Liberalism, Political Theory, and the Rights of Minority Cultures

346 Pages·2014·9.93 MB·English

Liberalism, Political Theory, and the
Rights of Minority Cultures:
Just How Different are the ‘Politics of Difference’?
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
by
Philip Parvin
Government Department
London School of Economics and Political Science
University of London
July 2001
UMI Number: U615217
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Abstract
Liberal political theory has come under increased criticism in recent years for its supposed
inability to sufficiently 'accommodate' or 'recognise' cultural difference. Liberalism, it is said, is
insufficiently attentive to the importance of group attachments, is rooted in a universalism which
undermines the boundaries between cultures and is, therefore, unable to adequately resolve those
political conflicts which arise out of the cultural, religious and ethnic diversity found in
contemporary Western societies.
The thesis examines these claims and argues that liberalism is more resistant to criticism than
many non-liberals (and liberals) believe. The thesis argues that liberalism is a necessarily
'comprehensive' doctrine, committed to the principle of individual autonomy and that this places
constraints upon what groups can and cannot be allowed to do in the name of cultural values. It
therefore challenges those 'political liberals' who seek to isolate individual autonomy as valuable
only in the political sphere, and those other liberals who argue that liberalism should not commit
itself to autonomy at all. The thesis argues that these liberals fail to displace the importance of
autonomy in liberalism, and that they cannot help but appeal to precisely this principle in order
to reach the conclusions they do.
The thesis extends this argument to those pluralists, difference-theorists and advocates of a
politics of 'recognition', who seek to replace liberalism with a new form of politics altogether. It
shows that these doctrines presuppose the ability of each and every individual to reflect upon
their ends and to justify them to within particular constraints in the same way as liberalism. It
argues therefore, that these antiliberal theorists are required to encourage and defend the
autonomy of each and every individual within the polity in much the same way as liberals.
Finally, the thesis questions the significance of 'culture' to liberal political theory and to
normative theorising more generally. Most specifically, it questions the link between cultural
membership and personal autonomy made by liberals like Will Kymlicka and Joseph Raz. It
argues that 'culture' is insufficiently determined in the literature and that this severely weakens the
argument for the 'affirmation' or 'protection' of cultural groups. The thesis argues that once we
begin to examine the idea of 'culture' (as it is used in the literature) in detail, we soon realise that
cultural membership is not a prerequisite of individual autonomy in the way that culturalist
liberals believe.
Having argued as much, the thesis claims that the liberal argument for affording 'group rights' to
cultures is severely weakened, as are similar arguments advanced by advocates of a politics of
difference, recognition, cultural recognition, or pluralism.
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Contents
Abstract.
Acknowledgements.
Introduction.
1. The Aim of the Thesis.
2. Themes and Structure: An Outline of What is to Come.
Part One
Chapter One: Political Liberalism, Autonomy, and the Privatisation of Identity.
3. The Search for Political Justice.
3.1 Setting the Scene: Deontology, Teleology, and the Ends of Justice.
3.2 Rawls’ Political Liberalism and the Status of Comprehensive Doctrines.
4. Agency and the State: The Limits of Political Justice.
4.1 Defining the ‘Basic Structure’.
4.2 ‘Political’ and ‘Ethical’ Autonomy: Public Freedom and Private Tyranny.
5. Recurring Problems, Ambiguous Debates: Political Liberalism After Rawls.
5.1 Stephen Macedo vs. Comprehensive Liberalism.
5.2 Martha Nussbaum and the Assumption of Autonomy.
5.3 Susan Moller Okin and Comprehensive Feminism.
5.4 Charles Larmore: Patterns of Moral Confusion.
6. Conclusion.
Chapter Two: Gender, Controversial Practices, and the Rules of Association.
7. Public, Private, and the Exclusion of Gender.
7.1 Feminism and the Importance of the Private.
7.2 The Private: Non-Political or Apolitical?
8. The Permeability of the Political.
9. Controversial Practices and the Rules of Association.
9.1 Association and Exit.
9.2 Marriage, Divorce, and the Principle of Universalisation.
10. Private Space, Public Freedom.
10.1 Reclaiming the Public/Private Dichotomy.
10.2 The Many Inconsistencies of Political Liberalism.
10.3 Consent and the Social Contract.
11. Conclusion.
Part Two
Chapter Three: Comprehensive Liberalism, Group Membership, and Inescapable
Values.
12. William Galston and Cultural Diversity.
12.1 Two Concepts of Liberalism?
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12.2 Social Unity and the Content of Liberalism.
13. Kukathas, Cultural Libertarianism, and the ‘Right of Exit’.
13.1 Kukathas and the Claims of Community.
13.2 The Assumption of Autonomous Individuality.
14. Civic Education and the Teaching of Autonomy.
14.1 Galston and Teaching National Values.
14.2 Kukathas and the Privatisation of Education.
15. Exit, Social Unity, and Toleration.
15.1 Kukathas and the Need for Liberal Social Unity.
15.2 The Limits of Toleration.
16. Culture, Choice, and Consent.
17. Conclusion.
Chapter Four: Impartiality, Dialogue, and the Pre-Conditions of Liberal Justification.
