Line by Line Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima Book III

306 Pages·2012·1.43 MB·English

Line by Line Commentary
on Aristotle’s De Anima
Book III
Eugene T. Gendlin, Ph.D.
University of Chicago
Line by Line Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, Book III
Copyright © 2012 by Eugene T. Gendlin
Published by the Focusing Institute
34 East Ln., Spring Valley, NY 10977
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or
otherwise, without prior permission of the publisher.
III-1 1
III-1
OVERALL
The chapter falls into two parts (before and after 425a13).
Aristotle asks whether there might be a sixth sense which we happen not to know. He
shows that the five special senses have a certain orderly arrangement that makes them a
complete set. So it seems reasonable that there exists no sixth sense that we lack and do not
know about.
The second part of the chapter takes up the common sensibles and the incidental
sensibles (the second and third kinds mentioned in II-6). Aristotle argues that it cannot be by a
sixth sense that we sense the commonalities of the five. Rather, we can differentiate the
common sensibles because there is a “common sensing” (a together-sensing) by the five. This
also explains how we are able to sense the incidentals.
The first part of the chapter concerns material and efficient causes (organ and media)
although the final cause enters in. The second part is in terms of formal causes. A short part at
the end follows from a final cause.
TEXT
424b22-24 That there is no other sense, apart from the five
(and by these I mean sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch)
we might be convinced by the following considerations.
Aristotle implies that there is some conjecture involved in this premises. That there is no
sense other than the five might seem quite reasonable if all of the following is the case:
424b24-26 We have even now perception of everything of which touch is the
sense (for all the qualities of the tangible, qua tangible , are
perceptible to us by touch).
2 III-1
He begins with the qualities that make an object touchable. It is the proportion of hot,
cold, fluid, dry which determines the degree of solidity or fluidity to the touch. But these are
also the very qualities which we sense by touch (as he said in II-11). Since we have the sense
of touch, there would be no touchable sensible that we could miss.
424b26-27 Also, if we lack any sense, we must also lack a sense-organ.
For Aristotle sense and sense-organ are one and the same concrete thing (II-12).
424b27-30 Every kind of sensible [object] which we perceive through direct
contacting is perceptible by touch, which we in fact have,
while all those [sensible objects] which we perceive through
media and not by direct contact are perceptible by means of the
simples (I mean, for example, air and water).
The word “simples” refers to the four elements, because each element has only two
qualities (fire extremely hot and dry, air hot and fluid, water cold and fluid, earth cold and dry),
whereas all other bodies are mixtures of all four qualities.
Now he will argue that if the senses and the media are arranged in a certain way, then it
would follow that there is no sense we miss.
He does this in terms of media and organs:
424b31-34 And the situation is such that
if many [sensibles] different in kind from each other are
perceptible through one [medium],
then whoever has a sense-organ of that [medium] will necessarily
be capable of perceiving both, e.g. if the sense-organ is [made
out] of air (ἐξ ἀέρος), and air conveys both sound and color;
To be “capable of perceiving both” means that the animal will have the necessary organs
III-1 3
for both (since the sense and the organ are one thing). He is certainly not saying that the same
organ will pick up the other sensibles in the one medium, since he knows that we don't smell
and hear with our eyes.
Aristotle said that the ear contains an enclosed column of air. Now his if-clause says
that if an animal has such an “air-organ,” the animal will also have the other organs for all other
sensibles conveyed through air.
So far the conclusion is that an animal with even one sense in a medium will always
have organs also for all other sensibles in that medium.
Aristotle said (II-2) that some animals have only the sense of touch, but evidently he
knows of no animal that has only one distance sense without the other two. He thinks this might
be necessarily so.
Later in the chapter Aristotle will use the final cause to support this argument by saying
that even the mole, although an exception since it is blind, does have rudimentary eyes under
the skin. Since Aristotle points out the mole’s eyes, it is clear that he means that the animals
who have an organ in one medium, will also have organs for all other kinds of sensibles
carried by that medium. Now we come to the other medium. So, now the cross-over:
424b34-425a3 while if there is more than one medium for the same sense-
object, e.g. both air and water for color, (for both are
transparent), then he who has one of these
will perceive whatever is perceptible through both.
