Leonard Wood and Cuban Independence, 1898–1902

245 Pages·1971·10.202 MB·English

by  James H. Hitchman (auth.)

LEONARD WOOD
AND CUBAN INDEPENDENCE
1898-1902
LEONARD WOOD
AND CUBAN INDEPENDENCE
1898-1902
by
JAMES H. HITCHMAN
I I
MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE / 1971
© 1971 by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague, Holland
All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form
ISBN 978-94-015-0236-8 ISBN 978-94-015-0749-3 (eBook)
DOl 10.1007/978-94-015-0749-3
To Marie
Matt, Suzy and Dan
CONTENTS
I. The Reasons for Occupation, 1898-1899
II. The Administration of the Military Government of Cuba 25
III. The Legal and Educational Systems 42
IV. The Economy of Cuba 60
V. Self-Government and Strategic Security, January Through July,
1900 75
VI. The Constitutional Convention, August, 1900 Through January,
1901 94
VII. Birth of the Platt Amendment, February to March 2, 1901 115
VIII. Negotiating the Platt Amendment, March Through April 15,
1901 135
IX. The Cubans Go To Washington:
An Exegesis of the Platt Amendment 149
X. Acceptance of the Platt Amendment, May and June, 1901 162
XI. The Transfer of Control, July, 1901 to May 20, 1902 184
Epilogue: The Fight Over Reciprocity 202
Appendices 213
A. Joint Resolution of Congress, April 20, 1898
B. Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1899
C. Disbursements of Military Government
D. Vote on the Platt Amendment
E. Map of Cuba
F. Platt Amendment
Bibliography 223
Index 231
PREFACE
This is a study of the Military Government of Cuba from 1898 to 1902.
Tracing and explaining the actions of General Leonard Wood's adminis
tration during those years reveals how the United States Government re
solved the questions of independence, strategic security, and economic inter
ests in regard to Cuba. Leonard Wood, Secretary of War Elihu Root, Senator
Orville H. Platt, and President William McKinley formulated and carried
out policies that had a strong influence on subsequent Cuban-American
relations. The broader aspects of this study, civil-military relations and
American imperialism, are topics of importance to all citizens today. This is
institutional and biographical history, written in the belief that a full ac
count of the men, action, and circumstances will add to our understanding
of the period when the United States emerged as a world power.
I am indebted to Professors Gerald E. Wheeler of San Jose State College
and Armin Rappaport of the University of California, San Diego, who di
rected my research in the early stages, and to Professor Eric Bellquist of the
University of California, Berkeley, for his criticism of the manuscript when
it was in dissertation stage. To Professor Raymond J. Sontag I would like to
pay special tribute for his guidance and inspiration through the years. The
assistance of my mother, Mrs. Sue Hitchman, is deeply appreciated. My
thanks go also to the staffs at the Library of the U. S. Department of State,
National Archives, Library of Congress, Connecticut State Library, Colorado
State Historical Society, and Libraries of the University of California, Ber
keley, as well as to the Graduate Committee on Research for Travel and
Grants at Berkeley. Research has been carried out in Cuban, German and
American sources. The writing shows both the Cuban and American points
of view, indicating a large amount of cooperation between the two groups
during the years of the first occupation.
Professor Frederick M. Nunn and his wife, Diana, of Portland State Uni.
versity, generously assisted by editing the manuscript and checking my
x PREFACE
translation. Professors Lejeune Cummins of California State College at
Hayward and Michael Onorato of California State College at Fullerton have
shared their deep interest in Leonard Wood. Many persons at Willamette
University, Salem, Oregon, encouraged me into academic life, among them
President G. Herbert Smith, Dean Robert D. Gregg, Professors Ivan Lovell,
Chester Kaiser and Howard Runkel. In various ways these friends also eased
the way to completion: Mr. Harrison W. Wood of Malvern, Pennsylvania;
Mr. and Mrs. John Gregory of Washington, D.C.; Mr. and Mrs. William
H. Woolsey, Jr., of Berkeley, California; Mr. and Mrs. Felix Calkins of Lake
Oswego, Oregon; Professors Victor Dahl, James Hart and Charles White of
Portland State University; Professors William Bultmann and Manfred
Vernon of Western Washington State College. The editors of The Americas
and the Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs have gener
ously granted permission to use material previously printed in those journals.
The support of Herbert C. Taylor, Jr., Dean of Research and Grants, and his
staff, Mrs. Jane Clark, Mrs. Ann Drake and Mrs. Ruth Huffine, at Western
Washington State College is gratefully acknowledged. Any mistakes in fact
or interpretation are mine. Finally, I thank Dr. H. J. H. Hartgerink and
Nijhoff's for publishing this book. May the reader enjoy it!
Bellingham, Washington
November, 1970
CHAPTER I
THE REASONS FOR OCCUPATION, 1898-1899
At the end of the Spanish-American War, the United States occupied Cuba
with a temporary military government in order to bring stability to the island.
Conditions demanded American intervention because no power existed in
the island capable of rebuilding a society weakened by nearly a decade of
depression and revolution. Authority to pacify Cuba was given to President
McKinley by the Congressional Joint Resolution of April 20, 1898, and the
Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898.1 These instruments indicated the
intention of the United States not to annex Cuba but rather to administer the
island's government until the Cuban people could govern themselves. The
prerequisite for withdrawal was the establishment of an independent republic
whose stability would satisfy the requirements of the United States.
The military government, which remained in Cuba until May of 1902,
undertook the reform of various institutions. As administered by General
Leonard Wood, it constructed the foundation for a stable, independent re
public by accomplishing impressive reforms in education, the legal system,
sanitation, public works, and self-government. In pursuing this course, the
McKinley and Roosevelt administrations steered between evacuation and
annexation. Small groups in both Cuba and the United States demanded
immediate evacuation; others desired ultimate annexation. The majority in
