Law As Passion: Systems Theory And Constitutional Theory In Peripheral Modernity PDF
Preview Law As Passion: Systems Theory And Constitutional Theory In Peripheral Modernity
Miguel Nogueira de Brito Carina Calabria Fábio Portela L. Almeida Editors Law as Passion Systems Theory and Constitutional Theory in Peripheral Modernity Law as Passion (cid:129) (cid:129) Miguel Nogueira de Brito Carina Calabria á F bio Portela L. Almeida Editors Law as Passion Systems Theory and Constitutional Theory in Peripheral Modernity Editors MiguelNogueiradeBrito CarinaCalabria FacultyofLaw FacultyofLaw LisbonUniversity FederalUniversityofPernambuco Lisbon,Portugal Recife,Brazil FábioPortelaL.Almeida BrazilianSuperiorLaborCourt Brasília(DF),Brazil ISBN978-3-030-63500-8 ISBN978-3-030-63501-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-63501-5 ©TheEditor(s)(ifapplicable)andTheAuthor(s),underexclusivelicensetoSpringerNatureSwitzerland AG2021 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsaresolelyandexclusivelylicensedbythePublisher,whether thewholeorpartofthematerialisconcerned,specificallytherightsoftranslation,reprinting,reuseof illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similarordissimilarmethodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped. 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Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:Gewerbestrasse11,6330Cham,Switzerland Foreword: Marcelo Neves Between Hydra and Hercules MarceloNevesgaveanimpressiveanalysisofthedevelopmentof“constitutionand positivity of law in peripheral modernity”1 in his dissertation more than 30 years ago. I had the honour and the pleasure to be his supervisor at the University of Bremen at that time. The final step in a wonderful and productive process of cooperation was the thesis defence which turned into a very lively discussion with the late Niklas Luhmann, who appreciated Marcelo’s work very much. One may assume with good reasons that Marcelo has provoked more attention to the now named“globalsouth”inLuhmann’swork.Onseveraloccasions,Luhmannreferred to the book that was based on Marcelo’s dissertation. There are no less than five quotations in Luhmann’s opus maximum on the “Law as a Social System”.2 The defence—whichwasnotreallyadefenceagainstcriticismbecausethejurywasfull of sympathy with Marcelo’s work—brought to light a hitherto hidden trait: Marcelo’s conviviality! I think the whole of the Brazilian community of Bremen and its surroundings showed up at this event! I think there were more than 50Braziliansintheroomwhichwastoosmallandthereforethelocationhadtobe changed.Theywereapparentlynotallacademicsbutallofthemhadthefeelingthat Marcelowasaheroandthathefoughtforacommoncause.Intheend,therewasa warmapplauseforMarcelo.Thiswasauniqueintellectualevent—veryseriousand very academic, very concentrated, very well-argued—and at the same time full of passion that touched also the non-academic audience: There was something in the air!Inthisrespect,itisperhapsapitythatMarcelo’spoliticalcareer,hisrun-offfor thepositionoftheBrazilianSenate,hascometoanearlyend—thoughhisacademic friends have taken this political defeat with a smile in one eye. (Having seen his video that presented him as “Senador dos seus direitos” I would have voted for Marcelo!) 1NevesM(1992)VerfassungundPositivitätdesRechtsinderperipherenModerne,Duncker& Humblot,Berlin. 2LuhmannN(2008)LawasaSocialSystem,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford. v vi Foreword:MarceloNevesBetweenHydraandHercules ThisbringsusbacktoMarceloNeves’sideasaboutaspecificversionofsystems theory for the global south, the incomplete autonomization of the legal system as opposed to the political system, and the code of power on the one hand and the autonomization of the economic system vis-à-vis both the political and the legal systemontheother.Thisleadstodifferentdirectorindirecteffectsofcorruptionand asaconsequenceasortofunstableandincalculable“oscillation”betweenlegaland economic or political “supplements” of legal decision-making. In his work on “symbolic constitutionalization”, Marcelo has developed the idea that against the background of missing differentiation of the legal and the political system, the process of constitutionalization might end up in a shift of responsibility for social reforms to the judiciary instead of parliament.3 Why is this interesting at all? Becausetheconstitutionhasalsobeeninthepastofsymbolicvalueonly. The Constitution of Brazil which is thesecond longestin the world (behind the constitution of Alabama) contains an impressive number of civil rights. However, the emergence of conflicts between these civil rights is obvious. It has led to the implementationof“balancing”asthefavouritemethodintothejurisprudenceofthe Supremo Tribunal Federal that acts also as constitutional court. At first sight, this newapproachhasapparentlyincreasinglyshiftedtothebackgroundtraditionaltext- based approaches to constitutional