Legitimacy's Stutter: The Philosophical Anarchist Challenge and Deliberation's Uncertain Solution

413 Pages·2017·1.95 MB·English

UC San Diego
UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Legitimacy’s Stutter: The Philosophical Anarchist Challenge and Deliberation’s Uncertain
Solution
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2sm1z2q2
Author
Ward, Alan
Publication Date
2017

Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

Legitimacy’s Stutter: The Philosophical Anarchist Challenge and Deliberation’s
Uncertain Solution

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Alan Ward

Committee in charge:

Professor Tracy B. Strong, Chair
Professor Gerry Mackie, Co-Chair
Professor Harvey Goldman
Professor Marcel Henaff
Professor Andy Lamey

2017

The Dissertation of Alan Ward is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for
publication on microfilm and electronically:

_____________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________

_____________________________________________________________________

Co-Chair

Chair

University of California, San Diego
2017

iii
DEDICATION
Writing a dissertation is hard. I don’t know anyone who successfully wrote one without
sometimes feeling as though they were running into a brick wall. Over. And over. And
over. But some people made the process less difficult. These are the people who put
padding on the wall, bandaged my forehead, and encouraged me to keep banging. This
dissertation is dedicated to them.

First, thanks go to my committee – Tracy Strong, Gerry Mackie, Harvey Goldman, Marcel
Hénaff, and Andy Lamey. The breadth and depth of their knowledge baffles me. At this
point I just take for granted that when they speak, whether in a group setting or one-on-
one, I’m about to hear something perceptive and liable to force me to rethink some of my
positions. Thank you for your professionalism, your help, and for making me smarter. The
same goes to Prof. Isaac Balbus, who supervised my Masters thesis at the University of
Illinois at Chicago. Ike taught me that it’s possible to be critical while being kind.

I also want to thank my grad student cohort and the friends I made in San Diego. My
friends Kathryn and Rhys fed me, laughed with me, and made sure I never had to have a
pint alone. Rick Malabo helped me clear my jumbled thoughts by going on frequent walks
and showing me unrelenting kindness. Marc Rolnik challenged me, but did so as a true
friend, providing wine and chocolate as we debated politics. Konstantin Ash entertained
and one-upped my ridiculous assertions until our talks reached the level of sublime
absurdity. Thanks to Simone Günther, who taught me many lessons, including humility by
tying me in a pizza-eating contest. Finally, my relationship with Rachel MacCratic has
been a major influence on my thought. She is one of the most outsized and original
personalities I met in any field, and I can’t imagine my time in San Diego without her.

Thanks go to Dr. Andrew Sward for all the laughs and rants. Sara Wong supported me
during the bad times and celebrated with me during the good ones. I cannot thank her
enough for being a part of my life. Peninah Rosenblum: you have filled my life with joy
and have encouraged me to be a better man. I’m so happy you’re my partner.

Thanks to Mark Bigney, whose brilliance and almost frightening uprightness has made
him my stock character when discussing intelligence or Kant’s categorical imperative.
Luiza Axioti has been a model of integrity and courage. Marc-A has shown me what it
means to combine compassion, an analytic mind, and an assertive drive for novelty. In a
very real sense, I never would have gone to graduate school had it not been for Marc
Peridis, Pirada Chamandy, and Jennifer Teoh. Thank you.

Erat, Darc, Jeron: seeing you is always a highlight when I visit Montreal. It wouldn’t be
home without you. Thanks for the hospitality and, most of all, the ridiculousness.

