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Leonard Wood and Cuban Independence, 1898–1902 PDF

245 Pages·1971·10.202 MB·English
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LEONARD WOOD AND CUBAN INDEPENDENCE 1898-1902 LEONARD WOOD AND CUBAN INDEPENDENCE 1898-1902 by JAMES H. HITCHMAN I I MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE HAGUE / 1971 © 1971 by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague, Holland All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form ISBN 978-94-015-0236-8 ISBN 978-94-015-0749-3 (eBook) DOl 10.1007/978-94-015-0749-3 To Marie Matt, Suzy and Dan CONTENTS I. The Reasons for Occupation, 1898-1899 II. The Administration of the Military Government of Cuba 25 III. The Legal and Educational Systems 42 IV. The Economy of Cuba 60 V. Self-Government and Strategic Security, January Through July, 1900 75 VI. The Constitutional Convention, August, 1900 Through January, 1901 94 VII. Birth of the Platt Amendment, February to March 2, 1901 115 VIII. Negotiating the Platt Amendment, March Through April 15, 1901 135 IX. The Cubans Go To Washington: An Exegesis of the Platt Amendment 149 X. Acceptance of the Platt Amendment, May and June, 1901 162 XI. The Transfer of Control, July, 1901 to May 20, 1902 184 Epilogue: The Fight Over Reciprocity 202 Appendices 213 A. Joint Resolution of Congress, April 20, 1898 B. Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1899 C. Disbursements of Military Government D. Vote on the Platt Amendment E. Map of Cuba F. Platt Amendment Bibliography 223 Index 231 PREFACE This is a study of the Military Government of Cuba from 1898 to 1902. Tracing and explaining the actions of General Leonard Wood's adminis tration during those years reveals how the United States Government re solved the questions of independence, strategic security, and economic inter ests in regard to Cuba. Leonard Wood, Secretary of War Elihu Root, Senator Orville H. Platt, and President William McKinley formulated and carried out policies that had a strong influence on subsequent Cuban-American relations. The broader aspects of this study, civil-military relations and American imperialism, are topics of importance to all citizens today. This is institutional and biographical history, written in the belief that a full ac count of the men, action, and circumstances will add to our understanding of the period when the United States emerged as a world power. I am indebted to Professors Gerald E. Wheeler of San Jose State College and Armin Rappaport of the University of California, San Diego, who di rected my research in the early stages, and to Professor Eric Bellquist of the University of California, Berkeley, for his criticism of the manuscript when it was in dissertation stage. To Professor Raymond J. Sontag I would like to pay special tribute for his guidance and inspiration through the years. The assistance of my mother, Mrs. Sue Hitchman, is deeply appreciated. My thanks go also to the staffs at the Library of the U. S. Department of State, National Archives, Library of Congress, Connecticut State Library, Colorado State Historical Society, and Libraries of the University of California, Ber keley, as well as to the Graduate Committee on Research for Travel and Grants at Berkeley. Research has been carried out in Cuban, German and American sources. The writing shows both the Cuban and American points of view, indicating a large amount of cooperation between the two groups during the years of the first occupation. Professor Frederick M. Nunn and his wife, Diana, of Portland State Uni. versity, generously assisted by editing the manuscript and checking my x PREFACE translation. Professors Lejeune Cummins of California State College at Hayward and Michael Onorato of California State College at Fullerton have shared their deep interest in Leonard Wood. Many persons at Willamette University, Salem, Oregon, encouraged me into academic life, among them President G. Herbert Smith, Dean Robert D. Gregg, Professors Ivan Lovell, Chester Kaiser and Howard Runkel. In various ways these friends also eased the way to completion: Mr. Harrison W. Wood of Malvern, Pennsylvania; Mr. and Mrs. John Gregory of Washington, D.C.; Mr. and Mrs. William H. Woolsey, Jr., of Berkeley, California; Mr. and Mrs. Felix Calkins of Lake Oswego, Oregon; Professors Victor Dahl, James Hart and Charles White of Portland State University; Professors William Bultmann and Manfred Vernon of Western Washington State College. The editors of The Americas and the Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs have gener ously granted permission to use material previously printed in those journals. The support of Herbert C. Taylor, Jr., Dean of Research and Grants, and his staff, Mrs. Jane Clark, Mrs. Ann Drake and Mrs. Ruth Huffine, at Western Washington State College is gratefully acknowledged. Any mistakes in fact or interpretation are mine. Finally, I thank Dr. H. J. H. Hartgerink and Nijhoff's for publishing this book. May the reader enjoy it! Bellingham, Washington November, 1970 CHAPTER I THE REASONS FOR OCCUPATION, 1898-1899 At the end of the Spanish-American War, the United States occupied Cuba with a temporary military government in order to bring stability to the island. Conditions demanded American intervention because no power existed in the island capable of rebuilding a society weakened by nearly a decade of depression and revolution. Authority to pacify Cuba was given to President McKinley by the Congressional Joint Resolution of April 20, 1898, and the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898.1 These instruments indicated the intention of the United States not to annex Cuba but rather to administer the island's government until the Cuban people could govern themselves. The prerequisite for withdrawal was the establishment of an independent republic whose stability would satisfy the requirements of the United States. The military government, which remained in Cuba until May of 1902, undertook the reform of various institutions. As administered by General Leonard Wood, it constructed the foundation for a stable, independent re public by accomplishing impressive reforms in education, the legal system, sanitation, public works, and self-government. In pursuing this course, the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations steered between evacuation and annexation. Small groups in both Cuba and the United States demanded immediate evacuation; others desired ultimate annexation. The majority in both countries, however, supported the United States policy of remaining in Cuba for a few years to establish a durable government that would render future intervention unnecessary. The military government ceased only when it appeared that the necessary safeguards to prevent upheaval in Cuba had been obtained. These safeguards 1 For the Joint Resolution and the Peace Treaty, see Appendices A and B, noting that the United States refused to accept the cession of Cuba by Spain, and with the fourth (Teller) clause of the Joint Resolution, the United States bound itself to depart from Cuba. More detail, statistics and information may be found in J. Hitchman, "Leonard Wood and the Cuban Question, 1898-1902," Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1965. 