Learning from Accidents This book has been written to remember the dead and injured and to warn the living Learning from Accidents Third edition Trevor Kletz OBE, DSc, FEng, FRSC, FIChemE OXFORD AUCKLAND BOSTON JOHANNESBURG MELBOURNE NEWDELHI Butterworth-Heinemann An imprint of Gulf Professional Publishing Linacre House, Jordan Hill, Oxford OX2 8DP 225 Wildwood Avenue, Woburn, MA 01801-2041 A division of Reed Educational and Professional Publishing Ltd A member of the Reed Elsevier plc group First published as Learning from Accidents in Industry1988 Reprinted 1990 Second edition 1994 Third edition 2001 © Trevor Kletz 2001 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced in any material form (including photocopying or storing in any medium by electronic means and whether or not transiently or incidentally to some other use of this publication) without the written permission of the copyright holder except in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 or under the terms of a licence issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency Ltd, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London, England W1P 0LP. Applications for the copyright holder’s written permission to reproduce any part of this publication should be addressed to the publishers British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Kletz, Trevor A. Learning from accidents. – 3rd ed. 1. Industrial accidents 2. Industrial accidents – Investigations 3. Chemical industry – Accidents I. Title 363.1'165 Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Kletz, Trevor A. Learning from accidents/Trevor Kletz. – 3rd ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0 7506 4883 X 1. Chemical industry – Accidents. 2. Industrial accidents. 3. Industrial accidents – Investigation. HD7269.C45 K43 2001 363.11'65–dc21 2001035380 ISBN 0 7506 4883 X For information on all Butterworth-Heinemann publications visit our website at www.bh.com Composition by Scribe Design, Gillingham, Kent Printed and bound in Great Britain by Biddles of Guildford and Kings Lynn Contents Forethoughts vii Preface ix Acknowledgements xii Introduction 1 1 Two simple incidents 13 2 Protective system failure 22 3 Poor procedures and poor management 32 4 A gas leak and explosion – The hazards of insularity 40 5 A liquid leak and fire and the hazards of amateurism 52 6 A tank explosion – The hazards of optional extras 63 7 Another tank explosion – The hazards of modification and ignorance 73 8 Flixborough 83 9 Seveso 103 10 Bhopal 110 11 Three Mile Island 122 12 Chernobyl 135 13 Aberfan 146 14 Missing recommendations 155 15 Three weeks in a works 162 16 Pipe failures 179 17 Piper Alpha 196 18 The King’s Cross underground railway station fire 207 19 Clapham Junction – Every sort of human error 216 20 Herald of Free Enterprise 226 21 Some aviation accidents 234 22 Invisible hazards 253 23 Signals passed at danger 259 24 Longford: the hazards of following fashions 267 25 The Gresford Colliery explosion 275 26 Green intention, red result 281 27 Looking beyond violations 291 vi Contents 28 Keeping an open mind 297 29 Secondhand software: the Therac story 303 30 Conclusions 308 Appendix 1 325 Appendix 2 328 Appendix 3 335 Afterthought 336 Index 337 Forethoughts It is the success of engineering which holds back the growth of engineering knowledge, and its failures which provide the seeds for its future development. D. I. Blockley and J. R. Henderson, Proc. Inst. Civ. Eng. Part 1, Vol. 68, Nov. 1980, p. 719. What has happened before will happen again. What has been done before will be done again. There is nothing new in the whole world. Ecclesiastes, 1, 9 (Good News Bible). What worries me is that I may not have seen the past here – perhaps I have seen the future. Elie Wiesel Below, distant, the roaring courtiers rise to their feet – less shocked than irate. Salome has dropped the seventh veil and they’ve discovered there are eight. Danny Abse, Way out in the Centre. ...But if so great desire Moves you to hear the tale of our disasters Briefly recalled... However I may shudder at the memory And shrink again in grief, let me begin. Virgil, The Aeneid. I realised that there is no rocket science in this. Improving safety can be quite simplistic if we go back to basics and not overcomplicate the processes we use. Comment made by a supervisor after I had described some accidents. Preface I would like to thank the companies where the accidents I have described occurred for letting me publicise their failures, so that others can learn from them, and the many colleagues with whom I have discussed these accidents and who made various comments, some emphasising the immediate causes and others the underlying ones. All were valuable. My colleagues – particularly those who attended the discussions described in Part 4 of the Introduction – are the real authors of this book. I am merely the amanuensis. Rabbi Judah the Prince (c. 135–217 AD) said, ‘Much have I learnt from my teachers, more from my colleagues and most of all from my students’. I do not always name the products made on the plants where the incidents occurred, partly to preserve their anonymity but also for another reason: If I said that an explosion occurred on a plant manufacturing acetone, readers who do not use acetone might be tempted to ignore that report. In fact, most of the recommendations apply to most plants, regard- less of the materials they handle. To misquote the well-known words of the poet John Donne, No plant is an Island, entire of itself; every plant is a piece of the Continent, a part of the main. Any plant’s loss diminishes us, because we are involved in the Industry; and therefore never send to know for whom the inquiry sitteth; it sitteth for thee. Descriptions of most of the accidents described in this book have appeared before but scattered throughout various publications, often in a different form. References are given at the end of each chapter and thanks are due to the original publishers for permission to quote from them. For the second and third editions I added chapters on some of the major incidents that had occurred since the first edition was written and I made some changes and additions to the original text. I retained the original chapter numbers, except that the last chapter is now number 30. I am x Preface grateful to Brian Appleton, one of the assessors at the Piper Alpha inquiry, for writing a chapter on that disaster. Since the first edition was published I have written a book with a rather similar title, Lessons from Disaster – How Organisations have No Memory and Accidents Recur (Institution of Chemical Engineers, 1993) but its theme is different. This book deals mainly with accident investigation and the need to look beyond the immediate technical causes for ways of avoid- ing the hazards and for weaknesses in the management system. The other book, as the sub-title indicates, shows how accidents are forgotten and then repeated, and suggests ways of improving the corporate memory. To avoid the clumsy phrases ‘he or she’ and ‘his or hers’ I have usually used ‘he’ or ‘his’. There has been a welcome increase in the number of women working in industry but the manager, designer or accident victim is still usually male. A note for American readers The term ‘plant manager’ is used in the UK sense to describe the first level of professional management, someone who would be known as a supervisor in most US companies. The person in charge of a site is called a works manager. A note on units I have used the units likely to be most familiar to the majority of my readers. Short lengths, such as pipeline sizes, are in inches and millimetres; longer lengths are usually in metres only (1 metre = 3.28 feet). Pressures are in pounds force per square inch (psi) and bars (1bar = 100 kilopascals and is also almost exactly 1 atmosphere and 1 kilogram per square centimetre). Masses are in kilograms or metric tonnes (1 metric tonne = 1.10 short [US] tons or 0.98 long [UK] tons). Volumes are in cubic metres (1m3 = 264 US gallons or 220 imperial gallons or 35.3 cubic feet). Temperatures are in degrees Celsius (°C). A note on the organisation of maintenance in the process industries A note on this subject may be helpful to readers from other industries. In most process industry factories, including oil refineries and chemical works, there is a dual organisation. One stream of managers, foremen and operators are responsible for running the process while another stream of
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