LETHAL TARGETING ABROAD: EXPLORING LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS OF ARMED ...

127 Pages·2011·2.27 MB·English

LETHAL TARGETING ABROAD: EXPLORING LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS
OF ARMED DRONE STRIKES IN OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

A Thesis
submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Georgetown University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Master of Arts
in Security Studies

By

Luke A. Olney

Washington, DC
April 14, 2011
Copyright 2011 by Luke A. Olney

All Rights Reserved

ii
LETHAL TARGETING ABROAD: EXPLORING LONG-TERM EFFECTIVENESS
OF ARMED DRONE STRIKES IN OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

Luke A. Olney, B.A.

Thesis Advisor: Adam R. Grissom, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT
As the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan continues in its tenth year, it is important to evaluate
not only the short-term effectiveness, but also the long-term implications of lethal targeting –
specifically the use of armed drone strikes – against high-value individuals. This paper explores
the following research question: are drone strikes an effective long-term strategy in overseas
contingency operations? Specifically, it examines the hypothesis that U.S. drone strikes cause an
increased number of militant attacks on local governments, which is likely to contribute to local
instability in the long term.
Two cases are analyzed to determine the impact of drone strikes on host governments.
The first case examines Yemen from January 2001 through September 2010. Data is evaluated
on the drone strike that killed Abu Ali al-Harithi on November 3, 2002, and the U.S. cruise
missile strikes on targets in Yemen on December 17, 2009, to determine the relationship between
U.S. strikes and militant attacks on the Government of Yemen. The second case evaluates
sustained drone strikes in northwest Pakistan from January 2004 to September 2010 and the
relationship between strikes and militant attacks on the Government of Pakistan. Each case
provides a contextual narrative for the strike periods evaluated.
This study concludes that drone strikes appear to have increased the number of militant
attacks on local government-related targets after isolated drone strikes in both Yemen and
Pakistan. However, in Pakistan where drone strikes have been sustained over time, militant
iii
attacks against the Government of Pakistan leveled off with approximately 30 attacks per month
in 2010. Without further evaluation of more variables, including domestic military operations,
recruitment levels, and other political factors, it is difficult to conclude that drone strikes are
solely responsible for the increased militant attacks on host nations. However, the data is highly
suggestive of the causal link between strikes and attacks. Decisionmakers should be aware of this
possibility and make decisions that limit the counterproductivity of drone strikes.

iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1
CHAPTER II. TERMINOLOGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE .............................................................. 5
CHAPTER III. CONTROVERSY OF DRONE STRIKES ........................................................................ 13
CHAPTER IV. METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................ 21
Hypothesis ............................................................................................................................................... 21
Data and Variables ................................................................................................................................. 21
Limitations .............................................................................................................................................. 23

CHAPTER V. CASE STUDIES AND FINDINGS .................................................................................... 24
Yemen case .............................................................................................................................................. 24
Pakistan case .......................................................................................................................................... 31

CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 37
CHAPTER VII. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................. 41
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................................ 43
Appendix A: Attacks in Yemen .............................................................................................................. 43
Appendix B: Drone Strikes in Pakistan .................................................................................................. 48
Appendix C: Attacks in Pakistan ............................................................................................................ 54

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................................... 119
v
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

As the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan continues in its tenth year, it is important to evaluate
not only the short-term effectiveness, but also the long-term implications of lethal targeting –
specifically the use of armed drone strikes – against high-value individuals (HVIs). The
consequences of drone strikes not only affect the success of U.S. forces to eliminate enemy
combatants, but also its ability to win the ―hearts and minds‖ of the local populace. U.S. drone
strikes also impact the stability of host nations where such strikes are conducted. Lethal targeting
should be reassessed to ensure its effectiveness in removing HVIs and that such a tactic is not
counterproductive to U.S. efforts in already troubled regions, especially as President Obama
seeks to de-escalate involvement in Afghanistan.
Armed drone strikes have had mixed results, but it is likely that they will continue to be
used as a means of lethal targeting to disrupt insurgent networks long into the future. The death
of Baitullah Mehsud, the former leader of the main Taliban militant group in Pakistan, Tehrik-i-
Taliban, demonstrates the attractiveness of drone strikes. Baitullah, along with his wife and
several body guards, was killed by a U.S. drone strike on a compound in South Waziristan,
Pakistan.1 In contrast, a subsequent drone strike on Baitullah‘s more aggressive successor,
Hakimullah Mehsud, missed its intended target.2 Successful strikes have eliminated key enemy
leadership while even unsuccessful ones no doubt limit the freedom of movement of enemy
combatants. However, drone strikes have raised serious questions about how strikes affect enemy
networks and their potential for civilian casualties.

