Levinas: Chinese and Western Perspectives

190 Pages·2009·3.191 MB·English

by  Chung?Ying Cheng(eds.)

Book Supplement Series to the
Journal of Chinese Philosophy
Editor: Chung-ying Cheng
LÉVINAS:
CHINESE AND
WESTERN PERSPECTIVES
Edited by
Nicholas Bunnin, Dachun Yang,
and Linyu Gu
Lévinas: Chinese and Western Perspectives Edito r by Nicholas Bunnin, Dachun Yang, and Linyu Gu
© 2008 Journal of Chinese Philosophy. ISBN: 978-1-405-19545-4
This edition fi rst published 2008
© 2008 Journal of Chinese Philosophy
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Book Supplement Series to the
Journal of
Chinese Philosophy
Editor: Chung-ying Cheng
L :
ÉVINAS
C W P
HINESE AND ESTERN ERSPECTIVES
Edited by
Nicholas Bunnin, Dachun Yang, and Linyu Gu
CHUNG-YING CHENG / Preface 1
NICHOLAS BUNNIN / Introduction 5
DACHUN YANG / Lévinas and the Three Dimensions of 11
Surpassing Phenomenology
JACQUES TAMINIAUX / Lévinas and Heidegger: 31
A Post-Heideggerian Approach to Phenomenological
Issues
DU XIAOZHEN / The Philosophy of Saintliness: 47
Some Notes on the Thought of Lévinas
MO WEIMIN / Phenomenology or Anti-Phenomenology? 61
—The Ethical Subject in Lévinas
SIMON CRITCHLEY / The Split Subject 79
WANG LIPING / Transcendence or Immanence? Lévinas, 89
Bergson, and Chinese Thought
WANG HENG / Lévinas’s Phenomenology of Sensibility 105
and Time in His Early Period
MARIE-ANNE LESCOURRET / Desire by Lévinas 123
SHANG JIE / The Phenomenology of Death 133
WANG TANGJIA / The Concepts of Death in Heidegger 143
and Lévinas
SUN XIANGCHEN / Emmanuel Lévinas and the Critique 155
of Modern Political Philosophy
iv contents
ROBERT BERNASCONI / Extraterritoriality: Outside the 167
Subject, Outside the State
DORIAN WISZNIEWSKI / “The Space of 183
Communicativity”: Lévinas and Architecture
chung-ying cheng
PREFACE
InTotalityandInfinity(1969)Lévinasunderstoodtotalitytobeastate
of subjectivity in which the Other was merged with the self as Being
and regarded infinity as a way of representing the Other that could
lead to the self assuming responsibility for the Other and even
responsibility for the responsibility of the Other. On this basis,
Lévinas took ethics of responsibility to be the first philosophy.The
face of the Other is revealed through language, but we do not have
grounds to speak of the Being of the infinite Other. On the basis of
our infinite trust in the Other, we can start our knowledge and our
reflections on beings of the world. Our trust in the Other and our
commitmenttotheOtherallowsustogivemeaningtoourepistemo-
logicalandontologicalstatements.Wecanaskhowthisphilosophical
stance is to be compared to Chinese philosophy, which also takes
ethics as its first concern before the initiation of ontology and episte-
mology,butwhichgroundsethicsandmoralityintheunityofheaven
and man.
Chinese philosophy in its classical, medieval and contemporary
periods,hasalwaysmaintainedacorepracticalconcernwithethicsas
the realization of human good in both individuals and collective
society. According to the Daxue, “From the Son of Heaven to
common people one must take self-cultivation of one’s self as the
basic task of life”(Analects 14–42).In the Confucian Analects,“One
cultivates oneself so that one will bring peace to other people (anren
).”Nevertheless,Confucius also speaks of knowing the mandate
of heaven (zhi tianming ), and Mencius speaks of knowing
heaven (zhitian ), where this knowledge is based on knowing
(one’s) nature as revealed in one’s reflection and the exercise in
practice of one’s heart-mind. A concern for moral action involving
othersleadstoreflectiononthesourceofone’snatureandleadstoan
understanding of ultimate reality.Hence,we see how ontology of the
world can arise from moral concern and practice.