In II-7 and II-8 we were told that although our ears contain air, we can hear sound in
both air and water. Our eyes contain water, but we can see color not only in water but also in
air. Now Aristotle concludes that if the animal is capable of sensing all sensibles in one
medium, the same organs which can do this can also pick up the sensibles in the other medium.
SEE ENDNOTE 80. ON ONE SENSE-OBJECT IN TWO MEDIA
If his ”if” clauses hold, the arrangement insures that if an animal has any one distance-
sense even just in one medium, then it also has every sense there is.
Here is another summary of the argument:
4 III-1
If we have what comes by means of contact (touch),
and,
If (as it seems) an animal having one media-organ for either air or water will also (have
the organs to) sense anything else in that one medium.
and
If sense-organs made of air can sense in water (and vice versa),
and
If only water and air can be media of distance-sensing,
then:
it follows that we know all senses there are.
Next he shows that there are no other media.
425a3-9 Now, sense-organs are made from two of these simples only, air
and water (for the pupil of the eye is of water, the organ of hearing
of air, and the organ of smell of one or other of these),
Of course the eyes and ears are not made just out of air or water; rather they are made
of flesh but the part that picks up the media-vibrations is air or water. Aristotle’s theory is that
the contained air in the ear, and water in the eye becomes continuous with the external medium
and can therefore be moved by it.
Of the four elements only air and water can be media for sensing. This is shown by
arguing that sense-organs cannot be made so as to contain the other two (fire and earth).
while fire either belongs to none of them [the organs] or is
common to all (for nothing is capable of perceiving without
warmth),
and earth either belongs to none of them or is a constituent
specially and above all of that of touch.
So there would remain no sense-organ apart from those of water
and air,
and these some animals possess even now.
III-1 5
Fire is too volatile. With earth the organ would be solid and tangible.
The last line assumes as he argued earlier, that if we have one air and water sense then
we have all senses in those media. Since we have air and water organs now, it seems from the
argument here that there cannot be an unknown sense.
SEE ENDNOTE 81. ON SOLIDITY
425a9-13 It may be inferred then that all the senses are possessed by those
animals which are neither imperfect nor maimed
(for even the mole apparently has eyes under the skin);
hence, unless there is some other body and a property
possessed by none of the bodies existing here and now,
no sense can be left out.
Here we see that the argument does rely on the final cause: Mostly and routinely,
nature would not make incomplete creatures. Aristotle assumes that nature would not make a
sixth kind of sensible object but fail to give it to any of the animals we know here and now. (This
is where he went wrong. Nature does give birds, bees, and bats some extra senses.) He thinks
that then all other animals would be incomplete. Incomplete animals like the mole do exist, but
they are exceptions, and even the mole has all the organs at least rudimentarily.
The argument presents a neat pattern. It is a demonstration only if his premises hold,
and they all begin with “if.” So it would not be right to argue against Aristotle: “Look, if we
happened not to have smell, your argument would prove that there couldn't be a third distance-
sense.” Such an objection begins with “If we lacked smell....” This objection assumes that
Aristotle’s if-premises are wrong. Beginning with Aristotle’s “if,” we could not have lacked smell
if we have even one distance sense.
Aristotle observed empirically that his “if” clauses apply to the animals he knows here
and now. If they see, they also all hear and smell. But this is not the basis of his argument.
Rather, he ponders by what orderly arrangement this would be so.
SECOND PART OF THE CHAPTER:
6 III-1
425a14 Nor again is it possible for there to be a sense-organ special for
the common-sensibles
He just showed that there is no other organ for a sixth sense-quality. That discussion
was in terms of material causes, organs and media. Still in material terms Aristotle says here
that there is no sixth organ for the commons either. We can take it from this spot, that the
supposed sixth sense for the commons (which he will now begin to discuss) would not have its
own access to the commons, since it has no organ of its own.
SEE ENDNOTE 82. ON NO SPECIAL ORGAN FOR THE COMMONS
425a14-20 the common-sensibles which we perceive by each sense
incidentally
Some commentators have thought that the text must have lost the Greek word for “not.”