both countries, however, supported the United States policy of remaining in
Cuba for a few years to establish a durable government that would render
future intervention unnecessary.
The military government ceased only when it appeared that the necessary
safeguards to prevent upheaval in Cuba had been obtained. These safeguards
1 For the Joint Resolution and the Peace Treaty, see Appendices A and B, noting
that the United States refused to accept the cession of Cuba by Spain, and with the
fourth (Teller) clause of the Joint Resolution, the United States bound itself to depart
from Cuba. More detail, statistics and information may be found in J. Hitchman,
"Leonard Wood and the Cuban Question, 1898-1902," Ph. D. dissertation, University
of California, Berkeley, 1965.
2 THE REASONS FOR OCCUPATION, 1898-1899
were embodied in the Platt Amendment of 1901, enacted by the United
States Congress, accepted by the Cuban Constitutional Convention, and
agreed upon in a treaty between the two countries. The Platt Amendment
was intended to prevent Cubans and foreign nations from weakening Cuban
sovereignty; it was not intended to make Cuba a protectorate of the United
States. Juxtaposed with the Platt Amendment was the Reciprocity Agree
ment of 1903, which gave the Cubans the market they needed to revive their
economy. These political and economic measures were designed to assist a
neighbor state to maintain itself as a friendly republic.
This experiment in republic making eventually failed. The sad course of
Cuban-American relations in the 20th century prompts the inquiry as to
whether anything occurred during the intervention that might have produced
such a result. The main reasons for the failure of the Cuban Republic may
be found in events that came after 1902, but the premature termination of
occupation was a crucial cause of the ultimate failure of Cuban re
pu blicanism.
The United States Government did not believe that the American people
would allow the occupation to continue for as long as a decade. Had this
been possible, representative government would have been more likely to
endure. Despite the remarkable achievements of the Wood administration,
there remained enough indications of instability to warrant continued occu
pation, but the Americans, eager to leave, hoped that the Platt Amendment
would act as a stabilizer. However, Cubans and Americans after 1902 rarely
understood or employed the Platt Amendment as its authors intended.
Cubans, who hampered chances for success by resenting their inability to win
independence unaided, allowed hurt pride to lead them to use the Platt
Amendment as an excuse for political irresponsibility instead of a spring
board to maturity. Americans meddled too often in the island's affairs, for
getting the restraints of the amendment on themselves. In the first inter
vention, there seemed to be a paradox of authoritarian democracy which im
posed self-government with safeguards upon a foreign culture.
The planners of Cuban policy attempted to resolve this conflict between
the principles of self-determination and strategic security. Presidents McKin
ley and Roosevelt, Senator Orville H. Platt, Secretary of War Elihu Root,
and General Wood served Cuban-American interests by supporting Cuban
independence. They did not believe the islanders were ready for immediate
independence in 1898 but believed them capable of it after preparation. The
delegates to the Constitutional Convention also demonstrated their desire
and faith in deciding for a republic by accepting the Platt Amendment. From
1898 to 1902 Cuban moderates and the military government cooperated to
THE REASONS FOR OCCUPATION, 1898-1899 3
prepare Cuba for nationhood. Their most difficult task was to form unity
among Cubans. The only alternative to American assistance in this endeavor
would have been continued civil war.
In 1898 Cuba was exhausted. A decade of depression and revolution had
reduced the island's population by twelve percent and destroyed two-thirds
of its wealth. The economy was crippled by staggering debt. The countryside
lay ravaged and towns and cities suffered from famine and pestilence. Water
systems and sewers were destroyed, and the only sanitation came from
buzzards, dogs, and rain. Malaria, dysentery, typhoid, smallpox, and yellow
fever stalked emaciated Cubans. Deaths in Santiago alone exceeded two
hundred per day. Bodies littered the shattered streets, while the living
crouched in dark and filthy dwellings, awaiting relief. The more fortunate
Cubans and Spaniards, unimpressed by this addition to the accumulated
filth of centuries, affirmed that life would continue and did little to help.
Virtual anarchy prevailed as enmity continued between Spaniards and
Cubans.
Of the island's 1.5 million people, two-thirds were illiterate and unem
ployed. The courts had ceased to function, public funds disappeared in the
hands of the Spaniards, and ordinary lines of communication and trans
portation were severed. The Cuban army had not disbanded and American
troops were weakened by tropical disease. It was a critical time, demanding
action to feed the starving, tend the sick, clean the cities, plant the fields, and
rebuild the island.2
But rebuilding required cooperation, and hostility in Cuban society, caused
in part by a colonial heritage of corruption and misrule, partly by the ener
vation stemming from decades of depression and revolution, prevented unity
among Cubans. This hostility flared among five groups: the Spanish element,
autonomists (Cubans desiring home rule under Spain), neutralists, revo
lutionaries, and the Negro faction. The latter two groups cooperated with
each other and, with the neutralists, composed a majority of the populace.
Yet this coalition was too weak to achieve a peaceful, prosperous Cuba, for
most of the wealth and talent lay with the Spaniards and autonomists, who
avoided political activities. The revolutionaries, given the opportunities,
would have enacted severe reprisals against these two groups, who they be
lieved had oppressed the Cuban people.a
2 u. S. War Department, Report on the Census of Cuba, 1899 (Wn: GPO, 19(0),41,
155,179; H. Hagedorn, Leonard Wood (N.Y., 1931), 1,184-188.
3 U. S., Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2d Sess., 3969; 0. H. Platt, "Our Relation
to the People of Cuba and Porto Rico," Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science, XVIII (July, 1901),152.