Wemaycallthismoralmetaphysicsandseethatitcharacterizesthe
position of some contemporary Neo-Confucian thinkers. In my own
work,I have characterized this position as possessing an onto-ethical
aspect and speak of onto-ethics in relation to moral metaphysics.
Because the purpose of moral metaphysics is ethical rather than
©2008JournalofChinesePhilosophy
2 chung-ying cheng
metaphysical,moralmetaphysicsservesasabasisforethicalpractice
and hence becomes onto-ethics. We see that moral metaphysics and
onto-ethics form an onto-hermeneutical circle: moral concern and
moral commitment give rise to a metaphysics that is needed for moral
action and moral practice. If we focus on Lévinas’s account of the
infinite otherness of God,we may perhaps say the same for Lévinas,
insofarastheinfiniteothernessofGodisultimatelythebasisforour
moral action and our moral understanding toward others. For
Lévinas, unlike Confucians, however, an absolute separation from
the Other,rather than identification with the Other,is the source of
the metaphysics or theology that in turn gives validity to our moral
actions.IseenoprobleminthiscontrastbecauseHeavenortheOther
canbeseparatedfrommanunderoneconditionandunifiedwithman
under another condition. Under either condition, morality could
reign.
InthisspecialcollectionofessaysonLévinas:ChineseandWestern
Perspectives,as edited by Nicholas Bunnin,DachunYang,and Linyu
Gu, we can see the essential relevance of Lévinas for Chinese
Philosophy and the respects in which Lévinas becomes essentially
relevant. It is not accidental that many contemporary Chinese
philosophystudentstakeaninterestinLévinasandrelatedfiguresin
French philosophy. Many of these students have found that pheno-
menology provides a new approach our experience of encountering
philosophical problems and issues of life and reality. Like Lévinas,
they are more often attracted to Heidegger than to Husserl because
Heidegger focused on human existence and its inner life while
Husserl concentrated on cognition. In not following Heidegger,
although being inspired by him,Lévinas counterbalanced Heidegger
byfocusingontheOther.WecanseethisfocusontheOtherinterms
of the other pole of the profound relationship of humanity with
heaven in Chinese philosophy,including things in nature for Daoism
and people in the world for Confucianism. For this reason, Lévinas
can be highly challenging and meaningful for Chinese philosophical
self-understanding and can stimulate Chinese philosophers to work
out a dialectics of sameness and otherness to accommodate possible
alienation of man from God and to allow both transcendence and
immanence.
InhisthoughtfulintroductionNicholasBunninraisesthequestion
of how we may fruitfully conduct comparative philosophy across
cultural and philosophical traditions that are far apart in their orien-
tation and their vision of the ends of life and society.He mentioned
“savingthephenomena”asamethodofAristoteliansynthesisregard-
ingtruth,wherewhatistobesavedarebothcommonexperienceand
thedifferentviewsofphilosophersgovernedbyaconstructivenotion
preface 3
of truth based on philosophical argument. What then is this philo-
sophicalargument?Onemightpointoutthatphilosophicalargument
mustbebasedonobservationsofacommonworldandreflectionson
whatonehasobservedandthatcomparativephilosophymustinvolve
openingoneselftowiderobservationsanddeeperreflectionsinorder
toreachwhatIhavecalledatranscendentalintegrationofthedifferent
or conflicting.In doing this,one must interpret the other in terms of
the self (zibenti ) and interpret the self in terms of the other
(duibenti )inordertoachieveanoverarchingbalancebetween
the two interpretations. This approach, which I have termed the
approach by an“onto-hermeneutical circle,”can save phenomena by
transforming them into relatively better understood forms under
interpretation. Further, to approach radical difference and conflict,
one must observe others in the world and reflect on what one has
observed through an awakening of one’s inner creativity.