2 THE REASONS FOR OCCUPATION, 1898-1899 were embodied in the Platt Amendment of 1901, enacted by the United States Congress, accepted by the Cuban Constitutional Convention, and agreed upon in a treaty between the two countries. The Platt Amendment was intended to prevent Cubans and foreign nations from weakening Cuban sovereignty; it was not intended to make Cuba a protectorate of the United States. Juxtaposed with the Platt Amendment was the Reciprocity Agree ment of 1903, which gave the Cubans the market they needed to revive their economy. These political and economic measures were designed to assist a neighbor state to maintain itself as a friendly republic. This experiment in republic making eventually failed. The sad course of Cuban-American relations in the 20th century prompts the inquiry as to whether anything occurred during the intervention that might have produced such a result. The main reasons for the failure of the Cuban Republic may be found in events that came after 1902, but the premature termination of occupation was a crucial cause of the ultimate failure of Cuban re pu blicanism. The United States Government did not believe that the American people would allow the occupation to continue for as long as a decade. Had this been possible, representative government would have been more likely to endure. Despite the remarkable achievements of the Wood administration, there remained enough indications of instability to warrant continued occu pation, but the Americans, eager to leave, hoped that the Platt Amendment would act as a stabilizer. However, Cubans and Americans after 1902 rarely understood or employed the Platt Amendment as its authors intended. Cubans, who hampered chances for success by resenting their inability to win independence unaided, allowed hurt pride to lead them to use the Platt Amendment as an excuse for political irresponsibility instead of a spring board to maturity. Americans meddled too often in the island's affairs, for getting the restraints of the amendment on themselves. In the first inter vention, there seemed to be a paradox of authoritarian democracy which im posed self-government with safeguards upon a foreign culture. The planners of Cuban policy attempted to resolve this conflict between the principles of self-determination and strategic security. Presidents McKin ley and Roosevelt, Senator Orville H. Platt, Secretary of War Elihu Root, and General Wood served Cuban-American interests by supporting Cuban independence. They did not believe the islanders were ready for immediate independence in 1898 but believed them capable of it after preparation. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention also demonstrated their desire and faith in deciding for a republic by accepting the Platt Amendment. From 1898 to 1902 Cuban moderates and the military government cooperated to THE REASONS FOR OCCUPATION, 1898-1899 3 prepare Cuba for nationhood. Their most difficult task was to form unity among Cubans. The only alternative to American assistance in this endeavor would have been continued civil war. In 1898 Cuba was exhausted. A decade of depression and revolution had reduced the island's population by twelve percent and destroyed two-thirds of its wealth. The economy was crippled by staggering debt. The countryside lay ravaged and towns and cities suffered from famine and pestilence. Water systems and sewers were destroyed, and the only sanitation came from buzzards, dogs, and rain. Malaria, dysentery, typhoid, smallpox, and yellow fever stalked emaciated Cubans. Deaths in Santiago alone exceeded two hundred per day. Bodies littered the shattered streets, while the living crouched in dark and filthy dwellings, awaiting relief. The more fortunate Cubans and Spaniards, unimpressed by this addition to the accumulated filth of centuries, affirmed that life would continue and did little to help. Virtual anarchy prevailed as enmity continued between Spaniards and Cubans. Of the island's 1.5 million people, two-thirds were illiterate and unem ployed. The courts had ceased to function, public funds disappeared in the hands of the Spaniards, and ordinary lines of communication and trans portation were severed. The Cuban army had not disbanded and American troops were weakened by tropical disease. It was a critical time, demanding action to feed the starving, tend the sick, clean the cities, plant the fields, and rebuild the island.2 But rebuilding required cooperation, and hostility in Cuban society, caused in part by a colonial heritage of corruption and misrule, partly by the ener vation stemming from decades of depression and revolution, prevented unity among Cubans. This hostility flared among five groups: the Spanish element, autonomists (Cubans desiring home rule under Spain), neutralists, revo lutionaries, and the Negro faction. The latter two groups cooperated with each other and, with the neutralists, composed a majority of the populace. Yet this coalition was too weak to achieve a peaceful, prosperous Cuba, for most of the wealth and talent lay with the Spaniards and autonomists, who avoided political activities. The revolutionaries, given the opportunities, would have enacted severe reprisals against these two groups, who they be lieved had oppressed the Cuban people.a 2 u. S. War Department, Report on the Census of Cuba, 1899 (Wn: GPO, 19(0),41, 155,179; H. Hagedorn, Leonard Wood (N.Y., 1931), 1,184-188. 3 U. S., Congressional Record, 55th Cong., 2d Sess., 3969; 0. H. Platt, "Our Relation to the People of Cuba and Porto Rico," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, XVIII (July, 1901),152.

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