18. Charles Larmore and the Content of Liberal Dialogue.
19. Equal Respect: The Argument for Inclusion.
20. From Dialogue to Politics: The Requirements of Equal Respect.
21. The Requirements of Reasonableness.
22. Conclusion.
Chapter Five: Politics, Discourse, and the ‘Cultural Defence*: Liberalism and the
Politicisation of Difference.
23. The Strategy of Politicisation.
24. The Preconditions of Political Discourse.
24.1 John Gray and the End of Politics.
24.2 Communitarian-Republicanism and the Politics of Difference.
25. The Assumption of Equality.
26. The Cultural Defence.
25.1 Relativism and the Brute Appeal to Culture.
25.2 Cultural Recognition and Self-Respect.
27. Conclusion.
Part Three
Chapter Six: Who ‘Needs’ Culture? Identity, Autonomy, and the Rejection of
Essentialism.
28. Voluntarism, Cognitivism, and Liberal Agency.
28.1 Confronting the Voluntarist/Cognitivist Dichotomy.
28.2 Liberal Agency and Communitarian Selves: Dissolving the Dichotomy.
28.3 Whose Liberalism? Which Liberals?
29. The Real Problem: Liberalism, Community, and Multiple Embeddedness.
29.1 Rejecting Essentialism and the Selective Elevation of Value.
29.2 Agency, Individuality, and Multiple Obligations.
30. Multiple Attachments and the Liberal Self.
30.1 MacIntyre Re-Visited: Narrative Unity and the
‘Compartmentalisation’ of the Self.
30.2 Postmodernism and the Destruction of Identity.
30.3 Unity and Complex Individuality.
31. Liberalism, Deliberation, and the Politics of Multiple-Embeddedness.
32. Conclusion.
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Chapter Seven: Cultural Politics and the Political Culture: Comprehensive
Liberalism, Nationalism, and Diversity.
33. Liberal Culturalism.
33.1 Culture as a ‘Context of Choice’.
33.2 Kymlicka’s Changing Definition of Culture.
33.3 From ‘Culture’ to ‘National Culture’.
33.4 Liberal Nations and Liberal Communities.
34. Culture, Social Unity, and the Limits of Toleration.
34.1 Miller’s ‘De-Ethnicised’ Nationalism.
34.2 Potential Criticisms: Miller, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Argument for
Individual Autonomy.
35. Wider Contexts of Choice? Culture, Nation, World.
35.1 Drawing Political Boundaries: Cultural, National, or International?
35.2 International Contexts and the Ambiguity of Borders: Where Does My
Culture End?
36. Conclusion.
Conclusion.
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Acknowledgements
Toward the end of this thesis I argue that our decisions, abilities and understandings - our lives - are
shaped by the many relationships we share and the many influences we acquire. This is of no-one
more true than the author. Many people have had a hand in the production of this thesis, either
during the four years it has taken to write, or in the years leading up to my decision to take the job on.
I owe them all a debt of gratitude.
My most profound thanks must go to John Charvet and Brian Barry. Together, they have read and
re-read successive drafts of this thesis and there is not a single page that has escaped their eagle eye.
As my supervisor in my first year, Brian was always full of encouragement and support, and that has
never wavered. I have had many discussions with him both in New York and in Britain over the last
four years, the result of which can be seen in one way or another on every page of this thesis. Anni’s
influence is less obvious, but it is there nonetheless. Her ability to create fantastic meals at the drop
of a hat and to discover the best bargain shops in Manhattan are rightly celebrated (by me especially).
John Charvet, since taking over as my supervisor after Brian, has been wonderfully supportive and an
enthusiastic critic. While always keeping his eye on the big picture, John has been fabulous at quietly
pointing out my own incoherences. He has seen this thesis grow from a collection of wild assertions
to what you see today. Any wild assertions that remain (over and above the usual quota allowed in a
work of political theory) are my fault alone.
Special thanks too must go to my two supervisors at York, Sue Mendus and Matt Matravers. When I
arrived to study for the MA in Toleration I was, quite honestly, totally in the dark about
contemporary political theory, having had little training in it during my undergraduate years at Kent. I
knew when I applied that I would only be able to study at a postgraduate level if I received full
funding. I would like to thank Sue for giving me one of the few ESRC studentships allocated to the
course. If she hadn’t, I have no idea where I’d be or what Fd be doing now, but it wouldn’t be
political philosophy.
Chris Taylor, my undergraduate tutor at the University of Kent also deserves particular thanks. His
course in ‘Politics, Propaganda, and Art’, as well as his lectures on political theory opened my eyes to
what I enjoyed most about politics (to the detriment of my other courses!). Chris was the first person
to suggest that I might enjoy postgraduate study. He was right.