This is the third volume in our Series of Supplements since 2006.I
wishtothankourthreeguesteditorsforthisoutstandingSupplement,
particularlyNicholasBunnin,whorecommendedthisgroupofexcel-
lent papers to me for publication in the spirit of both Socrates and
Confucius.
Chung-ying Cheng
Editor of Supplement Series
Editor-in-Chief
Journal of Chinese Philosophy
Honolulu
October,2008
nicholas bunnin
INTRODUCTION
ThearticlesinthisvolumearedrawnfromaneventinChinamarking
the centenary of the birth of Emmanuel Lévinas. They show the
capacity of Chinese philosophers, in this case specialists in phenom-
enology and French philosophy, to contribute along with leading
Westernscholarstotheperplexingtaskofassessingadeeplyoriginal
contemporary philosopher. Among the many reasons for the con-
tributorstoappreciateLévinasarehistransmissionofthethoughtof
HusserlandHeideggertoFrance;hisspiritualtransformationoftheir
phenomenology; his reflective response to the iconic horrors of
modern life,exemplified by the Holocaust;his rejection of totalizing
political and cultural conceptions of ourselves that he considered to
be a source of these catastrophes; his profoundly original Talmudic
studies;and his reinterpretation of the thought of Maimonides about
our response to the otherness and face of Jehovah in his radical
analysis of the otherness and face of human beings. In addition,
reading Lévinas can lead us to see each of his major predecessors in
a new light.All of these features have stimulated a rich diversity of
response to his methodology and doctrines,including fascinating and
serious objections as well as critical explications and applications.
For Chinese philosophers there are special reasons to pursue an
interest in Lévinas, centering on his regard for ethics, rather than
Husserlian epistemology or Heideggerian ontology, as first philoso-
phy. Although terminology and methods differ, this move can be
comparedtothesearchforamoralmetaphysicsintheworksofXiong
Shili and Mou Zongsan, two twentieth-century philosophers who
provide modern distillations of this theme from Chinese philosophy
in their contemporary Neo-Confucianism.Along with Lévinas, they
holdthatquestionsofhumanvaluelieattheheartofourconception
ofrealityratherthaninaseparatedomainsupplementingavalue-free
account of what there is.Whatever the methodological problems of
copingwithit,theworldfromthisperspectiveisasingleworldthatis
ethical and natural rather than two worlds that defy unification. In
this way,inherited dichotomies of fact and value or metaphysics and
NICHOLASBUNNIN,Dr.,Director,PhilosophyProject,InstituteforChineseStudies,
UniversityofOxford.Specialties:metaphysics,philosophyofmind,Chineseandcompara-
tivephilosophy.E-mail:[email protected]
Lévinas: Chinese and Western Perspectives Edito r by Nicholas Bunnin, Dachun Yang, and Linyu Gu
© 2008 Journal of Chinese Philosophy. ISBN: 978-1-405-19545-4
6 nicholas bunnin
morals are viewed as providing an inherently flawed grounding for
social and individual self-understanding. With their attempts to
combine ethics with metaphysics as first philosophy, Lévinas, Xiong,
and Mou raise questions about conceiving ourselves,our history,our
institutions, and our world, questions that open vistas and domains
thatareoftenhiddenordistortedfromotherstandpoints.ForChinese
philosophers critically exploring territory opened by Emmanual
Lévinas, the terrain, for all of Lévinas’s originality, might have a
certain welcoming familiarity.
It is important, nevertheless, to recognize that the aim of fusing
morality and metaphysics has been contested since the formative
beginnings of Chinese philosophy.While the Dao for Confucians is
both metaphysical and moral, the Dao for Daoists is fundamental
reality that is indifferent to human conceptions of value.The Daoist
injunction is to live naturally and spontaneously rather than living
accordingtocodes,principles,orlawsthataremistakenlysupposedto
beinherentintheDao.Theyholdthatethicalrulescannotcapturethe
creativityrequiredforpersonstoleadtheirlives.Creativityinpractice
isrecognizedbybothConfuciansandDaoistsintheirinterpretations
oftheBookofChanges,buttheDaoistunderstandingofthiscreativ-
ity does not lead to a Confucian moral metaphysics.To understand
eitherLévinasorConfucianaccountsofmoralityandmetaphysics,we
must grasp the questions they were addressing in the intellectual
contextoftheirthought.Tocomparetheirviews,wemustunderstand
thedifferencesaswellasthesimilaritiesoftheirintellectualcultures.