1 ―Obama: ‗We took out‘ Pakistani Taliban chief.‖ Reuters, August 21, 2009, online edition,
http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-41873120090820 (accessed February 7, 2011).
2 Carlotta Gall, ―Video Shows U.S. Attack Did Not Kill Top Militant,‖ The New York Times, May 3, 2010,
online edition, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/world/asia/03taliban.html# (accessed February 7, 2011).
1
Drone strikes are widely criticized for causing undue civilian casualties. A recent study
estimates the actual civilian fatality rate since 2004 is 21 percent, and only six percent during
20103, but these numbers are highly disputed. Even if the correct HVI is eliminated, civilians are
inevitably caught in the crosshairs of Hellfire missiles fired from Predators. Faulty intelligence
has sometimes led to the wrong target being struck altogether. On February 21, 2010, 23 Afghan
civilians were wrongly identified by a U.S.-operated drone as enemy combatants and killed in
airstrikes. It also appears that U.S. commanders were less than forthcoming about reporting the
civilian casualties until an investigation was launched.4 Such incidents often create resentment
with the indigenous populations toward the U.S. and local governments.5 This and the enemy‘s
demonstrated ability to replace its commanders create powerful arguments against the use of
drone strikes. These types of second-order effects raise legitimate concerns about the
contribution of lethal targeting to U.S. strategy.
What follows is a case study on lethal targeting that intends to contribute to the
knowledge and understanding of employing the tactic of armed drone strikes in the ―Global War
on Terror,‖ now dubbed Overseas Contingency Operations, and an evaluation of military
doctrine that guides the HVI targeting process. This paper explores the following research
question: are drone strikes an effective long-term strategy in overseas contingency operations?
Specifically, it examines the hypothesis that U.S. drone strikes cause an increased number of
militant attacks on local governments, which is likely to contribute to local instability in the long
term.

3 Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, ―The Year of the Drone,‖ New America Foundation,
http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones (accessed March 14, 2011).
4 Robert H. Reid, ―Officers reprimanded in fatal drone strike,‖ Army Times, May 29, 2010, online edition,
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2010/05/ap_afghanistan_airforce_drone_052910/ (accessed February 7, 2011).
5 George C. Wilson, ―The True Cost of Assassinations,‖ CongressDaily, September 13, 2010.
2
This paper begins with a review of terminology associated with drone strikes and the
military doctrine that governs human targeting in overseas contingency operations in order to
create the proper context for this study. It will then sample an array of academic opinion related
to the use of drone strikes and how scholars suggest drones should be used, if at all. The majority
of the literature on this topic focuses on the near-term significance, legality, or morality issues
associated with lethal targeting. Most analysts agree that lethal targeting does much to disrupt the
effectiveness and professionalism of insurgent networks in the near term, but the long-term
effects caused by lethal targeting have been largely unexplored or neglected entirely in
discussion because of a lack of publicly available data.
In order to test the stated hypothesis, two cases are analyzed to determine the impact of
drone strikes on host governments and possible long-term effects. The first case examines
Yemen from January 2001 through September 2010. Data is evaluated on the drone strike that
killed Abu Ali al-Harithi on November 3, 2002, and the U.S. cruise missile strikes on targets in
Yemen on December 17, 2009, to determine the relationship between U.S. strikes and militant
attacks on the Government of Yemen. The second case evaluates sustained drone strikes in
northwest Pakistan from January 2004 to September 2010 and the relationship between strikes
and militant attacks on the Government of Pakistan. Each case provides a contextual narrative
for each of the strike periods evaluated, as well as any recent developments associated with
drone strikes within each country.
Lastly, this paper will discuss the conclusions of this research and how they should affect
policy decisions. This type of research is important and timely because of the increased use of
armed drone strikes by the Obama administration and the ever-increasing reliance on high-tech
weapon systems for stand-off attacks by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence
3
Agency.6 A better understanding of the consequences of drone strikes is needed to evaluate the
U.S. drone strategy and how it might be tailored to increase long-term effectiveness.
Decisionmakers should be aware of possible second-order effects from drone strikes and make
decisions that limit the counterproductivity of this tactic. Ultimately, this study hopes to spur
more research and encourage debate on the long-term effectiveness of drone strikes.

6 John Barry and Evan Thomas, ―A War Within,‖ Newsweek, September 20, 2010, and Siobhan Gorman,
―Drones Target Terror Plot,‖ Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2010, online edition,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB20001424052748703694204575518553113206756.html (accessed February 7,
2011).
4
CHAPTER II. TERMINOLOGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE

Drone strikes are used in both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations.
Counterterrorism (CT) operations are enemy-centric and seek to kill enemy leaders and destroy
their organizations.7 These types of offensive operations are highly selective in their target
selections and require accurate, up-to-date intelligence. Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations,
on the other hand, are population-centric8 – designed to win the ―hearts and minds‖ of the local
populace. Drone strikes are often used to create a ―safe-enough environment‖ for COIN
operations to take place.9 The flexibility to move between CT and COIN operations as the
environment dictates is essential in modern warfare. This combination and balance of operations
is being conducted in Afghanistan and has been described as hybrid warfare – the combination
of traditional warfare mixed with CT and COIN operations.10
Targeting in general refers to the process used by military and nonmilitary agencies to
identify and prioritize targets of tactical, operational, and strategic value. Targeting is done in
both CT and COIN operations. Targets can be entities or objects. These include both kinetic
targets, such as individuals, and stationary targets, such as lines of communication or hardened
facilities. Different terms are often used to describe a target‘s value. For example, targets with
tactical and operational value are often called high-value targets (HVTs), while targets with
strategic value are called high-payoff targets (HPTs). Targets referring to individuals, such as an

7 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009), xv.
8 Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, xv.
9 There is much disagreement over the type of operations that should be conducted in Afghanistan. Should
operations be more CT-centric or COIN-centric and what is the proper balance between the two? Vice President Joe
Biden advocates for what has been dubbed counterterrorism plus (CT plus) in which lethal targeting is used to root
out terrorists, while small contingents of U.S. forces are used to train indigenous security forces. For more on this
argument, see Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York:Simon & Schuster, 2010), 234-235.
10 Frank Hoffman, ―Are We Ready for Hybrid Wars?,‖ Small Wars Journal, online edition,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/02/are-we-ready-for-hybrid-wars/ (accessed October 1, 2010).
5