Finally, this work is especially dedicated to my family. Andrea and Jason: I love and
admire both of you. Simone and Gwen: I couldn’t ask for more wonderful nieces. You
make being an uncle fun. Mom and dad, thank you so, so much for loving me and
teaching me so much. I’m proud to have you as parents. <3
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SIGNATURE PAGE…………………………………………………………………………iii
DEDICATION………………………………………………………………………………..iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................................... v
VITA ....................................................................................................................................... viii
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION .............................................................................. ix
Chapter 1: The Philosophical Anarchist Challenge.................................................................... 1
I. Legitimate Authority and Philosophical Anarchism ..................................................... 4
II. Types of Philosophical Anarchism ............................................................................... 11
II.1 Wolff and Simmons .................................................................................................... 11
II.2 “My” Country and the Political .................................................................................. 17
III. Simmons vs. Simmons.................................................................................................. 22
IV. Paths Not Taken: Alternative Responses to Simmons .............................................. 27
IV.1 Alternative Responses ............................................................................................... 27
IV.2 Upshot ....................................................................................................................... 32
V. Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 33
Chapter 2: Gratitude ................................................................................................................. 37
I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 37
II. Description ..................................................................................................................... 38
II.1. What kind of relationship? Filial vs. Transactional Gratitude ................................... 38
II.2 Psychological and Moral Gratitude ............................................................................ 46
III. Critiques ........................................................................................................................ 49
III.1 Against filial gratitude .............................................................................................. 49
III.2 Intentionality ............................................................................................................. 52
III.3 The Value of Gifts ..................................................................................................... 56
III.4 Goods relative to which bads? Gratitude and counterfactuals .................................. 62
Chapter 3: Fair Play .................................................................................................................. 70
I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 70
II. The Hart-Rawls Theory and Its Challenges ................................................................ 70
II.1 Original formulation ................................................................................................... 70
II.2 Objections to the original formulations ...................................................................... 73
III. Klosko’s Theory ........................................................................................................... 76
III.1 Klosko's Three Criteria ............................................................................................. 76
III.2 Discretionary Goods ................................................................................................. 82
IV. Challenges to Klosko .................................................................................................... 87
IV.1 Evil but fair regimes ................................................................................................. 88
IV.2 The reliance on other theories ................................................................................... 92
IV.3 Ambiguous empirical data ........................................................................................ 94
IV.4 Barely acceptable choices and symbolic violence .................................................... 96
V. Green and Reasonable Envy ........................................................................................ .99
VI. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 103
Chapter 4: Voting and Consent .............................................................................................. 105
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 105
II. Consent ......................................................................................................................... 108
v
II.1 Affinities between consent and promising ............................................................... 110
II.2 Differences between consent and promising ............................................................ 114
II.3 Consent, promising, and informality ........................................................................ 118
III. Voting .......................................................................................................................... 122
III.1 Voting does not entail consent ................................................................................ 123
III.2 Social understandings of the link between consent and voting ............................... 129
III.3 The non-consenting voter ........................................................................................ 133
IV. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 137
Chapter 5: Natural Duty, Dignity, and Respect ...................................................................... 140
I. Existing Natural Duty Theories and response ............................................................ 141
I.1 Rawls’s natural duty theory ....................................................................................... 141
I.2 Philosophical anarchist response ............................................................................... 144
II. Dignity and Respect ..................................................................................................... 151
II.1 Dignity ...................................................................................................................... 153
II.2 Respect ..................................................................................................................... 161
III. Natural duties and deliberation ................................................................................ 179
Chapter 6: Deliberative Democracy ....................................................................................... 184
I. Why Deliberative Democracy? .................................................................................... 184
I.1 Problems with democracy .......................................................................................... 186
I.3 Deliberation Defined ................................................................................................. 200
II. Deliberative Models: Orthodox vs. Subaltern ........................................................... 211
II.1 Orthodox Models ...................................................................................................... 211
II.2 Critiques of Orthodox Models and Rise of Subaltern Deliberative Democracy ...... 216
III. Critiques of Subaltern Models and Impasse ............................................................ 222
IV. Privacy and Modified Model ..................................................................................... 229
IV.1 Privacy and the Internal World ............................................................................... 229
IV.2 Recap and Philosophical Anarchist-friendly Model ............................................... 234
Chapter 7: Etiquette ................................................................................................................ 245
I. Politeness, Face, and Politic Behavior ......................................................................... 246
I.1 Brown & Levinson .................................................................................................... 246
I.2 Watts and the Critique of B&L .................................................................................. 253
I.3 Comparing the frameworks ....................................................................................... 260
I.4 Fiske ........................................................................................................................... 266
II. Laughter ....................................................................................................................... 274
III. Conclusions ................................................................................................................. 283
Chapter 8: Apology ................................................................................................................ 288
I. The Structure of Apology ............................................................................................. 289
I.1. Background ............................................................................................................... 289
I.2. Tavuchis's Tripartite Apologies ................................................................................ 293
I.3. Apologies in Political Science .................................................................................. 305
II. Lazare and Critique of Ideal Model........................................................................... 309
II.1. Lazare ...................................................................................................................... 309
II.2. Critique of Tavuchis ................................................................................................ 316
III. Restorative Justice and Apology ............................................................................... 322
III.1. The Importance of Apologies in Restorative Justice ............................................. 322
III.2. Case Study: Apologies and Braithwaite ................................................................. 334
vi
IV. Apology in Deliberative Contexts ............................................................................. 337
IV.1 Apology and Coercion ............................................................................................ 340
IV.2. The burden of acceptance ...................................................................................... 346
V. Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 353
Chapter 9: Rehabilitating Wolff ............................................................................................. 355
I. Introduction to the Conclusion .................................................................................... 355
II. The Alienation Critique .............................................................................................. 359
II.1 Summary and description of Wolff .......................................................................... 359
II.2 Baugh's critique ........................................................................................................ 363
II.3 Response to Baugh ................................................................................................... 366
III. The Promises are Promises Critique ........................................................................ 371
III.1 Are all promises alike? Or, how to fail at promising. ............................................. 371
III.2 Attenuated conception political promises ............................................................... 376
III.3 Promises and the social meaning of agreements ..................................................... 377
IV. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 381
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................... 388

vii
VITA

2004 Bachelor of Arts, McGill University
2007-2009 Research Assistant, University of Illinois at Chicago
2009 Master of Arts, University of Illinois at Chicago
2013-2017 Instructor, University of California, San Diego
2017 Doctor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego

viii
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Legitimacy’s Stutter: The Philosophical Anarchist Challenge and Deliberation’s
Uncertain Solution

by

Alan Ward

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

University of California, San Diego, 2017

Professor Tracy B. Strong, Chair
Professor Gerry Mackie, Co-Chair

There is persistent disagreement over whether or not there is a prima facie
ix