Many of the ideas in this thesis were tried out in conferences, seminars and workshops and have
been improved immeasurably as a result. I would therefore like to thank those who organised and
attended the Brave New World Graduate Conference in Political Theory, Manchester University,
June 1998 & May 1999; the 60th Annual Meeting of the Pennsylvania Political Science Association,
Villanova University, Philadelphia, April 1999; the PAIS Graduate Conference in Political Theory,
Warwick University, May 1999; the 95th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Atlanta, September 1999; the International Conference on “Nationalism, Identity, and
Minority Rights”, University of Bristol, September 1999; and the 97th Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 2001. In addition, I would like to
thank the Universities of York, London, and Oxford for inviting me to present to their Political
Theory Workshops. Special thanks must go to the members of the LSE Political Theory Workshop;
their many observations were always helpful (even if I didn’t especially enjoy hearing them at the
time).
Over the past four years I have had the great pleasure of discussing my ideas with many friends,
colleagues and teachers. I would therefore like to thank Pilar Anton-Serrano, Michael Bacon, Simon
Bastow, Richard Bellamy, Alan Boyce, Clare Chambers, Avigail Eisenberg, Cecile Fabre, Donald
Henderson, Rotem Gonen, John Gray, Ariadna Juarez-Garda, Paul Kelly, Chandran Kukathas, Will
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Kymlicka, Megan Martin, John Maynor, David Miller, Tariq Modood, Francis Moran III, Dan
Offord, Maria Paola-Ferretti, Philip Pettit, Joseph Raz, David Rowland, Richard Sakwa, Melissa
Schwartzberg, Adam Tebble, Nadia Urbinati, and Jeremy Waldron for all their invaluable help. I
would particularly like to thank Kennedy Stewart for providing me with helpful comments on the
entire draft.
I would also like to thank all my friends from Southampton, Kent, York, London, and elsewhere
who have been with me throughout. Together, they have provided the enormous service of
reminding me that the world does not begin and end with political philosophy and that, quite often,
there are better things to talk about than fundamental problems in liberal theory, and better things to
do than stay in and pore over books until the early hours. They know who they are, and I blame
them wholeheartedly for the fact that that this thesis took four years to complete instead of three. I
also thank them for keeping me sane.
Thanks also must go to those kind-hearted and generous souls who have funded this and other
research. I would therefore like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council for funding my
MA and the first three years of my PhD. I would also like to thank the LSE Graduate School for
awarding me a Travel Grant, enabling me to attend the APSA conference in Adanta. And I would
also like to thank all the people at PPS, for whom I have worked on a part-time basis for the past
year. The money I’ve made there has allowed me to stick around in London; the friends I’ve made
there have made London a more fun place to be.
Finally, and most importandy of all, I would like to thank my family. It is impossible to say what the
support and affection of my mum, dad, nan, and grandad mean to me. They have always stood by me
in my decision to keep studying well beyond any sensible or reasonable age, and have always been
proud of what I’ve achieved (even if much of what I’ve got to show for it must sound like the worst
kind of complicated nonsense). In December 2000, almost right at the end of my time at the LSE,
my grandad fell ill. He died that following April, leaving the world - and certainly our lives - emptier.
I probably didn’t see him as much as I should have toward the end; in my naive way I always thought
he would just get better. When I did see him, though, he would always tell me how pleased he was to
see me - how pleased he aluays was to see me. Well, it was good seeing you too grandad. And this
work is for you, with love.
Philip Parvin
July 2001
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Introduction
The first wave of writings on minority rights was primarily focussed on
assessing the justice of claims by ethnic groups for the accommodation of then-
cultural differences . . . [W]hile difference-blind institutions purport to be
neutral amongst different ethno-cultural groups, [campaigners for minority
rights argue that] they are in fact implicitly tilted towards the needs, interests,
and identity of the majority group . . . Minority rights do not constitute unfair
privileges or invidious forms of discrimination, but rather compensate for
unfair disadvantages, and so are consistent with, and indeed may be required
by, justice. In our view this first stage in the debate is coming to a close, with
the defenders of minority rights having effectively made their case.
Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman, ‘Introduction’
to Citizenship in Diverse Societies.
[I]t is common-ground that human beings should not have different rights and
priveliges as a consequence of their membership of ascriptive groups. When we
ask for the justification of principles and rules to govern our relations with one
another, we cannot discount the interests and claims of some people simply in
virtue of their identities. This is the premise of fundamental equality.
Brian Barry, ‘Something in the Disputation not Unpleasant’, in
Justice, Neutrality, and Impartiality: Re-Reading Brian Barry’s
Justice as Impartiality.
It is often said that, in these post-modern, multi-cultural, often anti-foundationalist, Godless times,
little more can be said of the ‘core’ ideas and presuppositions of our major political doctrines than
that they represent the convictions of a particular group, in a particular region, at a particular time.
Liberalism, like any other political doctrine, we are told, is inevitably and inescapably rooted in
traditions and understandings which have only localised validity and what is ‘true for us* may not
only be untrue to others but incomprehensible to them. This, it is said, is the great paradox at the heart
of modern morality and politics; that we struggle to understand the world (and our place within it)
by making claims about it which we understand to be universally true and which we believe capture
something important and recognisable in all people, regardless of where they live, or what they
believe, but that our attempts to do so are inevitably constrained and circumscribed by our own
particular (and contestable) ideas about the world. We judge others by our own standards while
claiming that these standards are universal, and we seek to examine the world through eyes which
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