Although Lévinas worked in the phenomenological tradition,ana-
lyticphilosopherswhorecognizetheimportanceofotherapproaches
to philosophy can also be stimulated by his views to use their own
methodstoexploretheconsequencesofplacingethicsandmetaphys-
icsasfundamentaltoallphilosophy.SimonBlackburnhasarguedthat
metaphysics historically has been shaped by a succession of funda-
mental concerns, including logic, religion, science, and language.1
From this perspective, a metaphysics with ethics as its most basic
concern can be seen as an intelligible goal rather than a beckoning
mirage that leads us only to confusion.
Inconsideringthepossibilityofanalyticaswellasphenomenologi-
cal and contemporary Neo-Confucian approaches to establishing a
moral metaphysics and by examining critical responses to such
projects within Chinese,phenomenological,and analytic philosophy,
we find that questions about comparative philosophy recur at every
stage, however historically or culturally close or distant the philoso-
phers or doctrines that we discuss.We have problems of comparison
whether we are considering Lévinas and Heidegger,Confucians and
Daoists,or Lévinas and Mou Zongsan.In all of these cases,we must
introduction 7
determinehowtofindourwayamongstrikinglydifferentphilosophi-
cal aims, methods, doctrines, conceptions of rigor, and standards of
argument.
Jiyuan Yu and I have proposed “saving the phenomena” as an
Aristotelian method in comparative philosophy, with philosophical
goals that go beyond the achievements of comparative intellectual
history.2Thephenomenatobesavedareboththecommonviewsand
the views of the wise on philosophical topics. Aristotle argued that
dialogue is the best way to conserve the important contribution that
conflicting views can make to complex and many-sided philosophical
truth. Aristotle aimed at the truth and sought to use philosophical
argumenttoreconciledifferentviewsinordertoachieveanobjective
account of reality rather than as a compromise removing tensions
among disputants without regard to truth. Because he was pursuing
truth, his own creative philosophical engagement could lead him
beyond the positions that he surveyed. I recommend this method
again, but because the way forward in comparative philosophy
remains fairly murky, I hope that readers will also explore other
methods of achieving philosophical ends through comparison.
Chinese philosophers will also be interested in the key role of
Kant’s account of “nothing” as a stimulus to Lévinas’s rejection
of Husserl’s phenomenology. For Husserl, intentional experience
involves the act of thinking (noesis) and the object of thought
(noema), but Lévinas argued that because of their absolute alterity
the Other and God are not objects for us and hence cannot be
broughtwithinthescopeofHusserl’sanalysis.Inthis,hewasinspired
byKant’sdiscussionofNothingintheCritiqueofPureReason.3Kant
distinguishedfoursensesofNothing:First,anemptyconceptwithout
object(ensrationis),suchasanoumenon;second,anemptyobjectof
aconcept(nihilprivativum),suchasashadoworcold;third,anempty
intuition without an object (ens imaginarium),such as space or time;
andfourth,anemptyobjectwithoutaconcept(nihilnegativum),such
asanimpossibleobjectlikeatwo-sidedrectilinearfigure.Wespeakof
“nothing”where for the reasons specified we lack a concept with an
object.WeshouldalsonotethataccordingtoKantthetranscendental
unity of apperception,4 the“I think”that accompanied all my repre-
sentations,isnotanobjectandiscertainlynotaCartesiansubstance,
but a mode of presenting objects.
LévinastookKant’saccountofanoumenonasanensrationisasa
starting point to express his disquiet with Husserl’s phenomenology,
which could be employed where we have noesis and noema as the
phenomenological counterparts of Kantian concept and object. In
assessing the consequences of Lévinas’s way of dealing with acts
of thinking that lack a noema, we can explore other ways that