in recording
my gratitude.
CONTENTS
PREFACE. ................................................................................................ V
CONTENTS ............................................................................................ vii
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................... viii
PARTONE- THEPROBLEM
CHAPTER 1 - THE ORTHODOX PERSPECTIVE: A PROBLEM OF
LINGUISTIC CREATIVITY .................................................... 3
CHAPTER 2 - THE PHILOSOPIllCAL PROBLEM: THE PLIGHT OF
ORTHODOXy ................................................................... 20
PART TWO - NEW METHODS
CHAPTER 3 - PHILOSOPIllCAL DISSOLUTION: UNINTELLIGIBLE
QUESTIONS ..................................................................... 49
CHAPTER 4 - PHILOSOPIllCAL THERAPY: A SENSE OF WONDER
AND A CHANGE OF ASPECT .............................................. 79
PART THREE - A THERAPY
CHAPTER 5 - SEMANTIC CREATIVITY: THE PHILOSOPIllCAL
PROBLEM AGAIN ........................................................... 111
CHAPTER 6 - SEMANTIC CREATIVITY: PROBLEM-DISSOLUTION
AND THERAPY ............................................................... 143
POST-SCRIPT -DISSOLVING PHILOSOPIllCAL PROBLEMS ........................ 179
NOTES ................................................................................................. 189
BIBliOGRAPHy .................................................................................... 191
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1- THE ORTHODOX PERSPECTIVE: A PROBLEM OF LINGUISTIC
CREATIVITY
1. The Root of the Problem: Initial Reasoning, Arithmetical Analogy -
formulates the questions that confront us with the problem of semantic
creativity, and spells out a trite line of reasoning and a compelling
analogy that lead us to ask them: that make us wonder what sort of
unconscious semantic information-processing is going on in competent
speakers ................................................................................................. 3
2. Formal Theories of Meaning for Natural Languages - clarifies the idea
of 'semantic information-processing' involved, by explaining the notion
ofs emantic theories for natural languages ............................................ 7
3. Computational Explanation - clarifies the idea of 'unconscious
information-processing' involved, by explaining the notion of
computational explanation and its intended application in the
explanation ofb eliefs about what expressions mean. ............................ 12
4. Aim and Structure of the Book - outlines the agenda: Chapter 2 will
isolate the philosophical problem of semantic creativity from among the
empirical issues outlined so far. Each of the next two chapters will then
introduce a method required for 'dissolving' that problem. The two final
chapters will then deploy these methods, chapter 5 to work the problem
into shape for such a 'dissolution " chapter 6 to effect that 'dissolution '.
17
ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS IX
CHAPTER 2- TIIE PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEM: TIIE PLIGHT OF ORTIIODOXY
1. What We Want - brings out that our Initial Reasoning has us ask not
for just any computational explanation of speakers' competence, but for
accounts that render them intelligible as finite and epistemically
conservative beings .............................................................................. 20
2. Rational Reconstruction: Requirements - develops a requirement to be
met if reference to such conscious semantic information-processing as we
have in mind when asking our first heuristic question (Q) is to provide us
with such an account: Any pertinent canonical derivation in any correct
compositional semantic theory has to enhance the semantic knowledge of
any theorist competent with that theory ................................................ 23
3. A Compositional Semantic Theory - shows that a certain theory of
truth T can do duty as a compositional semantic theory of meaning for a
fragment L of 'Loglish '. ....................................................................... 27
4. The Plight of the Semantic Theorist - establishes that the crucial
reqUirement is not met: There is a theorist competent with T whose
semantic knowledge about L is not enhanced by derivations in that
theory. ................................................................................................. 32
5. Computational Explanation: Requirements - spells out what such
unconscious semantic information-processing as we have in mind in
asking our second heuristic question (Q') amounts to, and builds up to a
reqUirement to be met if reference to such processing is to provide us
with the sort ofa ccount we seek. .......................................................... 37
6. The Plight of the Computer - establishes that accounts of the form we
had in mind flout this reqUirement, even though they may well be
acceptable as computational explanations ofs peakers 'competence ..... 41
7. The Philosophical Problem - sums up: Accounts along the orthodox
lines explored cannot render speakers intelligible as finite and
epistemically conservative beings, even if empirically successful. The
'philosophical problem' that may thus stay with us even once we have
solved the empirical problem of semantic creativity is the topic of this
book. .................................................................................................... 43
x ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 3- PHILOSOPHICAL DISSOLUTION: UNINTELLIGIBLE QUESTIONS
1. Stage-setting: What Do You Mean by 'Mean'? - isolates a dimension
of indeterminacy of our talk of 'knowledge of meaning', viz., relative to
ascriptions of linguistic competences, and shows that, within certain
limits, it is to be removed by fiat ........................................................ .49
2. Preparing for the Job: Tools - explains how this dimension of
indeterminacy is to be removed by piecemeal, local, ordinary, and
potentially innovative explanations of meaning that define possession of
semantic knowledge in terms ofm astery of 'game '-roles ...................... 53
3. Plain Answers for LJ - develops an intuition as to how to ascribe
semantic knowledge about a first object-language which many
philosophers working with formal theories of meaning are likely to
share, and thus arrives at a first proposal ofh ow to define possession of
semantic knowledge in terms ofm astery ofg ame-roles ........................ 58
4. Some More Plain Answers for LJ -develops another popular intuition
to yield an alternative set of such definitions, and follows up some
'objections' to them that yield yet further alternatives .......................... 62
5. A First Conclusion - is that all the definitions developed so far entail
that semantic information about a sentence of LJ is not, in any
epistemically relevant sense, 'new' relative to semantic information
about all of the sentence's elementary constituents. So that neither of the
heuristic questions we ask with respect to that language makes sense. 67
6. A First Problem-Dissolution - explains the sense in which these
questions are therefore 'unintelligible', and retraces the steps we took to
thus 'dissolve' the problem they seemed to present us with. This yields
the conception of philosophical 'problem-dissolution' first outlined by
Friedrich Waismann ............................................................................ 73
CHAPTER 4- PHILOSOPHICAL THERAPY: A SENSE OF WONDER
AND A CHANGE OF ASPECT
1. A Sense of Wonder - induces a sense of wonder in us by showing that
our finding is neither superficial nor due to verbal trickery, and then