interpretation. A certain enthusiasm about the possibility of a more active concretization of the constitution came to the fore.4 Conflicting civil rights in particular were regarded as demanding a process of balancing between different open “principles”5 which at the same time promised tobemoreopentowardstheobservationandreconstructionoftherealcoreofsocial conflicts. However, one of the (many) drawbacks of “balancing” is the idea that constitutionallaw infact isa judge-made practice ofreflectionof“reality” andthe future-oriented design of just solutions for social problems.6 The traditional approachoflegalinterpretationofthelawastextissaidtobemorefocusedonthe reconstructionofthemeaningoflawasasetof“rules”thathavebeenformulatedin thepastandareintended tobuildastablebridgebetweenthepastandthepresent. (This is why constitutions have not been regarded as being applicable law in the stricter sense in the past). Legal conceptuality seems to be regarded as oriented towardsthepreservationofthesocialorderofthepastoratleasttoslowdownthe dynamicprocessofthereproductionoflegalpractice.Traditionalinterpretationdoes notonly drawontheassumptionofastable normativitybutitincludesalegaland socialepistemology: Experience astheknowledge basis ofthe“societyofindivid- uals”isregardedasthecognitiveparadigmthathelpsunderstandthelegalconcepts 3Neves M (1998) Symbolische Konstitutionalisierung, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, p. 90f.; Herzog,433. 4BarrosoLR(2017)AJudicializaçãodavidaeopapeldoSupremoTribunalFederal,Fórum,Belo Horizonte. 5AlexyR(2008)ATheoryofConstitutionalRights,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,pp.44etsq. 6Barroso LR, Barcellos AP (2006) O começo da história: A nova interpretação e o papel dos princípiosdedireitobrasileiro.In:BarrosoLR(ed)Anovainterpretaçãoconstitucional,Renovar, RiodeJaneiro,3rded,p.327. Foreword:MarceloNevesBetweenHydraandHercules vii andservesastherepertoryofpracticalpatternsofbehaviourastheycanbeobserved inthepracticeandthelife-worldsofindividuals.Becauseofthiscloselinkbetween legalnormsassetbytheparliamentasthepoliticalrepresentativeofthepeople(the individuals)andthepeopleasthesocietyoftheindividualsasbeingbythemselves the source of a complex social infrastructure of legal norms, from the end of the nineteenth century until the 50s of the twentieth century, the constitution did not have much practical impact on the legal order of society. The American “Originalism” as the privileged method of interpretation of conservative judges tries to preserve this close link between the society of individuals and political societybyprojectingthespontaneousharmonyofthepastintoacompletelychanged society.Itisonlyfromthe50softhelastcenturyonwardsthatanincreasingnumber ofcasesraiseproblemsofcivilrightsintheAmericanSupremeCourt.Mostcasesin which freedomof thepress had beenat stake inthe past havebeendecided onthe basisofcommonlaw.Andtheclaimsconcerningseveremeasuresagainstfreedom ofopinionofanarchistsoraliensintimesofwarandpoliticaltensionhaveallbeen rejected by the Supreme Court. In Germany, there has been no reference to civil rights in the court practice of the Prussian High Court of Administration (Preußisches Oberverwaltungsgericht) at all. In the jurisprudence of the Reichsgericht(civillawcases),therewereonlyafew,however,importantreferences totheconstitutionalprotectionofpropertyandprotectionoftraditionalvestedrights, whereassocialrightsweretakentobeamerepoliticalprogramme.However,thisis an interesting phenomenon because it demonstrates the emerging possibility of a rupture between the conservative and the more liberal or social democratic groups both ofwhich formed the elite ofthe Weimar Republic. “Rights” were claimed by those parts of the elite whose position had been undermined by the new political order. MarceloNevesalsogetsinvolvedinamoreconcreteandpracticalconstructionof theconstitution.Thisdevelopmenthasalsoshedsomelightontheideaof“symbolic constitutionalization”:Itsbeingopposedtothetraditionalmorestaticversionofthe symbolic value of the constitution of the past “symbolic constitutionalization” indicates a reaction to a social dynamic that might bring forward political claims basedoncivilrights.Inaway,thisphenomenonisacknowledgedbytheconstitution thoughitisnotactivelyfueledbyaconcretizationofcivilrightsasMarceloNeves mentions.The“symbolicconstitutionalization”thereforeisanambivalentphenom- enon, and at the very least it differs from the more static ideas about the symbolic valueoftheconstitutionofthepast. Marcelo’s rather pessimistic outlook in both “Symbolische Konstitutionalisierung” and “Verfassung und Positivität” is later, in his book on “Transconstitutionalism”, superseded by a less gloomy perspective on a constitu- tionaldynamicthattendstoahigherdegreeofconstitutionalcommitmentandthus toovercomethemissingpracticeofconcretizationofcivilrights.Whyshouldthisbe possible? The answer lies in a reinterpretation of constitutionalism as a dynamic