Table Of Content

L   H  M P    L     H M P   J R Edited by Barbara Herman                       Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England  Copyright   by the President and Fellows of Harvard College    Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rawls, John, – Lectureson thehistoryofmoral philosophy/JohnRawls; editedbyBarbara Herman. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN --- (alk. paper)—ISBN --- (pbk. : alk. paper) . Ethics, Modern—th century. . Ethics, Modern—th century. . Ethics, Modern—th century. I. Herman, Barbara. II. Title. BJ.R  ′.′′—dc - C E’ F  A N   T  I: M M P, –  . A Difference between Classical and Modern Moral Philosophy  . The Main Problem of Greek Moral Philosophy  . The Background of Modern Moral Philosophy  . The Problems of Modern Moral Philosophy  . The Relation between Religion and Science  . Kant on Science and Religion  . On Studying Historical Texts  H . M P   P  . Background: Skepticism and the Fideism of Nature  . Classification of the Passions  . Outline of Section  of Part III of Book II  . Hume’s Account of (Nonmoral) Deliberation: The Official View  . R D   R  R  . Three Questions about Hume’s Official View  . Three Further Psychological Principles  . Deliberation as Transforming the System of Passions  . The General Appetite to Good  . The General Appetite to Good: Passion or Principle?          . J   A V  . The Capital of the Sciences  . The Elements of Hume’s Problem  . The Origin of Justice and Property  . The Circumstances of Justice  . The Idea of Convention  Examples and Supplementary Remarks  . Justice as a Best Scheme of Conventions  . The Two Stages of Development  . T C  R I  . Introduction  . Some of Clarke’s Main Claims  . The Content of Right and Wrong  . Rational Intuitionism’s Moral Psychology  . Hume’s Critique of Rational Intuitionism  . Hume’s Second Argument: Morality Not Demonstrable  . T J S  . Introduction  . Hume’s Account of Sympathy  . The First Objection: The Idea of the Judicious Spectator  . The Second Objection: Virtue in Rags Is Still Virtue  . The Epistemological Role of the Moral Sentiments  . Whether Hume Has a Conception of Practical Reason  . The Concluding Section of the Treatise  Appendix: Hume’s Disowning the Treatise  L . H M P  . Introduction  . Leibniz’s Metaphysical Perfectionism  . The Concept of a Perfection  . Leibniz’s Predicate-in-Subject Theory of Truth  . Some Comments on Leibniz’s Account of Truth  [  ]         . S  A S: T F  . The Complete Individual Concept Includes Active Powers  . Spirits as Individual Rational Substances  . True Freedom  . Reason, Judgment, and Will  . A Note on the Practical Point of View  K . G:P  P I  . Introductory Comments  . Some Points about the Preface: Paragraphs –  . The Idea of a Pure Will  . The Main Argument of Groundwork I  . The Absolute Value of a Good Will  . The Special Purpose of Reason  . Two Roles of the Good Will  . T C I: T F F  . Introduction  . Features of Ideal Moral Agents  . The Four-Step CI-Procedure  . Kant’s Second Example: The Deceitful Promise  . Kant’s Fourth Example: The Maxim of Indifference  . Two Limits on Information  . The Structure of Motives  . T C I: T S F  . The Relation between the Formulations  . Statements of the Second Formulation  . Duties of Justice and Duties of Virtue  . What Is Humanity?  . The Negative Interpretation  . The Positive Interpretation  . Conclusion: Remarks on Groundwork II:– (–)  [  ]         . T C I: T T F  . Gaining Entry for the Moral Law  . The Formulation of Autonomy and Its Interpretation  . The Supremacy of Reason  . The Realm of Ends  . Bringing the Moral Law Nearer to Intuition  . What Is the Analogy?  . T P  R   O   M L  . Introduction  . The First Three of Six Conceptions of the Good  . The Second Three Conceptions of the Good  . Autonomy and Heteronomy  . The Priority of Right  . A Note on True Human Needs  . M C  . Rational Intuitionism: A Final Look  . Kant’s Moral Constructivism  . The Constructivist Procedure  . An Observation and an Objection  . Two Conceptions of Objectivity  . The Categorical Imperative: In What Way Synthetic A Priori?  . T F  R  . Introduction  . The First Fact of Reason Passage  . The Second Passage: §§– of Chapter I of the Analytic  . The Third Passage: Appendix I to Analytic I, Paragraphs –  . Why Kant Might Have Abandoned a Deduction for the Moral Law  . What Kind of Authentication Does the Moral Law Have?  . The Fifth and Sixth Fact of Reason Passages  . Conclusion  [  ]         . T M L   L  F  . Concluding Remarks on Constructivism and Due Reflection  . The Two Points of View  . Kant’s Opposition to Leibniz on Freedom  . Absolute Spontaneity  . The Moral Law as a Law of Freedom  . The Ideas of Freedom  . Conclusion  . T M P  R, B I  . The Three Predispositions  . The Free Power of Choice  . The Rational Representation of the Origin of Evil  . The Manichean Moral Psychology  . The Roots of Moral Motivation in Our Person  . T U  R  . The Practical Point of View  . The Realm of Ends as Object of the Moral Law  . The Highest Good as Object of the Moral Law  . The Postulates of Vernunftglaube  . The Content of Reasonable Faith  . The Unity of Reason  H . H R  . Introduction  . Philosophy as Reconciliation  . The Free Will  . Private Property  . Civil Society  . E L  L  . Sittlichkeit: The Account of Duty  . Sittlichkeit: The State  [  ]         . Sittlichkeit: War and Peace  . A Third Alternative  . Hegel’s Legacy as a Critic of Liberalism  A: C O  I  [  ]