Aristotle says here that the commons (motion, figure, etc.) are sensed incidentally, whereas in
II-6 he said they are sensed in themselves as such (kath auta). But there need not be a
contradiction (as Hamlyn rightly points out, p. 117). Aristotle is not saying here that we sense
the commons only incidentally. We sense them in both ways. Each sense senses motion,
size, etc. directly as the white moves or as the loud moves, although not as common. Each
sense also senses the objects of every other sense incidentally (indirectly). So we sense the
commons incidentally by each of the five (as he says here). But we sense them in themselves
as such (kath auta) as common by the common sensing which he will introduce a little further
on.
e.g., movement, rest, figure, magnitude, number, and one;
for we perceive all these through movement, e.g. magnitude
through movement (hence also figure, for figure is of magnitude),
what is at rest [is perceived] through an absence of movement,
The list of commons is not quite the same as in II-6: “One” has been added! It comes at
the end of the list, and then again at the end of the passage. This will be important.
III-1 7
What does Aristotle mean by saying that we sense all the commons “by motion?” He
might mean by our motion, as when we walk around something to sense its shape and size, or
glide our hand over something, perhaps also smelling and tapping it so that we can smell and
hear its size. Or, we might trace the outline of something with a finger, or perhaps with a
scanning movement of our eyes, or an inward motion (as he discusses in M&R 452b14). We
can sense whether there is an interruption as we feel our way across. If we sense no
interruption then we sense one thing.
Aristotle might mean also that we sense all commons by the thing’s motion. For
example if a thing moves, we get to see that it has three-dimensions. Otherwise we might see
only two dimensions. Or, consider the motion of a point or a line that generates a geometrical
figure (all figures can be generated by a moving line). We sense number by the discontinuity
we hear, for example as one stone after another moves and falls down.
In the West we are often taught that we sense only static momentary bits, so that
sensing a motion seems to depend on a comparison between the moments. For Aristotle,
motion is continuous and the continuity is sensed directly. Only because we sense continuity,
can we also sense the interruptions of continuity. “One” is sensed through motion when there is
no interruption. Aristotle is everywhere in his works at pains to argue against atomic bits,
whether irreducible particles or atoms of time (e.g., Physics ).
For Aristotle the sensing of motion does not require memory. All animals with more than
one sense can sense motion, but only some animals have memory. A worm can sense
something moving. Sensing the commons does not require “the motion” he discusses in his
book on Memory and Recollection, the motion of memory-images (MR II, 452b10-25).
Assure yourself that your experience can be described in this way. You can see
whether or not the leaves of the tree are moving in the wind, and you can also hear them rustle.
You can climb into the tree and put your hand among them, to sense their motion by touch. If
something smelly moves by you, you can smell it moving toward you and away. You can hear
the trucks, coming and going.
number through negation of continuity
and also by the special objects
for each sense perceives one.
8 III-1
He listed “number” and “one” last, because he is going to continue to discuss “one.” We
sense number (one, or more than one) through continuity or its interruption, and also each
sense senses one.
We can read this “one” in four ways which do not contradict each other:
1) the quantity “one;”
2) one sense-object, for example just color, not also sound.
3) one color (red), or just one smell, or one temperature.
But most importantly it means:
4) “one thing.”
Seeing senses one thing, and hearing senses one thing, but so far we have not yet
understood how we can see and hear the same one thing. We will understand this if he can
show us how what he calls “the commons” are sensed as common across the five, but he has
not yet shown this. So far we only have how each sense senses one, just in its own special
object. One white. One sound. But how do we see the same one thing which we also hear?
We need to follow Aristotle closely in this (also in the next chapter) as he derives the same
commonly-sensed one thing.
With Western habits we would say that we “know” it to be the same thing across the five
senses. So we must notice that Aristotle argues that it is because of the common sensing that
we can sense it as the same thing.
Aristotle will first argue that our sensing and differentiating “one” and all the other
commons can not occur by means of an additional sense. There cannot be a sixth sense that
would sense what the five have in common. Then he will say how we do sense the commons
as common, (including thereby a same one thing).
425a20-22 Hence it is clear that it is impossible for there to be a special
sense for any of these, e.g. movement. For in that case
it would be as we now perceive the sweet by sight;
If there were a sixth sense for the commons, we would perceive them as we now
perceive sweet by sight, but how do we perceive sweet by sight? Aristotle has not mentioned
this up to now. It was not mentioned in II-6. There, under “incidental sensing” he mentioned
only the son of Diarous.