legalpracticethattranscendsthearenaofthestateandtheelitesthatareaggregated in a closed realm of groups and organizations that form the infrastructure of the State. This evolution expands over different layers and networks of viii Foreword:MarceloNevesBetweenHydraandHercules interrelationshipsthatmakeupthenewfracturedorder.Itfindsitsrepercussionboth withinthesocietyofthenationstateandbeyond.Increasingly,theriseofpractical normsthetransnationalcooperationamongdifferenttypesofprivateactorssuchas the new stateless global lex mercatoria, laws of sports, the self-regulation of the internet, and international standard setting by private actors (such as accounting rules) whose needs cannot be satisfied by international private law alone, has provoked the creation of new forms of arbitration beyond state-based courts. This includesachallengetotheterritorialityoflawandfinallyofconstitutionsgenerally. Howaboutconstitutionallawinthedomainoftransnationallegalcooperation?The increasing dynamic in both the “global north” and the “global south” shatters both the institutional arrangements of constitutional non-action as in the regimes of “symbolic constitutionalism” and the institutions of the traditional group-based pluralism of the social state that had been established after the Second World War intheglobalnorthandwhichhadbeenprecededbythe“NewDeal”intheUSA.The statehastakenamoreactiveroleinregulatingtheeconomyandinsocialdemocratic policies of redistribution. The latter development obviously had an impact on the interpretationofcivilrights:Inmyview,“balancing”7istheapproachtocivilrights under the paradigm of the “society of organizations”. A structured conceptual interrelationship between rights and the emerging knowledge bases has to be constructed. “Balancing” cannot just be reduced to a method or argument that is morefine-tunedto“reality”,but“reality”strikesbackinahybridformandimposes constraints on the normative methods of “argumentation”: Reality has become a movingtarget,i.e.theconstitutionempowersindividualsandorganizationtochange realityanddevelopsocialnormsandpatternsofbehaviourthattakeonalegalvalue of their own because society is transformed by legal operations, and this evolution hasalegalimpactonthelawandalsoonconstitutions.Thismeansthattheapproach that is presented here is not just due to a sociological observation of law from the outside but wants the judge to make use of the normative value of practical experience that has been generated from the “enactment” of civil rights—through the action of the subjects of these rights. Facticity and Normativity are entangled.8 Gunther Teubner has developed a somewhat different conception of “societal constitutional constitutionalism and globalization”9 that intends to overcome the hithertoexisting“state-and-politics-centricity”oftraditionalconstitutionalism.10His approachattributesa“pouvoirconstituant”alsotosocietal“regimes”thatareableto generateareflectivepotentialtoobserveandself-regulatetheirinternalorderasan autonomous legal constitution, a “constitutional fragment”. I cannot dwell on the intricaciesofthisapproachindetail.However,theideaofattributingconstitutional 7Cf. for a critique see the contributions in: Campos R (2016) Crítica da ponderação: Método constitucionalentreadogmáticajurídicaeateoriasocial,Saraiva,SãoPaulo. 8AugsbergI(2020)DieNormalitätderNormativität.Juristenzeitung75:425–431. 9Thisisthesubtitleofhisbook:TeubnerG(2013)ConstitutionalFragments:SocietalConstitu- tionalismandGlobalization.OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford. 10Teubner,ibid.,p.3. Foreword:MarceloNevesBetweenHydraandHercules ix valuetoautonomoussocietalnormsisfascinating.Iwouldnotgosofarasputting societal rules on a par with state-based positive constitutional law. Instead, I think one should in fact regard the collective trans-subjective effects emerging from interactionsoflegalsubjects—organizedandindividual—asbeingpersistenteffects of the use of civil rights, e.g. freedom of opinion. The relationship between public and private, the practice of political comedy, literary controversies, docu-dramas, etc., createasense ofwhatisregardedas“normal”:The“normal”isnotseparated fromthenormativebyaChinesewall. The subjects participate in what Vincent Descombes has named the “pouvoir instituant” (from below as opposed to the “pouvoir constituant” from above), the “socialfabric” for example of public opinion which is based on anonymous trans- subjectiveprocesses.Fromthosecollectivepracticesofinteraction“onbehalf”ofa civilrightemergepatternsofactionorsocialnorms11thathaveanormativequality oftheirown,andassuchhavetobeprotectedaspartoftherighttomakeuseofthe freedom of opinion. Reality is not an unstructured accumulation of “facts”. When deciding on a case that raises the question of the limits of freedom of opinion, the judgetakesovertheroleofamoderatorwhotriestosetupanexperimentalapproach thatleadstoahybriddecision:itismoreaconflictofnormsthatisreconstructedand “reframed”withinaperspectiveonthedevelopmentofa“commonpolicy”thatdoes justicetoprivateandpublicnormativity.12 Could not the challenge of cooperation and coordination between spontaneous practiceandorganizedsocialnormsgeneratedfromthecollectiveuseofcivilrights alsobeacasefor“transconstitutionalism”?Heretoo,anormativitybeyondthestate comesintoview... In “Entre Hidra e Hércules”, Marcelo has taken the view that principles cannot justbe“optimized”insteadofallowingforan“application”ofnormstofacts,butin principlehehasacceptedthedifferencebetween“rules”and“principles”. Thefarspreadmethodof“balancing”rightsasabalancingofinterestsjustadapts theformof“right”tosetsofsituationsinsteadoftraditionaltypesofactionstakenby individuals that was the privileged mode of construction of the “realm of rights”. Under these preconditions, “balancing” itself is doomed to end up in arbitrary singular judgments13, even in spite of the claim to rationality of the protagonists ofthismethod. 11DescombesV(2004)LeComplémentdesujet,Gallimard,NRFEssays,Paris,pp.429ff.;cf.also VestingT(2018)Staatstheorie:EinStudienbuch,BeckC.H.,Munich. 12Cf.fortheroleofa“commonpatentpolicy”ofinternationalorganizationsininternationalprivate lawconcerningtheprotectionofintellectualpropertyseeCalconnect,acommunityofdevelopers, etc.ofcollaborativetoolsforcommunication:https://www.calconnect.org/search/node/common% 20patent%20policy. 13MarceloNeves,EntreHidraeHércules:Princípioseregrasconstitucionais,SãoPaulo,p.194; Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale LJ (1987); Moshe Cohen-Eliya/IddoPorat,AmericanBalancingandGermanProportionalityI-CON8(2010),263; cf.Karl-HeinzLadeur,ACritiqueofBalancingandthePrincipleofProportionalityinConstitu- tionalLaw–ACaseforImpersonalRights?,7TransnationalLegalTheory7(2016),228. x Foreword:MarceloNevesBetweenHydraandHercules Balancing to a large extent broadens the perspective on individual rights by including established institutions of the “group state” into the cooperative process of interpreting and shaping civil rights, which is the core of “balancing”. For example, the press and its professional rules and practices of producing media are taken into consideration when it comes to define the freedom of the press or of broadcasting. Group rights of employers’ associations, trade unions, and churches areincludedintotherangeofsubjectsofrights.Thereachofindividualrightsinthe “global north” is expanded beyond the hitherto limited understanding as the guar- anteeofactionpotentialssuchastoincludepreconditionsofactionintothereachof rights. The reverse side of this evolution consists again in reinforcing the role of balancing,becauseifsomanyrightsareexpandedandnewrightscreatedtherewill alsobemoreconflictsofrightswhichneed“balancing”—thatis:theystrengthenthe role of the state as the moderator. “Balancing” undertakes the “grouping” of situa- tionsinwhichaclashofinterestsemerges. Inmyview,“transconstitutionalism”14istheoutcomeofareactiontothelimitsof this type of balancing within the nation state, which of course was different in the states of the “global south”. “Balancing” is so popular because it is extremely flexible: it includes an epistemology that shapes the “Sachverhalt” (the structuring of the conflicting interests) in a perspective that “smoothens” interests in order to “prepare”themforbalancingandcoordination.Whatdoesnotfitintothismodeof “constructing”interestsissetaside.Thecomplexityofintereststhatcanbesubjectto balancing is rather low: if the conflict is too complex, it no longer fits into the machinery of balancing. However, both within the nation state and beyond, a new complexity comes to the fore that does not lend itself to “balancing” in the established way which presupposes the state as the moderator. The interests of poor people, for example, do not fit well into the scheme of balancing. “Social rights” do not lend themselves easily to balancing because they tend to require a muchmorecomplexrestructuringofpublicpoliciesandofcoursethestatebudget. “Transconstitutionalism”isaproductoftheideathatnewlinesofhybrid,asymmet- ricconstellationsofrightsandinterestscometotheforethatneedanewconstruction ofmorecomplex“regimes”thatopenthemselvestowardsprocessesofa“diagonal” interoperation between heterogeneous rules (e.g. a weak law on environmental protection in a country of the “global south” and the constitutional requirements of environmental protection in a state of the “global north”). In this example, why not expand the latter to the transnational relationship of a big firm from the “globalnorth”toafirmorthestateinthe“globalsouth”andquestionthelimitsof the territoriality of law if the environmental law is too weak or only badly implemented?15 14Oxford2013. 15Ladeur KH, Viellechner L (2008) Die transnationale Expansion staatlicher Grundrechte. Zur Konstitutionalisierung globaler Privatrechtsregimes. Archiv des Völkerrechts 46 (1):42–73, atp.46.
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